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 iv Abstract			Using	the	framework	of	multi-speed	membership,	this	thesis	explores	party	membership	and	party	organisational	change.	It	does	so	within	a	single	party	case	study,	the	British	Labour	Party:	a	party	that	has	made	significant	changes	to	its	membership	model	in	the	period	of	analysis	(2011-2018).	This	party	provides	a	critical	case	within	which	to	explore	and	expand	our	understanding	of	membership	and	membership	change.		The	case	study	takes	both	a	demand-side	(elite)	and	supply-side	(members)	approach	in	order	to	understand	both	the	causes	and	consequences	of	multi-speed	membership	change.	On	the	demand	side,	the	question	of	‘why	change?’	is	answered	by	developing	a	multi-level	model	of	party	change,	a	model	appropriate	to	the	idea	of	multi-speed	membership.	This	framework	not	only	facilitates	a	broad	exploration	of	party	change	but	demonstrates	the	value	of	a	multi-level,	interactive	model	which	accounts	for	the	role	of	party	actors	in	shaping	change	as	well	as	responding	to	it.		The	supply-side	analysis	explores	the	nature	of	party	membership	and	the	relationships	between	members	and	their	party.	This	member-centred	approach	reveals	the	dynamics	in	this	relationship:	the	processes	that	lead	to	joining,	what	happens	after	joining,	and	how	and	when	the	relationship	sometimes	ends.	In	taking	this	approach,	new	concepts	and	categories	for	understanding	party	membership	are	developed.	These	conceptual	developments	suggest	a	path	towards	solving	some	of	the	puzzles	of	party	membership,	such	as	why,	in	spite	of	significant	ideological	incongruence	and	dissatisfaction,	some	party	members	don’t	leave.		This	thesis	seeks	to	fill	the	qualitative	gap	in	party	membership	studies	applying	a	mixed-methods	approach	utilising	interviews,	document	analysis	and	participant	observation	within	a	single	critical	case	to	develop	a	comprehensive	picture	of	the	dynamics	of	party	membership	and	party	organisational	change.	This	in-depth	analysis	of	change	in	one	party	adds	to	our	general	understanding	of	party	membership,	party	membership	changes	and	their	consequences,	with	insights	that	can	be	applied	across	other	cases.				 	
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Chapter	1:	Introduction		
“The	difference	between	supporters	and	members	is	like	the	difference	between	
cohabitating	with	your	partner	and	marrying	someone.	I	think	it’s	a	personal	choice.	
It	doesn’t	make	your	relationship	any	less	valid.	It	doesn’t	mean	you	can’t	have	kids	
together	or	a	joint	account,	or	fight	over	the	dishes.	It	just	means	something	to	you.	
It’s	a	commitment	in	front	of	your	friends	and	family	that	demonstrates	that	this	is	a	
union	that	matters	to	you.	I	think	it’s	the	same	with	joining	the	party.”	(member,	>20	
years)	
	There	are	many	ways	of	defining	membership,	and	many	ways	of	supporting	a	party.	And	whilst	these	various	forms	of	support	can	be	quantified	in	terms	of	fees,	rules	and	rights,	this	leaves	the	significant	question	of	what	it	means	to	be	a	party	member,	and	of	what	party	membership	means	to	parties.	What	is	the	relationship	between	party	members	and	the	structures,	ideologies	and	organisation	of	the	parties	to	which	they	belong?		As	membership	of	organisations	go,	political	party	membership	is	strangely	hard	to	define.	It	is	often	seen	as	a	set	of	rights	obtained	through	the	payment	of	a	fee	but	there	is	also	the	question	of	activity:	whether	there	is	a	responsibility	to	participate	or	if	simply	paying	a	membership	fee	is	sufficient.	Members	could	be	defined	as	loosely	as	those	that	support	the	party	at	the	polls	and	in	campaigns.	Members	could	be	those	who	choose	the	party’s	candidates,	leader	and	policies.	And	if	non-members	can,	and	do,	engage	in	all	of	the	above	(whilst	some	members	do	none	of	these	things)	this	suggests	that	the	concept	of	membership	may	have	little	actual	significance.		History	shows	us	that	the	relationship	between	parties	and	their	members	can	be	a	difficult	one.	Members	are	sometimes	seen	as	a	strength,	sometimes	as	a	liability.	Yet	the	persistence	of	membership-based	organising	suggests	that	parties	continue	to	see	party	membership	as	essential:	that	it	is	necessary	for	the	functioning	of	the	party.	Whether	that	is	as	a	source	of	financial	support,	campaign	support,	or	as	a	source	of	political	legitimacy.	Such	is	the	relationship	between	parties	and	their	members	that	the	widespread	decline	in	party	membership	in	the	latter	half	of	the	last	century,	particularly	in	the	UK,	has	been	used	as	evidence	of	party	decline.	The	idea	that	party	membership	is	a	source	of	party	strength	is	well	entrenched.		This	relationship	between	party	strength	and	membership	support	suggests	that	to	understand	parties	we	need	to	understand	how	membership	is	structured	and	the	relationship	between	parties	and	their	members;	both	how	parties	view	membership	and	how	members	view	party	membership.	And	it	is	a	relationship	that	is	changing.	As	the	traditional	membership	model	loosens	and	expands,	wider,	more	open	supporter	
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structures	and	expanded	democratic	mechanisms	are	becoming	increasingly	common	in	political	parties.	Susan	Scarrow	(2015)	coins	the	term	‘multi-speed	membership’	to	describe	this	open	approach	to	engagement.	Multi-speed	parties	offer	new	ways	to	affiliate	with	the	party,	often	extending	traditionally	member-only	rights	such	as	leader	selection	ballots	to	these	affiliates.	In	doing	so,	multi-speed	parties	begin	to	blur	the	difference	between	membership	and	support.	Yet	the	multi-speed	membership	party	does	not	sacrifice	formal	membership	completely,	continuing	to	offer	formal	membership	options	and	attempting	to	attract	new	members	with	increased	rights	and	privileges.			The	concept	of	multi-speed	membership	provides	a	framework	for	understanding	membership	and	party	organisation	change.	It	is	a	place	from	which	to	assess	the	scale	of	change	within	political	parties	and	to	understand	the	direction	of	travel.	This	framework	gives	us	a	place	from	which	to	assess	the	full	implications	of	expanding	affiliation	and	intra-party	rights,	to	develop	our	understanding	of	this	model	of	organisation	and	in	doing	so,	expand	our	understanding	of	the	party-member	relationship	and	its	implications	for	organisational	strength.			Whilst	we	know	that	parties	are	adopting	affiliation	models	and	intra-party	rules	that	go	beyond	traditional	membership,	we	know	little	of	the	consequences,	and	much	less	about	the	impact	from	the	perspectives	of	the	members	themselves.	To	understand	exactly	why	these	changes	are	being	introduced	and	what	the	impact	is,	I	use	the	framework	of	multi-speed	organising	to	examine	their	introduction	and	impact	within	the	British	Labour	Party;	a	party	that	has	gone	beyond	the	traditional	membership	model	to	a	degree	not	seen	in	most	other	established	parties	in	the	UK,	analysing	this	change	from	an	explicitly	member-centred	viewpoint.			
1.1	 The	Labour	Party	and	multi-speed	membership:	2011-2018		In	2011	the	British	Labour	Party	formalised	a	move	to	expand	affiliation,	revising	the	party	rulebook	to	include	a	change	to	the	party’s	primary	clause.	This	change	made	explicit	the	role	of	non-member	supporters	in	contributing	to	achieving	the	party’s	primary	goals	of	developing	policy	and	achieving	office	for	its	representatives.	Clause	1	of	the	party’s	rule	book	was	amended	to	include	supporters	and	‘collective	action’.	The	new	rule	book	text	read:		 Clause	1.	3.	The	party	shall	bring	together	members	and	supporters	who	share	
its	values	to	develop	policies,	make	communities	stronger	through	collective	
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action	and	support,	and	promote	the	election	of	Labour	Party	representatives	at	
all	levels	of	the	democratic	process.		Following	this	change,	and	after	another	party-wide	consultation,	new	rules	for	leader	selections	were	approved	in	2014,	introducing	a	One	Member	One	Vote	(OMOV)	rule	which	would	also	allow	non-member	supporters	to	participate.	For	the	first	time	in	the	party’s	history,	by	paying	£3,	anyone	who	declared	support	for	the	party	could	register	to	have	an	equal	vote	on	its	future	leadership.			Whilst	the	Labour	Party	had	previously	included	affiliated	trade	union	members	as	part	of	the	Electoral	College	for	leadership	elections1,	this	expansion	in	political	rights	was	a	significant	departure.	It	is	perhaps	a	cruel	irony	that	after	a	long	battle	for	One	Member	One	Vote	(OMOV)	(Russell,	2005)	members	came	closer	to	these	rights	at	the	very	time	they	were	given	away	to	a	larger	group	of	more	loosely	attached	supporters.		The	first	leadership	contest	under	the	new	rules	in	2015	saw	a	significant	jump	in	party	affiliation	with	112,799	supporters	registering	and	paying	£3	to	vote	in	the	contest	as	well	as	148,182	affiliated	trade	union	members	opting-in.	A	year	later,	in	the	subsequent	leadership	election	which	again	allowed	supporters	to	register	to	receive	a	ballot	(though	under	stricter	rules	and	for	a	significantly	higher	cost	of	£25),	121,517	non-member	supporters	voted.	And	yet,	many	people	also	chose	to	join	the	party	as	full	members	during	this	period.	By	the	mid-point	of	2016,	the	party	reported	that	membership	stood	at	over	half	a	million	(McNicol,	2016),	up	from	around	190,000	in	the	period	2010-2014.			The	results	of	this	exceptional	experiment	in	expanding	intra-party	democratic	opportunities	in	the	party	are	well	documented	(Dorey	and	Denham,	2016;	Quinn,	2016);	the	grassroots	of	the	party	(which	now	included	members,	supporters	and	affiliated	trade	union	members	who	had	‘opted-in’)	elected	a	leader	who	barely	received	enough	nominations	from	his	parliamentary	colleagues	to	get	on	the	ballot.	The	vast	majority	of	supporters,	majority	of	trade	union	affiliates	and	nearly	a	majority	of	members	voted	for	a	left-wing	candidate	put	on	the	ballot	by	his	parliamentary	colleagues	(many	of	whom	voted	for	other	candidates)	in	order	to	‘widen	the	debate’	(Helm	and	Boffey,	2015)	without	expectation	of	a	serious	challenge.		
                                                          
1 The	2010	leadership	election	was	held	under	the	reformed	tripartite	Electoral	College	consisting	of	equal	thirds	of	the	vote	for	MPs	(incl.	MEPs),	individual	members	and	individual	levy	payers	of	affiliated	organisations.	MPs	retained	nomination	powers. 
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	The	year	immediately	following	the	first	leadership	election	under	the	new	rules	saw	greater	internal	conflict	and	tension	between	the	leadership,	members	and	party	elites	than	had	been	experienced	in	decades.	Senior	party	figures	suggested	the	party	had	seen	widespread	infiltration	from	far-left	groups,	some	local	parties	were	suspended	and	a	group	of	new	members	challenged	decisions	about	affiliation	rules	made	by	the	party’s	ruling	body,	the	National	Executive	Committee,	in	the	High	Court.		Following	a	vote	of	no	confidence	in	the	leader,	supported	by	172	members	of	the	Parliamentary	Labour	Party2,	a	second	leadership	election	was	held	in	2016.	In	defiance	of	the	Parliamentary	party,	the	leader	was	returned	to	the	leadership	of	the	party	by	the	majority	of	members,	supporters	and	trade	union	affiliates.	The	party’s	new	leader	found	himself	with	significant	support	amongst	the	grassroots	of	the	party,	the	size	of	which	had	been	boosted	by	a	surge	in	membership	and	support,	but	not	from	his	parliamentary	colleagues.			This	rapid	expansion	of	the	party’s	membership	and	support	base	raised	significant	funds	and	provided	the	party	with	a	substantial	volunteer	resource	to	draw	on;	a	resource	seen	as	helping	the	party	to	a	significant	vote	share	in	the	2017	General	Election.	The	Labour	Party	had	not	only	reversed	the	long-term	decline	in	party	membership	numbers	but	had	somehow	managed	to	do	this	whilst	at	the	same	time	introducing	new	rules	for	expanding	intra-party	democratic	rights;	an	expansion	in	rights	that	would	appear	to	reduce	the	value	of	the	membership	offer.		Alongside	this,	a	new	Labour	party	linked	organisation	with	a	membership	base	of	its	own	was	established	by	supporters	of	the	new	leader	in	order	to	‘build	on	the	energy	and	enthusiasm	generated	by	the	campaign’	(Momentum,	n.d.).	Momentum	was	the	successor	of	the	campaign	to	elect	Jeremy	Corbyn	as	leader	and	transformed	after	his	election	to	boast	150	local	groups,	23,000	members	and	200,000	supporters	(Momentum,	n.d.).	Having	come	through	internal	disagreements	between	its	leader	and	other	individuals	(Fisher	et	al.,	2016),	from	July	2017	Momentum	members	were	required	to	also	hold	membership	of	the	Labour	Party.	In	doing	so,	Momentum	moved	to	adopt	a	strategy	of	greater	integration	with	Labour	Party	structures,	with	six	Momentum	supported	
                                                          
2 A	large	majority	of	the	232	members	of	the	PLP	(including	the	Leader)	at	that	time. 
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candidates	elected	onto	the	National	Executive	Committee	and	its	leader	running	to	replace	the	party’s	General	Secretary	in	2018.			This	period	in	the	Labour	Party’s	history	is	significant	not	just	for	the	change	in	leadership	and	resulting	intra-party	battles,	but	for	the	changing	significance	of	party	membership	and	the	role	of	party	members	and	supporters.	The	party	membership	emerged	from	this	period	stronger	in	number	and	(being	the	new	party	leader’s	source	of	support)	more	influential.	The	new	party	leader	sought	to	increase	members’	role	within	party	structures,	launching	a	review	of	Labour	Party	democracy	which	includes	within	its	terms	of	reference	suggestions	for	ways	to	increase	the	policy	making	role	of	Constituency	Labour	Parties	(CLPs)	and	Party	Conference,	and	‘strengthening	the	involvement	and	participation	of	our	hundreds	of	thousands	of	new	members	in	constituency	parties	and	other	aspects	of	the	Party’s	work’	(Labour	Party,	2018).	Yet	it	can	hardly	be	said	that	the	party	elite	had	planned	such	a	transformation	in	the	party	when	the	new	rules	were	initially	ratified.		By	the	summer	of	2016,	a	year	after	losing	a	General	Election	and	six	years	on	from	holding	government	office,	the	Labour	Party	in	Britain	had	more	party	members	than	all	other	UK	political	parties	combined.		With	over	half	a	million	members,	the	party	had	nearly	tripled	the	number	of	members	it	had	prior	to	the	General	Election.	By	adopting	a	multi-speed	way	of	organising,	the	party	appeared	stronger,	but	also	transformed	in	ways	that	could	not	have	been	predicted.			By	adopting	a	model	of	open	affiliation	and	intra-party	democratic	rights,	the	Labour	Party	had	taken	a	significant	step	beyond	traditional	membership	organising;	a	step	into	a	form	of	membership	organising	not	usually	seen	in	traditional,	established	parties	like	Labour.	This	extraordinary	shift	in	the	party	(resulting	in	a	far	larger	membership,	a	new	leader,	and	a	considerable	campaigning	base)	is	a	highly	significant	period	in	the	Labour	party	and	also	presents	a	significant	opportunity	for	party	membership	studies.			It	is	a	period	in	Labour	Party	history	that	provides	a	unique	insight	into	changes	in	the	party	membership	environment,	party	responses	to	these	changes,	and	the	consequences	for	traditional	membership	organising,	participation	and	political	support.	It	is	therefore	to	the	British	Labour	Party	that	this	research	turns	in	order	to	better	understand	the	causes	and	consequences	of	multi-speed	membership.			
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1.2	 Understanding	the	consequences	of	multi-speed	membership:	a	gap	in	the	
literature			Political	parties	are	expanding	intra-party	democratic	rights	(Scarrow	et	al.,	2002;	Kenig,	2009;	Cross	and	Blais,	2012;	Cross	and	Katz,	2013;	Gauja,	2013;	Pilet	and	Cross,	2014;	Faucher,	2015;	Scarrow,	2015)	but	we	don’t	fully	know	why,	and	we	don’t	know	what	the	consequences	are.	There	is	an	assumption	that	parties	are	expanding	rights	in	order	to	increase	participation	and	attract	new	affiliates.	But	are	there	other	driving	factors?	And	are	these	aims	achieved	in	widening	participation	-	who	does	it	attract	and	what	is	the	impact	on	existing	members?	How	does	expanding	rights	change	the	dynamics	of	the	party?		Scarrow	suggests	there	is	a	conflict	when	intra-party	democratic	rights	are	expanded:	Parties	wishing	to	recruit	and	retain	members	might	be	advised	to	limit	intra-party	ballots	to	the	long-term	membership,	whilst	those	seeking	to	mobilise	a	wider	constituency	of	support	would	want	to	expand	them	(2015,	p.212).	These	political	rights	can	be	used	to	attract	new	affiliates	or	reward	and	encourage	member	loyalty,	but	not	both	at	the	same	time.	Moreover,	these	new	affiliation	changes	are	often	made	incrementally;	they	are	‘layered’	on	top	of	the	existing	structures	and	this	creates	new	organisational	tensions.	Such	change,	Scarrow	argues,	creates	uncertainty	about	the	‘normative	source	of	authority’	(p.211)	in	the	party.	Opening	party	rights	can	shift	who	the	party	is	responsive	to	and	can	empower	those	who	may	not	share	the	party’s	long-term	values.		In	terms	of	the	impacts	of	expanded	affiliation	and	intra-party	democratic	participation	on	membership,	the	multi-speed	model	raises	a	number	of	questions:	Is	there	necessarily	a	conflict	for	parties	pursuing	the	dual	multi-speed	membership	strategy	of	appealing	to	formal	members	as	well	as	loosely	affiliated	supporters?	Does	a	multi-speed	party	that	expands	political	rights	to	supporters	necessarily	sacrifice	member	loyalty?	If	pursuing	this	model	creates	tensions	between	types	of	affiliate,	where	and	how	are	those	tensions	felt?			Whilst	we	do	not	know	the	impact	of	these	specific	changes	on	members,	there	is	evidence	that	expanded	participation	has	significant	consequences	for	parties.	Open	forms	of	party	democracy	such	as	fully	open	primaries	have	been	shown	to	‘degrade’	the	status	of	member,	weakening	party	support	and	disempowering	the	leadership	(Rahat	and	Hazan,	2001)	as	well	as	eroding	party	cohesion	(Pennings	and	Hazan,	2001).	Greater	
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participation	does	not	necessarily	lead	to	increased	party	strength.	The	consequences	of	expanding	intra-party	democracy	are	potentially	damaging	not	simply	for	membership	but	for	the	cohesiveness	of	the	party.			The	success	of	multi-speed	membership	depends	on	the	impact	it	has	on	the	traditional	membership	structures	upon	which	it	sits:	on	the	effect	it	has	on	members	and	particularly	active	members	who	contribute	the	most	to	party	organisation.	Given	the	potential	risks	in	this	approach,	it	is	worth	exploring	why	parties	adopt	these	measures,	and	indeed	if	such	changes	are	always	intentional;	and	to	examine	in-depth	what	their	impact	is	on	party	membership	dynamics	and	consequently	on	party	cohesion,	organisational	capacity	and	strength.				
1.3	 A	Qualitative	approach:	the	supply	and	demand	of	party	membership	
	If	members	are	the	focus	of	parties’	organisational	changes,	then	it	is	members	who	hold	the	key	to	their	success	or	failure.	The	‘Cinderellas’	of	British	politics	(Seyd	and	Whiteley,	1992,	p.2),	the	‘stalwarts’,	‘footsoldiers’,	those	who	deliver	leaflets	in	the	rain,	take	minutes	at	branch	meetings,	return	campaign	spending	receipts,	campaign,	organise,	fund	and	support	the	party	in	a	myriad	of	unwaged	activities,	these	volunteers	still	hold	the	key	to	the	party’s	success	(particularly	within	the	Labour	Party	that	in	recent	years	has	relied	on	a	strong	ground	campaign	in	elections).	Yet	we	know	little	of	the	impact	of	multi-speed	change	from	the	perspective	of	members	themselves.		
Labour’s	experience	of	expanding	intra-party	plebiscitary	democracy	provides	a	unique	opportunity	to	gain	an	insight	into	the	impact	of	multi-speed	membership	on	party	members,	and	therefore	on	the	traditional	membership	model,	in	a	party	that	has	taken	multi-speed	membership	further	than	most.	And	it	is	through	the	eyes	of	these	members	that	this	research	analyses	the	impacts.			Membership	studies	to	date	have	tended	to	take	a	quantitative	approach.	In	doing	so,	the	specific	nature	of	the	member-party	relationship	is	missed.	We	have	a	two-dimensional	picture	of	the	party	member,	their	attitudes	and	activities.	But	we	don’t	know	what	party	membership	means	to	them,	the	processes	that	led	them	to	join,	the	ways	they	have	been	influenced	by	party	culture	and	practices,	how	they	see	themselves	and	the	party,	the	relationship	between	the	party	and	their	values,	and	how	far	this	relationship	can	stretch	before	it	breaks.		
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	This	qualitative	gap	in	party	membership	studies	means	we	are	missing	a	large	part	of	the	party	membership	picture.	Van	Haute	and	Gauja	(2015)	suggest	a	qualitative	approach	would	better	undercover	the	changing	nature	of	participation	within	parties,	arguing	that	the	survey	method	cannot	fully	grasp	“party	membership	as	a	relationship	or	dynamic	process	involving	both	a	demand	side	(parties)	and	a	supply	side	(members)”	(2015,	p.200).		To	see	the	dynamics	of	party	membership	(the	in-and-out,	how	party	members	move	between	active	and	inactive	support	and	why,	the	background	conditions	and	the	triggers	for	joining,	when	they	decide	to	leave	and	what	leads	them	to	do	so,	and	even	to	understand	why	they	don’t	leave	when	the	exit	arithmetic	suggests	they	should)	we	need	a	more	comprehensive	way	of	researching	party	membership.	A	qualitative	approach	allows	us	to	see	a	fuller	picture	of	party	membership	and	crucially	to	see	it	as	something	over	time,	something	that	can	develop	and	change,	and	which	is	part	of	a	broader	landscape	of	political	action	and	everyday	life.			This	approach	is	complimentary	to	the	wealth	of	surveys	that	have	developed	a	strong	picture	of	why	members	join	and	what	they	do.	Qualitative	analysis	fills	in	some	of	the	gaps	exploring	how	motivations	might	be	structured,	which	motivations	are	important	when,	and	how	motivations	might	change.	A	narrative	approach,	looking	at	membership	over	time,	also	allows	us	to	ask	not	just	what	members	do	and	why,	but	to	investigate	what	sustains	that	activity	and	how	members’	relationship	with	the	party	might	change.			Understanding	multi-speed	membership	fully	requires	a	comprehensive	understanding	of	the	relationship	between	members	and	their	party:	one	which	can	explore	not	just	the	reasons	party	members	give	for	their	membership	but	the	routes	they	took	to	the	party	and	how	that	relationship	developed	over	time.	This	depth	of	understanding	calls	for	a	qualitative	approach.				
1.4	 Research	question,	aims	and	approach	
	This	research	begins	with	two	fundamental	questions:	why	would	a	party	adopt	multi-speed	changes	to	membership	organisation	and,	what	are	the	consequences	of	doing	so?	In	other	words	(and	as	might	be	asked	by	those	in	the	party),	how	did	we	get	here,	and	
what	does	it	mean	for	the	party?		
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	By	pursuing	multi-speed	strategies,	parties	are	treading	a	fine	line,	balancing	extending	supporter	options	(often	with	incentives	attached)	with	trying	to	retain	the	commitment	and	loyalty	of	traditional	members.	For	such	parties,	success	depends	on	navigating	that	tightrope,	ensuring	an	increase	in	other	affiliates	(who	may	be	contributing	finances,	campaigning	resource	or	contributing	to	the	party	in	some	other	way)	does	not	lead	to	a	loss	of	traditional	membership	(or	loss	of	member	activity).	We	might	then	hypothesise	that	multi-speed	success	requires	members’,	and	particularly	committed	and	active	members’,	incentives	for	joining,	becoming	active	and	remaining	so,	to	be	unaffected.	In	short,	multi-speed	success	depends	on	leaving	the	dynamics	of	the	traditional	membership	model	largely	intact.			We	might	also	presume	that	success	demands,	to	some	extent,	that	parties’	expectations	when	introducing	such	measures	match	the	actual	impact.	If	a	party	sees	a	wider	support	base	as	an	essential	source	of	additional	funds,	did	the	returns	match	the	investments	(financial	or	otherwise)?	Alternatively,	if	the	aim	is	wider	legitimacy,	greater	linkage	benefits,	then	success	might	be	more	tightly	linked	to	supporter	participation,	and	types	of	participation.	If	a	party	sees	supporter	status	as	a	gateway	to	membership,	have	extended	affiliation	options	also	increased	membership	numbers?	A	party’s	aims	could	encompass	all	of	these	or	none.	And	indeed,	intentions	aren’t	always	met,	nor	are	they	immune	to	change.	Nevertheless,	the	consequences	of	change,	the	correspondence	between	what	is	intended	and	what	results,	are	a	relevant	measure	of	success.			Taking	both	a	supply-side	and	demand-side	approach,	this	thesis	examines	the	causes	and	consequences	of	party	membership	change	from	an	elite	and	a	party	member	perspective.	Using	the	British	Labour	Party	as	a	case	study	of	membership	change,	the	drivers	of	multi-speed	membership	reforms	and	their	impacts	on	the	traditional	membership	model	are	explored	in-depth	within	a	party	that	has	gone	further	towards	this	model	of	organising	than	most.	By	bringing	together	these	two	sides	of	the	multi-speed	equation,	this	thesis	provides	the	detailed	and	rounded	understanding	of	the	paths	to	organisational	change	and	impact	of	these	changes	on	the	grassroots	of	a	party,	that	has	been	missing	in	the	literature.	It	highlights	the	pitfalls	and	the	potential	benefits	and	offers	lessons	that	all	parties	considering	wider	affiliation	and	intra-party	democratic	rules	could	learn	from.			This	research	draws	on	unique	data	drawn	from	interviews	with	a	range	of	party	members	at	all	levels	of	the	organisation,	including	staff,	representatives	and	party	elites	
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during	a	period	of	significant	change	in	the	organisation.	These	interviews	were	conducted	during	this	critical	period	(between	2015	and	2018)	and	as	the	consequences	of	changes	to	affiliation	and	intra-party	rights	were	still	unfolding.	As	the	party	as	a	whole	sought	to	manage,	accommodate,	understand,	accept	or	reject	this	dramatic	shift	in	the	party,	these	interviews	explore	the	attitudes,	values,	responses	to	change,	and	opinions	of	members	who	would	be	considered	to	be	most	affected	by	the	shift	to	a	more	open	party	model.	The	research	focuses	on	members	who	were	or	had	been	highly	active	and	engaged	in	party	activity;	members	whose	connection	to	the	party	is	potentially	most	at	odds	with	the	new	models	of	organising	support	and	similarly,	those	whom	the	party	has	most	to	lose	by	alienating.			Members	who	provide	the	most	resource	to	the	party	are	a	good	place	to	start	to	examine	the	impact	of	multi-speed	membership.	By	exploring	the	attitudes	of	active	party	members,	this	research	adds	to	our	understanding	of	the	party-member	relationship	and	this	provides	a	basis	from	which	to	assess	the	impact	of	membership	change	and	consequences	for	the	party	as	organisation.	It	is	the	response	of	these	members,	their	willingness	to	accommodate	change	and	the	elasticity	in	their	relationship	with	the	party,	that	indicates	whether	the	multi-speed	strategy	has	successful	navigated	the	tightrope	of	expanding	the	organising	model	whilst	leaving	the	traditional	membership	dynamics	in	place.	This	analysis	also	suggests	what	the	longer-term	consequences	of	multi-speed	membership	might	be.			
1.5	 Thesis	structure	
 
Chapter	two	reviews	the	literature	on	party	membership	and	membership	organising.	Starting	with	the	decline	thesis,	this	section	considers	membership	in	the	context	of	party	organisation:	the	value	of	members	to	the	party	and	the	value	of	the	party	to	members.	The	literature	on	recent	changes	to	membership	and	affiliation	is	then	reviewed	and	the	multi-speed	membership	theory	(Scarrow,	2015)	introduced.			
Chapter	three	outlines	the	research	questions	and	research	design.	Here	I	set	out	how	the	characteristics	of	multi-speed	membership	will	be	specified.	I	separate	out	the	two	core	questions	of	the	research	(the	demand	side	(why),	and	the	supply	side	(consequences))	and	explain	how	these	two	different	perspectives	on	the	same	subject	have	been	researched.	I	detail	the	case	study	approach	employed	for	this	research	and	why	it	has	particular	utility	in	this	research	area.	I	specify	the	tools,	methods	and	analytical	
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approaches	(primary	and	secondary)	employed	in	answering	the	two	questions	(these	tools,	methods	and	analyses	differ	for	the	supply	and	demand	sides	of	the	question).	I	provide	details	of	the	interviewees,	interview	processes,	ethical	considerations,	strengths	and	limitations	of	the	research.			
Chapter	four	answers	the	first	research	question:	‘why	change’.	Drawing	from	the	literature	on	party	organisational	change,	I	construct	an	ecosystem	model	of	change	which	I	test	against	multi-speed	changes	within	the	Labour	party.	This	chapter	charts	the	changes	within	the	Labour	party	which	saw	the	party’s	rule	book	adapted	to	include	a	wider	model	of	affiliation	and	then	subsequently	saw	the	rules	for	leadership	selection	changed	to	include	supporters.	Given	that	multi-speed	membership	is	not	only	a	move	towards	supporters	but	also	a	retention	of	traditional	membership,	this	section	is	really	asking	both	‘why	change’	and	‘why	continuity’.	Using	this	ecosystem	model	of	change,	I	explore	the	possible	causal	factors	which	I	categorise	as	environmental	factors,	organisational	structures	and	party-type,	and	direct	‘purposive-action’	moments.	This	analysis	draws	on	classic	political	economy	explanations	relating	to	the	competitive	and	membership	environment	of	the	party;	party	type	explanations	relating	to	the	party’s	‘narratives	of	legitimacy’	and	structures;	and	‘purposive	action’	explanations	for	change	which	draw	on	elite	perceptions	and	key	moment	of	‘external	shock’.	This	chapter	concludes	with	an	analysis	of	the	most	influential	factors	in	the	Labour	case,	and	in	doing	so	not	only	provides	an	answer	to	the	question	of	‘why	change’	for	Labour	but	provides	a	model	framework	for	evaluating	multi-speed	change	in	other	parties.		
Chapter	five	begins	the	supply	side	analysis	which	considers	the	consequences	of	multi-speed	membership	from	the	member	perspective	and	therefore	the	consequences	of	this	strategy	for	the	dynamics	of	the	traditional	membership	model.	I	begin	by	considering	what	and	how	party	members	are	driven	to	join	up	and	become	active	for	the	party.	I	analyse	members’	joining	narratives	to	understand	the	processes	which	lead	them	to	party	membership.	From	this	analysis	I	conclude	which	factors	are	driving	members	to	join	the	party	and	how	these	motivations	are	structured.	This	analysis	also	reveals	aspects	of	party	culture	that	may	influence	members’	reconstructed	justifications	for	joining.	Joining	narratives	also	reveal	the	place	of	other	parties	within	members’	political	lives,	with	potentially	positive	implications	for	multi-speed	organising.			In	the	second	section	of	this	chapter,	I	analyse	members’	ongoing	relationship	with	the	party:	what	keeps	members	active	and	what	keeps	them	involved.	I	find	specific	processes	
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that	affect	member	activity	and	party	cohesion,	but	these	are	processes	that	may	have	negative	implications	for	multi-speed	organised	parties.	I	conclude	by	evaluating	what	these	member	dynamics	mean	for	parties	adopting	multi-speed	models.			
Chapter	six	considers	the	next	stage	of	party	membership:	why	party	members	leave	or	stay,	and	how	they	deal	with	change	within	the	party.	This	chapter	provides	answers	to	one	of	the	key	questions	for	multi-speed	organised	parties:	how	to	retain	member	loyalty	when	opening	the	party	to	non-member	supporters.	Using	Hirschman’s	trilogy	of	exit,	voice	and	loyalty,	I	analyse	member	interviews	to	provide	insights	into	member	exit	and	re-joining	and	reveal	the	factors	that	encourage	members	to	leave	or	to	stay.	First,	I	explore	exit,	considered	as	a	process	rather	than	a	single	decision	to	leave.	Looking	at	exit	as	a	process	shows	that	leaving	involves	not	just	a	final	decision	and	the	prompt	for	that	decision,	but	background	conditions	and	the	influence	of	structural	factors.	This	chapter	also	explores	‘discontent’	as	a	proxy	for	voice.	Finding	extensive	negative	opinions	of	the	party,	I	consider	the	main	reasons	for	discontent,	particularly	discontent	arising	from	ideological	incongruence	and	party	change.	I	consider	the	reasons	for	ideological	incongruence	and	how	members	rationalise	these	views.			In	the	final	section	of	this	chapter	I	explore	loyalty	understood	as	‘non-exit’.	I	explore	why	party	members	stay,	particularly	when	the	party	changes.	Here	I	develop	categories	for	understanding	party	member	‘misfits’:	those	who	remain	within	a	party	which	they	see	themselves	as	ideologically	apart	from.	I	provide	an	explanation	for	the	puzzle	of	member	misfits	based	on	the	relationship	members	have	with	their	party;	how	members	see	the	party	and	their	role	within	it.	I	conclude	by	evaluating	what	these	findings	suggest	for	the	multi-speed	organised	party.			
Chapter	seven	concludes	the	supply	side	analysis	of	multi-speed	membership	by	directly	addressing	the	question	of	how	party	members	feel	about	multi-speed	membership.	This	section	sets	out	what	members	felt	about	the	new	rules	for	leader	selection.	Here	I	analyse	whether	the	expected	tension	(suggested	by	the	dual	approach	of	expanding	rights	whilst	retaining	traditional	membership)	has	occurred,	and	if	so,	exactly	where	that	tension	is	being	felt.	First,	I	consider	members’	views	of	multi-speed	changes	in	terms	of	their	relationship	with	the	party,	their	expected	costs	and	value	calculations.	I	then	consider	the	expansion	of	political	rights	against	the	background	of	the	motivation	structures	established	in	chapter	five.	Finally,	I	consider	the	Labour	Party-specific	factors	which	may	
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influence	members’	reactions	to	this	change.	I	conclude	by	summarising	the	consequences	of	multi-speed	organising	within	the	Labour	Party.			
Chapter	eight	concludes	the	thesis	with	a	summary	of	the	key	findings	and	an	analysis	of	the	opportunities	for	success	with	multi-speed	organising,	drawing	on	the	experience	of	the	Labour	Party	case.	Whilst	there	are	factors	that	may	be	Labour	Party-specific,	there	are	many	areas	of	the	Labour	experience	which	will	have	relevance	for	other	parties	moving	towards	multi-speed	membership,	particularly	those	in	the	cleavage	party	model.	I	suggest	which	areas	should	be	a	cause	for	concern	and	which	areas	present	opportunities	for	multi-seed	organising.			This	thesis,	considering	both	the	supply	and	demand	side	pictures	of	multi-speed	membership,	within	a	single	case	study,	examines	the	introduction	of	multi-speed	membership	within	an	established	and	traditionally	cleavage-representation	type	party	and	in	doing	so	illuminates	the	difficulties,	and	potential	opportunities,	for	change	within	a	party	type	that	would	be	expected	to	struggle	most	with	multi-speed	change.			The	demand-side	analysis	sheds	light	on	the	reasons	parties	might	adopt	multi-speed	changes	and	what	they	may	be	expecting	in	doing	so	and	demonstrates	the	utility	of	a	multi-level	model	which	acknowledges	the	interactions	between	variables	and	recognises	the	way	individuals	shape	change	as	well	as	responding	to	it.			On	the	supply-side,	by	taking	a	qualitative	approach	to	members’	joining,	activity	and	exiting	behaviours	and	attitudes	this	research	reveals	previously	overlooked	elements	of	membership	and	provides	possible	answers	to	important	puzzles	of	party	membership:	why	party	members	continue	to	support	parties	that	they	feel	ideologically	distant	to	and	why	some	members	join	without	becoming	active	whilst	others	become	active	without	joining.			In	answering	these	puzzles	and	exploring	multi-speed	membership	change	in	depth	and	through	the	eyes	of	those	enacting	and	experiencing	the	change,	this	research	provides	a	unique	insight	into	multi-speed	membership	and	the	future	of	party	political	organisation.			 	
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Chapter	2:	Literature	Review	
 Party	membership	studies	have	begun	to	investigate	changes	to	party	membership	and	the	expansion	in	ways	citizens	can	connect	to	and	engage	in	party	activity.	This	emerging	area	of	research	suggests	that	whilst	individual,	formal	membership	is	declining,	this	does	not	directly	equate	to	a	decline	in	organisational	strength	or	legitimacy.	Parties	are	experimenting	with	expanding	membership	options,	creating	new	modes	of	affiliation,	and	are	increasingly	involving	a	wider	group	of	citizens	in	policy	development	and	candidate	selection.	This	alone	gives	us	reason	to	question	the	conclusions	drawn	from	member	decline	theories	as	it	is	not	only	those	connected	to	political	parties	by	traditional	obligations	and	privileges	that	engage	in	activity	within	and	for	the	party.	Understanding	the	change	in	how	parties	and	citizens	connect	is	fundamental	to	understanding	the	changing	shape	of	party	organisation.			
2.1	 Membership	decline?	
	The	dominant	literature	within	party	membership	studies	has	predominantly	emphasised	membership	decline.	Both	within-nation	and	cross-national	studies	of	European	democracies	have	shown	a	general	downward	trend	in	membership	numbers.	The	major	works	on	party	membership	in	European	democracies	(Katz	et	al.,	1992;	Mair	and	van	Biezen,	2001;	Van	Biezen	et	al.,	2012)	have	demonstrated	a	robust	and	consistent	trend	across	the	majority	of	European	democracies	(old	and	new)	of	long	term	decline	in	party	membership.	This	downward	trend	has	been	confirmed	by	more	recent	analyses	(Webb	and	Keith,	2017).	All	of	these	major	studies	analyse	both	absolute	membership	numbers	(M)	and	membership	as	a	ratio	of	the	electorate	(M/E).3		
	The	first	major	study	looking	at	membership	across	European	democracies4	from	1960-1980	(Katz	et.	al;	1992)	found	that	whilst	the	ratio	of	members	to	electorate	declined	in	eight	of	the	ten	countries	studied,	there	was	no	evidence	of	a	European-wide	collapse	in	total	numbers	of	party	members	(M).	The	decline	in	the	M/E	ratio	was,	they	argued,	a	
                                                          
3	The	M/E	measure	allows	for	cross-national	comparison	as	well	as	within	nation	comparison	whilst	absolute	numbers	can	only	tell	us	about	membership	number	decline	over	time.	Party	membership	can	also	be	measured	as	a	percentage	of	a	parties’	voters	(M/V)	but	this	has	limited	explanatory	power	as	an	increase	in	the	ratio	could	either	explain	an	increase	in	members	or	decrease	in	voters.	
4	Austria,	Belgium,	Denmark,	Finland,	Germany,	Ireland,	Italy,	Netherlands,	Norway,	Sweden,	UK.	
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result	of	increasing	numbers	of	electors	(in	part	due	to	the	extension	of	the	franchise	in	many	countries).	However,	the	UK,	Denmark	and	the	Netherlands	did	suffer	more	acute	decline,	finishing	the	period	of	analysis	with	no	more	than	a	third	of	the	members	they	started	with	(measured	as	M/E).	Denmark	and	the	UK	were,	they	noted,	exceptions	deserving	the	term	‘collapse’.	The	follow-up	to	this	study	looking	at	the	period	1980-1990	(Mair	and	Van	Biezen,	2001)	found	a	continuation	of	the	decline	in	the	M/E	ratio	but,	for	the	first	time,	a	decline	in	absolute	membership	numbers	(M)	as	well.	This	study	reviewed	20	European	democracies5	and	whilst	finding	a	significant	range	across	countries	(Poland,	France	and	the	UK	had	M/E	ratios	below	2%	whilst	Austria	recorded	17%),	concluded	that	the	1990s	had	witnessed,	‘the	first	substantial	and	consistent	aggregate	evidence	of	growing	disengagement	from	conventional	politics	across	Western	Europe’	(2001,	p.13).	Significantly,	thirteen	of	the	largest	democracies	were	‘simply	haemorrhaging	members’	(2001,	p.13).	This	trend	was	continued	into	the	2000s	with	a	large	majority	of	European	countries	experiencing	further	decline	on	1990s	levels	(Van	Biezen	et	al.,	2012).	In	this	study	of	twenty-seven	European	democracies6,	six	countries	had	M/E	ratios	of	less	than	2%	and	France	and	the	UK	were	found	to	have	lost	around	two-thirds	of	the	memberships	they	recorded	in	the	1980s.	In	the	most	recent	study	of	membership	ratios	(Webb	and	Keith,	2017),	only	Ireland	records	a	modest	increase	in	M/E	ratio;	all	others	confirm	the	picture	of	decline.			The	downward	trajectory	of	party	membership	(in	the	majority	of	cases)	is	both	consistent	and	strong,	if	not	entirely	uniform.	And	whilst	the	direction	of	these	figures	is	robust	enough	to	give	confidence	in	the	general	trend,	they	should	not	be	read	uncritically.	Party	membership	suffers	from	a	range	of	measurement	issues.	There	are	just	two	ways	to	measure	party	membership:	through	self-reported	party	membership	in	surveys	or	by	using	parties’	reported	figures.	The	former	is	open	to	measurement	error	owing	to	sample	size	and	relying	on	survey	participants’	understanding	of	party	membership	(Mair	and	Van	Biezen,	2001)	as	well	as	cross-survey	variations	in	question	wording	(Ponce	and	Scarrow,	2016);	the	latter	presents	different	problems.	Parties	have	not	always	kept	accurate	records.	Many	parties	registered	members	locally	and	in	a	more	ad	hoc	fashion	than	the	centralised,	national	lists	that	prevail	today	(Scarrow,	2015).	Parties	also	have	reason	to	inflate	their	membership	figures	as	they	provide	a	signal	of	the	party’s	strength	
                                                          
5	As	above	plus	Czech	Republic,	France,	Greece,	Hungary,	Poland,	Portugal,	Slovakia,	Spain,	Switzerland.		
6	As	before	plus	Cyprus,	Estonia,	Latvia,	Lithuania,	Bulgaria,	Romania	and	Slovenia.	
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and	popular	support.	In	the	2012	study,	Van	Biezen,	Mair	and	Poguntke	address	this	issue	by	using	European	Social	Survey	(ESS)	data	as	a	check	on	the	validity	of	the	party-reported	figures.	Whilst	reported	party	membership	is	slightly	higher	than	parties’	own	figures,	the	measures	co-vary	substantially.	Ponce	and	Scarrow	(2016)	overcome	the	instability	in	survey-based	self-reported	membership	figures	by	using	a	behaviourally-validated	membership	definition:	self-identified	party	members	who	are	active	outside	and/or	within	the	party.	This	measure	demonstrates	that	decline	in	membership	numbers	can	mask	a	substantial	amount	of	stability	in	active	party	political	participation.	These	refinements	in	measuring	party	membership	however,	do	serve	to	confirm	the	general	downward	trend	in	party	membership	across	Europe	since	the	mid-point	of	the	20th	Century.			Recent	studies	of	party	membership	have	however	challenged	the	decline	thesis.	By	considering	the	development	of	the	mass	party	prior	to	the	Second	World	War,	Scarrow	(2002,	2015)	demonstrates	that	the	mass	party	was	not	the	dominant	model	in	all	countries	in	the	first	half	of	the	20th	century.	In	fact,	only	a	limited	number	of	democratic	parties	were	organised	in	such	a	way.	Scarrow	argues	that	by	taking	the	mid-point	of	the	century	as	the	starting	point,	party	membership	decline	is	overstated;	the	amount	of	variation	across	countries	and	within	party	families	is	‘hard	to	reconcile	with	artificial	and	undifferentiated	invocations	of	the	former	age	of	mass	party	dominance’	(2015,	p.67).	Selle	and	Svåsand	(1991)	argue	that	rather	than	a	generalised	trend	in	party	membership	decline	across	Europe,	countries	fall	into	one	of	three	categories:	countries	in	which	major	parties’	memberships	have	declined,	those	in	which	party	membership	in	general	has	increased,	and	those	in	which	some	parties	have	increased	members	whilst	others	have	lost	them.		Kölln	(2016)	argues	that	by	aggregating	all	parties’	membership	data	within	a	country,	cross-national	analysis	has	overlooked	the	differences	between	parties	within	countries,	particularly	between	older	and	newer	parties.	Kölln	also	argues	that	by	taking	just	a	few	points	in	time,	the	data	masks	the	fluctuations	that	occur	in	between.	Taking	47	parties’	annual	reported	membership	between	1960	and	2010	(1653	observations),	Kölln	finds	that	23%	did	not	experience	membership	decline	during	this	period.	The	results	give	some	support	to	the	idea	that	the	more	established	parties	are,	the	greater	the	membership	loss,	with	data	showing	the	age	of	party	to	be	a	determinant	of	membership	decline.	This	is	consistent	with	Gauja	and	van	Haute’s	(2014)	analysis	which	highlights	the	recent	stabilisation	or	growth	in	membership	of	environmental,	regional,	new	and	far	right	
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parties	across	Europe	and	Paulis	et.	al.’s	(2017)	analysis	that	finds	nuances	in	membership	decline	according	to	party	family	and	age	of	the	party.			These	analyses	suggest	that	whilst	the	overall	direction	of	party	membership	numbers	is	undoubtedly	downwards,	there	may	be	more	to	party	membership	than	uniform	decline.	Evidence	of	variation	between	parties	and	countries	at	different	points	in	time	suggests	that	the	aggregate	downward	trend	may	be	masking	a	much	more	nuanced	picture.	This	picture	is	further	complicated	by	disparities	and	developments	in	the	definition	and	forms	of	party	membership.		
2.2	 What	is	party	membership?	Concept	and	definitions		
	Party	membership	is	a	flexible	concept	that	varies	across	countries,	between	parties,	and	within	them	over	time.	This	variety	in	membership	makes	cross-national	comparison	challenging	(Ponce	and	Scarrow,	2013).	The	major	works	cited	above	used	a	strict	direct	and	individual	membership	criteria	but	parties	have	other	affiliation	modes.	Heidar	(2006)	categorises	these	as:	individual	membership,	auxiliary	membership	(through	organisations	linked	within	the	party:	usually	youth,	women,	pensioners	groups),	and	collective	‘corporate’	membership	such	as	trade	union	affiliation.	The	range	of	party	attachments	creates	further	difficulties	in	comparing	and	assessing	membership	numbers.	For	instance,	parties	with	large	numbers	of	members	affiliated	through	other	bodies	(such	as	trade	unions)	have	often	reported	these	individuals	in	their	total	membership	numbers.			The	formal	modes	of	membership	affiliation	listed	above	would	define	party	membership	organisationally	by	members’	obligations	(such	as	paying	fees)	and	privileges	(such	as	voting	rights)	though	even	within	this	definition	there	is	considerable	variation	in	the	rules	covering	fees,	citizenship	requirements,	age	restrictions,	probationary	periods	and	exclusivity	(Gauja	and	van	Haute,	2014).	But	membership	can	also	be	defined	by	activity.	Duverger’s	(1959)	seminal	work	on	party	organisation	devoted	a	whole	chapter	to	the	various	forms	of	party	membership	and	affiliation,	and	the	levels	of	participation	they	entail.	For	Cross	and	Gauja	(2014),	membership	can	be	seen	as	‘a	concept	constructed	by	parties	and	one	that	can	be	used	and	manipulated	(in	terms	of	who	can	be	a	member	and	the	rights/duties	ascribed	to	members)	as	a	tool	to	achieve	a	party’s	goals’	(2014,	p.612).	Clearly	a	member/non-member	distinction	does	not	give	us	the	full	picture	of	party	affiliation.		
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2.3	 Party	organisation	and	change	
	The	analysis	of	party	membership	cannot	be	divorced	from	consideration	of	what	role	party	members	are	given	in	party	organisation:	what	they	bring	to	the	party,	what	parties	expect	from	them,	and	how	they	add	or	subtract	from	parties’	organisational	strength.	As	such,	party	membership	needs	to	be	considered	in	the	context	of	how	parties	organise	and	organisational	change.			The	pattern	of	parties’	adaptive	change	viewed	through	party	model	theories,	from	the	mass-party	model	Duverger	(1959)	through	the	catch-all	party	(Kirchheimer,	1966)	and	electoral	professional	model	(Panebianco,	1988)	to	Katz	and	Mair’s	cartel	party	model	(1995),	can	be	viewed	as	an	evolution	in	increasing	detachment	from	party	membership:	a	move	away	from	internally	focused	concern	with	party	members,	towards	outward	concern	with	voters	(Kirchheimer,	1966).	In	Duverger’s	mass	party	model,	parties	provided	the	platform	for	bringing	newly	enfranchised	populations	into	political	participation.	Parties	therefore	aspired	to	mass	membership	not	necessarily	in	number	but	in	their	structure	(1959,	p.63).	The	mass	party	provided	a	place	for	mobilisation	of	the	masses	of	new	potential	voters	along	interest-based	lines.	The	transition	to	a	catch-all	model	of	party	organisation	(Kirchheimer,	1966)	represents	a	move	from	depth	to	breadth	of	support.	In	this	mode	parties	try	to	appeal	to	the	widest	possible	base	rather	than	represent	their	members	as	a	socially	identified	group.	They	make	their	appeals	on	policy	rather	than	on	ideological	grounds	and	in	doing	so	weaken	the	relationship	with	members,	no	longer	articulating	their	(predominantly	class-based)	interests.	The	floating	voter	becomes	the	focus	instead	of	the	member,	and	leaders	are	responsive	to	the	wider	electorate	over	the	membership.			The	role	of	party	members	is	further	weakened	in	the	electoral-professional	model	(Panebianco,	1988)	with	members	replaced	by	professional	campaign	staff,	media	experts	and	pollsters	who	are	employed	to	run	campaigns;	once	the	work	of	local	party	members	and	local	party	organisation.	Whilst	the	electoral-professional	party	may	seek	to	increase	its	membership,	it	does	not	do	so	to	see	members	fill	the	roles	they	did	in	the	mass	party	model.	Member	roles	in	financing	the	party	and	contributing	to	policy	are	limited,	with	the	party	focusing	on	the	‘opinion	electorate’	over	the	‘electorate	of	belonging’.	Thus,	any	expansion	in	membership	in	this	model	is	likely	to	favour	a	passive	membership.		
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The	focus	on	inactive,	dispersed	membership	is	developed	in	the	cartel	party	model	(Katz	and	Mair,	1995),	in	which	the	party	member	has	greater	rights	exercised	through	individual	ballots,	but	must	also	share	these	rights	with	a	wider	group	of	supporters	as	the	‘distinction	between	party	members	and	non-members	becomes	blurred’	(Katz	and	Mair,	2009).	And	because	these	rights	are	exercised	through	ballots	rather	than	local	meetings,	members	are	less	able	to	organise	against	the	leadership	and	challenge	it.	The	cartel	party	gives	a	veneer	of	mass	support,	with	significant	rights	for	members,	whilst	strengthening	central	leadership.	The	party	member	is	connected	more	directly	to	the	central	office,	but	also	more	atomistically,	and	the	party	on	the	ground	is	increasingly	separated	from	the	party	in	office.			The	direction	of	these	adaptations	is	away	from	members	and	mass	participation.	Because	of	this,	moving	away	from	membership	has	often	been	characterized	as	party	decline	or	decay.	Yet	a	weakening	in	the	relationship	to	the	grassroots	of	a	party	doesn’t	necessarily	mean	a	weakening	of	party	strength	organisationally.	Taking	the	mass	party	as	the	starting	point	has	naturally	led	to	an	extensive	literature	on	parties	in	decline;	the	move	away	from	membership	is	seen	as	a	decline	in	organisational	strength.	Katz	and	Mair	(1995)	argue	that	by	considering	only	the	relationship	of	party	to	civil	society	and	the	‘party	on	the	ground’,	the	strength	of	party	organization	in	terms	of	public	office	and	central	office	is	overlooked.	It	is	in	these	areas	that	parties	have	strengthened,	becoming	institutionalized	and	self-sufficient	but	also	more	remote	(Katz	and	Mair,	1995).	It	is	important	therefore	not	to	conflate	membership	decline	with	party	decline.	If	parties	are	successfully	adapting	to	models	of	organisation	that	are	not	reliant	on	party	members,	and	are	in	fact	strengthening	in	the	process,	this	suggests	that	adaptation	away	from	members	could	be	more	than	a	gradual	response	to	a	changed	external	membership	environment.	Instead,	it	might	derive	from	specific	party	strategy.	It	is	important	therefore	to	consider	the	role	of	elites	in	party	membership	change,	what	pressures	they	might	be	responding	to,	and	what	role	they	see	for	members.			Some	theories	of	organisational	change	(Harmel	and	Janda,	1994)	argue	that	party	change	is	the	result	of	specific	elite	actions.	Rather	than	a	gradual	process	of	adaptation,	they	encourage	a	reading	of	party	change	as	a	‘discontinuous	outcome	of	specific	party	decisions	linked	to	party	goals’	(1994,	259).	Previous	theories	of	party	change,	they	argue,	have	not	given	enough	attention	to	party	decision-making	processes,	seeing	change	as	a	response	to	gradual	external	environmental	change.	Instead	they	develop	a	hybrid	model	which	sees	party	change	as	involving	both	internal	and	external	causal	factors.	It	is	the	
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impact	of	this	external	stimulus	on	a	party’s	internal	organisation	(specifically	when	it	affects	a	party’s	‘primary	goal’)	that	brings	about	change.	Assuming	that	parties	are	conservative	organisations	and	won’t	change	for	the	sake	of	it,	this	external	‘shock’	or	stimulus	is	needed	for	elites	to	consider	it	worth	overcoming	the	‘wall	of	resistance’	(1994,	p267)	to	change.			Harmel	and	Janda	(1994)	outline	four	primary	goals	of	parties:	vote	maximisation,	office	maximisation,	policy	advocacy	and	intraparty	democracy	maximization.	For	parties	in	this	latter	category,	the	representation	of	members’	wishes	is	paramount	and	therefore	sudden	membership	decline	might	be	exactly	the	type	of	external	shock	that	effects	a	change	in	strategy	and	would,	‘presumably	cause	a	rethinking	of	internal	mechanisms	for	interest	aggregation	and	articulation’	(1994,	p271).	How	then	to	understand	the	impact	of	membership	decline	for	parties	whose	primary	goal	is	not	member	participation?	What	role	does	it	play	in	elite	decision-making	compared	to	electoral	concerns?			Panebianco	(1988)	argues	that	throughout	parties’	organisational	changes,	features	of	the	original	model	will	remain	(in	much	weaker	form)	shaping	future	developments:	‘A	party’s	organisational	characteristics	depend	more	upon	its	history,	i.e	on	how	the	organisation	originated	and	how	it	consolidated	than	upon	any	other	factor’	(1988,	p.50).	For	parties	that	have	previously	organised	around	member	mobilisation,	does	this	continue	to	have	a	role	in	the	decisions	a	party	makes?	In	understanding	party	change,	particularly	around	specific	elite	decision,	it	is	important	to	consider	both	where	the	party	comes	from	and	how	this	ideological	background	is	understood	by	elite	decision	makers.			Scarrow	(2015)	argues	that	the	decisions	elites	make	about	party	membership	are	shaped	by	party	values.	These	‘narratives	of	legitimacy’	identify	the	party’s	credentials	for	governing.	For	instance,	these	could	be	narratives	around	strength	in	leadership	or	the	party’s	links	to	citizens.	Parties	with	different	narratives	of	legitimacy	would	therefore	have	different	responses	to	membership,	and	membership	loss.	For	cleavage	representation	type	parties,	parties	that	represent	group	interests	and	build	ties	to	those	groups,	membership	is	a	way	of	cementing	those	links;	party	members	are	like	members	of	a	community.	Even	when	the	party	no	longer	exclusively	represents	these	interests,	the	values	and	ideological	commitment	to	this	form	of	party	representation	may	remain,	shaping	the	party’s	organisational	choices.	This	type	of	party	would	have	a	different	response	to	membership	loss	than	a	personalistic	or	political	market	party	which	sees	members	more	as	fans	(Scarrow,	2015,	p.20-26).	
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	This	party-type	understanding	of	change	suggests	that	parties’	strategies	are	shaped	by	the	historical	role	of	membership	in	the	party.	Alongside	the	cost-benefit	analysis	of	what	party	members	offer,	legitimacy	connected	to	ideology	would	shape	a	party’s	membership	strategy.	Yet,	whilst	this	ideological	commitment	may	shape	a	party’s	response	to	member	decline,	where	such	considerations	fit	within	elite	based	strategic	decisions	is	not	known.	Scarrow	(2015)	suggests	that	ideology	interacts	with	the	cost	benefit	analysis	parties	make,	applying	a	filter	to	the	expected	political	economy	logic	by	which	party	organisational	decisions	are	usually	considered,	but	this	has	not	been	tested.	How	great	a	role	this	ideological	filter	plays	in	the	analysis	elites	make	needs	further	exploration.	Dalton,	McAllister	and	Farrell	(2011)	argue	that	‘party	leaders,	typically,	are	committed	to	the	party’s	heritage	and	ideology,	and	want	to	influence	policy.	But	their	livelihood	is	also	often	dependent	on	the	party’	(2011,	p.225).	If	party	elites	are	driven	by	both	party	ideology	and	strategy,	how	does	this	affect	decisions	regarding	membership?			Ideal-type	party	models	provide	a	way	of	conceptualising	the	role	of	members	throughout	parties’	organisational	shifts	and	the	impact	of	membership	decline	on	parties’	strength	and	organisational	capacity.	Yet	there	is	much	to	be	discovered	about	how	party	elites	view	membership,	the	organisational	ideologies	that	may	shape	these	views,	and	what	impact	this	has	on	party	organisational	change.			
2.4	 Value	of	members	to	parties	(demand-side)	
	Viewing	the	transformation	of	party	organisation	through	the	attachment	to	membership,	suggests	that	membership	is	a	resource	that	can	be	pursued	or	forgotten	according	to	a	party’s	organisational	needs	and	goals.	But	membership	is	not	a	straightforward	resource.	For	Bartolini,	(1983)	maintaining,	increasing	or	decreasing	membership	is	a	process	which	requires,	‘from	the	leadership	perspective,	an	organisational	effort	which	might	or	might	not	be	rewarded	in	terms	of	money,	work	and	time’	(1983,	p207).	For	parties	therefore,	the	cost-benefit	analysis	of	membership,	why	they	pay	the	costs	and	what	they	expect	in	return,	helps	explain	why	parties	might	seek	to	change	their	supporter	relations.	In	short,	understanding	why	parties	change	requires	an	understanding	of	the	value	party	elites	give	to	membership.	And	it	is	a	value	that	need	not	be	grounded	in	truth;	it	is	elite	perceptions	of	members’	value	that	explains	the	change:	‘Unlike	money,	the	value	of	members	as	an	organisational	resource	is	a	subjective	one,	and	it	is	precisely	this	
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subjective	view	that	can	shed	light	on	parties’	organisational	manifestations’	(Scarrow,	1996,	p.36).			The	value	of	members	to	parties	can	be	viewed	both	in	organisational	functional	terms	and	according	to	wider	democratic	functions.	Scarrow	(1996)	identifies	eight	contributions	members	can	make	to	a	party	both	inside	and	outside	the	organisation.	Six	of	these	can	be	seen	as	directly	helping	the	party	fulfil	its	functional	roles.	At	the	very	basic	level,	members	make	up	the	available	pool	of	candidates	for	office.	In	this	way,	members	provide	the	means	for	parties	to	fulfil	their	main	function	in	a	democracy:	contesting	elections.	Members	also	help	win	those	elections	for	the	party.	Campaigning	‘on	the	ground’	by	party	members	(delivering	leaflets,	knocking	on	doors	and	‘getting	out	the	vote’)	has	been	shown	to	have	a	significant	effect	on	election	outcomes	in	the	UK	context	(Whiteley	and	Seyd,	1994;	Pattie	et	al.,	1995;	Denver	and	Hands,	1997).	In	addition	to	campaign	labour,	members	can	also	provide	outreach	benefits,	playing	the	role	of	‘ambassadors	in	the	community’	by	communicating	and	showing	support	for	a	party’s	values.	Members	also	provide	a	regular	and	stable	source	of	votes,	though	parties	still	need	to	win	votes	outside	of	their	own	supporters.	This	core	support	is	regular	and	reliable	as	members	are	more	loyal	in	their	voting	habits	than	non-members	(though	it	is	not	necessarily	membership	that	causes	party	loyalty,	rather	it	may	be	that	the	most	loyal	voters	make	up	the	membership	(Katz,	1990)).	It	is	also	suggested	that	party	members	can	be	a	source	of	innovation,	providing	the	party	with	new	ideas	(Scarrow,	1996).	Members	also	have	a	role	in	financing	party	activity.	In	addition	to	membership	dues,	they	are	more	likely	than	other	supporters	to	make	donations	(Ponce	and	Scarrow,	2011).	Members	are	an	important	financial	resource;	one	that	provides,	if	not	the	majority	source	of	funds,	still	a	‘non-trivial’	contribution	to	party	coffers	(Scarrow,	2015)	and	provides	an	income	that	is	both	more	stable	compared	to	donations	(which	can	be	dependent	on	electoral	success)	and	seen	as	more	legitimate	(Scarrow,	1996).	Additionally,	in	countries	where	public	subsidies	for	parties	rely	to	some	degree	on	membership	and	electoral	support,	the	financial	benefits	of	membership	to	parties	is	two-fold.			However,	it	is	precisely	in	these	functional	roles	that	members	have	seemingly	become	less	central	to	parties.	Whilst	members	still	predominantly	make	up	the	pool	of	candidates	for	office,	in	terms	of	labour,	communications	and	finance,	they	have	arguably	come	to	be	seen	as	less	essential.	In	organisational	adaptations,	parties	have	switched	their	campaign	activity	from	primarily	local	canvassing	by	party	members,	to	centrally	controlled	and	professionally	run	campaigns.	Parties	have	been	using	new	technologies	to	communicate	
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nationally	from	central	office,	and	financing	the	corresponding	increased	campaign	costs	by	non-member	donations	or	state	funds	(Bowler	and	Farrell,	1992;	Webb,	1992;	Katz	and	Mair,	1995;	Farrell	and	Webb,	2002).	Each	of	these	developments	can	be	seen	as	a	move	away	from	membership;	a	reduced	role	for	activists	as	campaign	volunteers,	funders	and	communicators.	An	increased	use	of	opinion	polling	which	is	‘seen	as	the	main	alternative	form	of	campaign	feedback	to	the	subjective	networks	provided	by	canvassing	and	the	party	activists’	(Bowler	and	Farrell,	1992),	has	also	seen	party	members’	role	in	policy	input	reduced.	Members’	functional	benefit	for	parties,	whether	supplanted	or	supplemented	by	these	developments,	is	clearly	less	crucial;	party	members’	contributions	are	valuable,	but	not	irreplaceable.			Scarrow	(1996)	argues	that	the	cost-benefit	analysis	parties	make	regarding	membership	must	include	an	assessment	of	what	type	of	supporter	(in	terms	of	levels	of	engagement)	is	likely	to	satisfy	the	role	that	parties	seek	to	fill.	Parties	only	reap	the	benefits	of	membership	if	they	can	recruit	members	who	are	willing	to	be	active	in	the	areas	they	want	them	to	be;	whether	that	is	canvassing,	making	donations	or	some	other	role.	Whilst	party	members	are	regular,	loyal	voters	of	their	party	(Katz,	1990),	there	is	evidence	to	suggest	that	party	members	are	an	increasingly	inactive	group.	Whiteley	and	Seyd	(2002)	find	that	new	members	of	the	British	Labour	Party	(recruited	to	the	party	in	a	centrally-driven	recruitment	campaign)	differed	from	existing	members	in	levels	of	activity.	Whilst	party	members	in	the	heyday	of	party	membership	were	certainly	not	all	uniformly	active	participants,	across	a	number	of	studies	(Seyd	and	Whiteley,	1992;	Heidar,	1994;	Gauja	and	van	Haute,	2014)	party	members	have	been	shown	to	be	less	active	than	in	the	past.	This	is	further	evidence	that	membership	numbers	alone	should	not	be	directly	equated	with	organisational	strength	and	that	the	value	of	party	members	as	a	functional	asset	is	not	straightforward.	Parties	can	only	gain	from	the	membership	in	terms	of	volunteer	labour	and	outreach	benefits	if	the	members	recruited	engage	in	these	activities.	Likewise	a	decline	in	membership	doesn’t	necessarily	result	in	a	decline	in	activism	if	those	that	remain	are	the	most	engaged	(Scarrow,	2002).		
	Despite	developments	in	party	organisation	that	would	suggest	members’	roles	are	now	less	valued	operationally	(and	because	of	developments	in	technology,	communications	and	financing,	also	less	necessary),	party	elites	continue	to	emphasise	the	importance	of	members,	placing	a	high	value	on	membership	numbers	in	party	rhetoric	(Gauja,	2013;	Pemberton	and	Wickham-Jones,	2013).	Beyond	purely	functional	roles,	members	clearly	bring	something	to	the	party,	and	the	answer	may	lie	in	their	non-functional	roles.	
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	Whilst	money	can	buy	a	number	of	functional	benefits,	it	cannot	replicate	the	democratic	legitimacy	parties	derive	from	their	members.	This	democratic	legitimacy	works	in	a	number	of	ways.	It	may	signal	to	potential	voters	that	the	party	is	well	supported,	enhancing	its	electoral	appeal.	Likewise,	if	members	reflect	the	segments	of	society	that	the	party	seeks	to	represent	and	appeal	to,	this	adds	credibility	to	those	claims.	It	also	may	serve	to	demonstrate	that	the	party	is	not	the	preserve	of	the	political	elites	that	run	it	(Scarrow,	1996).	In	this	sense,	parties	may	seek	to	enhance	membership	lists	even	if	those	on	them	remain	inactive.	Unlike	the	functional	roles	outlined	before,	legitimacy	can	be	simply	a	question	of	numbers	(an	idea	reflected	in	the	presence	of	state	funding	regimes	based	on	membership	numbers).				Attached	to	the	concept	of	legitimacy	is	that	of	linkage;	‘parties	claim	to	serve	as	agencies	of	linkage	because	that	is	one	way	to	maintain	legitimacy,	to	capture	the	votes,	which	are	their	currency	in	the	markets	of	power’	(Lawson,	1980).	Lawson	argues	that	it	is	linkage	that	marks	out	the	specific	role	of	political	parties	in	forging	a	‘substantive	connection	between	rulers	and	ruled’	(1980).	Lawson	identifies	four	types	of	linkage	that	political	parties	frequently	make	between	citizen	and	state:	‘participatory	linkage’	in	which	political	parties	provide	the	means	for	citizens	to	participate	in	government;	‘policy-responsive	linkage’	in	which	political	parties	ensure	the	government	is	responsive	to	the	views	of	voters;	‘linkage	by	reward’	in	which	parties	provide	the	channel	for	exchange	of	votes	for	favours;	and	‘direct	linkage	‘in	which	the	political	party	is	used	by	government	as	a	means	of	maintaining	coercive	control	over	citizens	(1980).	In	considering	the	role	of	party	membership	in	creating	a	link	between	citizen	and	state,	it	is	the	first	of	these	categories	that	is	of	interest.	Mass	parties	which	emphasise	getting	people	involved	in	politics	provide	a	‘participatory	linkage’	making	party	membership	strength	an	important	indicator	of	linkage	strength	(Widfeldt,	1995).	It	is	worth	stressing	however	that	numbers	alone	do	not	necessarily	provide	linkage.	Duverger’s	(1959)	mass	party	is	not	defied	as	such	by	the	volume	of	the	membership	but	by	the	structures	that	facilitate	members’	involvement	(through	political	education	and	financial	support).	So,	whilst	a	party	with	a	large	membership	might	appear	popular	and	representative,	it	is	not	a	parti	de	masse	in	Duverger’s	sense.	How	party	members	are	involved	in	their	party	is	also	of	import	when	assessing	linkage	benefits.			Contained	within	Lawson’s	conception	of	participatory	linkage	are	the	notions	of	‘representational’	and	‘policy’	linkage.	Lawson	sees	both	the	‘transmission	belt’	of	
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candidates	to	office	and	the	influence	of	activists	on	policy	as	part	of	participatory	linkage.	It	is	perhaps	helpful	to	separate	these	out,	as	Dalton,	McAllister	and	Farrell	(2011)	have	done,	into	‘campaign	linkage’	(including	the	recruitment	of	candidates	and	shaping	of	the	electoral	process),	‘representational	linkage’	(achieving	‘good	congruence’	between	citizen	policy	choices	and	government	programmes)	and	‘participatory	linkage’	(activating	citizens	into	the	political	process	through	elections),	as	well	as	‘ideological	linkage’	(parties’	role	in	providing	policy	choices	and	informing	voters	of	these	choices)	and	‘policy	linkage’	(in	which	parties	then	deliver	on	what	they	have	advocated).	Membership	decline	might	be	expected	to	have	an	impact	on	the	first	two	of	these,	creating	a	smaller	pool	of	candidates	to	draw	from	(and	therefore	a	potentially	less	representative	one),	and	weakening	the	party’s	connection	to	citizens	views	as	a	result	of	a	depleted	membership	base.			Membership	decline	can	therefore	affect	party	strength	by	decreasing	linkage	in	certain	areas	and	this	can	have	an	impact	electorally.	The	extent	to	which	a	party	has	reach	in	a	community	through	its	members	helps	to	demonstrate	that	it	is	‘rooted	in	the	concerns	and	values	of	real	people’	(Whiteley	and	Seyd,	2002).	Linking	to	the	values	and	concerns	of	the	electorate	not	only	presents	a	picture	of	the	party	that	can	be	electorally	beneficial,	but	provides	a	party	with	a	connection	to	the	community	it	serves.	Participatory	linkage	also	helps	stabilise	the	electoral	environment	for	parties.	Creating	a	connection	between	state	and	citizen	by	exchanging	votes	for	policies,	parties	can	stabilise	their	electoral	support	(Poguntke,	2002).	A	similar	decline	in	membership-based	organisations	linked	to	parties	(such	as	trade	unions)	increases	linkage	problems	(Van	Biezen	and	Poguntke,	2014).			Whilst	it	could	be	argued	that	opinion	polling	has	to	some	extent	replaced	policy	linkage,	in	connecting	parties	with	citizens’	views,	it	has	been	seen	as	a	poor	substitute.	Swanson	and	Mancini	(1996)	argue	that	this	‘objectified	statistical	construction’	could	‘in	periods	of	instability	and	rapid	change,	[	]	leave	the	parties	at	a	loss	as	to	understand	voters’	sentiments,	grievances	and	desires’	(1996,	p.15).	However,	linking	parties	to	citizens	through	members’	policy	input	is	not	a	straightforward	benefit.	For	some	parties	this	might	be	seen	as	much	a	liability	as	a	benefit.	The	benefit	to	parties	of	involving	members	in	intra-party	policy	process	is	that	they	link	the	party	to	voters.	If	party	members	are	the	party	in	the	electorate	then	they	will	help	reflect	those	views	in	party	policy	and	candidate	selection.	However,	this	strength	can	become	a	weakness	if	the	members	participating	in	these	activities	are	not	ideologically	representative	of	the	party’s	voters.	May’s	law	of	curvilinear	disparity	(May,	1973)	contends	that	those	most	active	in	a	party,	the	mid-level	
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elites	or	activists,	are	more	ideologically	extreme	than	the	voters	and	party	leadership.	Granting	significant	powers	to	this	group	can	result	in	a	break	in	policy	linkage	with	the	party’s	policies	becoming	unattractive	to	voters.	Party	members	can	become,	‘more	of	a	nuisance,	less	willing	merely	to	shout	their	approval	of	elite	policies	and	more	prone	to	make	electorally	costly	demands’	(Katz,	1990).			For	the	Labour	Party	in	Britain,	party	activists	have,	at	times,	been	viewed	as	such	a	nuisance;	becoming	an	impediment	by	imposing	vote-losing	policies	on	the	party	and	creating	an	unattractive	environment	for	recruiting	new	members.	The	party’s	response	has	been	to	increase	intra-party	democracy	and	centralise	membership,	the	increase	in	‘ordinary’	members	and	expansion	in	membership	rights	created,	paradoxically,	an	increase	in	central	party	control	by	undermining	activist	and	local	party	organization	(Webb,	1992;	Scarrow,	1996).	Given	there	is	good	evidence	to	suggest	that	empirically	May’s	Law	(1973)	does	not	hold	in	all	cases	and	party	activists	are	not	the	political	extremists	of	the	party	compared	to	rank	and	file	members	or	comparing	members	to	party	supporters	(Kitschelt,	1989;	Norris,	1995;	Widfeldt,	1995;	Narud	and	Skare,	1999;	Scarrow	and	Gezgor,	2010;	Van	Holsteyn	et	al.,	2017),	the	need	to	‘dilute’	the	activists	in	the	party	to	better	reflect	the	wider	public	may	not	always	be	a	concern.	However,	the	Labour	Party	case	highlights	that	parties’	decisions	to	expand	selection	procedures	might	not	always	mean	a	reduction	in	central	control.			Understanding	party	members’	potential	value	to	party	organisation,	functionally	and	symbolically,	helps	explain	why	elites	continue	to	place	a	value	on	party	membership	recruitment.	It	explains	why	parties	may	try	to	make	themselves	attractive	to	potential	new	members,	but	it	doesn’t	entail	that	they	are	successful	in	that	endeavour.	Likewise,	the	costs	and	benefits	of	party	members	are	not	straightforward	and	parties	are	not	always	able	to	dictate	the	outcomes.	And	whilst	parties	may	outwardly	be	trying	to	attract	members,	we	do	not	always	know	their	intention	in	this	regard;	we	don’t	know	what	value	party	elites	see	in	membership.			
2.5	 Value	of	party	to	members	(supply-side)	
	Parties’	organisational	adaptations	towards	or	away	from	membership	are	only	one	half	of	the	picture.	Whether	parties	see	a	value	in	membership	is	of	course	of	little	import	if	members	see	no	value	in	joining	parties.			
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Whiteley	and	Seyd’s	general	incentives	model	(Seyd	and	Whiteley,	1992;	Whiteley	et	al.,	1994;	Whiteley	and	Seyd,	2002)	goes	a	long	way	to	explain	the	complex	and	numerous	motivational	factors	behind	party	membership.	The	general	incentives	model	builds	on	Clark	and	Wilson’s	scheme	(1961)	which	defined	incentives	as	solidary	(social)	incentives	such	as	being	with	like-minded	individuals	and	having	shared	social	or	recreational	opportunities;	material	incentives	from	expectation	of	personal	rewards	or	patronage;	and	purposive	(political)	incentives	which	derive	from	being	part	of	advancing	particular	ideological	goals	(all	of	which	are	divided	into	inclusive	or	exclusive	benefits).	Whiteley	and	Seyd’s	model	brings	together	incentives	that	combine	aspects	of	rational	choice	with	social	psychological	models	of	participation	and	in	doing	so	seeks	to	overcome	the	paradox	of	participation	(Olson,	1995).	They	define	these	incentives	as	selective	process	incentives	(perceived	personal	benefits	from	the	process	of	participation	itself	regardless	of	outcome)	and	selective	outcome	incentives	(such	as	furthering	a	political	career).	They	add	to	the	model	collective	incentives	such	as	furthering	collective	goods	or	preventing	the	opposite,	altruism,	expressive	attachment	(which	sees	loyalty	and	affection	for	the	party	as	a	motivating	factor),	and	social	norms	which	sees	political	involvement	stemming	from	the	perceived	expectations	of	family	and	friends.			Across	a	range	of	national	surveys	(Young	and	Cross,	2002;	Gallagher	and	Marsh,	2004;	Pedersen	et	al.,	2004;	Heidar,	2014;	Baras	et	al.,	2015)	ideological	incentives	(those	related	to	political	goals)	come	out	as	the	strongest	motivations	for	joining	and	several	of	these	studies	have	supported	the	view	that	ideological	incentives	have	far	greater	impact	on	party	joining	than	selective	incentives	(Heidar,	2014;	Pedersen	et	al.,	2004;	van	Haute	and	Gauja,	2015).	One	exception	to	this	is	found	specifically	in	the	case	of	younger	members,	where	there	is	evidence	of	younger	‘professionally	minded’	members	being	driven	by	selective	outcome/material	motivations	such	as	career	opportunities	(Bruter	and	Harrison,	2009).			However,	this	extensive	literature	on	membership	incentives	is	nearly	entirely	survey	based	and	what	we	know	of	members	joining	activity	is	limited	by	the	data.	A	more	in-depth	approach	to	understanding	member’s	motivations	could	provide	a	richer	picture	of	what	drives	party	membership.			The	importance	of	ideological	incentives	in	attracting	members	is	consistent	across	different	political	systems	and	corresponds	to	a	decline	in	parties’	scope	to	provide	other	incentives.	As	social	and	class	ties	have	declined,	the	automatic,	socially-conditioned	reflex	
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to	join	a	particular	party	has	lost	strength	for	some	and	collective	solidary	benefits	have	weakened.	With	expanding	opportunities	for	leisure	and	social	activities	outside	of	parties,	and	an	increasing	desire	for	extra-party	political	participation	in	more	individualised	activities	(Norris,	2002),	selective	process	and	solidary	incentives	are	much	less	in	parties’	gift.	Parties	may	provide	material	benefits	to	members	through	access	to	discounts	and	consumer	benefits,	but	these	are	not	necessarily	valued	by	party	members,	and	are	widely	available	elsewhere.	What	remains	in	a	party’s	gift	is	access	to	its	own	democratic	channels.	It	is	political	incentives	that	parties	are	still	able	to	offer	to	potential	members	and	are	doing	so.			If	the	incentives	parties	offer	have	changed,	then	it	is	possible	that	those	joining	have	also	changed.	Given	the	declining	appeal	of	solidary,	selective	and	material	benefits,	it	might	be	expected	that	those	who	do	join	parties	are	more	ideologically	driven	(Scarrow	and	Gezgor,	2010).	Who	joins	is	an	important	question	as	the	composition	of	party	membership	may	add	or	detract	from	a	party’s	organisational	strength	and	legitimacy.	If,	by	shrinking,	parties	become	home	to	a	minority	of	ideologically	motivated	citizens,	the	membership	may	cease	to	represent	the	wider	electorate,	damaging	the	party’s	representational	and	policy	linkage.	Party	decline	theories	suggest	that	parties	(in	terms	of	their	memberships)	are	becoming	less	representative	of	the	wider	electorate	(Van	Biezen	et	al.,	2012).	This	is	a	problem	if	parties	rely	on	members	to	campaign	in	their	core	constituencies	and	provide	candidates	as	well	as	selecting	them.	As	Anders	Widfeldt	argues:	“If	a	party	needs	to	explain	party	policies	to	women,	young	people	and	working-class	
electors,	it	might	stand	a	better	chance	of	doing	so	effectively	if	it	has	more	women,	young	
people	and	workers	amongst	its	members”	(Widfeldt,	1995).		Yet	recent	research	suggests	that	whilst	parties	continue	to	be	sociologically	unrepresentative	(older,	more	male	and	(in	some	studies)	more	educated)	(Widfeldt,	1995;	Gallagher	and	Marsh,	2004;	Scarrow	and	Gezgor,	2010;	Baras	et	al.,	2015),	they	are	not	necessarily	ideologically	unrepresentative.	Whilst	ideology	attracts	potential	members	to	parties,	there	is	little	to	suggest	as	May’s	Law	(1973)	proposes,	that	party	members	are	the	political	extremists	in	all	cases	(Kitschelt,	1989;	Norris,	1995;	Narud	and	Skare,	1999;	Van	Holsteyn	et	al.,	2017).	Though	studies	have	found	that	party	members	place	themselves	further	to	the	end	of	the	ideological	spectrum	than	party	supporters	(Webb	et	al.,	2017)	they	have	also	been	found	to	represent	a	diverse	range	of	opinion	(van	Haute	and	Gauja,	2015).	This	suggests	that	party	membership	decline	has	not	necessarily	led	to	a	break	in	representational	linkage.	And	whilst	membership	numbers	alone	may	represent	a	
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decline	in	participatory	linkage,	this	might	be	changing	with	the	development	of	supporter	affiliation.			
2.6	 Recruitment,	retention	and	the	revolving	door	
	This	twin	picture	of	a	decreasing	demand	for	party	members	on	the	one	hand,	and	a	decreasing	desire	for	party	activity	on	the	other,	paints	a	picture	of	party	membership	decline	at	the	micro-level;	the	individual	decisions	of	party	members	and	party	elites	about	the	costs	and	benefits	of	membership.	Yet	at	the	macro-level,	a	focus	on	aggregate	national	trends	in	membership	has	encouraged	party	system	explanations	of	change.	These	two	types	of	analysis	see	parties	either	completely	powerless	to	reverse	membership	decline	or	all-powerful	in	shaping	it.	Missing	from	these	micro	and	macro	analyses	is	a	party-level	explanation	for	membership	change.	Paulis	et.	al.	(2017)	have	remedied	this	gap	by	providing	an	explanation	that	takes	into	account	the	party’s	position	(vote	share,	competition,	age)	and	internal	variables	such	as	leadership	change	and	selection	procedures	(Paulis	et	al.,	2017).	This	analysis	finds	‘a	bandwagon	effect	between	electoral	cycles	and	membership	cycles’	(2017,	p.15),	with	parties	that	are	gaining	votes	also	increasing	membership	ratios.	This	suggests	that	whilst	parties	may	not	be	completely	at	the	mercy	of	system-level	changes,	they	are	not	necessarily	completely	in	control	of	membership	recruitment	either;	parties	may	gain	or	lose	members	depending	on	the	political	environment.	This	presents	opportunities	for	parties,	though	not	ones	in	which	they	have	absolute	control.			The	importance	of	electoral	and	political	factors	in	shaping	party	membership	is	highlighted	by	Pemberton	and	Wickham-Jones	(2013).	Looking	at	Labour	Party	membership	and	recruitment	strategies	during	the	1990s,	Pemberton	and	Wickham-Jones	(2013)	conclude	that	membership	is	much	more	like	a	‘revolving	door’	than	a	linear	process.	They	point	to	the	significant	drop	in	party	membership	following	the	party’s	recruitment	drive	in	the	mid-1990s	and	they	argue	that	the	wider	political	context	had	greater	impact	than	party	incentives	on	this	decline.	The	incentives	remained	constant	during	this	period,	it	was	the	political	context	that	had	changed.	Whilst	parties	can	shape	some	of	the	incentives	to	join	(reduced	joining	rates,	member	benefits,	political	rights),	the	political	context	is	largely	out	of	their	hands.	Election	campaigns,	election	defeats,	and	whether	(and	how	long)	the	party	holds	government	office,	also	affect	the	party’s	attractiveness	to	members	or	potential	members.	However,	parties	do	have	the	opportunity	to	utilise	these	key	moments	for	member	recruitment.		
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	Whether	parties’	strategies	of	recruitment	(and	retention)	are	effective	or	not,	they	continue	to	attempt	to	attract	members	with	reduced	costs	and	by	lowering	the	barriers	to	entry	(Faucher,	2015;	Gauja,	2015).	This	manipulation	of	the	costs	and	benefits	of	party	membership	and	the	importance	of	electoral	cycles	suggests	that	parties	can	try	to	use	membership	recruitment	for	specific	purposes	at	specific	times	(particularly	elections).	It	is	during	election	campaigns	after	all,	that	collective	benefits	are	particularly	salient	and	the	opportunities	for	selective	process	benefits	(taking	part)	are	at	their	highest.	It	may	also	be	the	case	that	a	continuous	and	stable	mass	membership	is	not	an	organisational	necessity	or	goal.	Gauja	and	van	Haute	(2014)	suggest	something	similar	in	their	cross-national	analysis	of	party	member	fluctuations	which	finds	that	in	Canada	and	Israel	(countries	in	which	parties	hold	primaries	for	leadership	selections)	significant	fluctuations	occur	around	leadership	contests.	They	suggest	that	in	these	countries,	party	membership	takes	on	a	more	‘instrumental	character	…rather	than	a	signifier	of	a	shared	political	ideology’	(2014,	p.	6).			Whiteley	and	Seyd	(2002)	have	already	shown	in	the	UK	context	that	the	move	towards	more	‘plebiscitary’	participation	in	party	internal	affairs	can	lead	to	a	less	active	or	more	distant	membership.	It	may	be	that	parties	are	happy	to	have	a	more	loosely	attached	member	or	supporter	base;	a	‘virtually’	attached	membership	who	are	not	regularly	attending	local	meeting	are	more	easily	led	by	the	party	elite	and	less	able	to	organise	and	manoeuvre	against	them	(Katz	and	Mair,	1995).	There	are	good	reasons	to	recruit	members	and	offer	incentives	but	these	do	not	necessarily	increase	activity	nor	is	a	highly	active	membership	necessarily	desirable.	Parties’	aims	in	member	recruitment	are	not	always	straightforward.	Nor	is	it	clear	whether	parties	see	membership	as	a	constant	or	as	a	resource	to	accrue	as	and	when	necessary.	Are	parties	moving	towards	a	concept	of	membership	that	has	a	more	‘instrumental	character’?		Whilst	parties	continue	to	be	interested	in	member	recruitment	(for	specific	periods	or	otherwise),	it	is	unclear	how	much	they	concern	themselves	with	retention.	Party	membership	literature	has	focused	on	members	joining	parties	and	the	reasons	for	doing	so,	but	far	less	attention	has	been	given	to	why	members	leave	(with	some	exceptions	(Whiteley	and	Seyd,	2002;	Kosiara-Pedersen,	2016;	Bale	et	al.,	2017;	Wagner,	2017))	or	indeed,	if	they	come	back	again.	Membership	figures	at	the	party	level	are	unable	to	establish	fluctuations	within	the	figures	(members	leaving	and	joining,	new	members	replacing	leavers).	The	lack	of	research	in	this	area	is	understandable.	Member	exit	is	a	
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challenging	research	object	requiring	either	a	panel	survey	or	the	ability	to	track	down	ex-members;	a	far	harder	task	than	finding	current	ones.	However,	not	knowing	the	party	member	journey	(whether	membership	is	a	revolving	door	bringing	new	members	in	as	it	rejects	old,	or	whether	members	themselves	are	trapped	in	that	revolving	door,	leaving	and	re-joining)	it	is	difficult	to	fully	assess	the	organisational	implications	of	party	developments	such	as	changed	incentives	and	expanded	affiliation.	Understanding	why	party	members	stay,	when	they	leave,	and	in	what	circumstances	they	return,	is	vital	in	understanding	the	implications	of	changes	to	membership	organising.			
2.7	 Supporters	not	members	
	Party	membership	has	been	shown	to	be	a	flexible	concept	taking	a	number	of	different	forms	across	nations,	within	nations,	and	within	parties	over	time.	Ponce	and	Scarrow’s	(2016)	work	on	a	behaviourally-qualified	measure	of	party	membership	permits	the	idea	that	a	supporter,	who	identifies	as	a	party	member	(perhaps	because	of	a	psychological	attachment	rather	than	being	fully	paid	up	and	on	a	list)	and	engages	in	the	same	party	activity	within	and/or	outside	the	party,	has	equal	status	as	a	formal	party	member.	There	is	a	vast	difference	in	levels	of	activity	within	party	membership.	If	there	are	party	members	who	participate	very	little	it	stands	to	reason	that	there	may	also	be	supporters	who	engaged	in	greater	levels	of	party	activity.			Fisher	et.	al.’s	(2014)	analysis	of	campaign	activity	during	the	2010	UK	General	Election	found	a	significant	amount	of	campaign	activity	was	undertaken	by	supporters	who	were	not	formal	members.	These	supporters’	efforts	made	a	positive	independent	contribution	to	the	intensity	of	local	campaigns	and	both	complemented	as	well	as	supplemented	member	activity.	Recent	analysis	of	member	and	supporter	campaign	activity	(Webb	et	al.,	2017)	shows	that	whilst	supporters	are	less	likely	to	engage	in	high	intensity	activities,	they	do	make	a	significant	contribution	which,	at	the	aggregate	level	(because	of	their	greater	number),	may	be	as	great	(or	greater)	than	that	of	members.	Whilst	there	has	been	a	substantial	amount	of	research	on	the	benefits	of	party	membership,	there	has	been	little	assessment	of	the	relative	benefits	of	membership	compared	to	support	(Ponce	and	Scarrow,	2013).	Ponce	and	Scarrow’s	(2013)	research	shows	that	parties	rely	on	non-member	supporters	in	substantial	numbers;	in	equal	or	greater	numbers	than	members	in	some	cases.	They	define	supporters	as	non-members	who	declare	a	partisan	preference7	
                                                          
7 Respondents	answering	‘very	close’	or	‘quite	close’	to	the	‘How	close	do	you	feel	to	that	party’	question	in	the	European	Social	Survey	(ESS).  
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and	find	that	whilst	members	are	much	more	likely	to	work	for	a	party,	the	percentage	of	non-member	sympathisers	who	report	having	worked	for	a	party	is	significant	(making	up	over	30%	of	the	volunteer	workforce	in	eleven	of	the	twenty-four	countries	analysed).	This	group	of	non-member	supporters,	by	being	numerically	larger	than	the	membership,	might	be	presumed	to	provide	parties	with	a	substantial	resource	to	potentially	mobilise.			It	is	now	perhaps	the	case	that	party	membership	in	the	individual	and	direct	model	is	no	longer	an	appropriate	measure	either	of	party	organisational	strength	or	linkage.	Particularly	in	the	campaigning	function,	the	supporter/member	distinction	is	becoming	less	important	as	parties	seek	‘boots	on	the	ground’	from	outside	the	membership	(Cross	and	Gauja,	2014).	Whilst	parties	generally	require	their	candidates	to	be	members,	other	organisational	functions	are	being	fulfilled	adequately	by	supporters	who	are	also	connecting	parties	to	the	communities	they	represent.	As	parties	increasingly	blur	the	member-supporter	distinction	(Katz	and	Mair,	2009;	Gauja,	2015),	the	pressing	task	is	to	understand	the	relationship	between	parties	and	non-member	support.	What	do	parties	want	or	expect	from	supporters?	In	what	ways	are	they	changing	to	make	use	of	this	resource?	And	what	does	this	mean	for	formal	membership?		
2.8	 Expanding	membership	rights	
	Another	growing	trend	in	party	membership	is	the	expansion	of	intra-party	democratic	rights	such	as	leadership	selection	and	policy	development	(Scarrow	et	al.,	2002;	Kenig,	2009;	Cross	and	Blais,	2012;	Cross	and	Katz,	2013;	Gauja,	2013;	Pilet	and	Cross,	2014;	Faucher,	2015;	Scarrow,	2015).	This	expansion	in	membership	rights	at	a	time	when	traditional	membership	is	in	decline	represents	something	of	a	puzzle	for	party	membership	studies.	The	apparent	paradox	in	which	parties	are	increasing	members	rights	when	there	are	less	of	them,	makes	party	membership	‘simultaneously	less	and	more	important’	(Scarrow,	2015,	p.1).	For	Scarrow	this	puzzle	is	explained	by	the	continued	value	of	members	to	parties	(financially,	electorally	and	as	volunteers)	and	the	utility	of	rights	and	privileges	as	incentives	to	retain	and	attract	members.	The	continued	contribution	party	members	make	(simply	in	number)	to	party	legitimacy	perhaps	explains	why	parties	are	expanding	their	intra-party	democratic	processes	with	leadership	ballots	and	policy	forums;	not	simply	to	dilute	activists	but	in	an	era	of	declining	member	numbers,	and	growing	suspicion	of	parties,	to	give	an	air	of	legitimacy	to	their	operations	(Scarrow	and	Gezgor,	2010).	Political	rights	are	becoming	a	key	tool	in	increasing	parties’	appeal	in	an	attempt	to	reverse	the	general	decline	in	membership	
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numbers	(Van	Biezen	et	al.,	2012).	Parties	are	using	new	‘democratic	credentials’	to	make	themselves	more	attractive	in	the	political	marketplace	(Scarrow,	2015);	their	desire	to	demonstrate	these	democratic	credentials	evidenced	in	the	fact	that	some	parties	have	shown	more	interest	publicising	these	options	than	in	utilising	them	(Scarrow,	1999).	Not	only	are	parties	more	able	to	offer	such	benefits	but	they	are	also	seemingly	attractive	to	members:	participation	in	intra-party	ballots	is	high	compared	to	other	party	activity	and	parties’	memberships	grow	around	these	contests	(Scarrow,	2015).	Such	is	the	spread	of	democratisation	that	some	55%	of	parties8	have	now	institutionalised	some	form	of	plebiscitary	intra-party	democracy	(von	dem	Berge	and	Poguntke,	2017).			The	trend	towards	democratisation	in	parties,	particularly	the	expansion	of	leader	and	candidate	selection,	is	‘one	of	the	most	remarkable	and	widespread	organisational	changes	in	the	past	two	decades’	(Scarrow,	2015).	Achury	et.	al.	(2018)	find	that	43%	of	parties9	give	party	members	a	direct	vote	on	the	election	of	their	leader	(2018,	p.5).	This	trend	has	been	analysed	in	comparative	texts	(Leduc,	2001;	Kenig,	2009;	Cross	and	Blais,	2012)	and	country	specific	analyses	(Marsh,	1993;	Wauters,	2009).	Britain,	as	one	of	the	most	extensively	examined	cases	(Punnett,	1992;	Stark,	1996;	Quinn,	2004a;	Russell,	2005;	Denham	and	O’Hara,	2008)	(and	possibly	an	exceptional	one	(Denham,	2017)),	has	attracted	significant	attention.	The	British	Labour	Party	in	particular	stands	out,	having	extended	democratic	opportunities	to	non-members	and	in	doing	so,	become	a	rare	case	of	what	von	dem	Berge	and	Poguntke	(2017)	categorise	as	‘open	plebiscitary	intra-party	democracy’.			Whilst	intra-party	democratic	processes	are	being	expanded,	not	all	forms	of	democratisation	are	equal.	Studies	have	begun	to	disentangle	the	concept	and	start	categorising	and	measuring	types	of	intra-party	democratic	processes	(Bille,	2001;	Rahat	and	Hazan,	2001;	Kittilson	and	Scarrow,	2003;	Kenig,	2009;	Aylott	and	Bolin,	2017;	Rahat	and	Shapira,	2017;	von	dem	Berge	and	Poguntke,	2017).	Some	studies	focus	on	the	relative	inclusiveness	or	exclusiveness	of	elements	within	the	processes	(Rahat	and	Hazan,	2001;	Kittilson	and	Scarrow,	2003;	Kenig,	2009),	others	have	developed	indexes	for	assessing	intra-party	processes	on	a	variety	of	measures	(Rahat	and	Shapira,	2017;	von	dem	Berge	and	Poguntke,	2017).	Von	dem	Berge	and	Poguntke	(2017)	develop	a	two-fold	distinction	between	assembly-based	and	plebiscitary	types	of	intra-party	democracy.	This	
                                                          
8	Of	122	parties	across	19	democracies	drawn	from	the	Political	Parties	Database	project	(PPDB)	http://www.politicalpartydb.org/	
9	Of	a	sample	of	57	parties	across	10	countries	draw	from	the	PPDB 
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is	an	interesting	distinction	as	it	highlights	the	role	of	individuals	within	the	process.	The	latter	of	the	two	categories	has	implications	for	the	increasing	individualisation	of	party	decision	making.	Primaries	and	other	types	of	intra-party	decision	making	that	go	beyond	the	membership	are	classified	as	‘open	plebiscitary	intra-party	democracy’	which	the	authors	note	remain	‘a	rare	exception’	(Von	dem	Berge	and	Poguntke,	2017,	p.148).			Most	analyses	of	intra-party	democratisation	are	made	through	an	organisational	lens;	a	top-down,	demand-side	perspective.	Democratisation	is	seen	from	the	elite	perspective.	A	few	studies	have	considered	members’	views	and	reactions	to	intra-party	democracy	generally	(Seyd,	1999;	Sandri,	2011;	Sandri	and	Amjahad,	2015;	Rüdig	and	Sajuria,	2018).	But	a	party	member	perspective	specifically	on	the	role	of	supporters	in	the	party,	and	the	changes	to	include	supporters,	remains	largely	absent	(with	notable	exceptions	looking	at	the	Australian	Green	Party	(Gauja	and	Jackson,	2016)	and	Italian	parties	(Sandri,	2011)).	This	is	a	notable	gap	as,	where	parties	have	expanded	intra-party	democracy	beyond	the	membership	(in	semi-open	or	open	primaries),	they	would	appear	to	have	directly	affected	the	value	of	membership.	This	is	particularly	salient	in	the	case	of	the	British	Labour	Party	where	democratisation	has	led	to	the	expansion	of	rights	beyond	the	membership,	a	substantially	increased	support	base,	and	a	party	that	is	significantly	different	to	the	one	many	members	joined.	A	member	perspective	on	intra-party	democratic	change	is	largely	missing	in	this	rapidly	expanding	literature.	
	
2.9	 Multi-speed	membership	
	Scarrow	(2015)	argues	that	parties’	efforts	to	engage	citizens	beyond	their	members	has	created	multi-speed	membership	parties.	Multi-speed	parties	offer	a	range	of	affiliation	options	which	entail	a	variety	of	engagement	and	participation.	These	multi-speed	parties	differ	from	traditional	membership	parties	by	attempting	to	create	new	affiliation	options	for	supporters	whilst	also	attempting	to	maintain	a	traditional	membership	base	by	lowering	the	costs	of	membership	and	increasing	the	rewards	associated	with	membership.			In	addition	to	this	approach	to	members	and	supporters,	Scarrow	argues	that	multi-speed	membership	parties	have	three	characteristics.	They	are	centralised	(supporters	affiliate	directly	to	the	central	party);	digital	(based	on	electronic	media	with	registration	and	party	updates	through	Facebook,	Twitter,	blogs	and	text);	and	accessible	(they	are	easy	to	join	with	little	cost)	(Scarrow,	2015,	p.136-7).	
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	The	range	of	affiliation	options	offered	by	the	new	multi-speed	membership	party	include	categories	for	loyal	supporters	which	usually	involve	rights	and	obligations,	and	looser	membership	options	which	do	not	require	exclusive	membership	and	also	do	not	impose	duties	(though	some	membership	rights	might	be	extended	to	this	group).	The	first	of	these	categories	include	traditional	individual	membership,	light	membership	(such	as	party	friends	or	supporters)	and	cyber	members.	The	second	category	includes	Sustainers	(who	make	financial	contributions	large	or	small,	regular	or	one	off),	social	media	friends	and	followers,	and	news	audience	(those	who	sign	up	to	receive	information).			This	model	of	membership	sees	activism	as	something	that	varies	as	individuals	move	in	and	out	of	different	modes	of	affiliation	and	activity.	Parties	may	even	encourage	that	movement	at	particular	times	but	there	is	no	set	process;	the	supporter	may	never	become	a	member.	Scarrow’s	model	highlights	the	broad	range	of	ways	an	individual	can	now	engage	with	political	parties	and	be	active	within	them.	This	‘quantum’	model	of	support	recognises	that	parties	offer	a	range	of	affiliation	options	and	supporters	move	between	categories	of	support	at	different	times	(as	well	as	inhabiting	different	categories	at	the	same	time).	It	is	a	useful	way	of	reshaping	the	way	we	think	about	party	affiliation	and	it	raises	an	important	question	about	how	we	understand	these	dynamics.	If	to	fully	understand	partisan	engagement,	‘we	need	studies	that	are	more	like	films	than	like	snapshots’	(Scarrow,	2014),	how	can	that	research	agenda	be	realised?			Though	not	labelling	it	as	such,	Cross	and	Gauja	(2014)	briefly	explore	this	more	fluid	approach	to	affiliation.	They	point	to	party-affiliated	interest	groups	in	Australia	(Rainbow	Labor	and	Labor	for	Refugees)	as	examples	of	a	fluid	and	campaign-specific	way	for	supporters	to	engage	politically.	These	loosely	associated	groups	are	comfortable	with	participants	dropping	in-and-out	and	copy	the	appeal	of	single-issue	groups	by	combining	policy	and	campaigning.	It	is	this	type	of	political	model	which,	Cross	and	Gauja	argue,	is	successfully	engaging	citizens	in	political	activity	and	which	points	to	the	direction	of	future	developments	in	membership	organising.	Indeed,	some	parties	are	already	moving	in	this	direction.	In	analysing	parties’	responses	to	membership	change,	Cross	and	Gauja	(2014)	highlight	the	development	of	community	organising	within	the	Australian	Labor	party.	This	mobilisation	strategy,	adopted	from	the	United	States	(a	country	in	which	parties	do	not	have	formal	memberships),	seeks	to	move	supporters	straight	to	activism	with	no	requirement	to	sign	them	up	as	members	first;	‘in	this	model	of	campaign	organising,	the	notion	of	party	membership	has	a	more	fluid	and	expansive	functional	
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meaning’	(Cross	and	Gauja,	2014).	This	adds	weight	to	the	contention	that	some	parties	are	becoming	more	comfortable	with	a	looser	membership	model	and	are	seeking	to	use	this	to	advance	organisational	goals.	This	move	towards	looser	affiliation,	to	ways	of	organising	familiar	to	the	American	model,	can	be	seen	as	an	individualisation	of	party	support,	complementary	to	a	political	market	way	of	organising.	In	fact,	it	is	argued	that	a	multi-speed	way	of	organising	brings	parties	‘almost	full	circle’	to	the	individualistic	models	of	party	activity	that	existed	before	group-based	or	subscriber-democracy	models	became	popular	(Scarrow,	2015,	p.206).			There	has	been	little	research	to	date,	however,	on	parties’	intentions	in	this	regard:	whether	parties	seek	to	attract	these	supporters	in	addition	to	formal	membership,	whether	they	aim	to	use	support	as	a	gateway	to	formal	membership	or	if	they	ultimately	envisage	replacing	formal	membership.	And	there	is	little	research	on	how	parties	view	support	and	membership	itself,	whether	they	see	it	as	a	fluid	and	dynamic	attachment	(are	they	as	comfortable	with	easy	exit	as	with	easy	entrance?).	Scarrow	(2015)	argues	that,	‘For	the	most	part,	parties	have	presented	these	new	affiliation	options	as	complements	or	gateways	to	traditional	membership’	(2015,	p.151),	but	also	that	these	changes	are	often	a	‘bandwagon	response	to	trends	in	technology	and	marketing’	(2015,	p.	136).			Given	this	multi-speed	way	of	organising	is	being	adopted	in	some	form	or	other	across	a	number	of	countries	(Scarrow,	2015),	understanding	why	parties	are	moving	to	this	model	is	of	great	interest.	Particularly	as	this	mode	of	organisation	is	likely	to	have	consequences	for	parties.		
2.10	 Multi-speed	membership	and	intra-party	tensions	
	There	has	been	little	analysis	to	date	on	the	consequences	of	multi-speed	membership;	for	members	or	for	the	party	as	a	whole.	Scarrow	(2015)	argues	that	the	expansion	of	affiliation	options	has	the	potential	to	create	tensions	between	the	different	types	of	support,	particularly	as	these	new	support	routes	tend	to	be	‘layered’	on	top	of	existing	traditional	membership	structures	(2015,	p.206).	Not	only	do	multi-speed	parties	seek	to	attract	supporters	by	expanding	affiliation	options,	they	also	seek	to	attract	them	by	expanding	political	rights.	Scarrow	argues	that	when	rights	and	privileges	are	extended	to	this	wider	group	it	raises	important	questions	for	parties	in	terms	of	where	authority	lies;	where	the	party	demos	is	located.	In	cleavage	representation	parties	this	‘represents	an	
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even	greater	change	because	it	overturns	long-held	assumptions	about	who	should	have	the	last	word	in	defining	party	aims	and	values’	(Scarrow,	2015,	p.208).			Scarrow	argues	that	by	expanding	rights	to	non-members,	parties	bring	into	question	the	fundamental	structure	of	the	party.	Because	of	the	link	between	party	ideology	and	organisational	model,	as	much	as	ideology	might	influence	the	direction	of	organisational	change,	changes	in	party	organisation	(such	as	the	expansion	of	political	rights)	may	signal	a	change	in	the	organising	ideology	of	the	party	(Scarrow,	2015,	p.26).	For	instance,	a	move	to	open	leader	selection	even	if	introduced	for	short-term	goals,	may	shift	more	permanently	the	notion	of	leadership	support	and	legitimacy	(Scarrow,	2015).			This	looser	model	of	affiliation	may	also	potentially	destabilise	parties’	electoral	environments.	If	political	incentives	are	used	at	particular	times	to	attract	more	loosely	attached	supporters,	the	party	potentially	forsakes	its	reliable	support	base.	Bringing	party	members	into	decisions	about	who	should	lead	them	potentially	affects	party	member	loyalty,	with	those	supporting	the	losing	candidates	turning	away	from	the	party	(Scarrow,	2015);	‘whilst	intra-party	ballots	may	temporarily	boost	partisan	participation,	and	even	party	membership,	parties	face	a	longer-term	challenge	of	reinforcing	the	partisan	convictions	of	these	newfound	activists,	so	that	they	are	not	just	supporters	of	a	particular	candidate’	(2015,	p.215).			When	intra-party	rights	are	extended	to	wider	groups,	the	shift	in	authority	can	have	negative	consequences.	More	radical	forms	of	open	party	democracy	(such	as	fully	open	primaries)	can	disempower	the	party	leadership	(Rahat	and	Hazan,	2001)	and	erode	party	cohesion	(Pennings	and	Hazan,	2001).	In	terms	of	membership	of	the	party,	these	changes	have	particular	significance.	(Rahat	and	Hazan,	2001)	demonstrate	the	potential	impact	on	membership	that	expansion	in	democratic	rights	can	have.	Their	analysis	of	primaries	for	candidate	selections	in	major	Israeli	parties	finds	that	in	some	cases,	primary	candidates	have	sought	to	recruit	members	for	contests	regardless	of	their	support	for	the	party.	These	members	have	been	recruited	from	other	parties	and	have	even	failed	to	vote	for	the	party	in	the	subsequent	election.	They	contend	that	the	introduction	of	candidate	primaries	has	in	fact	served	to	‘degrade’	the	status	of	member.		Though	these	examples	are	extreme,	there	is	a	clear	problem	for	members	in	expanding	selection.	When	parties	move	to	open	primaries,	party	members	have	no	more	influence	in	the	decision	of	who	should	lead	their	party	than	any	other	citizen.	Indeed	the	role	of	the	
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membership	as	‘anchor’	of	the	party	is	given	by	Dutch	party	elites	as	a	reason	that	more	open	selection	has	not	been	adopted	(Van	Holsteyn	et	al.,	2014).	Australian	parties	have	also	sought	to	maintain	a	privileged	position	for	party	members,	even	when	selection	decisions	have	been	expanded	beyond	their	number	(Cross	and	Gauja,	2014).			Yet	studies	also	suggest	that	parties	with	lower	entry	costs	and	higher	political	benefits	have	more	ideologically	and	socially	representative	memberships	than	those	with	high	costs	and	few	benefits	(Achury	et	al.,	2018).	However,	this	does	not	hold	for	all	parties.	The	authors	of	this	study	highlight	the	British	Labour	Party’s	recent	leadership	campaigns	(2015,	2016)	as	an	exception	to	this	rule:	a	lower	cost,	higher	benefit,	rule	change	has	not	resulted	in	party	members	more	closely	reflecting	party	support	(2018,	p.11).			As	much	as	radical	forms	of	intra-party	democratisation	can	have	consequences	for	parties,	the	expansion	of	political	rights	does	not	necessarily	empower	the	membership	either.	Labour’s	previous	experience	of	reforming	leader	selection	is	not	seen	as	having	handed	power	to	members	(Hopkin,	2001;	Russell,	2005;	Scarrow,	1996;	Webb,	1994).	As	Katz	and	Mair	(1995)	establish	in	their	cartel	party	model,	party	leaders	can	increase	power	through	democratisation	by	empowering	party	members	at	the	expense	of	mid-level	organisers.	Labour’s	previous	reforms	shifted	power	towards	the	top	and	the	Parliamentary	party	held	onto	the	crucial	gate-keeping	role	of	nominations.			Changes	to	party	affiliation	and	rights	can	have	far-reaching	consequences	but	they	are	not	as	well	researched	as	they	are	popular	with	parties.	What	are	the	consequences	of	multi-speed	membership	models?	And	given	the	importance	of	these	rule	changes	for	members,	what	is	the	membership	perspective	on	this	shift?	Does	this	shift	create	a	tension	and	where	is	that	tension	felt?	Who	benefits	from	this	change	and	are	these	beneficiaries	the	intended	ones?			
2.11	 Conclusions		
	Whilst	different	parties	have	different	membership	relations,	from	parties	with	no	formal	members	to	traditional	mass	parties	with	membership	constitutionally	defined,	it	is	clear	that	there	have	been	some	notable	development	in	party	membership	and	affiliation.	The	expansion	of	affiliation	modes	and	engagement	of	a	wider	range	of	affiliates	in	party	activity	suggests	that	parties	are	moving	into	an	organisation	model	that	cannot	be	assessed	by	membership	figures	alone.		
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	Parties	are	moving	towards	much	wider	affiliation	models	and	radically	reshaping	their	internal	democratic	mechanisms.	Using	primarily	quantitative	research,	recent	work	has	uncovered	a	complex	picture	of	parties	expanding	rights	to	members,	expanding	the	number	of	ways	supporters	can	affiliate	to	the	party	and	experimenting	with	new	models	of	mobilisation.	Yet	the	consequences	of	these	changes	are	only	just	beginning	to	be	understood.	This	thesis	seeks	to	address	these	consequences	through	a	case-study	that	exemplifies	such	changes.			The	relationship	between	parties	and	their	supporters,	both	members	and	non-members,	is	a	rapidly	changing	arena	and	an	underexplored	one.	By	focusing	on	a	quantification	of	members’	contributions	and	behaviours,	research	to	date	has	not	explained	in	depth	the	motivations,	expectations	and	attitudes	of	this	group,	and	therefore	cannot	explain	members’	response	to,	or	the	long-term	implications	of,	changing	the	membership	model.	Van	Haute	and	Gauja	(2015)	suggest	a	qualitative	approach	would	better	undercover	the	changing	nature	of	participation	within	parties,	arguing	that	the	survey	method	cannot	fully	grasp	‘party	membership	as	a	relationship	or	dynamic	process	involving	both	a	demand	side	(parties)	and	a	supply	side	(members)’	(2015,	p.200).	In	understanding	the	relationship	party	members	have	with	their	party,	and	the	implications	of	party	membership	change	for	the	party	as	organisation,	a	qualitative	approach	is	needed.				 	 	
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Chapter	3:	Research	Design	
 Multi-speed	membership	is	being	adopted,	to	a	greater	or	lesser	extent,	by	multiple	parties	across	multiple	democracies,	and	yet	the	implications	of	this	are	not	fully	understood.	If	pursuing	a	dual	strategy	of	retaining	traditional	membership	whilst	expanding	affiliation	(and	sometimes	political	rights)	to	attract	supporters	creates	the	expected	tension	between	groups	of	affiliates	in	the	party,	as	Scarrow	(2015)	suggests,	this	is	likely	to	have	long-term	implications	for	the	membership	of	the	party	and	consequently	for	party	organisation.	In	particular,	if	these	new	support	options	are	layered	on	top	of	the	traditional	membership	model,	this	is	likely	to	have	consequences	for	membership	dynamics.	If	a	party	wants	to	retain	members	(and	we	would	expect	them	to	want	to	retain	those	who	contribute	the	most	to	party	organisation)	as	well	as	expand	support	options,	the	impact	of	multi-speed	changes	on	the	traditional	membership	model,	and	on	active	members	particularly,	is	of	paramount	importance	to	the	success	of	this	strategy.			This	thesis	tests	and	expands	the	theory	of	multi-speed	organising,	asking	why	a	party	would	pursue	this	model	of	affiliation	and	what	the	consequences	are	for	the	party	and	its	membership.			Using	unique	data	from	interviews	with	party	members	after	2015	when	multi-speed	changes	were	introduced	in	the	British	Labour	Party,	this	research	analyses	the	consequences	of	multi-speed	membership	organising	from	the	member	perspective.	This	uniquely	qualitative	and	supply-side	analysis	provides	a	new	perspective	on	the	relationship	between	members	and	their	party	and	the	impact	of	party	organisational	change	on	this	relationship.			There	are	few	qualitative	approaches	to	party	membership	study	and	this	has	left	gaps	in	our	understanding	of	many	aspects	of	party	membership	and	political	activism	in	parties.	We	know	a	great	deal	from	survey	research	about	why	members	join	but	this	method	limits	our	understanding	of	the	structure	of	those	motivations,	and	potentially	overlooks	important	motivational	factors.	We	also	have	very	little	knowledge	of	what	happens	after	joining:	how	members’	relationship	with	their	party	develops	over	time	and	how	and	why	it	sometimes	comes	to	an	end.	And,	despite	the	widespread	expansion	in	intra-party	democratic	rights	and	affiliation	options,	we	know	very	little	about	members’	opinion	of,	and	reaction	to,	this	change.	Expanding	our	knowledge	of	these	dynamics	of	party	
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membership	allows	for	an	assessment	of	the	impact	of	multi-speed	change	on	the	traditional	membership	model.			The	thesis	supplements	this	supply-side	approach	with	a	demand-side	perspective:	the	reasons	for	change	through	the	eyes	of	those	central	to	enacting	them.	This	complementary	perspective	facilitates	an	analysis	of	the	reasons,	ideologies	and	rationales	behind	party	membership	change,	and	whether	those	match	the	membership	response.			This	research	explores	the	supply-	and	demand-sides	of	multi-speed	membership	through	a	single	party	case	study,	in	a	party	that	has	travelled	significantly	away	from	its	original	organisational	practices	and	towards	a	multi-speed	membership	model.	This	critical	case	provides	a	lens	to	explore	the	implications	of	multi-speed	organising,	providing	an	insight	into	the	challenges	and	potential	successes	of	this	model	for	other	parties.	And	this	research	does	so	at	a	time	in	the	party	when	those	implications	were	being	felt	by	both	the	party	elite	and	party	members.	Using	this	unique	moment	in	the	party,	when	new	multi-speed	rules	were	being	used	for	the	first	time,	and	as	their	consequences	unfolded,	provides	a	rare	perspective	on	the	implications	of	multi-speed	membership.		
3.1	 Research	Question		
	
Why	and	with	what	consequences	is	the	Labour	Party	in	Britain	pursuing	a	multi-
speed	membership	and	mobilisation	strategy?		
3.1.1	 Research	sub-questions		
	 1. Why	has	the	Labour	Party	in	Britain	moved	towards	a	multi-speed	membership	model?		1.a.	Why	did	the	Labour	Party	change	its	membership	model?	1.a.i.	Why	did	the	Labour	Party	expand	affiliation	to	registered	supporters?		 1.a.ii.	Why	did	the	Labour	Party	extend	political	rights	to	these	new	affiliates?			 1.b.	Why	has	the	Labour	Party	retained	traditional	membership?		
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2. What	are	the	consequences	of	multi-speed	membership	for	the	party	and	its	membership?		Question	1	addresses	the	demand-side	of	the	multi-speed	membership	strategy.	As	the	multi-speed	way	of	organising	is	a	dual	strategy	of	appealing	to	a	wider	constituency	of	support	whilst	retaining	a	traditional	membership	structure,	this	question	has	two	prongs:	why	is	the	party	changing	the	membership	model	and	why,	at	the	same	time,	is	the	party	continuing	to	pursue	traditional	member	recruitment?	This	first	part	of	the	question	must	also	be	broken	down	into	two	parts.	Whilst	a	party	may	expand	affiliation,	it	does	not	necessarily	need	to	use	intra-party	democratic	rights	to	attract	support.	Question	1.a.	therefore	incorporates	two	research	sub-questions:	why	has	the	Labour	Party	expanded	its	affiliation	model,	and	why	has	the	Labour	Party	included	these	affiliates	in	party	decision-making?		Question	2	addresses	the	implications	for	the	party	of	a	multi-speed	membership	approach	from	the	supply-side.	It	examines	the	impact	of	multi-speed	membership	on	the	traditional	membership	model	through	the	relationship	party	members	have	with	the	party.	It	questions	how	the	change	in	organisation	affects	the	activities,	motivations	and	attitudes	of	members	in	the	party	and	what	impact	this	has	on	organising	capacity,	party	strength	and	cohesion.		
	
3.1.2	 Definitions	
	
Multi-speed	membership	party	-	The	multi-speed	membership	party	is	one	that	is	centralised,	digital	and	accessible	and	crucially,	offers	a	range	of	affiliation	options	(in	addition	to	membership)	potentially	extending	rights	to	leadership	selection	and/or	policy	development	beyond	the	membership	(Scarrow,	2015).	This	expansion	in	rights	is	a	critical	component	of	the	notion	of	a	multi-speed	membership	party.	The	multi-speed	party	seeks	to	engage	a	wider	group	of	supporters	by	using	political	rights	as	incentives	but,	at	the	same	time,	maintaining	a	traditional	membership	structure	with	similar	rights	and	responsibilities.			For	the	purposes	of	this	research	the	multi-speed	party	will	be	considered	a	party	that:		 a. Offers	more	than	one	type	of	affiliation	option	
 43 
b. Offers	incentives	in	the	form	of	political	rights	to	attract	members	(and	other	affiliates)	c. Continues	to	offer/promote	traditional	membership	options		Attribute	a.	does	not	necessarily	entail	attribute	b.	(though	the	multi-speed	theory	suggests	that	parties	offer	rights	to	attract	supporters)	therefore,	as	noted	above,	research	question	1	will	consider	these	attributes	separately.			
Member	-	‘Member’	or	‘party	member’	is	used	in	this	research	to	refer	to	any	individual	who	is	officially	signed	up	as	a	full	member	of	the	party.	This	means	they	have	joined	the	party	either	online	or	through	a	constituency	Labour	party	(CLP)	and	paid	a	membership	fee.	It	includes	members	who	paid	a	reduced	membership	fee	as	students,	new	members,	retired,	unwaged	or	through	a	specific	discount	membership	offer.	It	does	not	include	‘affiliated	members’	or	‘non-member	supporters’.		
Activist	/	active	member	-	‘active	member’	is	used	to	distinguish	members	who	are	or	have	been	active	in	the	party.	The	activities	used	to	establish	this	are	those	commonly	described	as	‘high-intensity’.	This	includes	various	campaigning	activity	such	as	canvassing	(‘door-knocking’),	also	known	as	‘voter	ID’,	street-stalls,	phone	banking,	envelope	stuffing	and	other	constituency	office-related	activity;	attending	meetings	such	as	branch	meetings	and	General	Committees;	holding	a	voluntary	position	in	the	party	such	as	CLP	Chair	or	Secretary;	holding	an	elected	position	for	the	party	(e.g.	Councillors,	MPs);	or	holding	a	paid	party	position	such	as	CLP	Organiser.			Many	of	the	above	‘high-intensity’	activities	are	of	course	overlapping	and	the	research	recognises	that	members	move	in	and	out	of	activity	over	the	course	of	their	membership.	However,	this	category	is	necessary	to	distinguish	those	who	contribute	or	have	contributed	to	the	party	to	a	greater	degree	than	simply	paying	their	membership	fee.			The	research	makes	a	distinction	between	‘high-intensity’	activities	outlined	above	and	those	that	take	place	online.	Though	members	may	be	intensively	active	online,	those	who	are	not	active	in	person	(face-to-face)	have	not	been	captured	under	this	category.	Whilst	after	the	2017	General	Election	there	has	been	a	growing	suggestion	that	online	activity	has	a	significant	impact	on	campaign	outcomes,	it	is	not	placed	in	the	‘high-intensity’	category	of	activities	because	it	is	likely	that	such	activity	does	not	‘cost’	the	participant	as	much	in	time	and	effort	as	the	other	forms	of	participation	highlighted	above.		
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	It	is	also	important	for	the	purposes	of	this	research	to	recognise	the	difference	between	face-to-face	activity	and	more	isolated	activities.	Those	activities	in	the	‘high-intensity’	category	are	all	activities	that	require	personal	contact	with	other	party	members.	This	is	an	important	distinction	to	make	when	analysing	party	members’	relationship	with	the	party.			
Non-member	supporter	-	‘Supporter’	or	‘non-member	supporter’	is	used	to	refer	to	individuals	who	have	signed	up	to	the	party	under	the	‘registered	supporters’	scheme.	From	2014	onwards,	these	individuals,	sometimes	referred	to	as	‘£3	supporters’,	had	the	opportunity	to	register	online	for	£3	and	were	given	a	vote	in	the	2015	leadership	election.	The	fee	for	registering	as	a	supporter	was	increased	to	£25	for	the	2016	leadership	election	so	the	term	‘registered	supporter’	is	also	used	in	reference	to	those	registering	under	the	revised	rules	that	came	into	effect	in	advance	of	the	2016	leadership	contest.	‘Supporters’	were	also	able	to	register	under	the	previous	‘registered	supporter’	scheme	(pre-dating	2014	rule	changes)	therefore	the	‘supporter’	terminology	extends	to	these	individuals	too.	‘£3	supporter’	is	used	specifically	to	refer	to	those	registering	under	the	post-2014	leadership	election	rules.		
Affiliated	member	and	registered	affiliates	-	‘Affiliated	members’	refers	to	any	member	of	an	affiliated	(levy-paying)	union	or	socialist	society.	Prior	to	2014	rule	changes,	these	affiliated	members	had	automatic	rights	to	Labour	Party	selection	processes	under	the	Electoral	College	election	rules.	After	the	2014	rule	change	only	‘registered	affiliates’	(affiliated	trade	union	members	who	had	‘opted-in’)	received	a	ballot.			Many	party	members	are	of	course	also	trade	union	affiliates	and	members	of	Labour	Party	affiliated	socialist	societies	(a	situation	that	previously	resulted	in	some	members	receiving	multiple	ballots	for	leadership	selection	under	the	Electoral	College	system).			
3.2	 Methodology	
	
3.2.1	 Aim	of	study		
	This	research	seeks	to	understand	the	multi-speed	membership	model,	in	context	and	in	depth,	to	both	test	and	expand	understanding	of	this	model	of	party	organising.	Its	aim	is	
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to	demonstrate	the	implications	of	multi-speed	membership	by	examining	its	introduction	within	a	party	that	has	moved	further	towards	this	model	than	most	other	parties.			
3.2.2	 Qualitative	research	approach		
	What	we	know	about	party	members	has	in	large	part	been	shaped	by	the	way	in	which	party	members	have	been	researched.	The	methods	used	for	party	membership	studies	have	shaped	not	only	the	population	of	these	studies	but	also	what	we	know	about	them.	The	dominance	of	quantitative	studies	in	this	field	has	meant	that	whilst	we	know	about	party	member	demographics,	broad	ideological	positions	and	types	of	activities	engaged	in,	we	know	little	of	how	their	relationship	with	the	party	has	evolved:	what	keeps	them	in	the	party	or	gives	them	cause	to	leave	(or	indeed	come	back),	why	they	engage	in	some	activities	and	not	others	(and	when),	and	how	their	relationship	with	the	party	may	have	changed	over	time.	The	dynamics	of	party	membership	are	little	understood	yet	crucial	to	understanding	how	parties	as	organisations	function.	Without	knowing	more	about	the	relationship	party	members	have	with	their	party,	and	what	happens	when	that	relationship	is	challenged	by	change	within	the	party,	we	cannot	fully	assess	the	impact	of	a	move	to	multi-speed	membership.		This	research	has	sought	to	remedy	these	gaps	by	taking	a	qualitative	approach.	Qualitative	research	employing	narrative	analysis	allows	for	a	longitudinal	view	of	party	membership	without	a	panel	survey.	This	distinctive	approach	to	party	membership	analysis	is	especially	important	for	understanding	multi-speed	membership	as	this	is	a	strategy	that	would	be	expected	to	affect	member	motivations	and	loyalty:	emotions	and	relations	that	are	complex	and	changeable.	As	multi-speed	membership	is	a	strategy	that	would	be	expected	to	alter	the	party-member	relationship,	it	is	important	to	look	at	that	relationship	in	depth	and	over	time	in	order	to	fully	understand	the	implications	of	implementing	such	a	change.				Individuals	are	central	to	these	research	questions.	Party	elites	and	party	members	are	both	a	source	of	data	and	the	subject	of	enquiry	in	this	research.	Their	attitudes,	values,	decisions	and	activities	shape	parties	(party	strength	and	organising	capacity)	and	are	a	driver	of	change	in	party	organisation.			This	research	is	focused	on	understanding	a	process	and	its	implications,	and	it	is	a	process	in	which	the	social	actors	involved	and	the	context	in	which	it	occurs	have	
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significance.	The	research	questions	place	emphasis	on	the	values,	ideologies	and	relationships	of	those	involved	in	the	process	and	this	therefore	leads	naturally	to	an	ontological	position	that	sees	social	phenomena	and	their	meanings	as	accomplished	by	social	actors	(Bryman,	2008).			Understanding	key	actors’	motivations	and	values	helps	reveal	the	tensions,	if	they	exist,	created	by	the	adoption	of	multi-speed	membership	and	mobilisation	strategies	within	traditional	membership-based	parties.	If	to	fully	understand	partisan	engagement	‘we	need	studies	that	are	more	like	films	than	like	snapshots’	(Scarrow,	2014),	this	research	seeks	to	part	fulfil	that	brief	by	taking	a	holistic	look	at	the	member,	supporter	and	party	relationship	in	depth,	and	in	context,	through	the	eyes	of	those	involved.		
3.2.3	 Case	study	strategy	
	This	research	addresses	both	the	‘how’	and	‘why’	of	multi-speed	membership	as	well	as	the	wider	question	of	impact.	It	is	therefore	both	explanatory	and	exploratory.	And	it	examines	these	questions	from	different	perspectives	within	the	party	as	organisation;	through	the	demand-	and	supply-side	(the	party	elite	and	the	party	membership).	This	multi-dimensional	approach	requires	a	range	of	research	tools	and	correspondingly	a	range	of	methods	of	analysis.		A	case	study	approach	is	sufficiently	flexible	to	cope	with	this	multi-layered	approach.	Firstly,	case	studies	have	a	particular	advantage	in	situations	where	‘how’	and	‘why’	questions	are	the	focus	of	the	study,	and	they	are	particularly	suited	to	research	into	contemporary	issues	where	the	researcher	has	little	or	no	control	over	events	(Yin,	1994).	In	this	way,	a	case	study	acts	like	a	scientific	experiment	in	a	new	area	of	enquiry;	the	study	is	guided	by	the	existing	theory	but	is	‘better	able	to	adapt	to	and	probe	areas	of	original	but	also	emergent	theory’	(Hartley,	1994).	Case	studies	are	also	uniquely	able	to	handle	a	variety	of	evidence	including	interviews,	documents	and	observation	(Yin,	1994).	The	case	study	is	often	used	in	organisational	studies	and	research	in	which	context	is	an	important	consideration.	These	strengths	made	the	case	study	strategy	ideal	for	answering	the	central	questions	of	this	study.			Time	was	also	a	consideration	for	this	research.	The	research	questions	are	focused	on	understanding	a	contemporary	event	during	a	period	in	which	the	event	was	still	unfolding	and	its	effects	unknown.	The	case	study	provided	the	ideal	strategy	for	analysis	
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in	this	challenging	environment.	The	flexibility	of	a	case	study	strategy	and	its	ability	to	capture	context	make	it	possible	to	research	new	areas	of	interest.	It	also	facilitates	in-depth	analysis	of	change	through	those	interpreting	and	implementing	the	change	as	it	happens,	and	through	the	perspectives	of	those	it	affects.			In	answering	the	‘why’	and	‘what	consequences’	of	multi-speed	membership,	the	case	study	approach	is	the	ideal	strategy.			
3.2.4	 Case	study	unit	
	This	research	is	based	on	a	single	case,	the	British	Labour	Party.	The	Labour	party	in	the	UK	presents	a	critical	(Yin,	1994)	or	instrumental	case	(Stake,	1994)	in	the	study	of	multi-speed	organising	as	it	meets	all	the	criteria	for	testing	and	extending	the	theory.	A	critical	case	is	a	single	case	which	allows	a	theory	with	testable	propositions	(and	circumstances	in	which	the	propositions	are	believed	to	be	true)	to	be	confirmed	or	challenged	or	extended	(Yin,	1994).	The	case	must	therefore	meet	the	conditions	in	which	the	propositions	can	be	tested.			The	Labour	Party	is	a	(formerly)	traditional	cleavage	representation	party	which	has	experimented	with	a	range	of	affiliation	options	and	widening	access	to	campaigning	and	political	rights	such	as	leader	selection.	Within	the	growing	trend	for	expanding	political	rights,	the	British	Labour	Party	has	gone	further	than	most	other	parties,	extending	democratic	opportunities	to	non-members.	In	doing	so,	it	has	become	a	rare	case	of	what	von	dem	Berge	and	Poguntke	(2017)	categorise	as	‘open	plebiscitary	intra-party	democracy’.	Though	other	parties	have	instituted	open	intra-party	processes	from	their	inception,	for	Labour	the	move	to	multi-speed	organising	is	a	significant	shift,	and	therefore	a	suitable	case	for	studying	the	‘why’	as	well	as	the	‘what’	of	multi-speed	membership.	The	political	system	within	which	the	British	Labour	Party	operates	is	also	a	suitable	place	for	exploring	multi-speed	membership.	The	UK	scored	highest	amongst	nineteen	countries	on	‘multi-speed	attributes’	and	‘online	accessibility’	indexes	(Scarrow,	2015).			Having	adopted	a	more	advanced	model	of	multi-speed	membership	than	many	other	parties	which	have	cleavage	party	roots,	the	Labour	Party	makes	an	ideal	case	study	for	exploring	and	explaining	multi-speed	membership.	In	addition,	having	introduced	new	multi-speed	membership	rules	prior	to	the	start	of	this	study,	the	party	then	tested	them	
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for	the	first	time	during	the	timespan	of	this	research.	This	presented	a	unique	opportunity	to	explore	multi-speed	organising	in	practice	as	it	developed	within	the	party.		
	
3.2.5	 Embedded	units	
	The	party	itself	is	the	primary	unit	of	analysis.	However,	as	an	organisation,	it	contains	subunits	in	the	form	of	individual	constituency	parties	and	individual	members	themselves.	The	research	therefore	takes	the	form	of	a	multi-layered,	embedded,	single	case	study	involving	several	units	of	analysis	(Table	1	in	the	appendix).	This	multi-layered	approach	enables	the	research	to	address	the	question	from	both	the	supply-	and	demand-side	which	helps	develop	a	fuller	understanding	of	the	party	operation	as	a	whole.	In	taking	this	approach,	the	case	study	design	takes	a	lead	from	Lipset,	Trow	and	Coleman’s	seminal	study	of	union	democracy	(1956)	in	which	the	union	was	analysed	through	its	component	units:	the	local	shops,	social	environment	and	individual	leaders	and	members	(Lipset	et	al.,	1956).	This	embedded	unit	design	is	particularly	useful	for	organisations	with	federal	structures	and	different	levels	of	authority	and	participation.			Individuals	within	the	case	are	treated	as	separate	units	of	analysis.	For	Lipset,	Trow	and	Coleman	it	was	‘more	important	to	characterise	the	man	and	his	immediate	social	environment	than	to	characterise	the	union	itself’	(1956,	p.423).	Party	activists	are	individual	‘cases’	creating	a	multiple	case	study	within	the	single	case.	Within	the	organisation,	there	are	intermediate	units,	the	Constituency	Labour	Parties	(CLP),	which	serve	as	subunits.	These	subunits	are	not	analysed	comparatively	as	single	cases.	Instead	they	provide	an	important	contextual	basis	for	understanding	the	operation	of	member	and	mobilisation	strategies	in	practice.	The	CLP	acts	as	the	gateway	to	the	member	cases	within	it	and	provides	important	contextual	data.		
3.2.6	 Case	study	strategy	and	generalisation	
	Whilst	not	comparative	at	the	highest	unit	level	(the	party),	case	studies	have	particular	strengths	in	analytic	or	theory-connected	generalisation	(Firestone,	1993).	This	case	study	facilitates	an	exploration	of	multi-speed	membership	theory	in	practice	which	has	wider	theoretical	relevance	(Mason,	1996)	for	other	parties	(particularly	those	in	the	cleavage	representation	model)	and	indeed	for	the	theory	of	multi-speed	organising	more	generally.	This	study	is	therefore	not	generalising	to	a	wider	population	of	parties	but	
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generalising	to	a	set	of	theoretical	propositions;	the	case	is	an	experimental	unit	rather	than	a	sampling	unit.			The	same	logic	is	applied	to	the	individuals	within	the	case	study.	Individual	party	members,	though	acting	as	multiple	cases	within	the	single	case	study,	are	not	sample	units	but	rather	individual	experimental	units.	These	experimental	units	are	used	to	develop	a	theory	which	is	then	tested	on	subsequent	units.	Embedding	‘replication	logic’	with	the	multiple-case	section	of	the	research	creates	the	right	conditions	for	analytic	generalisation	and	enhances	the	external	validity	of	its	findings	(Yin,	1994).	The	research	is	not	generalising	characteristics	to	the	broader	population	of	all	active	members	but	developing	an	understanding	of	the	attitudes,	identities	and	motivations	of	this	group;	an	understanding	that	provides	the	basis	for	further	statistical	testing.		Exploring	and	explaining	the	multi-speed	membership	model	in	the	context	of	a	single	party	(one	which	contains	all	the	critical	features	of	a	multi-speed	party)	creates	the	ideal	analytic	conditions	to	test	and	refine	the	theory.			
3.3	 Data	collection,	tools	and	methods	
	The	research	takes	a	mixed	methods	approach	to	data	collection	and	analysis.	This	provides	a	picture	of	the	multi-speed	membership	strategy	operating	at	different	levels	of	the	organisation	and	from	different	perspectives.	However,	whilst	examining	the	Labour	Party	case	in	detail,	the	research	does	not	provide	a	full	ethnographic	study	of	the	organisation.	Instead	this	research	uses	the	methods	appropriate	to	test	each	of	the	research	sub-questions	individually	and	in	context.	These	methods	differ	because	the	nature	of	the	object	under	analysis	in	the	separate	questions	also	varies.			The	research	employs	elite	interviews	combined	with	documentary	evidence,	individual	member	(semi-biographical)	interviews	and	a	preliminary	element	of	(micro-ethnographic)	observation	within	a	single	constituency	party.	Different	tools	for	data	collection	have	been	employed	for	different	parts	of	the	research	questions.			
3.3.1	 Data	collection	-	Q1	‘why	change’	
	
Elite	Interviews		
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Elite	interviews	were	used	to	answer	questions	about	the	party’s	strategies	and	the	influence	of	party	ideology	and	party	type	on	these	strategies.	This	section	of	the	case	study	asks	how	organisational	challenges	are	understood	and	acted	upon.	In	answering	the	question	of	why	parties	are	adopting	multi-speed	membership	strategies	(Q1)	the	research	considers	what	role	ideology	plays	and	how	that	is	balanced	against	organisational	needs.			The	research	explores	how	elites	view	the	potential	consequences	of	multi-speed	membership	and	what	role	ideology	and	issues	of	legitimacy	play	in	this	assessment.	Both	questions	are	questions	of	values	and	their	place	in	decision-making	and	as	such,	require	a	focus	on	the	meaning	individuals	give	to	events	and	processes.			Elite	interviews	are	a	standard	and	effective	method	for	analysing	complex	decision-making	within	a	single	case.	Elite	interviews	draw	out	where	key	party	actors	place	the	emphasis	within	these	competing	demands	and	how	they	frame	issues	and	legitimise	their	decisions.	Interviewing	is	the	appropriate	choice	for	this	type	of	enquiry	and	semi-structured	interviews	provided	the	right	degree	of	flexibility	in	this	context.		
Documentary	evidence		To	support	the	elite	interviews,	documentary	evidence	in	the	form	of	NEC	minutes,	blogs	and	official	party	documents	was	used	to	corroborate	the	detail	of	events	and	understand	the	context	in	which	they	occur.	The	research	focuses	on	official	documents,	consultations	and	meetings	of	key	decision	makers	and	their	personal	writings	on	the	subject.	Documents	are	also	particularly	useful	sources	of	party	rhetoric;	having	been	constructed	for	the	public	domain	they	are	direct	insights	into	party	actors’	understanding	of	the	issue	and	how	they	want	the	world	to	view	their	understanding	of	it.	Party	rhetoric	is	in	this	sense	a	‘direct	indicator	of	a	party’s	conscious	and	calculated	response	to	[	]	social	norms’	(Gauja,	2013,	p.34).	It	reveals	party	elites’	understandings	of	pressures	within	and	without:	the	changing	expectations	of	political	participants	contrasted	to	the	pressures	within	the	party.	Documents	reveal	how	the	party	understands	the	relationship	between	support	and	membership	and	the	role	of	ideology	in	shaping	their	response.			Official	texts	are	not	neutral	sources	of	information	and	in	this	research	context	that	is	a	strength.	The	ideologies	and	values	that	such	documents	contain	and	promote	are	of	central	interest	to	the	research	question;	what	the	party	wants	the	world	to	see	is	precisely	what	the	research	seeks	to	understand.	The	research	also	specifically	seeks	to	
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understand	the	tensions	and	conflicts	within	organisational	decisions:	how	these	are	understood	and	what	issues	are	emphasised	or	marginalised.	Party	actors’	personal	writings	are	useful	in	this	context,	revealing	how	different	key	individuals	draw	on	different	discourses	to	legitimise	or	delegitimise	certain	positions	or	actions.			
3.3.2	 Data	collection	-	Q2	‘what	consequences’			
	
Member	interviews		The	consequences	of	multi-speed	membership	are	explored	through	the	eyes	of	the	members	themselves.	In	order	to	understand	the	relationship	between	members	and	their	party,	there	is	a	need	to	look	in	more	depth	at	how	members	come	to	join,	why	they	join,	what	they	do,	and	crucially,	how	that	relationship	develops.	Only	with	this	level	of	detail	can	an	assessment	be	made	about	how	multi-speed	organising	affects	partisan	attitudes	and	behaviours.	Member	interviews	focused	on	the	nature	of	members’	relationship	with	the	party	at	the	national	and	local	level.	They	explored	the	attitudes,	motivations	and	political	activities	of	members	(particularly	those	engaged	in	face-to-face,	high-intensity	activity).		In-depth	interviews	with	party	members	add	another	level	of	detail	to	our	understanding	of	party	membership	gained	from	survey	data.	They	enable	us	to	fully	understand	the	complex	motivation	structures	behind	party	membership	and	activism.	Examining	members’	attitudes,	attachments	and	activity	over	time	(in-and-out	of	the	party,	between	active	and	passive	engagement)	helps	to	see	party	activity	in	the	fluid	and	dynamic	sense	that	Scarrow’s	‘quantum	model’	suggests	(2015).	Whilst	not	a	longitudinal	study,	this	research	taps	into	these	dynamics	by	taking	a	biographical	approach	to	interviews.			In	adopting	elements	of	a	biographical	approach,	the	interviews	sought	to	draw	out	interviewees’	stories	about	their	relationship	to	politics,	activism	and	party	politics	over	the	course	of	their	lives.	This	narrative	approach	to	the	interviews	uncovers	both	the	movement	between	categories	of	support	and	the	values,	attitudes	and	motivations	underpinning	the	interviewees’	political	behaviours.	By	encouraging	interviewees	to	place	their	current	political	activity	in	context	of	their	political	activity	over	a	lifetime,	the	interviews	reveal	members’	relationship	to	politics	and	the	party.	Interviewees	were	encouraged	to	reconstruct	the	story	of	their	political	activism	from	the	beginning	up	to	their	engagement	in	the	current	campaign.	Interviews	explored	participants’	routes	to	political	and	partisan	activity:	when,	how	and	why	they	joined,	their	expectations	and	first	
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impressions,	what	they	did,	what	they	do,	and	what	it	means	to	them	to	be	a	party	member.		
	Whilst	largely	biographical	and	led	by	the	interviewee,	the	interviews	were	semi-structured	in	order	to	keep	within	the	issues	of	interest.	However,	it	was	also	important	to	maintain	space	within	the	interview	for	participants	to	introduce	issues	and	concepts	that	were	not	already	addressed	in	the	literature.		The	biographical	approach	used	in	the	interviews	also	facilitated	an	analysis	of	party	exit.	Analysing	exit	typically	presents	practical	challenges:	it	is	far	easier	to	locate	and	survey	current	party	members	than	ex-ones,	especially	as	party	member	surveys	are	often	based	on	member	lists	provided	by	the	parties	themselves.	Surveying	party	member	exit	therefore	usually	requires	either	a	panel	survey	or	analysis	of	current	party	members’	
willingness	to	leave.	A	biographical	approach	in	interviews	can	not	only	capture	the	fluidity	in	members’	party	attachments,	it	resolves	the	practical	issue	of	locating	ex-members:	many	one-time	ex-members	are	current	members.			Issues	of	recall	of	course	have	an	impact	on	the	accuracy	of	the	descriptions.	In	asking	these	types	of	questions	it	was	important	to	acknowledge	that	time	has	an	effect	on	these	relationships,	that	memory	can	fail,	motivations	change,	and	that	the	present	shapes	how	the	past	is	understood	and	explained.	Authors	of	major	quantitative	studies	in	this	field	also	acknowledge	the	difficulties	asking	participants	about	motivations.	In	their	seminal	work	on	civic	participation,	Verba,	Schlozman	and	Brady	(1995)	recognise	the	influence	perceived	current	benefits	of	participation	can	have	on	reflections	of	past	incentives.	However,	they	conclude	that	such	reports	are,	‘at	a	minimum,	meaningful	contemporary	interpretations	of	past	activity,	respondents’	current	understanding	of	the	gratifications	attendant	to	participation’	(Verba	et	al.,	1995).	They	argue	that	as	well	as	indicating	reasons	activists	may	have	for	participating	again	in	future,	respondents’	‘rhetoric	of	participation’	reveals	the	culture	of	civic	participation	at	work.			These	interviews	sought	to	look	beyond	initial	responses	to	reveal	the	relationships	and	attitudes	underpinning	behaviours	and	to	remedy	some	of	the	category	issues	in	survey	data.	Taking	an	interpretivist	and	individualised	look	at	party	membership,	by	setting	the	act	of	joining	the	party	in	the	context	of	interviewees’	political	lives	and	giving	interviewees	the	opportunity	to	talk	in	depth	about	their	party	membership,	these	interviews	offer	a	more	rounded,	detailed	and	arguably	accurate	picture	of	the	motivation	
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structure	behind	party	membership.	In	this	way,	the	reconstruction	of	past	incentives	in	light	of	benefits	accrued	since	joining	tells	us	something	interesting	about	how	party	membership	shapes	participants,	about	how	their	relationship	with	the	party	develops	and	what	persuades	party	members	to	stay	(or	leave).	In	this	way,	the	rhetoric	of	party	membership	tells	us	a	great	deal	about	the	culture	of	party	participation.			Examining	the	narratives	that	politically	active	citizens	develop	to	explain	their	political	lives	reveals	a	great	deal	about	the	nature	of	partisan	behaviour	and	helps	to	uncover	cultures	of	political	participation	within	the	party.	Understanding	the	nature	of	partisan	attachment	in	this	depth	therefore	enables	a	more	detailed	assessment	of	the	impact	of	multi-speed	changes	to	party	organisation.			
Observation	and	participation	The	study	employed	some	observation	and	participation	at	the	initial	stages	to	scope	out	the	conditions	and	context	of	the	research.	Whilst	stopping	short	(for	practical	as	well	as	methodological	reasons)	from	a	full	ethnographic	study,	participant	observation	was	included	as	a	complementary	method	to	improve	understanding	of	the	daily	operation	of	the	research	context.	Observation	was	overt	and	with	the	consent	of	gatekeepers.	It	also	helped	to	build	relationships	in	advance	of	member	interviews.			An	individual	constituency	party	campaign	provided	the	initial	site	of	observation.	Constituency	Labour	Parties	are	a	mini-ecosystem	of	the	party	at	the	local	level,	with	a	range	of	actors	in	different	roles	and	with	different	links	to	the	national	party.	They	are	also	the	site	of	most	members’	party	activity.	Interviews	with	key	individuals	who	were	involved	in	campaigning	and	organising	members	and	supporters	formed	a	key	part	of	the	observation	strategy.	This	process	revealed	the	practical	operation	of	some	elements	of	the	multi-speed	membership	strategy.	It	revealed	the	priorities	of	the	party	at	the	local	level	and	helped	answer	contextual	questions	about	the	multi-speed	strategy,	for	instance,	whether	there	is	an	emphasis	on	activity	over	category	of	supporter	and	whether	there	is	a	drive	to	move	supporters	to	membership.	Observation	also	revealed	how	the	member/non-member	relationship	is	managed	at	the	local	level.		This	period	of	participant	observation	also	provided	context	for	the	individual	elements	in	the	research	design.	It	helped	refine	the	member	interview	questions	and	gave	some	empirical	shape	to	the	issues	raised	in	the	theory.		
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3.3.3	 Sampling	strategy		
	The	rationale	for	selecting	the	British	Labour	Party	as	the	primary	case	has	already	been	outlined.	This	next	section	will	discuss	the	theoretical	rationale	for	selecting	the	units	within	this	case,	both	at	the	elite	level	and	the	embedded	subunits.	Because	the	research	employs	different	methods	and	different	sources	of	data	generation	there	are	different	sampling	strategies	for	each.		
	
Elite	interviews	–	purposive	sample.		The	elites	selected	for	interview	were	chosen	by	reputational	and	positional	criteria.	There	are	a	few	key	figures	who	are	known	to	have	been	centrally	involved	in	Refounding	Labour	and	the	Collins	Review	and	whose	position	gives	them	decision-making	responsibility	in	the	organisational	structure.			
Documents			The	beginning	of	the	‘Refounding	Labour’	process	creates	the	first	boundary	for	document	case	selection	and	the	ratification	of	the	Collins	Review	the	end	point.	These	two	party-wide	consultation	processes	(conducted	online	and	in	public	and	private	meetings)	create	a	substantial	amount	of	written	material,	from	official	documents	to	individual	member	blogs,	as	well	as	a	number	of	consultation	submissions	from	individuals,	CLPs	and	party	affiliated	groups.	Yet	whilst	a	lot	has	been	written	about	the	process,	the	research	was	focused	on	particular	elements	of	it	(namely	those	relating	to	supporters	and	political	rights).	This	tighter	focus	reduced	the	amount	of	relevant	material.	Likewise,	there	is	a	small	group	of	key	individuals	who	would	be	considered	to	have	direct	influence	on	the	strategy	under	analysis	which	further	reduced	the	volume	of	relevant	material.			
Observation	(CLP/campaign)	The	choice	of	Constituency	Labour	Party	and	campaign	depended	largely	on	access,	permission	and	timing.	The	CLP	is	not	itself	the	case	being	researched	and	therefore	any	constituency	involved	in	campaigning	would	have	provided	a	suitable	test.	The	CLP	selected	was	a	marginal	seat	in	a	constituency	with	a	large	party	membership	which	provided	a	particularly	useful	site	for	observing	the	operation	of	the	multi-speed	elements	of	a	constituency	campaign.			
Party	members	–	theoretical	and	snowball.	
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The	selection	of	individual	party	members	did	not	follow	any	particular	sampling	frame	as	these	members	act	as	individual	cases	not	a	representative	sample.	Question	2	is	concerned	with	comparing	attitudes,	experiences	and	values:	characteristics	not	captured	by	a	sampling	strategy.			The	exploratory	nature	of	this	part	of	the	research	also	meant	that	the	choice	of	individuals	needed	to	be	directed	as	the	theory	emerged.	However,	some	characteristics	were	important	in	selecting	individuals	in	the	first	round	of	interviews.	Active	members	contribute	most	to	the	party’s	organisational	goals	and	were	therefore	an	important	focus	for	the	research	question.	Additionally,	some	characteristics	(such	as	age	and	gender)	are	important	in	political	participation	and	therefore	the	sample	of	member	interviews	needed	to	ensure	some	variation	along	these	lines.	Length	of	membership	was	also	an	important	consideration.	After	the	first	round	of	interviews,	additional	interviews	were	sought	with	members	with	longer	histories	of	party	membership	in	order	to	test	particular	aspects	of	the	party	relationship	emerging	from	the	data.			The	data	for	Question	2	of	the	study	was	drawn	from	interviews	with	30	UK	Labour	Party	members.	Interviewees	were	aged	between	18	and	80	with	roughly	equal	numbers	aged	under	45	and	45-and-over	(14	under	45;	16,	45	and	over).	Though	the	group	of	interviewees	is	fairly	representative	of	party	members	in	terms	of	age	they	were	more	female	than	average10	(17	women;	13	men).		All	interviewees	were,	or	had	been,	active	in	the	party	at	one	stage	of	their	lives.	They	all	had	contributed	more	to	the	party	than	simply	paying	their	membership	fee.	All	interviewees	had	at	some	stage	been	active	in	campaigning	(offline),	regularly	attending	meetings	or	had	stood	as	representatives	of	the	party:	activities	defined	as	‘high	intensity’	(see	section	3.1.2	on	definitions).	Some	currently,	or	had	in	the	past,	held	elected	positions,	paid	party	positions,	voluntary	party	positions	or	trade	unions	positions.	Some	were	recent	joiners,	others	members	for	over	five	decades.			The	initial	interview	participants	were	sourced	through	contact	on	a	single	constituency	General	Election	campaign	but	through	snowballing	reached	party	members	and	supporters	from	thirteen	separate	Constituency	Labour	Parties	across	five	regions	(two	nations)	of	the	UK.	Though	the	current	geographical	location	of	many	member	
                                                          
10 Research	puts	the	mean	age	of	Labour	Party	members	at	51	and	the	composition	of	membership	61.6%	male	(Webb,	Poletti	&	Bale	(2017)) 
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interviewees	is	the	South	East,	most	participants	had	been	members	in	more	than	one	constituency	over	the	course	of	their	membership,	often	in	different	parts	of	the	country.	The	geographical	spread	of	the	sample	is	therefore	wider	than	it	appears.			The	post-election	period	saw	the	election	of	a	more	left-wing	leader,	an	increase	in	membership	and	also	an	increasing	sense	of	factionalism	in	the	party.	These	contextual	changes	meant	that	additional	attention	to	participants’	political	views	was	necessary	to	avoid	an	ideological	bias	in	the	findings.	Both	supporters	of	the	new	leader	and	those	who	did	not	vote	for	him	were	interviewed	in	the	round	of	interviews	after	the	2015	leadership	election.		The	list	of	member	interviewees	is	provided	in	table	2	in	the	appendix.			
3.3.4	 Context	and	time	boundary	
	The	temporal	boundary	of	the	case	study	begins	with	the	‘Refounding	Labour’	process	(initiated	in	November	2010	which	led	to	a	change	in	the	Labour	party	rule	book	in	2011)	and	ends	a	year	after	the	second	leadership	election	(held	in	September	2016)	following	changes	to	leadership	selection	rules	(ratified	in	2014).		
	The	fieldwork	for	the	study	began	in	March	2015	at	the	beginning	of	the	short	campaign	for	the	2015	General	Election.	This	General	Election	campaign	was	the	first	to	be	held	after	the	initial	reforms	to	party	affiliation	and	provided	the	first	opportunity	to	observe	the	way	new	supporter	relationships	and	mechanisms	(‘multi-speed	organising’)	were	used	in	a	major	campaign.			The	first	round	of	member	interviews	began	shortly	after	Labour’s	election	defeat	in	the	2015	General	Election	and	continued	throughout	the	leadership	contest	(the	first	to	use	the	new	‘£3	supporter’	rules)	which	began	shortly	after,	concluding	in	September	2015.	In	2016	after	a	vote	of	no	confidence	in	the	leader,	a	second	leadership	election	was	held	concluding	in	September	2016.	Changes	to	the	new	rules	for	selecting	the	leader	were	introduced	for	this	second	election	and	were	being	considered	at	the	time	of	the	second	round	of	interviews	which	began	in	late	2015.			Interviews	with	elites	regarding	the	reforms	were	conducted	in	2017	following	the	snap	General	Election	in	June	that	year.	The	gap	between	the	first	outing	of	the	new	rules	and	
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these	elite	interviews	enabled	a	more	retrospective	assessment	of	the	reforms.	By	interviewing	two	years	after	the	new	rules	were	first	used,	the	issues	and	outcomes,	which	were	initially	highly	controversial	within	the	party,	were	regarded	with	less	sensitivity	and	therefore	created	a	more	open	environment	for	discussion.				
3.3.5	 Procedures		
	Following	ethical	review	and	permissions,	the	fieldwork	for	the	study	was	arranged	through	a	single	constituency	party	who	granted	permission	for	observer	participation	during	the	2015	General	Election	campaign.	This	period	acted	as	a	learning	process,	observing	how	supporters	were	involved	in	campaigns	and	how	new	online	tools	and	organisational	practices	were	employed.	As	the	busiest	and	most	active	period	for	party	campaigners,	the	General	Election	provided	an	ideal	moment	to	observe	the	party	in	action.	A	diary	of	this	period	was	kept	for	analysing	after	the	campaign.	These	notes	provided	a	guide	for	understanding	the	contemporary	roles,	context	and	issues	of	a	constituency-level	campaign	in	order	to	develop	appropriate	questions	for	the	member	interviews.			The	first	round	of	interviews	with	members	followed	the	General	Election,	initially	with	members	who	had	worked	on	the	campaign.	The	constituency	selected	was	a	marginal	target	seat	in	2015,	and	the	party	had	encouraged	members	from	neighbouring	constituencies	to	travel	to	campaign	there.	So	whilst	the	campaign	context	was	the	same	for	many	of	the	first	interviewees,	they	had	experience	of	membership	of	different	constituencies	outside	of	the	election.	Snowballing	was	used	to	reach	other	member	interviewees	from	across	the	country.			After	these	interviews	were	analysed,	a	second	round	of	interviewees	were	sought	to	test	and	develop	the	emerging	theory.	The	questions	for	these	interviews	were	refined	to	reflect	the	emerging	issues	of	interest.	The	emerging	theory	also	helped	direct	the	selection	of	members	(see	sampling	strategy	section).			
3.4	 Analysis	
	The	research	was	designed	to	test	and	expand	a	theory	within	a	single	case.	However,	within	this	single	case	are	embedded	units	of	analysis	and	the	theory	contains	multiple	research	sub-questions.	A	mixed-methods	approach	was	deemed	the	best	way	of	
 58 
answering	the	different	research	sub-questions	contained	within	the	single	case	study	(different	questions	explore	different	objects	and	therefore	require	different	methods).	A	mixed-method	approach	considerably	bolsters	the	construct	validity	of	the	research	as	a	whole	but	does	present	a	challenge	for	analysis	of	the	data.	There	is	a	risk	in	multi-layered,	embedded	unit,	single	case	studies	of	analysing	the	component	parts	without	returning	the	focus	to	the	unit	as	a	whole.	Likewise,	the	various	methods	need	to	be	drawn	together	coherently	to	allow	for	theoretical	generalisation.			Below	I	outline	the	primary	and	secondary	methods	of	analysis	used	in	the	component	parts	of	the	research	and	the	strategy	for	returning	to	the	higher	unit	level	of	the	case	study	in	order	to	avoid	fragmentation.		
	
3.4.1	 Analysis	Q1	(why	change?)	
	
Primary	methods			
Elite	Interviews/Document	analysis			The	elite	interviews	and	document	analysis	components	of	the	research	are	focused	on	understanding	both	the	processes	of	decision-making	and	pressures	that	informed	decision-making,	as	well	as	the	role	of	values	and	ideologies	in	shaping	those	outcomes.	The	accounts	given	in	interviews	are	themselves	the	object	of	the	research	revealing	key	actors’	values,	strategies	and	in	particular,	how	they	frame	these	within	the	context	of	organisational	ideology	and	social	expectation.	The	interviews	need	not	serve	as	second-hand	proof	of	events	(documentary	evidence	will	be	used	to	understand	the	course	of	events)	but	rather	read	interpretively	for	evidence	of	how	actors	understand	the	issues	(Mason,	1996)	and	events.			A	narrative	approach	to	both	the	interviews	and	analysis	was	employed	in	this	section	of	the	research.	‘Narratives	of	legitimacy’	are	centrally	important	in	the	first	research	question.	The	interview	schedule	was	therefore	designed	to	talk	through	events,	decisions	and	actions	in	a	chronological	order	to	focus	on	the	data	as	a	story	and	how	the	teller	of	that	story	makes	sense	of	it.	In	line	with	a	narrative	approach,	these	interviews	were	not	coded	or	broken	down	into	segments,	though	quotes	are	used	illustratively.			The	strategy	of	focusing	on	the	accounts	actors	give	as	the	research	object	has	particular	utility	in	elite	interviews	where	there	can	be	pressures	to	downplay	or	make	greater	claim	
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to	specific	versions	of	events,	especially	when	those	involved	are,	‘talking	about	their	work	and,	as	such,	justifying	what	they	do’	(Berry,	2002).	Analysis	of	elite	interviews	needs	to	acknowledge	that	those	involved	in	making	decisions	have	an	interest	in	justifying	their	activity	and	decisions,	securing	a	legacy	for	their	work.	However,	it	is	those	very	justifications	that	are	of	interest	in	this	research.	In	answering	‘why	change’,	the	strategies	of	the	actors	involved	and	the	justifications	given,	are	as	important	as	the	‘facts’	of	the	event	itself.	In	this	research,	these	justifications	reveal	where	the	pressures	for	change	or	continuity	lie.			
Secondary	method		
	
Pattern	matching	To	draw	these	component	methods	together	and	analyse	whether	the	empirical	evidence	matches	the	theory,	a	strategy	of	pattern	matching	is	used	as	a	secondary	analytical	method.	Pattern	matching,	first	identified	by	Campbell	(1975)	though	not	labelled	as	such,	provides	a	particularly	useful	approach	for	within-case	study	research.	It	is	a	process	that	enables	the	researcher	to	relate	different	pieces	of	data	to	a	larger	theory	(Yin,	1994),	synthesising	and	analysing	varied	methods.	Pattern	matching	is	a	secondary	method	of	analysis	(Lange,	2013)	which	draws	together	different	primary	methods	and	in	that	process	explores	whether	the	‘pattern’	of	the	primary	data	matches	the	‘pattern’	suggested	by	the	theory.	Because	most	theories	contain	more	than	one	key	proposition,	pattern	matching	enables	the	whole	theory	to	be	tested	within	a	single	case	and	thereby,	‘provide	multiple	points	of	insight	into	the	validity	of	a	theory’	(Lange,	2013).			A	‘rival	explanations	as	patterns’	(Yin,	1994)	form	of	pattern	matching	is	employed.	This	method	of	analysis	is	appropriate	for	assessment	of	the	independent	variables	of	the	question	(how	it	has	occurred	as	opposed	to	what	has	occurred).	In	this	form	of	pattern	matching,	alternative	explanations	for	the	phenomenon	are	tested	against	the	empirical	data	to	see	which	explanation	fits	best.			The	multi-speed	membership	theory	provides	several	propositions	to	explain	why	parties	adopt	multi-speed	membership	approaches.	However,	there	are	other	theories	of	party	change	that	provide	additional	or	alternative	explanatory	variables.	These	variables	or	propositions	are	‘pattern	matched’	with	the	evidence	found.	The	research	analyses	whether	they	match,	challenge	or	result	in	a	refinement	of	the	theory	of	‘why’	multi-speed	membership.		
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3.4.2	 Analysis	Q2	(what	consequences?)		Question	2	is	exploratory	in	nature;	the	impact	of	multi-speed	organising	on	members	is	not	known.	Though	the	theory	suggests	that	tensions	would	emerge,	the	full	implications	of	multi-speed	organising	for	members	has	yet	to	be	examined.	This	section	of	the	research	employs	an	explanation-building	analytical	strategy	based	on	grounded	theory	(Glaser	and	Strauss,	1967)	to	develop	new	theory,	as	well	as	elements	of	analytic	induction	to	test	established	theory	where	it	exists.			The	supply	side	of	the	research	is	focused	on	party	members’	relationship	with	the	party	and	membership	itself.	This	research	question	involves	two	types	of	inductive	analysis.	As	well	as	adding	to	what	is	already	known	about	party	member	activities	and	attitudes	from	quantitative	studies,	the	interviews	were	designed	to	facilitate	an	inductive	reading	drawing	out	aspects	of	party	members’	relationship	which	may	have	been	overlooked.	In	this	way,	analysis	of	the	member	interviews	was	both	concept	driven	and	data	driven:	concept	driven	where	there	are	established	theories	to	guide	the	analysis,	and	data	driven	in	areas	where	theory	is	less	well	developed.			Concept	driven	analysis	Interviews	with	party	members	sought	to	establish	the	key	activities	and	attitudes	that	constitute	the	mechanics	of	party	membership:	why	members	joined,	how	they	joined,	what	activities	they	engage	in.	These	elements	of	party	membership	are	well	researched	quantitatively;	we	know	a	great	deal	about	the	incentives	that	encourage	party	members	to	join	and	what	activities	they	engage	in.	From	these	studies	there	are	established	categories	of	incentives	and	activity.	However,	there	are	aspects	of	party	member	motivations	and	attitudes	which	are	not	amenable	to	quantitative	analysis	and	which	this	research	sought	to	uncover.	Therefore,	whilst	also	testing	established	theories	in	this	area,	the	research	needed	to	leave	space	for	new	or	alternative	categories	to	emerge.			A	process	of	analytic	induction	was	employed	to	test	existing	theories	in	this	area.	This	section	of	the	research	started	with	established	hypotheses	about	the	nature	of	party	member	motivations	and	incentives.	The	coding	process	searched	for	deviant	cases	and	revised	the	hypotheses	where	deviant	cases	were	found.	The	terminology	used	for	the	categories	found	was	kept	consistent	with	established	work	in	this	field	whilst	not	limiting	categories	to	those	already	established	in	order	to	allow	new	concepts	to	emerge.	
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	Whilst	interview	data	was	coded	for	categories	of	incentive,	the	depth	of	interview	data	also	facilitated	an	analysis	of	member	motivations	and	joining	incentives	as	a	process	rather	than	singular	cause.	Reviewing	how	and	why	members	joined	as	a	narrative	(as	well	as	individual	motivations)	revealed	how	the	individual	incentives	link	together,	revealing	overlapping	and	multiple	motivations	and	new	insights	into	why	members	join.					
Data	driven	analysis	Looking	beyond	the	mechanics	of	party	membership,	the	member	interviews	sought	to	better	understand	the	relationship	party	members	have	with	their	party:	what	keeps	them	active,	what	stops	them	leaving,	how	they	feel	about	the	party	and	the	changes	it	makes.	The	effects	of	multi-speed	organising	on	members	has	room	for	development	therefore	Question	2	is	designed	to	be	exploratory.	This	section	of	the	research	employs	an	explanation-building	analytical	strategy	based	on	grounded	theory	(Glaser	and	Strauss,	1967).	This	is	a	hypothesis-generating	strategy	in	which	interview	data	collection	and	analysis	occur	in	parallel.	The	emerging	concepts	and	categories	were	drawn	from	the	data	itself	with	no	existing	analytical	framework.			Figure	1	shows	how	the	interview	data	is	analysed	concurrently	with	the	testing	and	developing	of	the	theory.		
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Figure	1:	Grounded	theory	process	
	
3.4.3.	 Grounded	theory	approach	
	Grounded	theory	provides	the	tools	to	draw	theory	from	the	data	in	an	iterative	approach	in	which	data	analysis	and	data	collection	occur	in	parallel.	The	constant	comparative	method	employed	in	the	grounded	theory	process	ensures	a	close	connection	between	the	data	and	theoretical	conceptualisation.	This	research	employed	the	main	tools	and	procedures	associated	with	the	grounded	theory	approach	(of	which	there	are	a	range	of	versions	(Bryman,	2008))	to	develop	new	concepts	and	theories	around	membership.	This	second	part	of	Question	2	differs	from	the	analytical	induction	approach	employed	in	the	first	part	of	the	question	(concerning	motivations	and	incentives).	It	does	not	start	with	a	hypothesis	or	established	set	of	propositions/categories	to	confirm	or	refine	but	rather	approaches	the	data	openly	to	see	what	concepts	emerge	from	the	data.		
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	The	key	feature	of	the	grounded	theory	approach	is	the	close	connection	between	data	and	conceptualisation	through	constant	comparison	of	concepts,	categories	and	their	indicators	in	the	interview	data.	In	grounded	theory,	early	coding	directs	the	choice	of	further	sample	data.	In	this	study,	I	have	reduced	this	part	of	the	approach	to	a	two-step	process	in	which	the	concepts	emerging	from	the	first	round	of	interviews	directed	the	second	round	of	interviews.			The	stages	of	this	approach	are	highlighted	in	figure	1.	Interview	data	was	collected,	transcribed	and	coded	in	parallel.	Codes	in	the	grounded	theory	approached	are	flexible,	allowing	for	revision	as	new	data	is	inputted.	They	operate	as	indicators	of	potential	concepts	at	the	early	stage	and	are	open	to	as	many	new	concepts	as	possible.	A	more	focused	coding	procedure	is	then	used	in	later	stages	to	develop	categories	and	their	properties.			Concepts	or	labels	representing	discrete	phenomena	(e.g,	loyalty,	emotion,	skills)	were	produced	through	open	coding.	From	these	concepts,	higher	level	categories	(expressive	attachment,	social	networks)	encompassing	one	or	more	concepts,	were	established	(coding	grids	are	presented	within	the	empirical	chapter	texts	which	set	out	the	categories,	concepts	and	properties	developed).	The	first	round	of	interviews	were	then	re-analysed	to	see	how	well	they	corresponded	to	the	emerging	categories.	From	this	process	of	coding,	and	in	line	with	grounded	theory,	two	types	of	category	emerge:	those	abstracted	from	the	language	of	the	members	interviewed	(e.g.,	‘hanging	in’)	and	those	constructed	in	the	process	of	assessing	the	theoretical	properties	of	the	categories	(e.g,	forms	of	socialisation).	Those	abstracted	from	the	situation	form	labels	for	behaviours	whilst	those	constructed	form	the	explanation	of	the	behaviours	(Glaser	and	Strauss,	1967).			These	categories	then	formed	the	first	hypotheses	which	directed	both	the	interview	schedule	and	the	choice	of	participant	for	the	second	round	of	interviews.	Categories	emerging	from	the	first	stage	suggested	that	loyalty	and	socialisation	were	significant	and	so	party	members	with	longer	memberships	were	sought	for	the	second	round	of	interviews	in	order	to	test	the	emerging	theory.			The	process	began	again	with	the	second	round	of	interviews.	This	data	was	compared	against	the	existing	categories	whilst	also	openly	coded	for	new	concepts.	The	categories	
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were	developed	and	refined	in	this	second	round	of	interviews	until	no	further	insights	could	be	gained	and	the	hypotheses	could	be	stated.			
3.4.4.	 Organisation,	transcription,	software	
	A	fieldwork	diary	was	kept	during	the	participant	observation	phase	of	the	research.	These	notes	were	collated	thematically,	analysed	and	used	to	direct	the	interview	question	guide	for	the	first	interview	phase	of	the	research.			Interviews	with	members	were	recorded,	and	then	transcribed	in	full,	as	close	to	the	time	of	interview	as	possible.	Interview	transcripts	were	anonymised	(see	ethical	considerations,	section	3.5),	assigned	a	number,	and	then	uploaded	to	Nvivo.	Only	age,	gender,	length	of	party	membership	and	region	were	retained	as	participant	information.			Each	interview	was	read,	re-read	and	then	coded	according	to	emerging	concepts	and	categories	in	Nvivo	(see	description	of	approach	above).	Coding	grids	for	each	of	the	substantive	concepts	are	given	in	chapters	5	and	6.		
3.4.5.	 Analysis	–	party	level	
	In	the	concluding	analysis,	the	various	components	are	drawn	together	to	assess	how	well	the	findings	match	the	propositions	(see	pattern-matching	section)	contained	within	multi-speed	membership	theory	and	where	new	concepts	can	help	refine	our	understanding.	Returning	to	the	primary	unit	of	analysis	(the	party)	the	research	concludes	by	making	an	assessment	at	the	highest	unit	level	of	the	causes	and	implications	of	multi-speed	membership.			
3.5	 Ethical	considerations	
	
3.5.1	 Anonymity		
	
Interviews	In	the	case	of	elite	interviews,	the	position	someone	holds	is	of	relevance	to	the	data	they	provide.	Because	of	this,	interviewees	were	asked	to	waive	anonymity	(given	the	positions	are	usually	held	by	a	single	person,	it	would	be	difficult	to	ensure	anonymity).	However,	
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participants	in	the	elite	interviews	were	given	several	options	in	relation	to	their	anonymity	and	data.		Participants	were	given	a	consent	form	explaining	clearly	their	options	regarding	anonymity.	They	were	offered	a	range	of	options	for	the	information	disclosed	about	them	and	were	made	fully	aware	of	the	purposes	of	the	project	and	use	made	of	their	data.	They	were	also	given	the	opportunity	to	review	the	data	(quotes	used).	In	some	cases,	the	option	of	reviewing	the	data	to	be	made	public	was	taken	up.	This	added	to	the	construct	validity	of	the	research	by	adding	a	key	informant	review	stage	in	the	analysis.			To	help	participants	in	their	understanding	of	the	project	(in	order	that	they	can	fully	assess	what	level	of	anonymity	they	may	want),	a	guide	to	the	issues	for	discussion	and	types	of	questions	in	the	interview	were	made	available	in	advance.			Party	members	were	not	asked	to	waive	anonymity	and	a	number	of	steps	have	been	taken	to	ensure	that	they	are	not	identifiable.	Only	the	very	basic	data	about	the	individuals	involved	has	been	recorded	(age,	gender,	length	of	party	membership,	type	of	job/position	in	the	party	and	region).	Given	the	small	number	of	activists	involved	in	some	CLPs	it	was	important	to	ensure	participants	could	not	be	identified	through	the	constituency	and	this	meant	anonymising	the	CLP	and	other	geographical	information	that	could	identify	their	location.	Constituency	Labour	Party	details	were	removed	from	the	individual	transcripts.	Additional	details	in	the	interview	data	that	could	locate	an	individual	or	identify	them	(such	as	discussion	of	the	nature	of	the	constituency,	the	MP,	the	area)	was	also	anonymised.			During	data	transcription	and	analysis,	participants	were	assigned	a	code	ID.	As	with	elite	interviews,	it	was	made	clear	to	the	interviewee	that	they	had	the	opportunity	to	review	their	data	or	get	in	touch	regarding	their	data	at	any	point	after	the	interview.			
Overt	observation	During	the	participant	observation	stage,	the	researcher’s	role	and	purpose	was	made	explicit	to	other	volunteers	and	party	employees.	It	was	agreed	that	this	role	would	not	be	highlighted	to	other	individuals	that	the	researcher	came	into	contact	with	during	activities	as	this	was	considered	detrimental	to	the	volunteers’	and	staffers’	work	and	these	other	individuals’	activities	were	not	being	observed	as	part	of	the	research.		
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3.6	 Trustworthiness,	validity,	reliability	and	credibility	
	Case	studies	have	particular	value	in	securing	construct	validity.	Multiple	sources	of	evidence,	appropriate	to	the	variables	of	interest,	add	strength	in	this	area.	Within	the	overarching	case,	the	two	core	research	questions,	being	explanatory	and	exploratory	respectively,	have	differing	approaches	and	therefore	different	tests	for	rigour.			The	use	of	multiple	sources	of	evidence	in	answering	Question	1	provides	strong	construct	validity.	The	two	main	sources	of	data	(elite	interviews	and	documentary	evidence)	are	used	to	corroborate	evidence	of	the	same	phenomena.	The	two	methods	are	particularly	suited	to	methodological	triangulation	in	this	research	as	they	are	both	designed	to	provide	data	of	the	same	research	objects	and	propositions.	Elite	interview	data	and	documentary	evidence	are	compared	to	see	if	they	support	the	same	findings	and	enhance	construct	validity.	The	use	of	pattern	matching	to	establish	the	causal	relationships	in	Question	1	also	bolsters	the	internal	validity	of	the	case	study.			This	case	study	is	not	making	claim	to	statistical	generalisation	but	theoretical	generalisation.	In	the	exploratory	section	of	the	research	(Question	2)	the	judgement	of	rigour	must	be	based	on	the	strategy	used	for	collecting,	coding	and	analysing	the	data.	Measures	of	rigour	such	as	sample	size	and	hypothesis	construction	do	not	apply	in	grounded	theory:	theoretical	sampling	does	not	provide	extensive	enough	data	to	provide	for	statistical	generalisation	to	a	population.	Nor	is	it	claimed	that	different	analysts	would	arrive	at	exactly	the	same	codes	independently.	Rather	the	process	is	flexible	enough	to	enable	theory	generation	which	can	be	tested	subsequently.	The	close	connection	between	data	and	theory	in	this	inductive	approach	avoids	the	potential	for	inaccurate	inference	from	findings	to	theory,	a	risk	typical	in	deductive	analysis.			
3.7	 Potential	bias	and	limitations		
	This	case	study	does	more	than	analyse	a	single	period	of	change	within	a	specific	party.	By	using	this	instrumental	case	to	develop	a	theory,	this	research	has	developed	and	expanded	on	a	theory	of	party	change	that	could	be	applied	in	other	parties	and	other	case	studies.	However,	the	theory	generated	here	needs	to	be	taken	further	and	tested	in	other	cases.			
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Whilst	the	sample	of	members	interviewed	is	not	enough	to	generalise	to	the	population	of	party	members,	it	does	add	to	our	understanding	of	member	behaviours	and	attitudes	that	could	be	tested	quantitatively.	The	findings	on	members’	motivations,	attitudes	and	behaviours	presented	in	chapters	5,	6	and	7,	reveal	new	dimensions	in	the	member-party	relationship	that	provide	a	framework	for	future	member	surveys.	The	analysis	of	members’	joining	and	leaving	behaviours	specifically	look	at	gaps	in	existing	quantitative	research.	Having	filled	in	some	of	those	gaps,	the	next	step	would	be	to	integrate	them	into	quantitative	research.	By	highlighting	areas	where	existing	quantitative	studies	are	insufficient,	this	research	has	provided	a	map	for	areas	to	test	in	future.			By	taking	a	grounded	theory	approach	in	the	second	section	of	Question	2	of	the	case	study,	the	sample	of	members	is	tied	in	to	the	development	of	theory.	The	sample	is	dictated	by	the	point	at	which	theoretical	saturation	is	reached	(where	new	interviews	yield	no	further	categories)	and	therefore	there	is	nothing	to	suggest	that	further	interviews	would	add	to	the	theory.		One	of	the	common	problems	specific	to	the	inductive	section	of	this	research	(Q2)	is	that	grounded	theory	tends	to	produce	substantive	theory	–	relevant	to	the	specific	research	object	–	but	not	formal	theory	which	would	require	data	collected	in	alternative	settings	(such	as	other	parties,	other	countries).	Given	the	depth	of	this	research,	such	breadth	would	be	far	beyond	its	scope.	However,	this	research	has	gone	beyond	the	categorisation	of	data	to	produce	theories	that	are	appropriate	for	testing	in	other	settings	and	by	other	methods	in	future	research.	Yet	there	are	several	elements	of	this	case	that	would	not	be	applicable	in	other	parties.	Having	begun	life	as	a	party	without	individual	membership	and	having	a	strong	history	of	collective	affiliation,	the	Labour	Party	is	different	in	original	form	to	other	social-democratic	membership	parties	and	other	cleavage	representation	parties.	Debates	about,	and	struggles	over,	internal	democracy	also	have	a	pronounced	heritage	within	this	party	especially.	Whilst	the	rare	nature	of	the	party’s	experiments	in	opening	decision-making	are	helpful,	making	the	ideal	case	in	which	to	test	and	develop	theory	on	these	elements,	the	other	aspects	are	less	so.			Some	of	the	aspects	of	this	study	are	specific	to	a	very	tumultuous	and	difficult	time	within	the	party.	This	case	study	specifically	looked	at	contemporary	events	as	they	unfolded	and	interviewees	responses	will	undoubtedly	have	been	shaped	by	these	contemporary	events.	Whilst	this	does	not	affect	the	value	of	the	interviews	(interviewees’	immediate	reactions	to	the	changes	within	the	party	are	important)	it	does	mean	that	elements	of	the	
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research	would	be	difficult	to	replicate.	However,	the	theories	and	hypotheses	developed	are	testable	in	different	situations	and	at	different	times.				
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Chapter	4:	‘Why	Change’	
	
4.1	 Modelling	and	explaining	multi-speed	membership	
	When	Labour’s	leader	Ed	Miliband	took	to	the	platform	at	the	party’s	special	conference	in	2014,	he	introduced	the	changes	he	sought	ratification	for	as,	“the	biggest	changes	to	our	party	since	1918”.	What	he	was	asking	for	were	indeed	significant	changes	to	the	party.	These	reforms	moved	the	party	towards	a	more	open	form	of	party	organisation	that	would	place	Labour	at	the	more	extreme	end	of	plebiscitary	intra-party	democracy	(von	dem	Berge	and	Poguntke,	2017).	Though	in	line	with	a	general	shift	towards	greater	intra-party	democracy	and	wider	engagement	that	has	characterised	the	most	recent	period	of	development	in	party	organisation	(Leduc,	2001;	Scarrow	et	al.,	2002;	Kenig,	2009;	Cross	and	Blais,	2012;	Cross	and	Katz,	2013),	Labour’s	decision	to	open	leader	selection	to	non-members	was	a	step	further	than	most	parties	have	been	willing	to	go.	Why	would	Labour	take	such	a	decision,	and	how	did	the	party	end	up	with	this	specific	form	of	open	plebiscitary	intra-party	democracy?			This	chapter	takes	a	demand-side	lens	to	multi-speed	membership	asking	how	the	Labour	Party	arrived	at	this	particular	form	of	open	plebiscitary	intra-party	democracy	and	why.	The	chapter	first	sets	out	how	party	change	is	measured	and	understood,	then	creates	an	original	model	that	provides	a	framework	for	examining	multi-speed	change	in	a	single	party	case	study.	The	model	brings	together	environmental,	structural/party-type,	and	purposive-action	approaches	to	party	change,	in	order	to	facilitate	a	broad	and	deep	analysis	of	this	period	of	change	within	the	party	and	multi-speed	changes	more	broadly.	This	multi-level	framework	which	encompasses	political	environment,	party	environment	and	individual	factors	is	applied	to	the	events	leading	up	to	the	two	significant	rule	changes	within	the	party	that	ushered	in	a	more	multi-speed	membership	model.	This	rich	account	of	the	range	of	drivers	for	change	also	captures	forces	for	continuity	and	the	role	of	party	organisational	ideology	in	shaping	change,	thereby	creating	a	specific	multi-speed	framework	for	party	organisational	change.			The	analysis	draws	on	official	party	documents,	interviews	with	key	decision	makers	and	wider	written	resources	such	as	minutes	of	party	meeting	to	provide	a	thick	description	of	the	environment	for	change	and	the	key	moments	of	change,	as	well	as	capturing	the	
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rhetoric	employed	to	explain	and	promote	change,	and	the	norms	and	values	that	underlie	that	rhetoric.			This	approach	finds	that	whilst	an	environmental	reading	can	explain	the	first	set	of	party	reforms,	latter	reforms	are	better	explained	by	a	purposive-action	model.	However,	as	the	first	set	of	party	reforms	is	a	significant	explanatory	factor	in	the	latter	reforms,	a	multi-level	explanation	provides	the	best	fit	overall.	Structural	and	party-type	related	concerns	underlie	both	reforms	and	help	explain	both	the	direction	of	reform	and	its	limitations.			The	multi-level,	multi-speed	framework	developed	here	(which	captures	structures	and	agency,	pressures	for	change	and	pressures	for	continuity,	and	recognises	the	role	of	ideological	filters	as	well	as	rational	choice	in	decision-making)	provides	a	useful	model	for	understanding	multi-speed	change	in	parties.	By	putting	leader	and	elite	decision-making	at	the	centre,	this	model	provides	a	framework	for	understanding	not	just	the	conditions	for	change	but	why	change	happens,	and	indeed	what	limits	and	constrains	it.			
4.2	 Party	change		
	The	literature	on	party	change	offers	two	distinct	(though	not	necessarily	contradictory)	visions	of	parties	as	organisations:	the	party	as	gradually	evolving,	adapting	to	survive	(Katz	and	Mair,	1992,	1995;	Webb,	1994;	Dalton	et	al.,	2011)	and	the	party	as	naturally	conservative	organisation,	changing	abruptly	only	in	response	to	specific	stimuli	(Panebianco,	1988;	Harmel	and	Janda,	1994;	Wilson,	1994).	For	the	former,	party	change	(at	the	individual	rather	than	system	level)	is	continuous,	gradual	and	occurs	in	response	to	changes	in	the	external	environment.	This	environmental	approach	sees	the	party	as	shark-like,	continually	adapting	to	survive	(Dalton	et	al.,	2011).			Party	membership	is	one	area	in	which	parties’	adaptation	to	environmental	change	is	evidenced	(Dalton	et	al.,	2011).	The	mass	membership	model	itself	emerged	out	of	the	expansion	of	the	franchise	and	the	need	to	fund	party	organisation.	This	mass	model,	developing	from	parties	on	the	left	(‘the	concept	of	membership	is	a	result	of	the	evolution	which	led	from	the	cadre	party	to	the	mass	party’	(Duverger,	1959:63)),	was	replicated	by	other	parties	in	a	‘contagion	from	the	left’,	as	Duverger	coined	it	(1959).	The	mass	model	secured	funds	and	provided	democratic	linkage,	but	as	the	membership	environment	changed	so	too	did	parties’	models	of	organisation.	Changes	in	campaigning,	funding	and	the	use	of	technology	are	further	evidence	of	parties’	gradual	adaptation	to	environmental	
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changes	(Webb,	1994;	Scarrow,	1996;	Farrell	and	Webb,	2002).	The	notion	of	contagion	in	the	environmental	approach	is	also	noted	by	Scarrow	(2015)	who	argues	that	changes	(to	membership	rights	especially)	can	often	be	a	‘bandwagon	response	to	trends	in	technology	and	marketing’	(2015,	p.	136).		Party	leaders	do	have	a	role	to	play	in	the	environmental11	theories	but	it	is	a	role	like	that	of	a	CEO,	a	straightforward	personal	investment	in	the	continuation	of	the	organisation	for	their	own	sake	(Dalton	et	al.,	2011,	p.255),	rather	than	as	a	direct	agent	of	change.			Alternative	accounts	of	party	change	see	the	strategic	choices	of	leaders	driving	change.	From	these	theories	we	get	a	picture	of	parties	as	conservative	organisations	‘forced’	to	change	in	response	to	specific	external	pressures.	For	Harmel	and	Janda	(1994)	there	is	a	‘wall	of	resistance’	to	overcome	in	change:	it	is	not	something	that	‘just	happens’	(Harmel	and	Janda,	1994,	p.261).	Janda	(1990)	specifies	the	conservative	forces	within	party	organisations	that	make	them	resistant	to	change:	parties	are	constrained	in	policy	positioning	by	being	identified	with	certain	issue	positions,	constrained	by	their	dependence	on	their	support	base,	and	constrained	by	internal	power	bases.		These	purposive-action12	models	of	change	include	both	internal	factors	and	external	stimuli	but	tend	to	put	an	emphasis	on	the	former.	Party	actors	have	a	significant	role	to	play	in	perceiving	and	responding	to	external	change,	but	they	must	also	build	coalitions	in	order	to	enact	changes	internally.	‘Perceptive	and	capable	leaders’	must	also	find	support	within	their	parties	for	change,	particularly	if	the	environment	(socioeconomic,	political	and	institutional)	is	not	favourable	(Wilson,	1994,	p.281).			Harmel	and	Janda’s	model	(1994)	of	party	change	(the	most	widely	replicated	of	all	the	‘purposive-action’	models)	theorises	three	factors	in	party	change:	leadership	change,	change	in	the	dominant	faction,	and/or	external	stimulus.	Electoral	defeat	is	a	classic	example	of	an	external	stimulus	(Harmel	and	Janda,	1994;	Panebianco,	1988),	but	Harmel	and	Janda	add	another	level	of	detail	to	our	understanding	of	external	pressures	by	linking	them	to	party	goals.	For	Harmel	and	Janda	the	most	important	external	stimuli	are	those	which	force	a	party	to	reconsider	how	it	meets	its	primary	goal.	They	offer	four	possible	primary	goals:	vote	maximising,	office	seeking,	representation/participation	of	members,	and	policy/ideology	advocacy	(1994,	p.268).	Primary	goals	can	vary	across	parties	and	
                                                          
11	To	use	(Müller,	1997)	terminology.	
12	ibid 
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within	them	over	time.	A	party	will	experience	external	stimuli	as	an	‘external	shock’	when	it	directly	impacts	on	the	party’s	primary	goal.	For	instance,	an	electoral	defeat	will	be	experienced	as	‘external	shock’	for	a	vote	maximising	party.	Party	actors	are	assumed	to	have	an	explicitly	rational	actor	type	response	to	this	‘external	shock’.		
4.3	 Party	change	and	intra-party	democracy	
		The	environmental	type	model	of	change	has	already	been	employed	to	explain	issues	of	membership	within	parties	and	changes	in	membership	roles,	but	turning	specifically	to	changes	in	membership	rights,	Cross	and	Blais	(2012)	have	developed	a	model	to	explain	why	parties	adopt	direct	member	votes	in	leadership	selections.	This	model	draws	on	both	internal	and	environmental	factors	and	the	interaction	between	them.	In	an	analysis	of	leader	selection	across	different	parties	in	Australia,	New	Zealand,	Canada,	Ireland	and	the	United	Kingdom,	they	find	that	the	adoption	of	a	wider	selectorate	in	the	latter	three	countries	can	be	explained	by	four	factors:	the	party	being	in	opposition,	suffering	an	electoral	setback,	being	a	new	party	and	the	presence	of	contagion	within	the	party	system.			Cross	and	Blais’	(2012)	model,	whilst	not	explaining	why	a	party	initially	adopts	direct	leader	selection	in	the	absence	of	other	parties	doing	so,	explains	how	a	party	comes	to	do	so	if	there	is	the	possibility	of	contagion	within	the	party	system.	Once	one	party	has	made	the	change,	others	will	do	so	after	they	have	suffered	an	electoral	setback	and	are	in	opposition.	Opposition	matters	as	it	reduces	the	stakes	in	choosing	the	leader	(members	are	not	selecting	the	Prime	Minister)	and	the	parliamentary	party	holds	less	power	as	a	result	of	being	out	of	government,	thereby	shifting	power	to	the	extra-parliamentary	party.	This	model,	whilst	recognising	internal	and	external	pressures	and	acknowledging	that	change	requires	party	actors	to	recognise	those	pressures,	gives	party	decision-makers	a	fairly	one-dimensional	role.	Cross	and	Blais	(2012)	assume	that	party	elites	will	be	resistant	to	change,	wanting	to	hold	on	to	power,	and	that	members	will	want	greater	influence.	Given	these	two	static	conditions,	the	question	of	change	is	reduced	to	an	analysis	of	what	conditions	are	sufficient	to	make	party	elites	concede	some	of	that	power.	This	is	useful	for	comparative	analysis,	but	in	simplifying	party	elites’	(and	indeed	members’)	motivations,	it	ignores	potentially	conflicting	motivations	and	reduces	party	actors’	roles	in	shaping	change.			
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Another	model	of	party	change	focused	on	intra-party	democracy	is	offered	by	Barnea	and	Rahat	(2007).	This	model	looks	at	motivational	factors	for	candidate	selection	changes	from	a	three-tiered	perspective,	categorising	explanatory	factors	at	the	political	system	level,	party	system	level	and	intra-party	level.	Political	system	level	factors	are	those	based	in	the	political	system	encompassing	the	norms	and	conventions	of	the	political	environment	such	as	the	democratisation	or	personalisation	of	politics;	party	system	level	factors	would	include	those	affecting	the	party’s	competitive	environment	such	as	election	defeat	or	government	change;	and	finally,	the	intra-party	level	factors	cover	the	interactions	between	individuals	and	groupings	within	the	party,	such	as	leadership	change	or	factional	changes.	This	model	gives	an	explicit	role	to	party	actors	in	influencing	and	driving	change,	most	particularly	at	the	intra-party	level.	However,	their	decision-making	is	again	reduced	to	rational	actor	type	decisions	(‘The	interests	of	individuals	are	a	
calculated	combination	of	their	interests	as	team	players	(the	party)	and	as	individual	
players	within	the	party’	(Barnea	and	Rahat,	2007,	p.378)).		Gauja	(2016a)	draws	on	Barnea	and	Rahat’s	multi-level	model	to	develop	a	comprehensive	account	of	party	reform	which	accounts	for	both	environmental	pressures	and	individual	actions,	but	gives	those	individual	decisions	greater	explanatory	power.	This	constructivist	version	of	an	institutionalist	analysis	captures	the	importance	of	party	decision-makers	in	recognising	external	and	internal	pressures	and	additionally,	how	they	then	portray	those	pressures	in	party	discourse.	This	analysis	highlights	the	importance	of	the	‘discursive	power’	of	party	actors:	how	they	shape	their	environments	through	their	ideas	and	rhetoric.	Gauja	also	highlights	that	it	is	not	only	party	elites	that	have	this	power	but	also	those	around	the	party	such	as	think	tanks	(2016a,	p.13).			As	well	as	explaining	‘why’	change,	Gauja’s	model	tries	to	capture	the	processes	of	change,	utilising	the	‘swiss	cheese’	heuristic	to	explain	how	these	factors	combine	to	produce	change.	On	this	model,	change	is	most	likely	when	the	‘holes’	(motivational	factors)	within	the	three	levels	(political	system,	party	system	and	individual	party)	increase	in	importance,	multiply	and	line	up	(Gauja,	2016a,	p.12).		Applying	this	multi-level	model	to	the	introduction	of	primaries	in	earlier	work,	Gauja	(2012)	finds	that	primaries	are	driven	by	party	elites,	not	the	grassroots	of	the	party	and	are	motivated	by	a	range	of	factors	at	each	of	the	levels.	At	the	level	of	the	individual	party,	motivations	include	the	weakening	of	factions,	increasing	membership	and	improving	the	quality	and	representativeness	of	candidates;	at	the	party	system	level	primaries	are	seen	
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as	giving	electoral	advantage	(often	as	a	contagion	from	other	parties	in	the	system);	and	at	the	broader	political	system	level,	reform	is	seen	as	legitimising	the	party,	reconnecting	it	with	citizens.			Gauja’s	(2016a)	model	of	party	reform	brings	us	closest	to	a	comprehensive	account	of	party	change	but	whilst	it	captures	why	change	happens,	and	the	processes	of	change,	it	sees	this	as	a	unidirectional	process.	The	‘swiss	cheese’	model	sees	change	(quite	legitimately)	as	a	linear	movement.	To	understand	multi-speed	change,	however,	we	need	to	consider	both	change	and	continuity;	the	pressure	for	change	and	the	pressures	for	continuity.	And	whilst	Gauja’s	model	recognises	the	role	of	individuals	in	shaping	the	party	environment	and	‘selling’	the	message	of	change	(2016a,	p.13),	the	norms	and	values	that	influence	change	are	only	explicitly	captured	at	the	political	system	level	(values	related	to	democratisation	or	personalisation	in	democratic	practice),	though	the	values	of	party	leaders	are	noted	within	the	other	party-level	analysis.	In	this	way,	this	model	itself	may	miss	a	significant	part	of	the	multi-speed	picture.	Scarrow’s	analysis	of	membership	change	highlights	the	importance	of	norms	and	values	within	the	party	(2015),	which	can	be	expected	to	work	as	a	filter	on	their	membership	decisions.			Scarrow	(2015,	p.20)	links	a	party’s	organisational	choices	to	its	values,	arguing	that	the	decisions	party	elites	make	are	shaped	by	implicit	or	explicit	‘narratives	of	legitimacy’.	These	narratives	are	used	to	identify	the	party’s	credibility	but	they	may	also	shape	how	parties	develop	organisationally.	Different	narratives	of	legitimacy	imply	different	roles	for	members;	the	value	of	members	is	not	determined	simply	by	a	cost-benefit	assessment,	but	by	inherited	traditions	concerning	the	role	of	party	members	in	the	party.	In	cleavage	representation	parties,	which	represent	group	interests,	members	are	the	ties	to	those	group	and	the	role	of	member	is	as	part	of	the	community	(2015,	p.22).	Cleavage	representation	parties	may	view	mass	participation	as	central	to	the	party’s	legitimacy	and	these	parties	are	likely	to	have	rules	that	expect	members	to	commit	to	party	aims.	Changing	this	model	would	necessarily	pull	against	the	party’s	‘narrative	of	legitimacy’	and	so	for	cleavage	representation	parties	the	move	to	multi-speed	organising	is	particularly	difficult.	The	widening	of	affiliation	challenges	this	concept	of	political	legitimacy.	It	represents	a	shift	in	who	the	party	represents,	who	the	leadership	is	accountable	to	and	who	should	define	the	party’s	values.	This	relationship	between	the	structures	of	the	organisation	and	the	values	of	those	that	lead	it	are	therefore	essential	to	any	model	of	multi-speed	change.			
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Constraints	can	also	be	structural,	as	Janda	(1990)	notes	in	his	list	of	conservative	forces.	For	Labour	especially,	these	structural	constraints	have	an	impact	on	the	freedom	of	its	leaders	in	driving	change.	Affiliated	trade	unions	and	socialist	societies	have	rights	not	just	in	leader	selections	but	also	in	conference	decisions:	the	vehicle	through	which	constitutional	change	in	the	party	must	pass.	Though	there	have	been	many	changes	to	the	original	delegatory	structures	inherited	from	its	trade	union	roots,	the	Labour	Party	still	has	a	number	of	decision-making	processes	and	sites	of	authority	beyond	the	leadership	(see	Seyd,	1999)	which	again	constrain	change.			
4.4	 Modelling	party	change	
	The	next	section	operationalises	these	explanatory	factors	and	modifies	them	to	create	a	specific	multi-speed	model	of	change	with	which	to	examine	the	move(s)	towards	multi-speed	membership	in	the	British	Labour	Party.		This	analysis	begins	with	two	assumptions.	Firstly,	the	analysis	proceeds	on	the	basis	that	both	environmental	exogenous	and	direct	endogenous	variables	are	relevant	in	the	study	of	party	change	as	are	the	ideas	and	actions	of	individuals	at	the	decision-making	level.	Secondly,	it	is	taken	as	self-evident	that	a	change	has	occurred:	the	analysis	presented	here	does	not	question	whether	party	change	has	occurred	or	in	what	magnitude	it	has.	The	following	discussion	sets	out	the	two	key	periods	of	change	and	why	they	should	be	understood	as	capturing	a	move	towards	multi-speed	membership.			
4.4.1	 What	change?	
	In	understanding	how	the	Labour	Party	ended	up	with	an	open	form	of	plebiscitary	intra-party	democracy	there	are	two	key	moments.	The	first,	a	decision	initiated	by	the	‘Refounding	Labour’	review	(a	party-wide	consultation	process,	initiated	by	the	party	Leader	in	November	2010	and	led	by	the	party’s	Policy	Chair,	Peter	Hain)	which	resulted	in	a	change	to	Clause	1	of	the	party’s	rulebook	(in	2011).	Clause	1	changed	from	committing	the	party	to	winning	elections	to	a	broader	definition	which	included,	in	addition,	a	commitment	to	‘bring	together	members	and	supporters	who	share	its	values	to	develop	policies’	and	a	commitment	to	‘make	communities	stronger	through	collective	action’.	This	change	to	the	party	constitution	made	explicit	the	role	of	non-member	supporters	in	achieving	the	party’s	primary	goals.	Whilst	supporters	had	been	included	in	party	processes	before	this	point,	this	was	the	formal	recognition	of	a	wider	model	of	
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affiliation.	The	final	‘Refounding’	document	which	was	agreed	at	autumn	party	conference	(on	a	take-it-or-leave-it	yes/no	vote)	paved	the	way	for	proposals	to	involve	supporters	in	leader	selections	within	the	existing	Electoral	College	model,	subject	to	their	number	reaching	a	critical	mass	(50,000).	By	formalising	the	role	of	non-member	supporters	in	the	party’s	rulebook	and	paving	the	way	for	supporter	involvement	in	party	decision-making,	these	changes	(henceforth	the	‘Refounding	reforms’)	mark	a	significant	step	towards	multi-speed	organising.			The	second	key	moment	was	the	ratification	of	changes	to	the	party’s	selection	methods	which	introduced	one-member-one-vote	rules	for	leadership	selections,	reforming	the	Electoral	College	and	trade	union	affiliation	rules	and	most	significantly,	including	supporters	in	the	selectorate.	This	change	began	with	another	party-wide	consultation	and	review	process	initiated	by	the	Leader	of	the	party	in	July	2013	and	led	by	former	General	Secretary	of	the	party	Ray	Collins.	It	was	this	latter	change	that	took	the	party	from	a	wider	affiliation	model	(commensurate	with	other	parties),	to	a	more	radical	version	of	plebiscitary	intra-party	democracy	(von	dem	Berge	and	Poguntke,	2017)	that	extended	intra-party	democratic	rights	to	these	affiliates	and	placed	them	on	equal	footing	in	leadership	selection	to	‘full’	members	and	union	affiliates	(henceforth	the	‘Collins	reforms’).	A	further	step	towards	multi-speed	organising.			Therefore,	in	asking	why	the	Labour	Party	adopted	a	multi-speed	membership	model,	this	section	is	really	asking	two	questions:	Why	the	Labour	Party	expanded	its	affiliation	model	and	why	the	Labour	Party	then	included	these	affiliates	in	party	decision-making.			The	change	to	the	party’s	primary	clause	and	change	to	its	leader	selection	rules	clearly	meet	the	definition	of	party	change	as	‘self-imposed	changes	in	party	rules,	structures,	policies,	strategies	or	tactics’	(Harmel	and	Janda,	1994,	p.	277).	Indeed	this	shift	encompasses	not	only	party	change	as	party	modification	(a	rule	change),	but	could	also	be	seen	as	a	party	trend	(defined	as	a	steady	increase	in	the	size	of	conventions)	and	a	party	event	(Harmel	and	Janda,	1994).			In	addition,	it	is	important	to	consider	why	certain	changes	have	not	occurred.	Multi-speed	membership	is	a	strategy	not	just	of	change	but	of	continuity.	The	multi-speed	party	does	not	simply	move	towards	a	wider	affiliation	model;	it	also	maintains	its	traditional	membership	model,	‘layering’	the	new	on	top	of	the	old	(Scarrow,	2015).	Therefore,	in	
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understanding	this	move	towards	multi-speed	organising,	the	analysis	must	also	consider	why	the	formal	membership	model	has	endured.			
4.4.2	 The	model	
	This	analysis	will	consider	both	environmental	exogenous	and	direct	endogenous	variables	as	filtered	through	the	perceptions	of	party	elites	but,	taking	a	lead	from	Gauja’s	(2016a)	approach,	will	not	limit	the	role	of	party	decision-makers	to	rational	choice	responses	to	these	variables.	Instead	this	analysis	will	explore	the	role	elites	and	other	individuals	have	in	shaping	the	options	for	change	and	the	ideological	filters	they	may	apply	to	their	decisions.			Change	doesn’t	‘just	happen’	and	yet	there	are	important	environmental	factors	that	create	the	conditions	for	change	and	which	make	it	possible	for	agents	to	drive	change.	Likewise,	agents	do	not	operate	free	of	the	structures	around	them,	structures	that	can	enable	or	constrain.	The	environmental	and	purposive-action	theories	therefore	do	not	necessarily	contradict	each	other;	a	party	may	adapt	gradually	and	then	make	different	or	further	changes	in	response	to	new	external	‘shocks’;	leaders	may	be	instrumental	in	change	and	yet	bounded	by	their	environments.			Correspondingly,	this	analysis	will	address	the	environmental	conditions	for	change,	the	organisational	constraints	and	opportunities	as	well	as	the	key	moments	(the	‘external	shocks’)	and	the	agents	of	change.	These	factors	are	not	contradictory	and	can	be	reviewed	alongside	each	other	to	provide	a	comprehensive	analysis	and	permit	some	ranking	of	importance	amongst	the	variables.		One	of	the	risks	of	this	approach	is	that	by	taking	party	change	as	the	dependent	variable,	the	analysis	potentially	includes	a	large	number	of	independent	variables	which	may	have	either	direct	or	indirect	effects.	As	Wilson	sets	out	(1994),	this	list	could	include,	‘socioeconomic	change,	political	culture,	constitutional	or	institutional	change,	change	in	terms	of	party	competition,	and	the	impact	of	party	leaders	or	reformers’	(p.263).	However,	this	wider	approach	is	only	a	problem	when	considering	a	variety	of	parties,	party	systems,	or	a	long	time	period.	Within	single	country,	single	party,	case	studies	within	a	limited	time	period,	this	broader	approach	can	be	accommodated.			
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Authors	of	more	narrowly	focused	analyses	sacrifice	completeness	for	order.	In	defending	an	earlier	performance	theory	of	change	that	focused	on	just	three	independent	variables,	Janda	(1990,	p.11)	argues,	“The	function	of	a	theory	in	the	social	sciences,	however,	is	less	to	
account	for	all	possible	sources	of	variation	than	to	impose	intellectual	order	on	the	major	
factors	in	a	situation	of	multicausality”.	Whilst	a	single	narrow	model	provides	a	lens	through	which	to	study	change,	it	is	also	a	very	limited	one.	In	a	multi-causality	situation,	as	the	application	of	a	particular	shaped	cookie	cutter	produces	a	particular	shaped	cookie,	so	the	application	of	a	performance	theory	of	change	is	likely	to	find	a	performance	explanation	of	change.	One	is	likely	to	find	what	one	is	looking	for	at	the	expense	of	other	potentially	influential	factors.	This	approach	is	most	suited	to	cross-national	research	on	multiple	parties	over	a	longer	period	of	time	(See	Harmel	et	al.,	1995).	By	ignoring	other	potential	causal	mechanisms	(and	assigning	explanatory	weight	to	these	variables	only	theoretically	(Müller,	1997)),	it	fails	as	a	causal	analysis.			Muller	(1997)	argues	that	case	studies	can	be	used	to	establish	causality	by	tracing	causal	mechanisms.	For	instance,	they	can	establish	the	effect	of	leadership	change	by	demonstrating	whether	leaders	adopted	a	deliberately	different	strategy	to	their	predecessors,	or	by	ruling	out	the	influence	of	technical	or	environmental	changes	by	establishing	if	leaders	supported	this	course	of	action	before	becoming	leader.	Case	studies	are	also	useful	for	establishing	policy	transfer	or	contagion.			Gauja’s	(2016b)	strategy	for	establishing	whether	organisational	transfer	has	occurred	relies	on	three	conditions:	the	party	intends	to	change	its	practices;	it	is	motivated	to	seek	out	information	on	other	parties’	practices;	and	the	practices	implemented	resemble	those	of	the	party	from	which	transfer	is	thought	to	have	occurred.	These	conditions	are	best	established	with	the	depth	of	a	case	study	strategy.	Intention	can	be	established	by	contextual	analysis,	motivation	by	interviews	with	party	elites	and	party	reform	documents,	and	implementation	by	analysis	of	the	changes	enacted	(Gauja,	2016b).			The	case	study	approach	within	a	single	party,	in	a	single	country	and	within	a	specific	and	short	period	of	time,	opens	up	the	possibility	of	a	more	in-depth	analysis	of	potential	causal	mechanisms	and	the	opportunity	to	provide	an	account	that	does	not	privilege	one	explanation	over	another.	A	thick-descriptive	approach	not	only	provides	an	empirical	account	of	change	but	helps	advance	theoretical	scholarship	in	the	field	(Gauja,	2016a).			
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Whilst	it	is	useful	to	separate	out	different	levels	of	explanatory	factor,	it	is	important	to	recognise	that	they	do	not	operate	in	isolation	of	each	other.	Gauja	(2016a)	acknowledges	that	the	‘Swiss	cheese’	heuristic	doesn’t	fully	capture	the	interdependence	of	these	different	levels.	I	have	tried	to	remedy	this	by	demonstrating	how	the	different	explanatory	factors,	and	levels,	are	layered	and	filtered	through	each	other	but	crucially	all	explanatory	factors	are	filtered	through	the	perceptions	of	elites.			Whilst	it	is	important	to	capture	both	environmental	conditions	and	external	‘shocks’	or	catalysts,	these	explanatory	factors	do	not	create	change	on	their	own.	Leaders	and	elites	must	recognise	environmental	conditions	or	events	as	necessitating	change.	Environmental	conditions	may	shape	the	direction	of	change	or	create	a	background	pressure	for	change	but	alone	cannot	cause	it.	Likewise,	external	‘shocks’	must	also	be	perceived	by	leaders,	weighed	and	considered	damaging	enough	to	warrant	action.	In	addition,	leaders	and	elites	are	often,	in	the	case	of	intra-party	democratic	changes,	those	driving	change,	instead	of	being	forced	to	change	by	pressure	from	the	grassroots.	Thus,	the	explanatory	model	developed	here	puts	leader	and	elite	decision-making	at	the	centre.		
4.4.3	 An	ecosystem	of	change		
	The	model	developed	in	this	chapter	presents	the	forces	for	change	(and	continuity)	within	a	party	as	an	ecosystem	containing	a	range	of	individuals,	group,	organisations,	structures,	and	ideologies	all	interacting	with	each	other.	This	ecosystem	contains	a	variety	of	processes	too.	It	is	an	ecosystem	where	processes	of	osmosis	allow	environmental	factors	to	seep	into	elites’	decision-making	calculations;	where	ideas	from	other	organisms	can	pollinate	in	processes	of	contagion,	and	catalysts	(external	or	internal)	can	disrupt	the	balance	of	the	ecosystem,	creating	change.			This	ecosystem	model	includes	environmental	conditions	split	into	the	political	environment	and	separately,	the	membership	environment.	The	latter	includes	both	functional	and	legitimising	membership	concerns	including	membership	numbers	and	related	financial	considerations,	member	voluntary	capacity	and	contribution,	member	attitudes	to	reform	and	members’	relationship	to	the	party	elite/leadership.	This	grouping	of	interconnected	membership-related	pressures	I	call	the	ecology	of	membership.			The	political	environment	is	the	setting	within	which	change	occurs.	This	environment	is	the	competitive	situation	parties	operate	in,	where	the	most	important	influence	is	other	
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parties.	Change	in	this	arena	can	be	from	within	and	without	the	party	system	and	incudes	the	pressures	of	party	position	(whether	in	government	or	opposition),	electoral	outcomes	and	the	transfer	of	ideas:	contagion.	This	collection	of	political	pressures,	ideas	and	power	relationships	I	refer	to	as	the	political	climate.			The	model	also	includes	the	conservative	and	enabling	forces	contained	in	the	party’s	structural	and	institutional	setting	including	the	formal	decision-making	processes.	Linking	party	structures	to	elite	perceptions	and	ideas	are	considerations	relating	to	party	type:	the	organising	ideologies	and	understandings	of	the	legitimate	role	for	members	and	role	of	members	in	legitimising	the	party,	that	may	encourage	or	supress	change.	These	considerations	I	draw	together	under	the	heading	of	‘party-type’	explanations.			The	model	also	includes	the	three	specific	purposive-action	type	variables	contained	with	the	Harmel	and	Janda	model	(1994):	leadership	change,	change	in	the	dominant	faction	and	external	shocks.	These	factors	emerge	from	within	the	party	or	within	the	ecosystem,	and	sit	on	top	of	the	environment	created	by	the	political	climate	and	ecology	of	membership.	These	catalysts	must	also	be	perceived	by	party	actors	and	pass	through	their	ideological	filter.			The	decision-makers	at	the	top	of	the	party	are	the	nucleus	of	change	in	this	ecosystem,	rather	than	the	party	in	its	entirety.	This	is	to	recognise	the	role	they	have	in	effecting	change	compared	to	other	party	representatives	and	members.	Members	feature	elsewhere	in	the	system:	as	part	of	the	ecology	of	membership	and	as	part	of	organisational	constraints.	However,	there	is	a	boundary	between	what	is	internal	to	the	party	and	what	is	external	(the	political	climate	sits	outside	the	party	whilst	the	ecology	of	membership	and	financial	concerns	sit	within	it).			By	bringing	together	a	range	of	possible	factors	within	a	single	model,	and	putting	leaders	and	elites	in	the	centre,	this	approach	facilitates	an	analysis	of	which	factors	provide	the	best	explanation	of	change	and	an	understanding	of	how	they	relate	to	each	other:	a	reading	not	possible	in	more	narrowly	focused	approaches.	It	recognises	that	whilst	these	factors	are	all	linked,	they	are	not	all	equally	important.		
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Figure	2:	The	Model	–	an	ecosystem	of	change		
 
			In	this	model	the	political	climate	is	the	environment	in	which	change	must	necessarily	occur.	All	parties	will	occupy	a	certain	position	within	this	political	environment,	the	first	boundary	of	which	is	the	political	system	in	which	the	party	operates.	This	competitive	system	provides	a	number	of	pressures	for	change,	the	most	significant	of	which	are	electoral	outcomes.		Sitting	within	the	party	system,	and	also	outside	of	it,	is	the	pressure	for	change	in	response	to	change	in	other	parties.	Contagion,	the	transfer	of	ideas	from	other	parties,	can	effect	change	either	because	of	a	need	to	stay	competitive	in	response	to	change	in	other	parties	within	the	same	system	or	simply	as	a	transfer	of	ideas	and	inspiration	from	parties	outside	the	system.			The	ecology	of	membership,	the	connected	membership	concerns,	sit	within	the	political	climate.	The	role	of	members	in	financing	the	party	is	a	primary	consideration	in	this	environment	but	the	attitudes	and	relationship	of	the	members	to	change	within	the	party,	and	towards	the	leadership	of	the	party	and	party	decision-makers,	is	also	key	and	form	part	of	this	environment.	Though	not	a	homogenous	group,	members’	attitudes	to	reform	are	still	significant	and	in	party	structures	have	a	role	to	play	in	facilitating	or	preventing	
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change.	The	role	members	play	in	legitimising	the	party	is	an	important	part	of	membership	environment	but	also	feeds	into	the	wider	political	climate:	the	perception	of	a	party’s	legitimacy	in	the	wider	competitive	system.	This	is	a	good	example	of	why	a	layered	model	best	represents	the	interactions	between	these	factors.			Both	the	political	climate	and	ecology	of	membership	are	the	filters	through	which	party	decision-makers	analyse	options	for	change.	These	conditions	cannot	be	ignored	but	at	the	same	time,	they	alone	cannot	effect	change.	Their	effect	on	the	perceptions	of	party	decision-makers	is	more	like	osmosis	than	a	catalytic	event.		Party	structural	considerations	directly	impact	on	decision-makers’	options	for	change	but	they	are	also,	for	many	parties,	the	gatekeepers:	the	doors	to	be	unlocked	before	change	can	be	enacted.	Considerations	of	party	type	and	the	historical	origins	and	structures	of	the	party	influence	both	the	direction	and	extent	of	change.	And	whilst	structural	considerations	may	be	obvious	to	decision-makers,	the	influence	of	party	organising	ideology	may	be	less	immediate.	They	are	the	implicit	and	yet	embedded	notions	of	the	role	of	members	and	source	of	party	legitimacy	that	restrict	and	shape	change	perhaps	without	any	explicit	recognition	from	decision-makers.	Changes	in	the	membership	environment,	political	context	and	contagion	effects	must	all	pass	through	this	ideological	filter.			Finally,	there	is	the	direct	catalyst	for	change	in	the	form	of	an	external	shock.	The	external	shock	sits	within	the	political	system	because	the	most	common	external	shock	is	electoral	defeat.	However,	party	decision-makers	perception	of	the	external	shock	must	be	filtered	through	the	party’s	primary	goal;	only	if	the	external	shock	directly	affects	the	party’s	performance	against	this	measure	(and	is	perceived	as	doing	so	by	decision-makers	in	the	party)	will	it	effect	change.	If	those	conditions	are	met	however,	it	is	a	direct	cause	of	party	change.			
4.5	 Applying	the	model	
	The	following	analysis	applies	the	ecosystem	model	to	the	two	significant	rules	changes	within	the	Labour	Party	that	ushered	in	a	decidedly	multi-speed	approach	to	membership.	This	analysis	is	divided	into	three	sections	looking	firstly	at	the	environmental	conditions,	then	the	structural	and	party-type	factors,	and	finally,	the	purposive-action	variables.	It	is	
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acknowledged	that	separating	these	factors	may	create	a	false	sense	of	independence,	however,	the	analysis	demonstrates	that	each	of	these	types	of	change	are	interlinked.			The	analysis	draws	on	official	party	documents	(in	particular,	the	consultation	documents	and	final	reports	of	the	two	major	reforms),	interviews	with	the	key	decision-makers	who	designed	the	reforms	and	led	them	through	the	consultation	and	ratification	processes	(indeed	those	whose	names	are	given	to	the	reforms	themselves),	and	other	sources	of	party	information	such	as	minutes	of	National	Executive	Committee	meetings	and	reports	in	the	press.	These	sources	are	triangulated	to	give	a	holistic	account	of	the	changes	and	by	focusing	on	the	narratives	of	those	involved	in	the	changes,	an	insight	into	the	values	and	norms	shaping	those	decisions.	Because	of	the	central	role	of	leadership	decisions	in	this	model,	interviews	with	key	decision	makers	and	their	writings	on	the	subject	are	central	to	the	research.	They	reveal	which	environmental	conditions	are	seen	as	important	and	how	these	conditions	are	interpreted,	which	external	events	are	seen	as	important	and	why,	and	they	reveal	whether	ideological	filters	are	shaping	decisions	and	in	particular,	which	narratives	concerning	the	role	of	members	are	dominant.			
4.5.1	 Environmental	conditions	
4.5.1.i.	The	ecology	of	membership		
	In	considering	the	environmental	conditions	for	this	transformation	in	the	party,	one	of	the	most	pertinent	is	clearly	the	membership	environment.	Party	membership	was	on	a	long-term	low	ebb	at	the	time	of	Ed	Miliband’s	election	as	leader.	There	was	a	reported	post-2010	election	surge	of	50,000	members	(though	25%	of	these	dropped	off	after	a	year)	but	the	previous	ten	years	had	seen	a	steady	decline	throughout	Labour’s	period	in	Government,	reaching	a	low	of	just	over	150,000	members	at	the	start	of	2010.	Between	September	2010	when	Ed	Miliband	became	leader	and	2014,	membership	remained	around	190,000.	Though	low,	this	figure	did	not	put	the	Labour	Party	behind	its	competition.	Figures	published	by	the	Conservative	Party	show	Conservative	membership	was	just	under	150,000	in	2013.	Other	parties’	membership	numbers	were	far	lower.			As	Leader,	Ed	Miliband	appeared	to	take	an	early	interest	in	membership	numbers	reportedly	saying	to	his	first	meeting	with	the	NEC	that	he	was	‘encouraged	by	the	surge	in	membership	and	renewed	enthusiasm	for	politics’	(Black,	2010).	Membership	also	featured	in	the	new	General	Secretary’s	bid	for	leadership	in	which	he	stressed	he	would	treat	members	as	‘a	resource	not	a	problem’	(Black,	2011).	Whilst	these	positive	attitudes	
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towards	party	membership	are	to	be	expected	from	those	leading	a	membership-based	organisation,	and	whose	jobs	depend	on	support	from	the	membership,	they	nonetheless	evidence	the	gradual	change	in	the	demand	side	of	party	membership.	It	was	an	approach	very	different	to	earlier	periods	in	the	party	in	which	membership	had	been	seen	as	either	redundant	or	a	liability	(Webb,	1992;	Scarrow,	1996).		In	November	2010,	not	long	after	his	election	as	leader,	Miliband	appointed	Peter	Hain,	Chair	of	the	National	Policy	Forum,	to	lead	a	review	into	‘party	structures	and	culture’	(Labour	Party,	2011a).	The	initial	consultation	document	(Labour	Party,	2011b)	focuses	heavily	on	building	Labour’s	volunteer	base:	both	members	and	other	affiliates.	‘Refounding	Labour:	a	party	for	the	new	generation’	sets	out	the	scale	of	Labour’s	membership	problem	claiming	despite	the	post-election	surge	that	Labour	is,	‘still	spread	pretty	thinly	on	the	ground’	(p12).	The	document	references	socioeconomic	changes	in	the	membership	environment	which	have	made	membership	less	attractive:		
“This	widespread	disengagement	from	party	politics	can	partly	be	explained	by	the	rise	
of	the	consumer	society	and	competing	pressures	on	people’s	time	from	work	and	study,	
obligations	to	friends	and	family,	and	other	sport	and	leisure	interests.	People	have	also	
preferred	to	back	non-party	groups”	(Labour	Party,	2011b,	p.12)		Declining	membership	(and	affiliate)	numbers	are	recognised	as	a	problem	for	the	party,	
“declining	individual	and	affiliated	membership	has	narrowed	the	range	of	voices	heard	
within	the	party’s	discussions	and	reduced	the	chance	of	a	voter	hearing	the	party’s	policies	
advocated	in	the	course	of	everyday	life”	(Labour	Party,	2011b,	p.12).	Peter	Hain,	who	personally	led	the	review,	puts	membership	decline	at	the	centre	of	the	arguments	for	reform:	“I	was	concerned	that	the	traditional	party	model	was	bust.	A	long	term	declining	membership	from	the	early	‘50s	…	People	were	not	relating	to	politics	in	the	way	that	they	used	to.	People	might	have	been	Labour	supporters	but	they	would	not	have	dreamt	of	joining	the	party”	(Interview	with	Peter	Hain).			However,	it	is	notable	that	the	solution	to	declining	levels	of	membership	and	affiliated	support	in	the	Refounding	period	is	not	to	be	found	in	reforms	to	increase	either	of	these	constituencies	but	in	looking	outward	to	other	individuals	and	groups.	The	Leader’s	foreword	in	the	Refounding	consultation	document	calls	on	the	party	to	‘widen	our	horizons’	and	‘look	outward’	(Labour	Party,	2011b,	p.12).		Despite	a	recognition	of	the	decline	in	party	membership,	the	focus	is	largely	on	drawing	support	from	other	places,	rather	than	making	membership	more	attractive.	The	
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Refounding	consultation	document	includes	sections	looking	at	links	with	non-member	registered	supporters,	party	affiliates,	community	groups	and	single-issue	campaigning	organisations	but	only	a	couple	of	paragraphs	considering	the	cost	and	attractions	of	membership.	There	is	consideration	of	the	rights	of	members	but	little	focus	on	the	membership	offer	as	a	whole.	The	shift	towards	a	wider	model	of	support	is	pushed	throughout	the	report	and	this	suggests	that	the	leadership	of	the	party	is	leaning	heavily	towards	a	multi-speed	membership	model.	Though	there	is	a	clear	desire	to	find	a	solution	to	the	problems	declining	membership	appears	to	create,	the	Refounding	reforms	seek	to	resolve	it	through	expanding	non-member	support,	rather	than	trying	to	directly	increase	membership.		Whilst	the	focus	in	the	Refounding	reforms	is	on	opening	the	party,	it	is	also	clear	that	the	existing	membership	structure	is	not	up	for	wholesale	reform.	In	these	reforms	we	see	the	beginnings	of	a	distinctive	shift	towards	a	multi-speed	model	that	seeks	to	‘layer’	new	affiliation	modes	on	top	of	existing	formal	structures.	Membership	remains	a	very	important	construct	throughout	the	reforms	with	no	suggestion	of	fundamentally	changing	the	model.	It	is	suggested	that	the	structures	developed	in	1918	are	not	appropriate	for	the	party	now,	but	the	fundamentals	of	the	ward,	constituency	and	member-based	structure	are	not	challenged.			The	dual	strategy	of	the	multi-speed	membership	approach	(retaining	the	loyalty	of	existing	members	whilst	increasing	the	party’s	appeal	to	supporters	and	wider	affiliates)	is	recognised	explicitly	in	the	Refounding	consultation	text:	
	
“The	balance	between	constitutional	structures	and	encouraging	open	participation	
requires	careful	assessment.”	(Labour	Party,	2011b)	
	
“We	now	need	to	cement	that	change	by	reaching	out	to	new	supporters,	giving	those	
we	lost	good	reason	to	return	and	encouraging	those	who	have	stood	by	us	to	stay	the	
course.”	(Labour	Party,	2011b)		The	impact	on	members’	rights	of	the	changes	being	introduced	is	a	key	concern	in	the	consultation	period.	There	is	an	explicit	recognition	of	the	challenges	of	pursuing	this	dual	strategy	in	the	final	Refounding	documents	which	note	that	the	introduction	of	new	supporter	structures	must	be	balanced	against	the	rights	of	members:		
“how	can	we	maximise	the	potential	for	participation	by	‘Labour	Supporters’	–	those	
who	would	not	join	the	Party,	but	who	could	be	mobilised	to	back	and	work	for	us?	How	
do	we	manage	this	in	a	way	that	does	not	undermine	the	right	of	‘full’	members”	(Labour	Party,	2011b)	
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		“In	order	to	safeguard	the	membership	offer,	there	should	be	no	formal	rights	for	
Registered	Supporters	in	CLPs	or	Branches.”	(Labour	Party,	2011c,	p.15)		The	concern	for	balancing	member	rights	with	the	new	supporter	schemes,	meant	that	in	the	early	proposals,	supporters	would	only	have	gained	a	‘fractional	say’	in	leadership	contests	(“I	thought	they	could	have	a	fractional	say;	it	could	be	a	small	percentage	like	a	tenth	of	the	vote	or	something	like	that.”	(Interview	with	Peter	Hain)).	The	idea	of	extending	rights	to	supporters	was	not	the	main	focus	of	the	reforms.			Yet	whilst	there	is	a	recognition	of	the	declining	attractiveness	of	formal	membership,	and	a	clear	aim	to	seek	support	from	outside	the	membership,	there	is	still	suggestion	that	new	support	models	may	act	as	a	gateway	to	formal	membership:		
“registered	supporters	will	also	be	encouraged	to	join	the	Labour	Party	at	the	low	local	
join	rate	of	£15.”	(Labour	Party,	2011c,	p.16)		
“We	may	be	able	to	offer	them	[Labour	supporters]	a	pathway	into	Labour	membership	
through	other	avenues,	including	through	trade	unions	but	also	socialist	societies,	by	
first	signing	them	up	as	supporters.”	(Labour	Party,	2014,	p.18)		However,	overall	during	the	Refounding	reform	period,	whilst	it	is	envisaged	that	the	registered	supporters	scheme	could	provide	a	gateway	to	membership	it	is	recognised	that	the	membership	environment	has	changed	and	the	traditional	membership	model	needs	reform	(“what	we	had	to	do	was	transform	the	party	into	what	I	call	a	‘movement’	rather	than	a	party	in	the	traditional	sense”	(Interview	with	Peter	Hain)).	The	idea	that	the	traditional	model	is	‘bust’	shapes	the	direction	of	these	reforms	away	from	membership	and	firmly	into	multi-speed	organising.			
Financial	and	campaigning	resource	The	Refounding	consultation	highlights	that	membership	dues	contributed	£7.3	million	to	party	funds	in	2010.	Whilst	membership	revenues	are	not	the	party’s	primary	source	of	income	in	this	period,	at	around	£5	million	per	year13	they	represent	between	fourteen	and	seventeen	percent	of	overall	income	and	dwarf	other	parties’	membership	revenues	(the	Conservatives’	income	from	membership	dues	drops	below	£1	million	after	2010	(£863,000)	and	continued	to	decline).	For	Labour,	member	subscriptions	in	this	period	(2010-2014)	are	providing	an	increasing	amount	of	funding	and	an	increased	percentage	of	overall	income	(though	outside	of	an	election	year	individual	donations	would	be	
                                                          
13	Data	retrieved	from	party	accounts	submitted	to	the	Electoral	Commission.		
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expected	to	provide	less	of	the	party’s	funding)	but	also	income	which	(especially	after	the	party	attracted	criticism	of	the	role	of	large	donations	in	funding	the	party	in	the	past)	is	untainted	by	suggestion	of	giving	advantage	to	vested	interests	and	therefore	increases	party	legitimacy.			Prior	to	Refounding,	reducing	membership	fees	and	finding	new	member	incentives	were	considered	to	be	the	way	of	attracting	more	members	(Pemberton	and	Wickham-Jones,	2013).	Yet	it	is	clear	that	the	party	is	increasingly	reliant	on	fees,	creating	an	environment	where	attracting	new	members	with	lower	rates	would	be	less	attractive	than	creating	a	new	category	of	affiliate	(with	a	financial	contribution	attached).	However,	the	reliability	of	membership	dues	is	also	a	consideration.	The	party’s	Treasurers’	report	submitted	to	the	Electoral	Commission	in	2010	cites	membership	revenue	as	a	source	of	‘reliable	income’	that	can	be	used	to	cover	fixed	organisational	costs	(Labour	Party,	2010).	It	might	be	concluded	that	whilst	supporters	present	a	financial	opportunity,	it	is	one	that	cannot	be	exploited	at	the	expense	of	membership	revenues.			And	yet,	whilst	supporter	registration	fees	did	end	up	contributing	around	£364,000	to	party	funds	in	2015	and	over	£4.5	million	in	201614	(after	the	registration	fee	was	increased),	the	initial	proposals	that	introduced	supporter	rights	in	leadership	selection	required	no	such	contribution.	The	level	of	fees	(if	any)	required	to	register	as	a	supporter	and	take	part	in	the	leadership	contest	(along	with	registration	and	freeze	dates)	was	left	to	the	NEC	to	decide	after	the	reforms	had	been	agreed.	Therefore	the	idea	that	these	changes	were	introduced	in	the	Labour	Party	with	the	aim	of	providing	the	party	with	additional	funding	can	be	discounted.			Preserving	formal	membership	and	constituency	party	structures	is	seen	as	important	in	keeping	‘the	party	going	through	bad	times	and	troughs	in	membership’	(Labour	Party,	2011b,	p.17)	demonstrating	an	awareness	of	the	disproportionate	voluntary	capacity	that	stalwart	local	activists	provide.	However,	it	is	also	clear	in	Refounding	that	the	party	sees	many	primary	party	functions	being	ably	carried	out	by	non-members.	The	report	highlights	successful	constituency	campaigns	that	have	involved	non-member	volunteers,	joint	campaigns	with	non-party	groups,	as	well	as	ambitions	to	source	Labour	candidates	from	outside	the	party.	The	value	of	non-member	supporters	in	party	political	campaigning,	whilst	probably	always	present	in	some	form,	had	begun	to	be	explicitly	
                                                          
14	Based	on	121,295	£3	registrations	in	2015	(fees	were	not	refunded	to	those	who	were	subsequently	disqualified)	and	183,541	£25	registrations	in	2016. 
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recognised	within	the	party.	The	Refounding	consultation	points	to	the	Edgbaston	campaign	which	mobilised	extra	volunteers	during	the	election	through	links	to	community	groups.	Whilst	the	value	of	on	the	ground	campaigning	by	volunteers	is	repeatedly	recognised	as	a	crucial	election	fighting	tool	(particularly	against	a	better	funded	Conservative	party)	it	is	also	clear	that	the	party	does	not	see	this	as	an	exclusively	member	domain.				
Member	attitudes	to	reform	Another	aspect	of	the	membership	environment	is	members’	attitudes	to	reform.	Constitutional	change	in	the	Labour	Party	was	initially	raised	and	driven	by	the	Campaign	for	Labour	Party	Democracy	(CLPD),	an	organisation	formed	in	1973	initially	to	campaign	for	annual	conference	policy	decisions	to	be	binding,	and	then	for	mandatory	reselection	of	MPs.	As	part	of	a	wider	campaign	group	of	affiliated	Labour	organisations,	the	CLPD	were	instrumental	in	marshalling	support	amongst	CLPs	for	member	rights	in	leadership	selection	(Seyd,	1987;	Russell,	2005).	Their	efforts	secured	the	introduction	of	the	tripartite	Electoral	College	in	1981	which	introduced	member	and	affiliate	votes	(prior	to	these	reforms	leaders	had	been	selected	by	the	Parliamentary	party).	However,	after	this	point,	pressure	for	further	changes	to	leader	selection	and	the	Electoral	College	came	to	be	driven	by	the	leadership	of	the	party	(and	a	few	supportive	organisations).	This	is	in	part	because	changes	to	OMOV	for	parliamentary	selection	was	seen	as	a	way	to	wrestle	back	control	after	the	introduction	of	mandatory	reselection	(Russell,	2005).	The	CLPD	opposed	these	reforms	though	support	for	change	amongst	members	of	the	party	was	increasing	(Russell,	2005).		Returning	to	the	period	of	reform	in	question,	pressure	appears	to	come	from	the	top	rather	than	the	grassroots	of	the	party.	Yet,	whilst	there	was	no	great	campaigning	movement	amongst	the	grassroots	of	the	party	for	the	change,	76%	of	CLP	votes	were	cast	in	favour	of	the	Collins	reforms	at	the	special	conference.	The	CLPD	mobilized	against	the	reforms	encouraging	CLPs	to	oppose	primaries	and	defend	the	union	link	but	with	little	impact.			With	the	Refounding	reforms	it	was	felt	that,	whilst	the	reforms	had	been	agreed	and	adopted	in	principle,	the	reality	was	that	very	few	constituencies	really	bought	into	the	changes	and	few	made	any	substantial	change	to	the	way	they	organised	and	campaigned.	Whilst	the	local	structures	of	the	party	supported	the	leadership	in	the	ambition	of	the	reforms,	actually	significant	change	at	the	grassroots	level	was	minimal.		
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Members	and	their	leader	The	membership	environment	for	the	leader	personally	is	also	important	during	this	period.	Accounts	of	the	September	2011	National	Executive	Committee	meeting	report	Miliband	saying	he	‘wanted	to	give	members	more	of	a	voice,	even	if	this	was	inconvenient	for	him	personally’	(Black,	2011).	Indeed	he	must	have	been	all	too	aware	during	the	early	period	of	his	leadership	that	the	membership	environment	was	already	‘inconvenient	for	him	personally’	having	not	received	a	majority	of	member	votes	in	his	election	in	2010.	Only	10	percent	of	the	member	section	of	the	Electoral	College	gave	him	their	first	preference	(the	largest	vote,	14.7	percent,	went	to	his	brother	David).	In	the	fourth	and	final	run	off	round	between	the	brothers,	David	Miliband	was	the	preferred	candidate	amongst	the	membership	by	54.4%	to	45.6%.			
Summary	of	the	ecology	of	membership	The	membership	environment	prior	to	and	during	both	sets	of	reforms	serves	to	create	a	situation	in	which	a	shift	to	multi-speed	organising	was	met	with	little	opposition.	It	was	perhaps	the	emphasis	on	supporters	as	a	resource	to	help	in	elections	and	the	modest	proposals	to	reform	party	structures	in	the	initial	Refounding	reforms	(the	balancing	of	the	multi-speed	membership	dual	prongs)	that	meant	the	initial	reception	to	these	proposals	was	fairly	warm.	NEC	member	Ann	Black	writes	that	‘maintaining	lists	of	people	who	will	help	with	campaigns,	and	inviting	them	to	social	events	and	local	policy	discussions,	seems	uncontentious’	(Black	minutes	July	NEC	2011).	This	may	also	have	been	because	at	this	stage	there	was	less	discussion	of	voting	or	political	rights	being	extended.	There	is	suggestion	of	a	‘recognised	consultee’	option	for	campaign	groups	that	are	not	affiliated,	and	the	possibility	of	their	members	participating	in	party	decisions,	‘in	a	way	that	did	not	undermine	or	discourage	fully	fledged	members’	(Labour	Party,	2011b,	p.19).	However,	the	suggestion	of	supporter	involvement	in	leadership	elections	is	only	hinted	at	in	the	final	pages	of	the	Refounding	consultation	document	and	would	have	only	have	ever	been	a	‘fractional	say’.	The	involvement	of	registered	supporters	in	leader	selections	only	appears	in	the	final	‘Refounding	to	Win’	summary	document	(Labour	Party,	2011d)	presented	to	conference	in	a	‘take-it-or-leave-it’	yes	or	no	vote.			The	membership	environment	during	the	course	of	these	reforms	in	the	Labour	Party	is	one	of	declining	or	at	best,	stagnating	membership	numbers,	though	membership	is	still	substantial	enough	to	provide	the	party	with	a	significant	(and	stable)	income	and	a	reliable	campaigning	resource.	However,	it	is	also	an	environment	in	which	members	are	
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increasingly	not	seen	as	the	exclusive	source	of	these	goods.	In	the	Refounding	reforms	especially,	the	party	is	recognising	the	shift	in	the	membership	environment	and	seeing	the	future	of	party	support	elsewhere.			Yet	whilst	the	party	clearly	sees	a	value	in	non-member	support	there	is	still	an	emphasis	on	traditional	formal	membership.	The	primacy	of	membership	is	stressed	throughout	these	changes	and	evidenced	in	the	desire	to	allow	supporters	only	a	‘fractional	say’	in	party	democracy	initially.	The	party	also	continues	to	present	supporter	status	as	a	gateway	to	membership.	These	limits	on	supporter	status	may	have	been	a	tool	to	keep	members	onside	with	the	reforms	but	it	seems	also	to	be	based	in	practicality:	members	are	providing	a	substantial	financial	resource	and	a	stable	base	in	the	constituencies	(keeping	the	party	going).	The	stalwarts	are	still	of	value	to	the	party	functionally.	Yet	the	functional	explanation	alone	does	not	quite	capture	the	emphasis	on	party	membership	numbers	in	these	reforms.	A	commitment	to	the	mass	party	model,	and	the	value	of	membership	numbers	in	that,	is	clearly	deeply	embedded	in	the	party’s	organising	ideology	(see	section	4.5.2).	The	difference	is	that	the	party	is	now	clearly	seeking	the	legitimacy	of	numbers	from	outside	the	membership	too.		
	
4.5.1.ii	Political	climate	Starting	with	the	premise	that	the	most	relevant	political	environment	for	parties	in	a	competitive	system	is	other	parties,	this	section	will	consider	the	tactics	and	strategies	of	other	parties	and	their	impact	on	Labour,	as	well	as	the	possible	influence	of	tactics	and	strategies	from	parties	outside	the	party	system.	Electoral	defeat	is	also	a	significant	consideration:	the	political	environment	that	Labour	found	itself	in	during	this	period	of	reform	is	one	of	being	a	party	of	opposition	for	the	first	time	in	13	years.			
Electoral	defeat	and	opposition	politics	Following	defeat	in	the	2010	general	election,	the	Labour	Party	entered	its	first	period	of	opposition	since	1997.	The	failure	of	the	Conservatives	to	win	a	majority15	suggested	that	this	period	of	opposition	could	be	short-lived	and	the	new	Labour	leader	was	setting	a	path	to	return	to	power	in	2015	(Bale,	2015)	if	not	sooner.	Indeed,	the	reforms	to	party	structures	in	the	early	part	of	Miliband’s	tenure	were	presented	as	a	vehicle	to	achieve	this	aim.	The	Refounding	consultation	opens	with	a	review	of	the	party’s	loss	of	electoral	support	entitled	‘Facing	the	facts’	(Labour	Party,	2011b).	The	impact	of	electoral	defeat	on	
                                                          
15	Twenty	seats	short	of	a	majority	the	Conservatives	formed	a	coalition	government	with	the	Liberal	Democrats	in	the	first	full	coalition	government	in	the	Westminster	parliament	since	1945.		
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the	party’s	need	to	reform	is	clear.	When	the	consultation	document	returned	as	a	set	of	proposals,	‘Refounding	Labour’	was	rebranded	as	‘Refounding	Labour	to	Win’.			Opening	with	a	recognition	that	‘the	Labour	Party	was	badly	beaten,	recording	our	lowest	share	of	the	popular	vote	since	1983’	(Labour	Party,	2011b,	p.2),	the	Refounding	consultation	and	resulting	recommendations,	whilst	about	widening	participation	and	the	party’s	relationship	with	communities	generally,	are	focused	on	doing	so	to	win	back	support	for	future	electoral	success.	The	‘Refounding	Labour	to	Win’	document	states	that	the	innovations	in	local	party	organisation	that	the	reforms	seek	to	expand	were	‘producing	results	in	terms	of	membership,	campaigning	and	electoral	success’	(Labour	Party,	2011c,	p.5).	The	review	cites	a	number	of	CLPs	that	had	defeated	the	odds	in	the	2010	general	election.			The	Collins	Review	published	four	years	after	the	general	election	presents	reforms	as	‘broadening	and	deepening	the	party’s	relationship	with	ordinary	men	and	women	in	communities	across	the	country’	(Labour	Party,	2014,	p.5)	and	seeking	to	widen	support	in	order	for	the	party	to	‘survive	and	prosper’	(Labour	Party,	2014,	p.16).	The	political	environment	is	still	one	in	which	the	party	is	rebuilding	as	an	opposition	seeking	a	return	to	power	but	it	is	by	this	stage	also	one	where	the	party	appears	on	the	back	foot,	during	a	period	in	which	its	internal	structures	appeared	to	threaten	its	electoral	success.	But	electoral	success	still	forms	the	foundation	of	reform,	as	Ray	Collins	notes:		
“the	first	test	of	any	new	system	would	have	been	the	Mayoral	primary	which	we	could	
have	used	to	reach	out	to	supporters	and	build	committed	votes	for	the	subsequent	June	
election.”	(Interview	with	Ray	Collins)	
	
Contagion	(from	the	right?)	The	political	environment	in	the	British	party	system	at	this	time	was	shifting	towards	opening	up	party	procedures.	But	it	was	the	Conservative	party	that	led	the	charge	in	opening	up	voting	rights	to	non-members	by	experimenting	with	primaries	for	parliamentary	and	mayoral	candidates.			Almost	a	decade	before	Refounding,	primaries	were	being	advocated	and	trialled	within	the	Conservative	Party.	Following	a	couple	of	pilots	and	with	the	backing	of	the	new	party	leader	David	Cameron,	over	100	‘primaries’	for	parliamentary	candidates	were	held	between	2006	and	2009	(Williams	and	Paun,	2011).	These	were	‘primary	meetings’	involving	members	and	non-members	with	a	hustings	followed	by	a	ballot.	In	2009	the	Conservatives	held	two	full	‘postal	primaries’	in	the	Totnes	and	Gosport	seats	in	which	
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ballots	were	sent	to	all	registered	voters	in	the	constituency.	These	fully-open	primaries	were	seen	to	be	successful	by	selecting	popular	local	candidates	who	went	on	to	be	elected	as	MPs.	A	primary	was	also	held	in	2007	to	select	the	Conservative	candidate	for	London	Mayor	in	which	London	residents	could	vote	by	phoning	a	£1-a-minute	phone	line.	Boris	Johnson	was	selected	and	went	on	to	win	the	2008	contest.			The	move	towards	more	open	selection	in	the	Conservatives	had	been	developing	for	some	years	prior	to	the	2008	Mayoral	primary,	attributed	to	Conservative	MP	Andrew	Tyrie	who	began	advocating	for	primaries	in	2001	(Gauja,	2012).	For	the	Conservatives,	the	reasons	for	expanding	selection	were	focused	on	electoral	competition:	primaries	provided	a	route	to	finding	candidates	that	would	attract	greater	electoral	support	(Gauja,	2012).		When	in	2011,	the	Labour	Party	began	to	consider	the	use	of	primaries,	the	Conservatives	had	almost	a	decade	of	experience	in	this	area.	Particularly	in	the	case	of	primaries,	the	Labour	Party	took	note	of	this	experience.	Ray	Collins	met	with	the	Chief	Executive	of	the	Conservative	Party	to	find	out	about	the	Conservative	Party	experience	of	primaries	during	the	Collins	Review	(Interview	with	Ray	Collins).		Contagion	from	within	the	party	system	is	also	seen	in	the	comparative	data.	The	use	of	leadership	ballots	(across	a	range	of	parties	in	different	countries)	more	than	doubled	in	the	latter	half	of	the	period	1990-2012.	Their	growth	is	not	evenly	spread	across	parties	in	this	data:	in	some	countries,	no	party	had	used	leadership	ballots,	in	others,	several	parties	had	used	them,	sometimes	more	than	once	(Scarrow,	2015).	This	is	also	supported	by	Cross	and	Blais’	(2012)	five	country	study.			In	widening	participation	in	leadership	selection	there	is	considerable	evidence	of	contagion	within	party	systems.	For	Labour,	the	adoption	of	more	open	leader	selection	may	have,	in	part	at	least,	been	a	case	of	‘contagion	from	the	right’.			
Contagion	from	other	party	systems	Whilst	within-country	contagion	is	a	likely	source	of	pressure	for	change,	contagion	can	also	travel.	Whilst	parties	from	outside	the	British	party	system	do	not	form	part	of	the	competitive	political	environment	(and	therefore	the	tactics	of	these	parties	cannot	be	seen	as	forming	part	of	the	‘competitive	situation’	(Wilson,	1994)	in	which	Labour	
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operates),	they	do	have	influence.	For	the	agents	involved	in	this	change	within	the	party,	the	sources	of	inspiration	they	refer	to	are	almost	exclusively	from	outside	the	UK.			Labour	Party	documents	explicitly	refer	to	countries	outside	of	the	UK	as	examples	to	learn	from.	The	Collins	Review	notes	that	evidence	from	Australia,	Italy,	Canada,	the	US	and	France	(specifically	on	primaries)	featured	in	submissions	to	the	review.	However,	it	is	the	United	States	and	the	2008	Obama	presidential	campaign	that	dominates	in	this	period.	The	timing	of	this	successful	and	much	discussed	campaign	makes	it	an	obvious	source	of	ideas	coming	shortly	before	the	early	part	of	Ed	Miliband’s	tenure.	Indeed,	Miliband	went	as	far	as	to	employ	both	Arnie	Graf,	Obama’s	community	organising	mentor,	and	his	campaign	strategist,	David	Axelrod,	in	the	run	up	to	the	2015	General	Election	and	during	the	Refounding	review	period,	Peter	Hain	also	spoke	to	the	Obama	campaign	and	took	inspiration	from	their	model	of	organising	(Interview	with	Peter	Hain).		Even	before	Miliband’s	election	as	leader,	publications	from	Labour	affiliated	organisations	were	calling	on	the	party	to	adopt	methods	employed	by	the	Obama	campaign.	Published	in	2009,	a	Fabian	Society	publication	entitled	“The	change	we	need:	
What	Britain	can	learn	from	Obama’s	victory”	(Anstead	and	Straw,	2009),	featuring	a	foreword	by	then	Prime	Minister	and	leader	of	the	party,	Gordon	Brown,	advises	on	the	campaign	structures,	volunteer	recruitment,	organising,	fundraising	and	online	strategies	of	the	Obama	campaign.	This	pamphlet	urges	the	party	to	‘transform	the	role	of	their	
members	and	supporters	…The	American	election	showed	the	way	for	genuine	movement-
based	democratic	change.	It	is	now	Britain	and	Labour's	turn	to	emulate	that	extraordinary	
success.’	(Anstead	and	Straw,	2009,	p.4).		Under	Ed	Miliband,	the	biggest	influence	from	the	Obama	campaign	came	in	the	shape	of	community	organising:	a	grassroots	mobilisation	strategy	that	seeks	to	build	support	at	a	local	level	around	community	specific	issues.	The	Refounding	reforms	mainstreamed	community	organising	in	the	party,	changing	clause	one	of	the	party’s	rule	book	to	include	a	commitment	to,	‘make	communities	stronger	through	collective	action	and	support’.	It	was	clear	from	the	initial	consultation	that	community	organising	would	feature	in	the	final	recommendations,	with	a	whole	section	dedicated	to	it	in	the	consultation	document.	The	final	Refounding	summary	document	advises	that,	‘There	is	wide	recognition	of	the	need	to	
learn	from	the	approach	to	Community	Organising	in	the	US’	(Labour	Party,	2011d,	p.5).	As	a	fairly	uncontentious	change,	supported	strongly	by	the	party	leader	and	new	General	Secretary,	and	something	that	would	be	considered	best	practice	by	most	local	parties	
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anyway,	it	is	unsurprising	that	the	party	emulated	the	US	experience	of	community	organising.	Yet,	whilst	uncontentious,	as	a	mode	of	political	mobilising	that	seeks	to	move	supporters	to	activism	with	no	requirement	for	membership,	the	interest	in	community	organising	shows	the	party	moving	towards	a	position	that	sees	activity	within	the	party	as	more	important	than	type	of	affiliation:	a	fundamental	shift	towards	the	multi-speed	way	of	organising.			Whilst	the	party	was	comfortable	with	widening	participation	in	campaigns,	there	was	notably	less	enthusiasm	for	widening	participation	in	party	decisions.	International	experience	of	primaries	features	in	the	review	period,	but	emulating	these	models	of	candidate	selection	is	more	contentious.	The	Collins	Review	notes	‘a	majority	against	the	widespread	use	of	this	process’	in	submissions	with	some	‘absolutely	opposed	to	the	use	of	primaries	in	any	form’	(Labour	Party,	2014,	p.33).	NEC	member	Ann	Black	notes	in	her	minutes	of	the	meeting	to	discuss	the	Collin	Review	recommendations	that	‘this	was	an	understatement:	I	found	only	a	handful	of	support’.	Black	cites	the	objection	to	primaries	as	‘undermining	the	value	of	membership,	the	cost	for	candidates	and	making	infiltration	easier’	(Black,	2014).	Opposition	to	the	US	model	(primaries	but	also	the	widening	of	non-member	participation	more	generally)	is	forcefully	put	in	a	2006	Compass	publication	which	argues:		 “the	prevailing	views	of	senior	party	figures	seem	to	be	in	favour	of	what	we	would	
term	a	pseudo-democratic	monolith:	a	tightly	drilled	central	bureaucracy,	supported	
by	a	loosely	defined	membership	–	increasingly	drawn	from	a	so-called	Supporters	
Network	….	Throw	in	voguish	talk	about	adopting	the	US	model	of	primaries	for	the	
selection	of	both	candidates	and	leaders,	and	you	may	start	to	feel	very	anxious:	
Labour’s	proposed	solution	may	be	a	system	of	party	organisation	that,	if	America	is	
anything	to	go	by,	will	kill	the	idea	of	the	party	as	a	meaningful	membership	
organisation….’	(Cruddas	and	Harris,	2006)		The	Refounding	review	process	is	cautious	around	the	issue	of	primaries	of	any	form,	recommending	in	the	final	summary	document	that	‘further	consideration’	(Labour	Party,	2011d,	p.5)	be	given	to	involving	supporters	in	leadership	elections.	Indeed	prior	to	Ed	Miliband’s	St.	Bride’s	speech	in	July	2013	which	introduced	the	idea	of	a	primary	to	select	Labour’s	candidate	for	London	Mayor,	primaries	(which	were	increasingly	being	used	in	other	party	systems	as	well	as	by	the	Conservatives)	were	not	enthusiastically	promoted	in	the	Labour	Party.			Two	notable	exceptions	to	this	come	from	Labour	member	organisation	Progress	which	published	a	pamphlet	in	2009	arguing	for	primaries	to	be	used	for	the	candidate	for	
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London	Mayor	in	2012	and	for	parliamentary	candidate	selection	(Straw,	2009).	This	draws	on	the	US	experience	but	also	on	the	Conservatives’	primaries	in	Totnes	and	for	London	Mayor.	More	evidence	of	contagion	in	the	case	of	primaries	comes	from	leadership	candidate	David	Miliband	who,	in	2009,	wrote	an	article	for	Tribune	magazine	advocating	emulating	the	US	system,	‘why	not	adopt	a	system	of	registered	voters,	as	in	the	US,	to	create	the	basis	for	primaries?’	(Miliband,	2009).			It	is	interesting	that	the	US	provided	the	more	dominant	source	of	inspiration	in	this	period	rather	than	European	parties,	also	experimenting	with	primaries	and	opening	affiliation,	and	whose	organising	structures	would	have	more	closely	matched	the	UK	model.	It	was	an	interest	no	doubt	driven	by	the	Presidential	candidate	at	that	time	but	Labour	had	every	reason	to	have	reservations	about	full-scale	adoption	of	a	US	style	registered	voters	and	primaries	system.	The	American	model,	based	on	a	system	with	no	formal	membership,	has	limited	direct	application	in	a	membership	party.	The	organisational	considerations	in	adopting	some	of	these	strategies	for	Labour	would	have	been	complex.	The	need	to	balance	opening	up	the	party	and	widening	involvement	against	retaining	exclusive	rights	for	members	(the	dual	strategy	of	the	multi-speed	membership	party)	is	addressed	throughout	party	reform	documents	particularly	in	reference	to	primaries.	In	his	St.	Bride’s	speech	introducing	the	London	mayoral	primary,	Ed	Miliband	stated:	“As	we	reshape	our	Party	for	the	future,	we	must	always	value	the	role	of	Party	members”.		Yet	the	party	appears	at	this	stage	to	becoming	increasingly	comfortable	with	supporter	structures	more	similar	to	the	US	and	elsewhere.	David	Miliband	in	his	Tribune	article	of	2009	suggests	adopting	a	supporter	structure	akin	to	Pasok	in	Greece.	In	this	article	Miliband	writes,	Pasok	has	also	gone	furthest	in	party	reform,	opening	up	the	party	so	that	more	than	900,000	Greeks,	out	of	a	population	of	11	million,	have	equal	rights	as	members	or	"friends"’	(Miliband,	2009).			
Contagion	from	within	One	further	source	of	contagion	is	previous	party	leaders.	This	ecosystem	model	places	party	leaders	and	elites	at	the	centre	of	change,	rather	than	the	party	as	a	whole.	By	doing	so,	it	makes	it	possible	to	consider	the	effects	of	contagion	within	the	same	party,	across	different	leaderships.			
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Though	not	given	‘equal	rights’,	supporters	were	already	part	of	Labour’s	structures	before	the	change	to	Clause	1	formalised	this	role.	Through	the	Labour	Supporters’	Network,	introduced	several	years	earlier	under	Tony	Blair,	Labour	supporters	who	didn’t	want	to	join	as	members	could	sign	up	for	free	and	had	been	invited	to	contribute	to	policy	discussions.	The	opening	and	widening	of	party	affiliation	had	therefore	begun	long	before	the	Refounding	process.	In	some	ways	then,	this	period	of	reform	can	also	be	seen	as	contagion	within	the	party,	across	party	leaderships.	Responding	to	the	Collins	Review	recommendations,	former	Prime	Minister	Tony	Blair	said	of	Ed	Miliband,	“he's	carrying	through	a	process	of	reform	in	the	Labour	party	that	is	long	overdue	and,	frankly,	probably	I	should	have	done	it	when	I	was	leader”	(Wintour,	2013a).	Though	this	remark	is	in	response	to	the	package	of	measures	as	a	whole,	not	just	those	relating	to	membership	rights,	it	does	indicate	that	there	is	a	long	running	movement	in	the	party	in	this	direction	that	pre-dates	Miliband’s	leadership.	Blair’s	successor	Gordon	Brown	was	also	involved	in	moving	the	party	towards	a	more	direct	membership	model.	In	1993	he	authored	Making	
Mass	Membership	Work	aimed	at	attracting	trade	union	members	to	party	membership	and	later	as	Prime	Minister	he	wrote	in	a	Progress	pamphlet	of	the	need	to	expand	the	party’s	connection	with	local	organisations	and	supporters	(Pemberton	and	Wickham-Jones,	2013).			There	is	also	the	possibly	of	contagion	from	even	closer	to	home.	During	the	leadership	contest,	as	well	as	supporting	wider	affiliation	options	and	primaries,	Ed	Miliband’s	brother	David	(also	a	candidate	for	leader)	set	up	Movement	for	Change.	Movement	for	Change	was	a	community	organising	initiative	that	would	certainly	have	been	integrated	into	Labour’s	activities	had	David	Miliband	become	leader.	Instead	it	was	his	brother	who	took	over	bringing	Movement	for	Change	under	the	Labour	Party’s	wings	in	March	2011	(Stratton,	2011).			
Political	climate	summary	The	political	environment	for	Labour	following	electoral	defeat	in	2010	was	one	of	newly	found	opposition,	led	by	a	new	party	leader.	The	party	of	government	for	thirteen	years	now	had	to	rebuild	and	rebrand	itself	and	get	used	to	being	in	opposition	for	perhaps	the	next	five	years.	This	political	environment	is	one	ripe	for	self-renewal	and	the	party	is	clearly	looking	elsewhere	for	inspiration	in	that	endeavour.	Yet	the	arguments	for	opening	party	democracy	and	emulating	the	successes	of	the	Obama	campaign	appeared	well	before	the	2010	election	defeat.	The	direction	of	travel	within	and	without	the	party	system	in	the	period	up	to	these	reforms	is	towards	opening	up	party	models	either	
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through	greater	supporter	mobilisation	or	primary	mechanisms.	Reforms	to	bring	non-members	into	party	activity	had	begun	years	before	under	the	leadership	of	Tony	Blair.			Contagion	from	outside	the	party	system	played	a	part	in	the	reforms	at	this	time,	repeatedly	referenced	in	party	documents	and	by	party	personnel	and	affiliated	organisations.	The	US	and	particularly	the	2008	Obama	presidential	campaign	provides	a	source	of	organisational	reform	ideas	in	this	period	and	although	primaries	were	not	enthusiastically	promoted,	the	model	of	registered	support	(a	model	most	familiar	in	the	United	States)	becomes	increasingly	central	to	organisational	reform.			Yet	whilst	party	elites	and	other	influencers	within	the	party	claim	inspiration	from	abroad,	the	most	relevant	and	closest	example	of	widening	participation	comes	from	closer	to	home.	Whilst	not	referencing	the	Conservative	experience	of	primaries	in	party	documents,	the	Labour	Party	was	well	aware	of	their	use	and	their	effectiveness	in	selecting	successful	candidates,	most	notably	in	the	2008	London	Mayoral	contest.	Introducing	the	recommendation	that	the	party	should	hold	a	primary	for	the	Labour	London	Mayoral	candidate	in	2015,	the	Collins	Review	cites	evidence	of	the	Australian	Labor	Party’s	mayoral	primary	in	Sydney.	It	is	perhaps	understandable	that	party	elites	would	not	draw	explicitly	on	their	rival’s	organisational	reforms	publicly,	especially	when	trying	to	persuade	party	members	of	their	value	(and	crucially	of	their	place	within	Labour	structures	and	traditions)	but	it	is	clear	that	the	Australian	experience	was	not	the	sole	source	of	contagion	in	the	decision	to	adopt	a	primary	for	London	Mayor,	a	decision	that	moved	the	party	closer	to	formal	supporter	involvement	in	leader	selections.		Charting	changes	in	the	political	environment	shows	that	contagion	within	and	without	the	party	system,	and	within	the	party	itself,	is	a	strong	driver	of	change.	It	meets	the	first	two	of	Gauja’s	(2016b)	tests	for	policy	transfer:	the	intention	to	change	is	clear	and	the	party	is	clearly	motivated	to	seek	out	information	on	the	practice	of	other	parties.	However,	the	resulting	changes	do	not	closely	resemble	those	of	other	parties.	Instead,	the	party	landed	on	a	very	Labour-specific	model.	The	explanation	for	this	lies	perhaps	in	the	party’s	existing	structures	and	the	role	of	alternative	sources	of	party	authority	in	shaping	the	reforms	(see	section	4.5.2).				During	both	reforms	however,	the	move	to	extend	political	rights	to	supporters	was	still	contentious.	There	is	clear	opposition	within	the	party	for	expanding	political	rights	to	non-members.	This	opposition	is	acknowledged	within	the	final	Collins	Review	report	
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which	recommends	both	a	primary	for	London	Mayor	and	allowing	registered	supporters	to	vote	in	the	next	Leadership	contest.	Whilst	these	reforms	came	on	the	back	of	strong	contagion	effects	and	party	debate,	they	were	not	uncontentious.	Pressures	pulling	against	change	are	evident	even	in	the	final	reform	document	itself	and	suggest	that	contagion	effects	were	limited	by	organisational	norms	concerning	the	role	of	members.	The	dual	multi-speed	strategy	again	evidenced	in	these	reforms.			
4.5.2	 Party	type,	organisation	and	structures	
	For	the	Labour	Party,	there	are	specific	decision-making	structures	(derived	from	the	party’s	origins	in	collective	and	delegate	structures	of	representation)	through	which	change	must	necessarily	pass.	These	structures,	which	give	power	over	organisational	change	to	the	party’s	affiliated	organisations,	are	a	significant	consideration	in	the	analysis	of	change.	Yet,	according	to	Scarrow’s	theory	(2015)	the	party’s	origins	have	a	further	role.	They	not	only	shape	the	decision-making	structures	but	also	the	organising	rhetoric	of	the	party,	the	‘narratives	of	legitimacy’	it	draws	on.	These	narratives	not	only	set	the	context	for	reform	but	also	influence	how	far	the	party	feels	it	can	change	its	structures.			
‘Narratives	of	legitimacy’	Whilst	Labour	has	moved	some	way	from	a	traditional	cleavage	representation	structure	in	its	various	modernisation	programmes,	the	party’s	origins	as	a	cleavage	representation	party	would	be	expected	to	have	an	influence	on	the	‘narratives	of	legitimacy’	that	it	draws	upon,	and	may	act	as	a	conservative	force	against	changes	to	membership.			The	Collins	Review,	which	introduces	the	most	significant	changes	to	the	party’s	structures	for	decades,	begins	with	an	analysis	of	the	origins	of	the	party	in	which	the	link	between	individual	party	membership	and	the	development	of	the	party	is	made:			
“The	party	leadership	also	believed	that	to	gain	electoral	support	Labour	had	to	attract	
a	wider	body	of	people	into	its	ranks.	A	structure	that	only	allowed	individuals	to	join	
the	party	indirectly,	through	an	affiliated	trade	union	or	socialist	society,	placed	a	
barrier	to	achieving	that	goal.	So	the	introduction	of	individual	party	membership	was	
integral	to	Labour’s	plan	to	reach	into	all	communities	…So	the	1918	constitution	
created	separate	individual	and	affiliated	sections	which	were	both	represented	in	the	
party’s	structures	bequeathing	an	organisational	blueprint	that	remains	relevant	
today.”	(Labour	Party,	2014,	p.11)		
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The	party’s	history	is	shaping	the	narratives	of	change,	they	are	the	background	to	which	change	must	pay	homage	and	which	‘set	the	blueprint’	for	the	direction	of	that	change.	Ray	Collins	describes	the	influence	of	the	party’s	origins	on	the	direction	of	the	Collins	review:	
	
“The	Tory	Party	of	course	doesn’t	have	quite	the	same	problem	as	they	are	a	parliamentary	
party	primarily…	we	start	off	as	a	party	outside	parliament,	trying	to	seek	representation	in	
it,	and	the	Tory	party,	the	other	way	round.”	(Interview	with	Ray	Collins).		
	The	party’s	beginnings	are	still	important	for	those	leading	change	within	it.	The	origins	of	the	party	as	one	based	in	collective	organisation	outside	parliament,	with	strong	roots	into	society	through	the	unions	and	seeking	representation	for	those	groups	within	Parliament,	still	shape	how	the	party	views	its	position	today.			
Party	history	and	collective	affiliation	The	British	Labour	Party	has	never	been	a	mass	membership	party	in	the	style	of	Western	European	social-democratic	parties.	Individual	membership	of	the	Labour	Party	was	not	introduced	until	1918	and	prior	to	this,	most	people	participated	as	union	delegates	or	members	of	the	affiliated	Independent	Labour	Party	(Tanner	et	al.,	2000).	Having	been	founded	on	collective	affiliation	rather	than	direct	membership,	the	member	and	support	distinction	has	always	been	more	complex	in	the	Labour	Party	than	other	parties.	Non-member	affiliates	have	always	held	rights	to	internal	decision-making	within	the	party	and	the	number	of	affiliated	trade	unionists	have	always	vastly	outnumbered	individual	members.	Yet	because	of	these	links,	and	the	size	of	party	affiliation,	the	party	has	had	a	claim	on	mass	party	status,	even	after	membership	numbers	dwindled.	In	other	words,	numbers	matter	in	the	Labour	party:	“at	the	end	of	the	day	we	went	out	and	asked	3	million	
people	who	we	want	to	lead	our	party”	(Ray	Collins	interview	discussing	2010	election)		In	both	the	Refounding	reforms	and	Collins	Review,	narratives	of	mass	participation	are	utilised	not	only	in	emphasising	the	role	of	members	within	the	party	but	in	justifying	the	need	to	change	the	member	structure,	and	to	expand	the	support	structure.			
“We	must	rebuild	as	a	mass	movement	…	our	individual	members	will	always	be	at	
the	heart	of	our	party	…	But	in	order	to	create	a	mass	movement	we	need	to	reach	out	
to	a	wider	range	of	supporters,	community	groups	and	national	organisations”	(Labour	Party,	2011,	p.5)	-	Refounding		
“Ed’s	central	objective	is	to	transform	Labour	so	that	it	becomes	a	genuinely	mass	
membership	party	reaching	out	to	all	parts	of	the	nation”	(Labour	Party,	2014,	p.5)	-	
Collins		
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The	focus	on	strength	through	numbers	dominates	both	sets	of	reforms,	and	in	this,	there	is	clear	evidence	of	a	concern	for	declining	participatory	linkage.	Sections	of	both	the	Refounding	consultation	and	Collins	Review	are	dedicated	to	examining	the	decline	in	party	membership	numbers	and	also	the	decline	in	trade	union	membership.			
Linkage	and	mass	membership	Parties	in	the	cleavage	representation	model	draw	legitimacy	from	involving	and	building	ties	to	the	people	they	seek	to	represent.	Linkage	is	therefore	an	important	concept	for	the	cleavage	representation	party.	In	both	Refounding	and	the	Collins	Review,	the	concept	of	linkage,	(understood	as	participatory	linkage	in	which	the	party	provides	a	channel	for	popular	participation	in	politics)	and	concern	for	its	decline,	is	used	as	a	justification	for	the	reforms:			
“A	new	Clause	1	should	set	out	our	desire	to	build	a	party	fit	for	the	future;	a	genuine	
movement	where	the	connection	between	the	party	and	the	public	is	strong”	(Labour	Party,	2011c,	p.11)	
	
“Building	a	better	politics	starts	by	building	a	Party	that	is	truly	rooted	in	every	
community	and	every	walk	of	life.”	(Ed	Miliband,	St.	Bride’s	Speech,	2013)		Throughout	both	sets	of	reforms	there	are	repeated	references	to	the	representativeness	of	the	party	(to	concerns	that	party	reflects	those	it	seeks	to	represent)	and	to	what	could	be	understood	as	‘policy-responsive’	linkage,	in	which	the	party	responds	to	the	interests	of	those	its	seeks	to	represent.	Both	of	these	outcomes	are	seen	as	deriving	from	strong	participatory	linkage:	a	strength	of	the	mass	membership	party.	What	marks	out	these	reforms	is	that	the	party	is	shifting	away	from	membership	being	the	source	of	that	linkage.	This	could	suggest	that	either	party	leaders	are	concerned	that	party	membership	is	untypical	of	party	support	(as	hypothesised	in	May’s	Law	(1973))	or	that	the	party	does	not	feel	that	a	return	to	mass	membership	is	a	realistic	prospect.			A	concern	for	linkage	is	also	seen	in	the	suggestion	initially	put	forward	in	the	Refounding	proposals	for	a	new	‘recognised	consultee’	status	for	non-affiliated	organisations.	These	proposals	would	have	seen	non-affiliated	unions	and	civil	society	organisations	given	the	option	of	having	a	formal	link	to	the	party	and	a	formal	role	in	policy	consultation,	“We	would	be	offering	an	open	door	where	they	would	have	a	formal	role	in	the	policy	consultation	process	and	in	that	way	I	thought	we	could	really	deepen	our	links	into	civil	society”	(Interview	with	Peter	Hain).	In	a	way	this	dual	pronged	individual	supporter	and	consultee	groups	structure	mirrors	the	individual	member	and	affiliated	unions	structure	
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introduced	in	1918,	but	in	a	much	looser	(more	multi-speed)	format.	It	was	a	suggestion	however	that	did	not	make	the	final	reform	proposals.			Whilst	strong	representativeness	and	policy-responsive	linkage	is	an	important	way	of	ensuring	government	responds	to	citizens,	it	is	also	beneficial	for	parties,	ensuring	party	platforms	are	attractive	to	those	whose	votes	a	party	seeks.	Representativeness	helps	convince	voters	that	the	party	speaks	for	those	it	claims	to.	These	dual	aims	are	expressed	throughout	the	reform	documents:		
“We	need	to	strengthening	[sic]	our	long	term	relationships	in	the	local	community,	not	
just	to	enhance	our	short	term	electioneering	capacity,	but	to	be	a	party	more	
representative	of	the	communities	we	seek	to	represent.”	(Labour	Party,	2011b,	p.7)			“Declining	individual	and	affiliated	membership	has	narrowed	the	range	of	voice	
heard	within	the	party’s	discussions	and	reduced	the	chances	of	a	voter	hearing	the	
party’s	policies	advocated	in	the	course	of	everyday	life”	(Labour	Party,	2011b,	p.11)		The	concept	of	‘ambassadors	in	the	community’,	party	members	conveying	the	parties	aims	through	contact	with	friends,	family,	colleagues,	is	also	found	in	the	reform	documents.	Reaching	out	beyond	membership	to	not	only	ensure	that	policies	are	in	line	with	voter	preferences	and	credibly	supported	by	those	in	whose	name	they	are	made,	but	that	they	are	advocated	by	a	wider	network	too.			
“..our	policies	and	promises	may	command	more	credibility	if	they	are	promoted	
enthusiastically	by	volunteer	party	members	on	the	doorstep,	backed	by	a	local	
network	of	Labour	supporters…”	(Labour	Party,	2011b,	p.	14)			Throughout	this	period	of	reform,	party	elites	draw	heavily	on	the	concept	of	participatory	linkage.	The	idea	of	Labour	as	‘The	People’s	party’	(Labour	Party,	2011b,	p.3)	and	a	desire	to	create	a	‘movement’	(“Today	if	you	vote	for	these	reforms	you	will	be	voting	for	Labour	to	
be	a	movement	again”	(Ed	Miliband,	Speech	to	Special	Conference,	March	2014))	draw	on	ideas	of	the	mass	party	that	relate	directly	to	Labour’s	origins.	The	idea	that	party	strength	is	to	be	found	in	the	size	of	its	membership	is	commensurate	with	the	party’s	collective	beginnings	and	typical	of	the	cleavage	representation	party	type.	Whilst	representativeness	and	policy-responsiveness	have	electoral	benefits	too,	it	is	clear	that	these	linkages	also	serve	to	legitimise	the	party	and	crucially	in	this	period,	are	employed	to	legitimise	change	within	it.	Peter	Hain	explicitly	recognises	the	role	of	extra-parliamentary	support	in	advancing	the	party’s	goals,	“I	believe	change	comes	in	the	combination	of	extra-parliamentary	pressure	and	parliamentary	pressure”	(interview).			
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The	Party	still	sees	itself	in	the	mass	membership	model	yet	mass	integration	narratives	are	used	not	only	to	highlight	the	problems	of	declining	membership	but	also	to	rationalise	the	change	to	the	membership	model.	In	this	approach	there	is	a	distinct	shift,	whether	deliberate	or	not,	from	the	cleavage	representation	party	type.	Whilst	a	cleavage	representation	party	would	be	likely	to	set	a	high	bar	to	membership	and	expect	membership	to	be	enduring,	by	looking	for	support	outside	membership	(looking	to	create	the	‘mass’	of	‘mass	membership’	through	supporters),	the	Labour	Party	is	taking	a	step	towards	a	political	market	type	arrangement	in	which	the	party	is	representing	the	voter	and	membership	rules	are	loosened	to	increase	participation	(see	Scarrow,	2015,	p.21).	Concern	for	‘broadening	the	mandate’:	“You	want	to	expand	the	party’s	reach,	involve	more	people	in	policy	debate”	(Interview	with	Peter	Hain),	show	the	party	making	distinctly	political	market	party	type	decisions.			
‘Layering’	of	new	affiliation	structures	For	Scarrow	(2015),	parties	shifting	to	multi-speed	membership	tend	to	add	new	affiliation	models	on	top	of	existing	ones:	retaining	formal	membership	whilst	also	trying	to	reach	out	to	new	support.	The	new	affiliation	models	are	‘layered	on	top’	of	old	ones.	In	the	Collins	Review	there	is	evidence	of	the	party	taking	this	approach.	Whilst	recognising	the	need	for	reform,	the	origins	and	traditions	of	the	party	are	respected,	and	therefore	reforms	seek	to	layer	rather	than	reform	wholesale:		
“Ed	Miliband	is	clear	about	the	direction	in	which	he	wishes	the	party	to	move.	It	is	a	
direction	of	travel	that	builds	on	the	party’s	historic	foundations	but	responds	to	the	
world	as	it	is	today.”	(Labour	Party,	2014,	p.	18)		
“So	the	starting	point	of	this	report	is	a	clear	recommendation	that	the	federal	
structure	which	enables	individuals	and	organisations	to	have	a	voice	inside	the	party	
should	remain	the	bedrock	of	Labour	organisation.”	(Labour	Party,	2014,	p.20)		The	Collins	reforms	in	particular	are	an	accommodation	of	the	dual	structure	of	the	Labour	Party:		
“how	do	we	deal	with	this	apparent	dialectical	problem	of	trade	unions,	collective	
organisations,	seeking	representation	for	their	members,	with	individual	members	
whose	main	responsibility	is	to	win	representation.	Because	in	winning	representation	
they’re	in	constant	contact	with	the	people	who	are	the	deciding	factor	-	the	voter.”	(Interview	with	Ray	Collins)		
“The	practical	dilemma	is	how	to	give	effect	to	these	objectives	without	undermining	
the	principle	of	collective	affiliation”	(Labour	Party,	2014,	p.20)		
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In	addition	to	ideological	considerations	relating	to	party	type	and	the	role	of	members	within	these	narratives,	there	are	specific	existing	structures	through	which	change	must	pass.	
	
Union	influence	and	structural	constraints		‘Undermining	the	principles	of	collective	affiliation’	was	certainly	something	the	leaders	of	those	collectively	affiliated	would	be	expected	to	want	to	avoid.	Particularly	in	the	case	of	the	Collins	reforms	which	directly	addressed	the	party’s	relationship	with	the	unions.	These	reforms	came	up	against	structural	constraints	created	by	the	role	of	trade	unions	and	affiliated	societies	who	not	only	have	a	link	to	the	party’s	origin	and	‘narrative	of	legitimacy’,	but	also	a	vested	interest	in	its	political	direction.	The	final	form	the	Collins	reforms	took	is	as	much	to	do	with	negotiating	something	that	was	palatable	for	all	involved	as	it	was	to	do	with	keeping	within	the	party’s	membership	traditions.			The	initial	union	response	to	Ed	Miliband’s	St	Bride’s	speech	saw	some	major	unions	cut	their	affiliation	fees.	This	was	either	as	a	warning	shot	at	Ed	Miliband	or	potentially	because	they	had	a	longer	term	goal	of	disaffiliation	(Bale,	2015;	McHugh,	2015).	Turning	the	proposals	into	something	that	could	pass	a	vote	at	conference	(a	vote	which	would	include	union	delegates)	meant	finding	a	compromise.	The	eventual	move	to	OMOV	can	be	seen	as	a	result	of	trying	to	find	that	compromise:		
“The	initial	plan,	agreed	with	the	leader’s	office,	was	to	press	for	a	new	college	based	on	
one-third	MPs	and	MEPs,	and	two	thirds	members	and	affiliates.	Two	problems	
immediately	arose.	One	was	the	complicating	factor	of	(non-trade	union)	registered	
supporters,	whose	potential	presence	in	the	leadership	ballot	had	been	established	
under	Refounding	Labour.	The	other	more	serious	issue	was	trade	union	opposition	to	
the	dissolution	of	the	affiliates’	section.	That	was	ultimately	only	overcome	by	agreeing	
to	dissolve	the	entire	college	and	removing	the	MPs	as	well.”	(McHugh,	2015)		The	compromise	worked	and	the	reforms	(which	amongst	other	things	involved	changing	to	an	‘opt	in’	for	union	affiliates	as	well	as	a	change	to	leadership	elections)	were	passed	86	percent	in	favour	(96%	of	the	union	votes	and	76%	of	CLP	delegates	(Sparrow,	2014)).		The	Labour	party	has	very	specific	structural	constraints	that	can	provide	either	enabling	or	constraining	forces.	Affiliated	unions	are	not	only	the	foundational	origin	of	the	party	(woven	into	the	‘narrative	of	legitimacy’	the	party	draws	on)	but	also	more	practically,	the	provider	of	party	funds	and	have	specific	rights	in	party	decision-making.	Labour	leaders	are	constrained	by	this	sharing	of	power	which	limits	the	extent	and	shape	of	reform.	As	Meg	Russell	(2005)	notes	of	the	adoption	of	OMOV	within	the	Electoral	College	and	
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parliamentary	selection,	a	decade	previously,	reforms	took	‘over	10	years	of	painful	negotiation’	and	resulted	in	reforms	that	‘fell	far	short	of	what	leaders	had	originally	wanted’	(Russell,	2005,	p.60).	These	same	structures	worked	to	both	constrain	the	eventual	form	the	Collins	reforms	took,	but	also	enabled	the	reforms	to	go	ahead	once	the	leaders	of	the	party’s	power	bases	found	enough	in	the	changes	to	suit	their	purposes.			
Organisation,	structures	and	party	type	summary	Throughout	both	sets	of	reforms,	the	party’s	history	of	collective	affiliation	and	mass	integration	shape	how	reforms	develop	by	providing	the	structures	through	which	change	must	pass	and	the	‘narratives	of	legitimacy’	that	reform	proposals	must	conform	to.	There	is	no	evidence	that	the	party	is	contemplating	wholesale	reform	of	the	membership	model	but	instead	‘layering’	new	on	top	of	old.	Indeed,	a	‘narrative	of	legitimacy’	that	sees	mass	participation	as	legitimising	the	party,	is	used	not	only	as	the	starting	point	for	reform	but	also	as	the	rationale	for	the	set	of	reforms	being	introduced.			Labour’s	‘narrative	of	legitimacy’	based	in	the	notion	of	mass	integration	and	linkage	creates	a	contradiction	in	this	changed	membership	environment.	Whilst	declining	party	membership	and	declining	trade	union	membership	forces	the	party	to	seek	support	elsewhere	in	order	to	maintain	a	degree	of	‘mass’	support	and	linkage,	the	origins	of	the	party,	based	on	interest	representation	and	collective	affiliation,	make	widening	support	difficult.	For	cleavage	representation	parties,	support	comes	from	those	whose	interests	you	represent.	Tight	rules	on	who	can	join,	an	expectation	of	loyalty	from	members,	and	commitment	to	the	aims	of	the	party	go	alongside	this	(Scarrow,	2015).	A	looser	model	of	support	cannot	make	such	demands	of	supporters	or	‘friends’.	Widening	affiliation	therefore,	whilst	providing	greater	linkage	in	some	forms,	also	challenges	the	traditional	model	of	party.	Yet	the	collective	roots	of	the	party	also	help	make	this	transition	easier.	Not	all	union	affiliates	were	party	supporters	under	the	previous	arrangements	so	whilst	a	traditional	cleavage	representation	party	might	expect	a	firmer	commitment,	the	Labour	Party’s	arrangements	have	always	included	‘looser’	support.		Labour’s	origins	as	a	cleavage	representation	party	are	exerting	both	a	conservative	influence,	preventing	wholesale	reform	of	the	membership	and	affiliation	model,	and	also	legitimising	its	reform,	through	the	promise	of	improved	representational	and	participatory	linkage.	The	fact	that	both	sets	of	reforms	involved	member	and	affiliate	consultation	periods,	and	required	ratification	through	a	conference	vote,	demonstrates	the	central	place	that	membership	and	affiliation	hold	in	party	structures.	The	role	of	
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membership	and	affiliation	in	legitimising	the	party	explains	the	dual	strategy	the	party	adopts	and	the	continued	(as	one	member	interviewee	described	it)	‘sovereignty	of	the	membership’	within	the	party.			The	weight	of	party	history	is	enabling	and	constraining	change,	both	directly	through	the	structures	of	ratification	built	into	party	rules,	and	through	the	‘narratives	of	legitimacy’	that	shape	the	way	party	elites	think	about	change,	long	before	any	such	change	is	formalised	and	agreed.			
4.5.3	 Purposive-action	approach		Having	explored	potential	environmental	factors,	this	chapter	will	now	consider	the	three	variables	set	out	in	Harmel	and	Janda’s	(1994)	purposive-action	type	model:	leadership	change,	change	in	the	dominant	faction	and	‘external	shocks’.			Central	to	the	measurement	of	causality	in	the	Harmel	and	Janda	(1994)	model	is	the	timing	of	events.	A	two-year	timeframe	is	theorised	as	providing	evidence	of	causality	from	one	of	the	aforementioned	variables	to	the	change	under	scrutiny	(Harmel	et	al.,	1995).	A	timeline	of	the	key	events,	publications	and	decisions	of	both	the	Refounding	and	Collins	reforms	is	set	out	below	in	figure	3.		These	key	moments	will	be	explored	in	more	depth	throughout	this	section	but	is	it	worth	noting	initially	that	whilst	the	Refounding	reforms	appear	very	shortly	after	Ed	Miliband	was	elected	as	leader	and	the	party	suffered	an	electoral	defeat	(within	one	year),	the	Collins	reforms	are	made	much	later	(beyond	the	two-year	timeframe).			
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Figure	3:	Timeline	of	change		
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Leadership	change		Change	in	leadership	in	the	party	in	this	period	is	closely	tied	in	to	both	electoral	defeat	and	change	in	the	dominant	faction.	It	is	common	(though	by	no	means	necessary)	in	the	Labour	Party	that	the	leader	steps	down	after	an	election	defeat.	Following	the	party	losing	its	majority	in	the	2010	General	Election,	the	then	Leader	and	Prime	Minister,	Gordon	Brown,	resigned	on	11	May	2010	triggering	a	leadership	election	which	concluded	with	the	election	of	Ed	Miliband	on	25	September	2010.	The	Refounding	reforms	were	officially	launched	in	March	2011,	six	months	later.	This	transition	from	election	defeat	to	new	leadership	in	the	party	most	closely	fits	what	Harmel	and	Janda	(1994)	call	‘incidental’	leadership	change:	it	comes	as	a	result	of	an	unexpected	departure	rather	than	through	a	commitment	to	change.			This	particular	change	in	leadership	presented	a	greater	shift	in	the	party	than	the	election	(unopposed)	of	Gordon	Brown	two	years	previously.	Brown,	having	been	part	of	the	genesis	of	New	Labour	and	serving	as	Chancellor	for	the	duration	of	Labour’s	three	terms	in	office,	whilst	seen	as	a	departure	from	previous	leader	Tony	Blair,	was	also	very	much	a	continuity	candidate.	Brown’s	resignation	appeared	to	open	up	the	possibility	of	change	within	the	party.	There	were	candidates	who	represented	a	continuation	of	the	New	Labour	decade,	such	as	David	Miliband	(who	had	worked	as	Tony	Blair’s	policy	advisor	and	had	contributed	to	the	1997	Labour	party	election	manifesto)	however,	there	were	others	who	offered	an	alternative.	Ed	Miliband	was	seen	as	the	change	candidate	offering	a	fresh-start	with	a	more	socially	liberal	and	socially	democratic	approach	(Bale,	2015,	p.22).			Ed	Miliband’s	influence	as	leader	is	seen	clearly	in	the	Refounding	documents,	particularly	in	the	focus	on	community	organising.	Whilst	these	reforms	are	led	by	others	in	the	party	(Chair	of	the	National	Policy	Forum,	Peter	Hain),	the	leader	has	clearly	set	the	parameters	of	the	reforms	which	embody	his	‘political	vision’	(McHugh,	2015).	By	falling	within	the	two-year	timeframe,	these	reforms	can	be	linked	to	leadership	change.	In	the	Collins	reforms	however,	the	influence	of	the	leader	is	more	clearly	felt,	not	least	in	the	fact	that	many	of	the	final	recommendations	for	reform	are	outlined	by	Ed	Miliband	in	a	speech	to	
launch	the	consultation.	It	was	the	job	of	the	review	to	turn	‘the	St	Bride’s	speech	into	practical	reality’	(McHugh,	2015).	These	reforms	however,	occurring	past	the	two-year	mark,	may	owe	less	to	a	change	in	leadership	than	another	explanatory	variable.			
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Formal	structures	need	to	be	considered	in	relation	to	leadership	change.	In	latter	formulations	of	the	model,	Harmel	et	al.	(1995)	hypothesise	that	‘the	relationship	between	leadership	changes	and	party	change	is	stronger	for	parties	with	strong	leadership	structures	than	for	parties	with	severely	limited	leaders’	(p.7).	For	Labour	particularly	(as	noted	earlier)	the	ability	to	drive	change	is	limited	by	formal	structures	that	give	significant	power	to	affiliated	organisations.			Harmel	and	Janda	argue	(1994)	that	with	incidental	leadership	change,	new	leaders	can	advocate	and	bring	about	change	without	an	external	shock,	but	it	is	an	external	shock	that	creates	the	‘clear,	broad	mandate’	for	change.	Leadership	change	is	sufficient	but	not	necessary:	the	extent	of	change	is	dependent	on	the	scope	created	by	change	in	the	dominant	faction	and	formal	structures.	Ed	Miliband’s	election	as	leader	clearly	creates	the	space	for	change	but	alone	does	not	drive	change	in	the	party	(particularly	in	the	latter	reforms	which	fall	outside	of	the	two-year	period).	Indeed,	in	this	case	of	leadership	change,	it	is	difficult	to	assess	the	impact	isolated	from	other	variables,	particularly	change	in	the	dominant	faction.			
Change	in	dominant	faction	The	leadership	election	contest	in	2010	was	seen	as	a	battle	between	New	Labour,	represented	by	David	Miliband,	and	a	change	in	this	dominant	faction	(which	had	led	Labour	to	power	in	1997	and	remained	the	dominant	faction	for	the	next	13	years)	represented	by	Ed	Miliband.	If	Ed	Miliband’s	election	as	leader	marked	the	end	of	New	Labour	and	a	switch	in	the	dominant	faction,	most	significant	in	the	analysis	of	this	change	is	the	nature	of	the	election	contest	and	the	source	of	his	support.			Leadership	elections	in	the	Labour	Party	in	this	period	are	conducted	under	a	reformed	version	of	the	tripartite	Electoral	College	in	which	MPs	have	nomination	powers	and	votes	are	divided	into	equal	thirds	MPs	(including	MEPs),	individual	members,	and	individual	levy	payers	of	affiliate	organisations	(trade	unions	and	socialist	societies).	Votes	are	counted	on	a	one-member-one-vote	(OMOV)	basis	within	the	Electoral	College	but	each	section	of	the	college	counts	as	a	third	of	the	vote.	The	vote	is	then	counted	under	the	principles	of	the	Alternative	Vote	(AV)	in	which	the	second	preferences	of	the	lowest	scoring	candidates	are	redistributed	until	one	candidate	secures	a	majority.			Having	led	the	contest	within	the	MP	and	member	sections	of	the	Electoral	College,	David	Miliband	was	the	favourite	to	win.	However,	strongly	backed	by	the	unions,	Ed	Miliband	
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was	favourite	in	the	affiliates	section.	In	the	final	run	off,	Ed	Miliband	secured	enough	second	preferences	to	win	despite	David	Miliband	still	leading	in	the	MP	and	member	sections.	Miliband’s	victory	on	the	basis	of	a	strong	union	vote	cast	him	in	the	role	of	representing	the	left	of	the	party	(old	Labour)	and	providing	a	distinct	break	from	New	Labour.	This	victory	was	not	without	controversy	however,	in	part	because	David	Miliband	had	been	the	clear	favourite	amongst	MPs	and	members,	but	also	because	two	of	the	unions	backing	Ed	Miliband	had	seemed	to	run	against	the	spirit	of	election	rules	in	their	support	of	him	(by	including	candidate-promoting	material	in	the	same	mailing	as	the	ballot	papers).			Disquiet	in	the	party	following	Ed	Miliband’s	election	as	leader	was	subsequently	recognised	in	the	Refounding	consultation	which	begins	a	section	on	leadership	elections	with	the	statement:	‘Questions	have	been	raised	about	the	system	for	electing	our	Leader	and	Deputy’	(Labour	Party,	2011b,	p.24).	This	recognition	is	followed	at	the	end	of	this	section	with	the	suggestion	of	including	registered	supporters	in	leader	selections.	It	is	clear	from	the	coupling	of	disquiet	within	the	party	over	the	nature	of	that	victory	with	the	proposal	to	widen	the	affiliation	model,	that	Labour’s	move	to	multi-speed	membership	has	a	clear	link	to	leadership	change	and	change	in	the	dominant	faction.		Yet	in	this	case	it	would	seem	that	it	was	the	threat	of	change	in	the	dominant	faction,	rather	than	an	actual	change	in	the	dominant	faction,	that	provided	the	catalyst	for	change.	The	divisive,	factional	nature	of	the	leadership	election	ensured	that	the	new	leader	saw	pulling	the	party	together	to	be	a	central	task	of	his	leadership	(Bale,	2015);	something	he	was	praised	for	achieving.	Instead	of	resulting	in	a	change	in	the	dominant	faction,	leadership	change	had	a	conservative	effect,	preventing	the	leader	from	moving	the	party	decisively	in	a	new	direction.	So	whilst	the	purposive-action	model	suggests	that,	‘when	a	new	party	leader	assumes	the	position	by	virtue	of	being	the	head	of	a	victorious	faction	after	a	bloody	internal	dispute,	that	leader	is	likely	to	pursue	the	change	closest	to	the	hearts	of	the	faction’	(Harmel	and	Janda,	1994,	p.266),	the	factional	nature	of	the	contest	actually	limited	party	change.	The	nature	of	the	leadership	contest	and	pressures	on	the	leader	from	those	who	had	backed	him	and	those	who	hadn’t,	did	create	an	environment	for	change.	However,	it	was	one	in	which	the	leader	felt	compelled	to	act	against	those	who	had	backed	him.		
External	stimuli	and	external	shocks	
 110 
In	Harmel	and	Janda’s	(1994)	model,	an	external	shock	is	an	external	stimulus	that	directly	affects	a	party’s	performance	according	to	its	primary	goal:	a	shock	so	significant	that	it	causes	a	party	to	re-evaluate,	‘the	party’s	effectiveness	on	that	goal	dimension’	(p.268).	Whilst	this	model	permits	that	parties	may	have	more	than	one	goal,	there	is	always	one	that	is	more	important	than	others.	To	assess	whether	Labour	and	its	new	leader	felt	the	pressure	to	change	from	an	external	shock,	we	must	first	establish	the	party’s	primary	goal.		Of	the	four	primary	goals	elaborated	by	Harmel	and	Janda	(vote	maximising,	office	seeking,	representation/participation	of	members,	and	policy/ideology	advocacy),	vote	maximising	would	appear	the	most	likely	candidate.	Though	this	period	of	change	occurs	shortly	after	an	election,	it	is	clear	from	the	reform	documents	that	rebuilding	the	party	to	ensure	victory	at	the	next	general	election	is	the	main	focus	of	the	party	at	this	time.	The	party’s	rulebook	states,	‘Its	purpose	is	to	organise	and	maintain	in	Parliament	and	in	the	country	a	political	Labour	Party’	(Labour	Party,	2016).		Considering	the	alternative	primary	goals,	it	would	seem	that	office	maximising	is	an	unlikely	candidate	for	Labour	or	indeed	any	UK-wide	political	party.	Office	maximising	is	listed	separately	from	vote	maximising	in	the	Harmel	and	Janda	model	because	parties	in	systems	where	coalition	government	is	the	norm	do	not	necessarily	need	to	win	elections	to	get	into	office.	Despite	2010	heralding	the	first	coalition	government	in	the	UK	for	over	sixty	years,	coalition	government	is	not,	up	to	this	period,	a	common	feature	of	UK	politics.	Even	after	the	2010	election,	the	culture	and	electoral	strategy	within	the	Labour	Party	does	not	shift	to	see	office	as	anything	other	than	the	end	result	of	winning	a	majority	of	seats.	In	the	2017	General	Election	the	party	strongly	condemned	moves	to	create	‘progressive	alliances’	with	other	left-of-centre	parties.	Party	spokespeople	also	strongly	denied	any	coalition	plans	pre-election,	suggesting	that	coalition	was	still	seen	as	alien	to	Labour	party	culture.		We	can	therefore	discount	office	maximising	as	a	separate	category	of	primary	goal	in	this	context.			Another	option	of	primary	goal	is	policy/ideology	advocacy.	Harmel	and	Janda	(1994)	argue	that	some	parties	seek	to	advance	their	cause	over	and	above	winning	office	to	do	so.	Undoubtedly	there	are	those	in	the	Labour	Party	who	see	‘policy	purity	to	be	more	important	than	winning	votes	or	gaining	access	to	the	benefits	of	office’	(Harmel	and	Janda,	1994,	p.	270).	However,	withstanding	the	narrative	of	creating	a	‘movement’	that	
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dominates	this	period,	there	is	no	suggestion	that	the	movement	is	desired	for	its	own	sake;	party	elites	see	the	‘movement’	as	a	vehicle	for	winning	the	next	election.			To	the	final	option,	maximising	intra-party	democracy.	Clearly	intra-party	democracy	is	a	key	concern	of	the	reform	period;	however,	as	the	dependent	variable	in	this	model,	intra-party	democracy	cannot	also	stand	as	an	independent	variable.	There	is	also	little	evidence	that	intra-party	democracy	is	valued	on	its	own,	or	as	the	core	aim	of	the	party.	In	the	Refounding	reforms,	intra-party	democracy	is	presented	as	an	aid	to	vote	maximising.	The	Collins	reforms	aims	are	more	inward-looking	but	not	to	the	extent	that	maximising	intra-party	democracy	had	taken	over	from	vote	maximising	as	the	party’s	primary	goal.	Indeed,	as	consideration	of	external	shocks	will	demonstrate,	maximising	intra-party	democracy	could,	by	the	Collins	Review,	be	seen	as	wholly	aimed	at	vote	maximising	(or	rather,	avoiding	the	opposite).			
External	shock	-	election	defeat	Taking	vote	maximising	to	be	the	primary	goal	of	the	party,	the	‘performance	criterion’	on	which	the	party	is	judged	is	winning	votes	and	seats.	External	shock	therefore	comes	in	the	form	of	electoral	defeat.	This	chapter	has	already	noted	the	role	of	electoral	defeat	as	an	environmental	factor.	This	section	has	also	noted	how	electoral	defeat	is	closely	linked	to	leadership	change	in	the	Labour	party	context	and	how	the	election	shapes	the	reforms	in	the	Refounding	period	immediately	afterwards.	Yet	whilst	the	Refounding	reforms	occur	in	the	aftermath	of	electoral	defeat,	the	ideas	begin	within	the	party	well	before	May	2010,	when	Labour	are	still	in	government.	And	whilst	electoral	defeat	leaves	a	clear	imprint	on	the	first	period	of	reform,	it	has	less	of	an	influence	on	the	Collins	Review.	We	need	therefore	to	look	elsewhere	for	the	catalyst	for	the	latter	reforms.			
External	shock	–	Falkirk	scandal	Two	years	after	Ed	Miliband’s	election	as	leader	and	the	criticisms	of	union	influence	in	that	process,	the	party’s	rules	and	the	influence	of	the	unions	in	the	party	were	brought	again	into	the	public	gaze	and	into	the	party	leader’s	in-tray.	Concerns	were	raised	about	union	influence	on	the	selection	of	a	Labour	prospective	parliamentary	candidate	in	the	Falkirk	constituency.	In	the	period	between	the	existing	Falkirk	MP	standing	down	and	the	constituency	selection	contest	to	replace	him,	affiliated	union	Unite	were	accused	of	seeking	to	ensure	their	favoured	candidate	was	selected	by	signing	up	Unite	members	as	individual	members	of	the	party	(within	rules	that	allow	for	unions	to	pay	membership	costs	initially),	in	some	cases	without	the	knowledge	of	those	being	signed	up	(see	Power,	
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2017).	Widespread	media	coverage	of	the	‘vote-rigging	scandal’	and	suggestion	that	many	other	seats	were	being	targeted	(Pickard,	2013)	increased	the	pressure	on	Miliband	who	was	seen	as	too	weak	to	stand	up	to	Union	influence	(Bale,	2015).			Pressure	on	Miliband	mounted	from	within	the	party	(Wintour,	2013b)	and	from	the	Conservatives	who	made	the	most	of	the	political	advantage	offered.	The	Prime	Minister,	David	Cameron,	referred	to	union	influence	several	times	when	he	faced	Miliband	over	the	Despatch	Box	immediately	after	the	Falkirk	scandal	broke	claiming	that,	“they	[unions]	have	taken	control	of	the	Labour	party”	and	referring	explicitly	to	the	nature	of	the	leadership	election:	“all	done	by	the	man,	Len	McCluskey,	who	gave	the	right	hon.	Member	for	Doncaster	North	his	job”	(Hansard,	03	July	2013).	There	can	be	no	doubt	that	Miliband	was	under	significant	pressure	to	act	and	to	prove	that	he	was	not	in	the	pocket	of	the	unions	nor	too	weak	to	act	against	them.			The	Falkirk	scandal	clearly	threatened	the	Labour	party’s	performance	on	the	primary	goal	of	vote	winning.	The	apparent	influence	of	vested	interests	and	conflicted	position	of	the	leader	in	standing	up	to	them	created	an	electoral	problem	for	the	party.	The	Falkirk	scandal	hit	Labour	on	its	key	electoral	weak	spots:	the	potential	for	a	move	to	the	left	because	of	union	influence	and	the	perceived	personal	weakness	of	its	leader.	Despite	Labour	leading	in	the	polls,	Ed	Miliband’s	approval	ratings	had	been	on	a	steady	decline	for	the	first	half	of	2013	(Jordan,	2013).	The	Falkirk	scandal	meets	the	criteria	of	an	‘external	shock’,	directly	affecting	the	party’s	performance	on	its	primary	goal	by	threatening	the	party’s	electability.	This	‘external	shock’	led	directly	to	the	Collins	reforms	later	the	following	year	and	whilst	the	party’s	response	to	Falkirk	did	little	to	improve	Ed	Miliband’s	ratings	(Bale,	2015),	the	reform	process	was	already	in	place.			The	director	of	the	party’s	constitution	unit,	working	alongside	Ray	Collins	on	the	reforms,	describes	the	influence	of	Falkirk	in	the	decisions	made:		
‘The	new	supporters	section	would	most	likely	have	withered	in	the	vine	–	had	it	not	
been	for	a	row	over	selecting	a	parliamentary	candidate	in	Falkirk’	(McHugh,	2015)		His	analysis	of	the	decision	also	supports	the	view	of	Falkirk	as	providing	the	catalyst	for	change,	an	‘external	shock’:		
‘it	[Collins	reforms]	was	not	the	culmination	of	a	carefully	crafted	modernising	plan.	
Rather	it	was	the	product	of	political	panic,	damage	limitation	and	–	ultimately	–	a	
deal	with	the	unions.’	(McHugh,	2015)	
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There	is	also	evidence	then	that	these	reforms	meet	Harmel	et	al.'s	(1995)	hypothesis	that	formal	structures	constrain	and	limit	change.	Support	from	the	unions	allowed	the	reforms	to	pass	but	also	had	a	role	in	limiting	the	form	these	reforms	could	take:	moving	to	a	pure	OMOV	model	was	not	an	option.		The	timing	of	the	reforms	also	supports	this	argument.	Ed	Miliband’s	St	Bride’s	speech,	which	set	out	how	he	was	going	to	address	the	questions	raised	by	the	Falkirk	scandal	and	which	he	uses	to	introduce	the	primary	for	London	Mayor,	occurs	four	days	after	he	had	referred	the	Falkirk	incident	to	the	police	(13	July	2013).			
Purposive-action	summary		This	section	has	considered	the	three	key	variables	in	Harmel	and	Janda’s	(1994)	model	of	party	change:	leadership	change,	change	in	the	dominant	faction	and	external	shock.	From	this	analysis	it	is	clear	that	although	these	three	factors	do	not	encompass	the	sum	of	internal	and	external	pressures	for	change,	they	do	comprise	the	most	important	ones,	at	least	for	the	latter	reforms.			This	analysis	has	shown	that	leadership	change,	change	in	the	dominant	faction,	formal	structures	and	electoral	defeat	are	all	closely	related	in	the	Labour	Party’s	case,	each	variable	leading	to	and	influencing	the	other.	Yet	electoral	defeat	is	not	the	most	important	‘external	shock’	in	this	analysis,	despite	the	party	fitting	into	the	‘vote	maximising’	type.	It	is	the	party’s	own	internal	procedures	(and	their	misuse)	that	causes	the	greatest	‘external	shock’.	Whilst	the	actual	effect	of	the	Falkirk	scandal	on	the	Party’s	electability	may	have	in	fact	been	minimal,	it	is	the	leader’s	perception	of	its	influence	that	is	important.16		
4.6.	 Conclusion		This	chapter	began	by	setting	out	the	two	key	reforms	within	the	Labour	Party	that	evidence	the	party	moving	into	a	multi-speed	membership	organising	model:	the	Refounding	reforms	(which	saw	the	party	change	its	rulebook	to	officially	mark	the	role	of	non-member	supporters	and	open	up	the	possibility	of	them	having	a	say	in	leadership	
                                                          
16	This	is	commensurate	with	Harmel	and	Janda’s	(1994)	approach	which	argues	that	external	shocks	need	to	be	recognised	by	party	decision-makers	as	impacting	on	a	party’s	effectiveness	against	its	primary	goal	in	order	to	effect	change.	On	this	model,	the	perception	of	a	threat	is	just	as	likely	to	effect	change	as	any	actual	effects.		
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elections)	and	the	Collins	reforms	(which	replaced	the	Electoral	College	for	leadership	selections	with	a	One-Member-One-Vote	model	that	would	include	non-member	supporters	(as	well	as	introducing	a	primary	for	London	Mayor)).		These	two	critical	changes	were	analysed	using	an	ecosystem	model	which	combined	environmental,	structural	and	ideational,	and	purposive-action	variables.	By	looking	at	these	two	specific	changes	in	detail,	the	causal	mechanisms	are	revealed.	It	is	clear	that	a	range	of	explanatory	factors	are	involved	but	that	the	two	periods	of	reform	have	different	primary	explanatory	variables.			In	the	Refounding	reforms	we	see	a	new	party	leader	keen	to	make	his	mark	on	the	party	with	a	vision	of	‘movement’	politics	and	enthusiasm	for	community	organising	inspired	by	the	2008	Obama	campaign.	Yet	as	much	as	leadership	change	and	contagion	from	the	United	States	have	an	influence,	the	Refounding	reforms	are	building	on	the	general	direction	of	travel	not	just	within	the	party	but	within	the	party	system	and	beyond.	Ed	Miliband	was	supportive	of	community	organising	and	supporter	involvement	but	was	not	the	only	leader	in	the	party	to	move	in	that	direction.	The	movement	towards	looser	affiliation	and	supporter	registration	can	be	seen	as	early	as	Tony	Blair’s	leadership	(under	which	the	Registered	Supporter	scheme	was	introduced)	and	had	been	occurring	in	parties	across	Europe	and	beyond.	The	move	towards	more	open	affiliation	is	not	just	a	trend	but	rooted	in	the	(then)	widespread	decline	in	membership	numbers	(and	decline	in	trade	union	member	numbers).	The	membership	environment	and	its	financial	implications	are	key	to	this	change,	they	provide	a	reason	to	reform	and	a	justification	for	that	reform	to	face	outward,	beyond	the	membership.	Leadership	change	mattered	but	the	ecology	of	membership	and	contagion	within	and	without	the	system	contributed	too.			The	political	environment	(electoral	defeat)	also	enabled	the	party	to	reform	by	facilitating	a	change	in	leadership	and	creating	the	rationale	for	reform.	Refounding	reforms	therefore,	can	be	explained	by	the	combination	of	the	ecology	of	membership	and	political	climate	with	a	particular	emphasis	on	contagion.	These	predominantly	environmental	factors	created	the	space	for	reform	and	encouraged	the	reform	in	a	particular	direction.			The	analysis	of	this	period	of	reform	also	highlights	the	importance	of	the	party	leaders	in	shaping	reform	(Tony	Blair’s	focus	on	membership	and	support,	Ed	Miliband’s	commitment	to	Community	Organising).	This	supports	the	ecosystem	model	of	change	as	
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these	elites	are	not	simply	responding	to	changes	in	the	environment	(not	simply	making	rational	actor	decisions)	but	actively	shaping	that	environment,	pollinating	the	party	with	ideas	picked	up	from	other	parties,	think	tanks	and	indeed	from	other	elites	and	leaders.			Turning	to	the	Collins	reforms,	the	picture	fits	more	closely	a	purposive	action	model.	The	Falkirk	scandal,	and	the	immediate	and	far-reaching	response	of	the	party	leader,	fits	perfectly	the	model	of	an	external	shock	which	is	perceived	by	party	elites	to	affect	the	party’s	performance	against	its	primary	goal.	Change	in	the	party	can	be	seen	as	emanating	directly	from	the	crisis.	But	we	can	also	see	how	structural	constraints	affect	the	shape	of	the	reforms	that	are	eventually	put	to	the	vote.	As	much	as	the	party	leader	is	central	to	driving	the	reforms	through,	he	is	also	constrained	by	the	political	coalition	he	needs	to	build	to	get	them	passed.	And	the	nature	of	those	changes	are	also	constrained	by	the	affiliation	environment,	the	environment	created	by	the	Refounding	reforms	which	had	already	introduced	the	registered	supporter	category	and	the	notion	of	involving	supporters	in	leadership	elections.	The	ecology	of	membership	for	the	Collins	reforms	had	been	set	by	the	Refounding	reforms	that	preceded	them.			Again,	in	this	second	period	of	reform,	the	ecosystem	model	provides	a	useful	way	of	understanding	change.	A	purely	purposive-action	model	can	explain	the	adoption	of	the	Collins	reforms,	but	as	noted	at	the	beginning	of	this	chapter,	those	applying	a	‘purposive-action’-shaped	cookie	cutter	will	always	get	a	‘purposive-action’-shaped	cookie.	The	Collins	reforms	would	not	have	been	possible	had	the	supporter	category	and	precedent	of	giving	supporters	a	say	in	intra-party	democracy	not	previously	been	established	under	the	Refounding	reforms.	These	significant	environmental	considerations	would	not	have	been	captured	in	a	model	that	doesn’t	consider	the	full	range	of	explanatory	variables.	But	this	finding	also	suggests	a	new	factor	needs	to	be	added	explicitly	to	the	ecosystem:	the	environment	created	by	previous	party	reform.			Multi-speed	membership	in	the	Labour	Party	has	been	a	gradual	process	driven	by	party	leaders	in	response	to	the	membership	environment	which	itself	has	been	shaped	by	contagion	from	the	left	and	right,	and	shaped	by	party	elites	themselves.	Throughout	these	gradual	shifts	a	clear	commitment	to	membership	and	the	role	membership	plays	both	functionally	in	providing	resources	and	in	legitimising	the	party	can	be	felt,	demonstrating	the	importance	of	the	link	between	organisational	structure,	membership	decisions	and	‘narratives	of	legitimacy’	(Scarrow,	2015).	These	narratives	of	legitimacy	are	employed	both	as	a	starting	point	for	reform	and	to	justify	the	change,	but	it	is	also	evident	that	they	
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can	be	a	constraining	force	too.	This	analysis	suggests	that	in	future	work	on	party	change,	particularly	in	relation	to	multi-speed	membership	change,	attention	to	party	elite	rhetoric	and	these	narratives	of	legitimacy	is	important.	It	also	demonstrates	that	considering	forces	of	continuity	as	well	as	change	provides	a	more	complete	picture.		Later	reforms,	the	decisive	step	towards	a	more	extreme	version	of	multi-speed	membership,	owe	much	to	internal	party	crisis	and	the	response	of	a	leader	constrained	by	specific	power	bases	in	the	party.	Here	a	key	external	shock	and	leadership	decision	are	layered	on	top	of	the	environment	created	by	previous	reforms	creating	a	significant	rule	change.	If	the	membership	and	party	environment	help	explain	why	the	Labour	Party	edged	towards	more	plebiscitary	intra-party	democracy	with	the	Refounding	reforms,	the	Falkirk	scandal	explains	why	the	party	ended	up	diving	headfirst	into	an	extreme	version	of	it.		Developing	and	applying	an	ecosystem	model	of	multi-speed	change	has	facilitated	an	in-depth	analysis	of	these	significant	changes	in	the	party.	Building	on	previous	models	of	party	change,	this	model	has	sought	to	clearly	set	out	the	way	environmental	factors	(within	the	party	system	and	within	the	party)	interact	with	party	actors	who	are	not	simply	responding	to	change	but	instrumental	in	shaping	it;	how	key	decision-makers	not	only	assess	theirs	and	the	party’s	interests,	but	bring	with	them	established	ideas	about	the	role	of	membership	within	a	party	(ideas	influenced	by	party	origins	and	type).	It	has	demonstrated	the	value	of	considering	both	forces	for	change	alongside	forces	for	continuity	when	analysing	multi-speed	membership.	This	model	has	brought	together	structures	and	agents,	exogeneous	and	endogenous	factors,	rational	decisions	and	ideological	ones,	and	shown	how	they	link	together.	In	doing	so	this	analysis	of	change	has	shown	how	multi-speed	membership	change	has	occurred	in	the	Labour	Party	and	created	a	multi-speed	model	of	change	which	can	be	applied	to	other	party	case	studies.		
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Chapter	5:	The	supply	side	of	party	membership		To	understand	multi-speed	membership	as	a	strategy	it	is	important	to	examine	its	impact	through	the	eyes	of	the	membership.	The	dual	multi-speed	approach	of	appealing	to	both	traditional	members	and	more	loosely	attached	supporters	can	only	succeed	if	the	new	multi-speed	structures	do	not	adversely	affect	the	traditional	membership	model	upon	which	they	are	‘layered’.	Therefore,	to	understand	its	impact,	we	need	first	to	understand	the	dynamics	of	membership	in	depth.	Correspondingly,	this	supply	side	analysis	of	multi-speed	membership	focuses	on	the	dynamics	of	party	membership	and	on	the	dynamics	of	the	traditional	member	model.		The	headline	organisational	consequences	of	adopting	multi-speed	membership	for	Labour	have	been	a	significant	increase	in	affiliated	support	(both	registered	supporters	and	membership)	and	an	increased	stream	of	funding.	Yet	from	the	analysis	of	demand-side	motivations	for	change	presented	in	chapter	4,	we	see	that	financial	decisions	alone	did	not	drive	the	change	(decisions	about	costs	were	made	independently	of	the	decision	to	open	political	rights	to	supporters).	The	legitimacy	provided	by	numbers	is	important	for	the	party	but	what	the	party	expected	from	the	shift	to	wider	support	is	clearly	derived	from	expectations	of	linkage	and	legitimacy.	So	multi-speed	success	for	Labour	cannot	be	understood	in	terms	of	increased	revenue	alone;	nor	does	success	depend	purely	on	increased	numbers.	As	discussed	in	chapter	4,	linkage	is	more	than	just	numerical	strength:	it	is	connected	to	participation.	To	understand	the	success	of	multi-speed	membership	in	the	Labour	party,	we	need	to	look	beyond	finances	and	numbers.			Previous	studies	have	shown	(see	section	2.6)	that	increases	in	membership	numbers	following	past	party	experiments	in	expanding	plebiscitary	options,	did	not	lead	to	an	increase	in	active	membership.	There	is	a	risk	that,	should	new	affiliation	options	not	lead	to	more	active	support	or	increased	active	membership,	and	at	the	same	time	negatively	affect	the	motivations	and	benefits	of	existing	active	members,	a	multi-speed	strategy	could	be	damaging	for	the	party.	The	increase	in	affiliated	support	as	a	result	of	the	party’s	multi-speed	membership	strategy	may	also	come	with	a	‘cost’	for	membership.		It	is	clear	from	the	analysis	of	why	multi-speed	membership	has	been	pursued	in	the	Labour	party,	that	it	has	not	been	introduced	with	the	aim	of	replacing	formal	membership.	This	is	seen	in	the	frequently	stated	desire	to	protect	the	status	of	member	and	in	the	party’s	claims	that	supporter	affiliation	could	be	used	as	a	gateway	to	full	
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membership.	This	again	suggests	that	a	focus	on	the	impact	of	multi-speed	organising	on	traditional	membership	is	necessary	to	understand	the	success	and	sustainability	of	such	a	move.			In	this	chapter	I	present	findings	from	interviews	with	members	of	the	Labour	party	who	are,	or	had	at	one	time	been,	active	in	‘high-intensity’	activities	for	the	party.	I	analyse	what	motivates	party	members	to	join,	become	active,	and	stay	active	and	engaged	within	the	party	and	I	assess	the	impact	of	multi-speed	membership	on	these	membership	dynamics.		
	
5.1.	 Why	do	party	members	join,	what	do	they	do,	and	why?	
		This	chapter	answers	two	central	questions	regarding	the	supply	side	of	party	support	in	order	to	assess	the	consequences	of	making	changes	to	that	model:		
• What	reasons	do	party	members	give	for	joining	the	party	and	becoming	active?		
• Do,	and	if	so	how	do,	those	motivations	change	during	active	membership?	How	does	the	party-member	relationship	develop?		Consequently,	are	these	motivation	structures	affected	by	expanding	affiliation	options	and	political	rights	to	non-members?			The	first	section	of	this	chapter	explores	the	routes	that	people	take	to	party	membership.	It	looks	at	the	motivations	party	members	offer	to	explain	joining	the	party	and	becoming	active.	It	explores	how	party	members	came	to	join	and	what	they	did	after	joining.	The	analysis	of	members’	paths	to	party	membership	also	includes	consideration	of	interviewees’	wider	political	activities	and	the	relationship	between	party	support	and	party	membership.			I	examine	the	range	of	motivations	and	experiences	members	draw	on	to	explain	their	entry	into	party	politics.	These	paths	to	party	membership,	though	individual,	share	much	in	common.	A	pattern	which	incorporates	social	norms,	political	values	and	selective	process	and	outcome	incentives	emerges	from	these	interviews	and	is	common	to	nearly	
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all	member	narratives.	This	in-depth	analysis	of	party	membership	reveals	the	significance	of	selective	incentives	and	how	party	culture	may	be	shaping	how	motivations	have	been	presented	in	quantitative	research	to	date.			The	findings	of	this	study	also	challenge	the	dominant	view	of	the	relationship	between	party	membership,	activism	and	partisan	identification,	suggesting	that	activism	often	precedes	membership	and	that	partisan	identification	is	more	fluid	amongst	party	members	than	previously	understood.	This	adds	to	the	growing	literature	that	recognises	the	importance	of	non-member	party	activity.	These	findings	raise	important	questions	for	how	parties	structure	opportunities	for	partisans	and	what	they	can	expect	in	return.			The	second	section	of	this	chapter	considers	the	question	of	‘what	next?’,	looking	at	the	nature	of	party	membership:	how	it	develops	and	shapes	members’	motivations	and	relationship	with	the	party,	and	sustains	(or	not)	their	activism.	Taking	an	open	and	inductive	approach	(see	research	design	chapter,	section	3.4.3)	to	analysis	of	party	members’	experiences	of	party	membership	reveals	the	importance	of	socialisation	and	solidary	incentives	derived	from	social	networks	(social	ties).	Solidary	(social)	incentives	are	shown	to	encourage	active	participation	and	potentially	dissuade	members	from	exit.	I	find	strong	evidence	of	members’	relationship	with	the	party	cementing	over	time	through	the	creation	of	social	networks,	with	the	party	becoming	intertwined	with	members’	lives	outside	of	politics.	This	party	network	keeps	members	engaged	with	the	party	which	in	turn	makes	activism	more	likely.			A	second	related	process	is	that	of	socialisation.	There	is	evidence	of	strong	socialisation	effects	which	help	members	to	learn	the	rules	and	norms	of	the	party.	I	find	that	this	socialisation	process	is	particularly	important	in	the	development	of	shared	language	and	skills,	both	of	which	reduce	the	barriers	to	active	participation.	Thirdly,	I	find	suggestion	of	ideological	convergence	at	the	local	level.	Interviewees	revealed	an	awareness	that	at	the	local	level,	shared	language	and	skills	often	seep	into	shared	ideas.	Understanding	the	ideological	positioning	of	the	local	party	helped	with	active	participation	but	was	also	identified	as	potentially	off-putting	for	newer	recruits.			Together,	the	socialisation	process	and	development	of	social	ties	provide	a	bond	that	both	activates	and	keeps	members	active	within	the	party.	They	are	therefore	essential	components	of	organisational	coherence	and	viability.		However,	these	processes	could	also	prove	exclusionary	to	more	loosely	affiliated	supporters.	Likewise,	expanding	the	
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membership	model	to	include	non-member	support	has	the	potential	to	disrupt	socialisation	processes	and	social	ties.	For	the	multi-speed	membership	party,	retaining	active	members	whilst	encouraging	non-member	active	support	is	a	very	fine	balancing	act.		
5.2	 Party	members	-	Incentives	and	motivations	(background	literature)	
	Much	of	what	we	know	about	party	member	attitudes	and	activities	has	been	shaped	by	Seyd	and	Whiteley’s	general	incentives	model	(Seyd	and	Whiteley,	1992;	Whiteley	et	al.,	1994;	Whiteley	and	Seyd,	2002).	Building	on	the	tripartite	scheme	developed	by	Clark	and	Wilson	(1961)	which	categorises	incentives	as	material,	solidary	and	purposive,	Whiteley	and	Seyd’s	general	incentives	model	of	participation	combines	these	aspects	of	the	rational	choice	approach	with	a	social	psychological	understanding	of	action.	Incentives	are	categorised	as	selective	incentives	(those	with	private	benefits)	and	collective	incentives	(those	that	are	aimed	at	collective	benefits).	Selective	incentives	can	be	either	selective	process	incentives,	derived	from	the	process	of	participation,	such	as	‘meeting	like-minded	and	interesting	people’	(1992,	p.60)	or	the	enjoyment	of	politics	in	itself	(similar	to	Clark	and	Wilson’s	solidary	incentives),	or	selective	outcome	incentives,	most	frequently	conceived	at	career	benefits	(those	categorised	as	‘material’	under	Clark	and	Wilson’s	scheme).	Whiteley	and	Seyd	argue	(1992)	that	no	account	of	collective	action	can	be	complete	without	allowing	for	situations	in	which	the	individual	thinks	collectively	(p.61).	Thus,	the	model	contains	collective	incentives	both	positive,	aimed	at	achieving	collective	‘goods’,	and	negative,	aimed	at	preventing	collective	‘bads’.	In	these,	the	participant	has	made	a	collective	cost-benefit	assessment	of	the	utility	of	their	participation.			To	these	rational	individual	benefits	and	collective	benefits,	they	add	two	which	do	not	contain	a	cost-benefit	assessment:	altruism,	initially	defined	by	Whiteley	and	Seyd	(1992,	p.63)	as	a	contribution	from,	‘a	sense	of	loyalty	or	affection	for	the	party.	They	have	an	emotional	attachment	to	the	party’	(in	later	texts	this	appears	closer	to	a	sense	of	duty:	‘Individuals	can	devote	hours	of	their	time	out	of	a	sense	of	conviction	that	it	is	their	duty	to	get	involved	in	politics	in	a	democracy’	(1994,	p.86)),	and	social	norms	which	sees	participants	as	motivated,	‘by	a	desire	to	conform’,	perhaps	following	family	traditions.	In	later	texts	(1994,	2002)	two	further	categories	are	added	to	the	model;	selective	
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ideological	incentives	(a	process	incentive)	which	uses	May’s	Law17	as	a	theoretical	explanation	of	party	activism,	suggesting	the	more	radical	will	be	more	motivated	to	participate	as	it	gives	them	opportunity	to	‘give	expression	to	deeply	held	beliefs’	(1994,	p.	85),	and	‘expressive	or	affective	evaluation’	which	appears	to	take	the	place	of	altruism	as	previously	defined:	they	are	motives	‘based	on	the	strength	of	the	member’s	emotional	attachment	to	the	party’	(1994,	p.86).	Tested	against	other	theoretical	models	of	political	participation,	examining	not	just	why	people	join	parties,	but	why	some	are	active	and	some	are	not,	the	general	incentives	model,	including	both	rational	choice	and	social	psychological	elements,	proves	the	best	fit.			Whiteley	and	Seyd’s	general	incentives	model	has	been	hugely	influential	in	understanding	party	membership,	but	also	in	shaping	how	political	science	has	conceptualised	and	measured	political	activism	in	parties.	Yet	there	are	some	problems	with	this	model	and	its	indicators	(Granik,	2005).	There	is	potential	for	overlap	between	categories:	‘social	norms’,	which	includes	influence	of	family	and	friends,	could	easily	be	understood	as	a	selective	outcome	incentive	(the	social	approval	gained	from	the	act	could	be	seen	as	a	personal	benefit).	Some	surveys	have	classified	the	role	of	family	(as	party	members	or	party	membership	as	a	family	tradition)	as	a	process	incentive	rather	than	as	a	separate	category	of	social	norm	(Baras	et	al.,	2015;	Bennie,	2015;	Heidar,	2015;	Sandri	et	al.,	2015;	van	Haute,	2015),	perhaps	seeing	family	not	so	much	as	setting	the	background	normative	value	of	party	membership	but	as	the	‘likeminded’	individuals	one	would	participate	with.			There	is	also	potential	cross-over	between	those	incentives	described	as	altruistic	and	those	considered	collective	incentives;	a	sense	of	duty	to	promote	social	justice	might	equally	be	described	as	a	commitment	to	certain	social	policies.	Where	there	is	potential	for	overlap,	it	cannot	be	assumed	that	researchers	and	respondents	ascribe	the	same	meaning	to	survey	answers,	and	this	is	problematic.			The	measurement	of	selective	outcome	incentives	is	also	problematic.	Admitting	to	political	ambitions	is	often	seen	as	unacceptable	in	party	politics.	Whiteley	and	Seyd	acknowledged	this	may	have	resulted	in	a	lower	proportion	of	respondents	reporting	selective	outcome	motivations	in	their	surveys	(1992,	p.76).	In	later	studies	they	have	
                                                          
17 May’s	Law	of	curvilinear	disparity	(1973)	contends	that	those	most	active	in	a	party	are	more	ideologically	extreme	than	the	voters	and	party	leadership,	creating	a	curvilinear	relationship	between	position	in	the	party	hierarchy	and	ideological	radicalism. 
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tried	to	overcome	this	by	using	an	indirect	measure,	whether	the	respondent	sees	‘a	person	like	me’	as	suitable	for	elected	office	(1994).	This	indirect	measure	would	appear	to	capture	feelings	of	personal	efficacy	rather	than	selective	outcome	incentives.	More	recent	surveys	have	overcome	this	problem	by	asking	respondents	to	rank	how	important	each	incentive	is.	This	has	enabled	respondents	to	acknowledge	selective	incentives	for	the	decision	to	join,	without	them	having	to	say	such	incentives	are	their	most	important	motivation	(Poletti,	Webb	and	Bale,	forthcoming). 		There	is	also	variation	in	the	use	of	‘ideological’	to	describe	motivations.	‘Ideological’	is	often	used	to	mean	policy	goals	or	political	values	which	would	be	categorised	as	collective	motivations	under	the	general	incentives	model	rather	than	as	the	specific	measurement	of	partisan	radicalism	labelled	‘ideological’	in	the	general	incentives	model.	However,	some	surveys	(see	for	instance	Spier	and	Klein	(2015))	do	use	‘ideological’	as	a	separate	category	to	collective	incentives,	picking	up	on	factional	motivations	(‘to	support	a	specific	wing	of	the	party’;	‘to	influence	the	political	course	of	the	party’	(Spier	and	Klein,	2015)).		These	difficulties	suggest	that	whilst	member	surveys	can	helpfully	reveal	member	attitudes,	more	in-depth	research	might	be	utilised	to	test	and	expand	on	these	findings,	getting	underneath	the	meanings	respondents	ascribe	to	their	membership.			Permitting	respondents	to	select	just	one	primary	(most	important)	motivation	can	also	limit	our	understanding	of	member	motivation	structures.	Whiteley	and	Seyd	(1992),	admit	this	approach	has	potentially	underestimated	the	importance	of	other	motivations	(1992,	p.76).	Other	studies	of	party	member	motivation	(McCulloch,	1990)	suggest	that	motives	are	complex	and	volatile.	Restricting	the	reasons	people	join	and	stay	in	political	parties	to	a	model	that	offers	a	constrained	range	of	explanations	may	be	too	limiting.	Given	the	ambiguities	of	measuring	some	of	those	elements,	it	is	important	to	get	beyond	the	limitations	of	the	formal	quantitative	models.	A	more	in-depth	approach	would	expand	our	understanding	of	what	drives	party	membership,	as	well	as	what	sustains	it.			Intra-party	democratic	rights	are	not	featured	as	a	separate	category	in	the	general	incentives	model.	These	‘political	rights’,	which	are	selective	and	inclusive,	are	the	rights	that	are	increasingly	available	to	parties	to	offer	potential	members	(Scarrow,	2015).	They	could	perhaps	be	categorised	as	selective	process	benefits	(Cross,	2015;	Rahat	and	Kenig,	2015;	Sandri	et	al.,	2015),	but	they	are	not	related	to	the	benefits	of	collective,	group	
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activities	(joining	in	with	like-minded	individuals).	Instead	they	are	individual	rights	such	as	having	a	vote	in	leader	selection	or	policy	within	the	party.	Often	these	rights	are	plebiscitary	rather	than	assembly-based	(von	dem	Berge	and	Poguntke,	2017)	increasing	their	individualised	nature.	Consequently,	their	role	in	members’	motivations	for	joining	deserves	more	detailed	consideration.			
5.2	 Interviews			To	understand	the	relationship	between	members	and	their	parties,	we	need	to	look	in	more	depth	at	how	members	come	to	join,	why	they	join,	what	they	do,	and	crucially	how	that	relationship	develops.	Only	then	can	we	assess	the	way	party	organisation,	in	particular	the	multi-speed	membership	way	of	organising,	relates	to	partisan	behaviour.		These	interviews	with	party	members	explored	participants’	routes	to	political	and	partisan	activity:	when,	how,	and	why	they	joined;	their	expectations	and	first	impressions;	what	they	did;	what	it	means	to	be	a	party	member	and	what	they	think	about	political	rights,	specifically,	how	they	feel	about	these	rights	being	extended	to	supporters.	By	setting	the	act	of	joining	in	context,	giving	interviewees	the	opportunity	to	talk	in	more	depth	about	their	party	membership,	these	interviews	offer	a	more	detailed	and	arguably,	accurate	picture	of	the	motivation	structure	behind	party	membership.	Though	details	may	be	inaccurately	recalled	(as	indeed	survey	responses	may	be)	these	narratives	reveal	a	lot	about	the	processes	of	party	membership	and	about	members’	personal	relationship	with	their	party.	Taking	a	qualitative,	inductive	approach	has	revealed	the	complex	motivational	structures	behind	joining	and	activism,	the	potential	influence	of	party	culture	on	responses,	and	revealed	the	importance	of	social	ties	and	socialisation	processes	in	keeping	members	active.	Exploring	joining	and	activism	as	a	narrative	and	a	process	has	added	depth	to	understanding	of	the	supply	side	of	party	support.		
Results:	Section	One	
	
5.4.	 Why	do	party	members	join	and	become	active?	
	
5.4.1.	 Paths	to	party	membership		The	findings	of	this	research	do	not	suggest	that	categories	of	motivation	beyond	those	developed	in	the	general	incentives	model	are	needed	to	explain	the	multiple	reasons	
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party	members	offer	to	explain	joining	the	party	but	rather	that	the	existing	categories	can	be	understood	better	by	giving	interviewees	space	to	discuss	their	motivations	in	depth	and	to	discuss	joining	as	a	process	not	a	single	event.18	To	capture	the	multi-dimensional	nature	of	participants’	attachment	to	the	party,	analysis	of	interviewees’	incentives	was	not	limited	to	just	one	given	reason.	Instead,	participants’	responses	were	analysed	to	capture	all,	additional	or	alternative	reasons.	After	coding	interviewees’	incentives,	their	‘joining	narratives’	were	explored	to	better	understand	the	process	as	a	whole	and	how	these	motivations	fit	together.		Membership	surveys	across	a	number	of	countries	have	been	surprisingly	consistent	in	identifying	which	incentives	party	members	find	compelling.	Consistently,	selective	material	and	social	benefits	are	found	to	be	far	less	important	than	collective	(sometimes	referred	to	as	ideological19)	incentives	(Pedersen	et	al.,	2004;	Heidar,	2014;	Scarrow,	2015;	van	Haute	and	Gauja,	2015).20	Though	there	are	exceptions	(notably	Bruter	and	Harrison	(2009),	who	look	specifically	at	younger	members	and	find	that	there	are	‘professional	minded’	younger	members	with	clear	selective	(material)	benefits	in	mind),	the	dominant	view	in	quantitative	studies	is	that	collective	benefits	are	key	to	explaining	member	motivations.			The	interviews	I	conducted	with	party	members	reveal	that	collective	incentives	were	not	the	predominant	motivation.	Whilst	participants	did	mention	either	specific	policy	goals	(feminism,	anti-war)	or	a	desire	to	oppose	others	(Boris	Johnson,	the	Coalition	government)	these	collective	incentives	were	not	the	only	incentives	contained	within	members’	membership	narratives.	Understanding	members’	joining	behaviour	as	a	process	rather	than	static	moment	in	time	reveals	a	more	complex	motivation	structure	which	includes	strong	selective	and	social	incentives.			
                                                          
18	See	research	design	(section	3.4.2).	In	analysing	members’	reasons	for	joining,	a	process	of	analytic	induction	instead	of	grounded	theory	was	used.	Whilst	open	to	finding	and	capturing	categories	of	incentive	not	present	in	the	general	incentives	model,	the	aim	of	this	section	of	the	research	was	to	build	on	the	existing	theory	rather	than	develop	an	alternative	account.	However,	the	analysis	was	also	open	to	new	concepts	and	reviewed	the	data	as	a	narrative	in	addition	to	coding	incentives	in	order	to	expand	on	the	theory.		
19	‘Ideological’	is	used	here	to	mean	policy	goals	or	political	values	which	would	be	categorised	as	collective	incentives	under	the	general	incentives	model.	
20	In	contrast,	altruistic	incentives	are	the	most	frequent	in	Seyd	and	Whiteley	(1992)	followed	by	selective	process	incentives,	though	some	of	those	categorised	as	altruistic	could	be	interpreted	as	collective.  
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Though	participants	often	initially	cited	collective	incentives	as	their	reason	for	membership,	further	discussion	of	interviewees’	aims	and	actions	revealed	other	motives.	A	commonly	occurring	pattern	was	for	members	to	name	a	specific	political	moment	that	prompted	them	to	join	(the	election	of	Conservative	governments,	war),	reflect	on	the	influence	of	their	family	background	or	friends,	and	then	discuss	the	personal	aims	that	led	them	to	join	(the	opportunity	presented	by	an	election,	union	membership,	candidacy).	Whilst	every	story	is	different,	this	pattern	demonstrates	that	it	is	rare	for	members	to	have	just	one	motive	for	joining.	This	pattern	also	suggests	a	process	which	links	these	various	motivations	together.	First,	the	background	conditions	for	membership	are	established	through	the	transmission	of	social	norms,	then	the	broad	values	of	the	individual	emerge,	then	a	specific	event	happens,	or	the	possibility	of	a	selective	benefit	become	apparent	(a	trigger),	which	prompts	the	decision	to	join.			
“There	are	certain	political	milestones	that	push	you	to	become	more	involved.	Like	
when	there’s	a	world	cup	everyone	plays	football.	And	a	general	election	is	one	of	those	
things	that	pushes	you	to	get	more	involved	to	a	point	where	you	become	a	member.”	
(#02,	member	<	1	year)	
	
	
Figure	4:	The	process	of	joining	
 
		As	might	be	expected	with	active	or	formerly	active	party	members,	selective	incentives	were	significant.	A	desire	to	get	involved	in	an	election,	a	campaign,	or	union	activity	(selective	process	incentives)	or	the	opportunities	participation	might	create	in	terms	of	careers	or	skills	(selective	outcome	incentives),	formed	some	part	of	nearly	all	interviewees’	stories.	The	importance	of	selective	incentives	is	a	notable	divergence	from	most	survey	findings	(though	there	are	some	exceptions	(see	Bruter	and	Harrison,	2009;	Poletti,	Webb	and	Bale,	forthcoming;	Young	and	Cross,	2007)).	
	
Figure	5:	Joining	incentives	–	example	coding	decisions	
 
Incentive	for	joining	 Examples	from	the	data			Collective	incentives	(positive)	 “It	was	single	issues	and	it	was	in	general	things	[like]	poverty,	class”	
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	“For	us	in	those	days,	we	wanted	to	change	the	world”		“It	seemed	to	me	to	be	the	party	that	was	more	interested	in	equality”		“I	had	worked	in	the	voluntary	sector	on	issues	like	rough	sleeping,	the	impact	on	women,	global	issues,	austerity.”			Collective	incentives	(negative)	 “I	had	all	sorts	of	problems	with	the	Coalition	government	and	having	a	Conservative	government”		“Boris	Johnson	became	Mayor	of	London	and	it	was	the	last	straw”		“I	was	inspired	by	being	pissed	off	with	the	Conservatives”		“[there	were	the]	education	changes	under	the	Conservatives	-	and	then	the	Labour	alternative	looked	much	more	appealing”			Selective	incentives	(process)	 “I	joined	wanting	to	help	campaigning	and	door	knocking	and	organising	an	election”		“I	joined	the	party	after	watching	the	leaders’	debates	in	2010	–	I	wanted	to	try	to	help,	to	get	involved”		‘There	is	also	a	nice	feeling	that	you	are	among	others	that	feel	that	way,	and	that	you	are	not	a	lone	voice.”		“We	thought	it’s	a	good	way	of	getting	to	know	people	and	being	involved	in	the	community”		Selective	incentives	(outcome)	 “And	I	also	just	think	it	was	good	for	me	as	well	to	kind	of	broaden	my	horizons”		“I’d	always	imagined	that	I’d	be	working	in	London	in	the	political	sphere”		“I	couldn’t	actually	have	any	other	paid	work	really	whilst	it	was	going	on,	so	there	had	to	be	a	bit	of	an	investment	in	the	next	stage”		“I	think	it’s	interesting	and	I	think	it	opens	up	doors”		Social	Norms			 “My	mum	was	always	a	Labour	supporter…we	went	on	a	lot	of	demonstrations,	CND	demo’s,	demo’s	on	local	authority	cuts”		“I’d	been	involved	heavily	in	that	election	because	my	father	was	an	agent	and	our	house	was	always	used	as	a	committee	room”	
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	“I	was	in	the	union	because	of	the	miners’	strike	and	my	Dad	was	a	miner	and	I	was	politicised	through	the	strike.”		“My	parents	had	always	been	fairly	political,	left-wing”		Expressive	/altruistic	 “You	get	swept	away	in	the	emotion	of	it.	It’s	why	people	join	after	the	election.”		“I	wanted	to	make	a	statement	that	this	is	what	I	believe”		“I	thought	I	ought	to	become	a	member	and	…	I	ought	to	commit	to	being	a	member	of	the	Labour	party”			
	
	One	notable	addition	to	this	pattern	of	incentives	is	the	party	leader	as	an	incentive;	whether	as	the	embodiment	of	a	set	of	values	or	because	they	represent	change	in	the	party.	For	some	interviewees,	whilst	the	background	conditions	(social	norms)	and	development	of	political	values	(collective	incentives)	followed	the	same	pattern,	a	change	in	leader	provided	the	final	nudge	to	join.	Though	this	is	seen	across	different	leaderships	(“I	was	a	big	fan	of	Neil	Kinnock	actually”;	“I	re-joined	when	Ed	Miliband	was	selected”),	it	was	particularly	notable	amongst	newer	joiners.			 “I’d	been	fairly	disenchanted	with	the	Labour	Party	for	a	few	years	and	when	he	
[Jeremy	Corbyn]	came	along	I	thought	“Wow,	Yes!””	(#23,	member	<	1	year)	
	
“And	then	I	came	back	and	he	[Jeremy	Corbyn]	wins.	That	day	I	joined	the	Labour	
party.	Because	I	thought,	what’s	the	point	being	outside	of	it	and	you’ve	got	the	
opportunity	to	be	part	of	shaping	something.	So	I	joined	that	day”	(#27,	member	2	
years)	
	
“I	actually	only	became	a	paid-up	member	after	I	first	saw	Jeremy	Corbyn	on	the	first	
television	interview	before	he	was	elected”	(#28,	member	2	years)	
	The	party	leader	as	a	motivating	factor	is	not	specifically	highlighted	in	the	general	incentives	model	texts	but	the	opposition	party’s	leader	is	mentioned	and	categorised	under	collective	negative	incentives	(‘Mrs	Thatcher	has	been	an	excellent	recruiting-sergeant	for	the	Labour	Party!’	(Seyd	and	Whiteley,	1992)).	However,	in	subsequent	analyses	using	the	general	incentives	framework,	the	leader	of	the	party	has	been	picked	out	as	a	significant	motivating	factor.	Whiteley	et.	al.	(forthcoming)	note	the	appeal	of	Jeremy	Corbyn	as	a	specific	factor	in	Labour	party	recruitment	post	2015.		Motivations	relating	to	the	leadership	of	the	party	have	been	classified	as	ideological	incentives	(Kosiara-Pedersen,	2015)	and	as	an	ideological	incentive	specifically	related	to	
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party	goals	(‘to	follow	the	political	project	of	the	party	leader’)	(Sandri	et	al.,	2015).	In	other	analyses	the	leader	has	been	seen	as	an	expressive	incentive	(‘because	of	impressive	personalities	at	the	top	of	the	party’	(Spier	and	Klein,	2015)).			Offering	leadership	as	a	separate	category	however,	demonstrates	its	importance	in	members’	motivational	structures.	‘Belief	in	the	leadership’	has	been	found	to	be	the	third	most	important	motivation	for	Labour	members,	second	only	to	positive	and	negative	collective	incentives	(Bale	et	al.,	2018).		For	those	who	saw	the	leader	as	a	motivating	factor	in	these	interviews,	indeed	as	the	catalyst	for	their	signing	up	as	members,	the	leader	was	seen	most	often	as	a	proxy	for	their	values,	someone	they	could	relate	to,	or	as	a	vehicle	for	change	in	the	party.	For	these	reasons,	leadership	as	a	motivation	is	linked	to	positive	collective	incentives,	policy	goals	and	values,	but	is	also	indicative	of	a	change	in	the	party.	The	change	in	the	party	that	leadership	change	represents	can	create	new	selective	process	incentives	for	potential	joiners.	The	change	gives	potential	members	a	reason	to	sign	up	and	get	involved,	catalysing	the	idea	that	their	involvement	(process	incentives)	will	help	achieve	their	political	goals	(collective	incentives).			Whilst	the	party	leader	played	a	role	in	the	joining	process	for	some	of	the	members	interviewed,	the	opportunity	to	select	that	individual	(political	rights/intra-party	democratic	processes),	did	not	feature	in	the	majority	of	members’	accounts	of	their	paths	to	membership.	Indeed,	of	all	the	motivations	that	party	members	describe	in	their	joining	narratives,	political	rights	were	of	least	interest	to	the	majority	of	members.	However,	for	a	couple	of	newer	members	(post-2015),	selection	rights	had	provided	the	catalyst	or	prompt	for	joining.	More	recent	studies	that	have	picked	out	leader	selection	as	a	separate	incentive	(particularly	with	members	of	the	Labour	party	post-2015),	find	that	such	rights	are	an	important	motivation	(Bale	et	al.,	2018).	This	suggests	that	the	incentives	offered	are	shaping	the	types	of	member	who	joins.	The	role	of	political	rights	as	incentives	is	explored	in	more	depth	in	chapter	7.	The	rest	of	this	chapter	explores	the	incentives	that	have	led	these	party	members	to	active	participation.			
5.4.2.	 Selective	outcome	incentives	and	party	culture		The	interviews	suggest	that	selective	outcome	incentives	in	particular	have	been	underplayed	in	most	membership	studies	to	date.	Selective	outcome	incentives	(material	
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benefits),	most	notably	career	or	skills	building	opportunities,	were	significant	in	these	interviews	with	party	members,	predominantly,	though	not	exclusively,	those	who	were	younger	(under	25)	and/or	had	been	members	for	less	than	five	years.	These	members	talked	about	the	opportunities	and	access	that	active	party	membership	could	afford	them.	The	focus	was	rarely	on	elected	positions	(though	these	might	have	featured	in	the	background	as	a	future	goal)	but	on	more	realistic	immediate	career	opportunities	such	as	working	for	an	MP,	for	the	party,	or	simply	gaining	new	skills.	For	most	of	these	newer	or	younger	members	the	election	gave	them	a	specific	moment	in	which	to	engage	with	active	political	participation,	get	access	to	party	processes	and	gain	experience:		
	“I	was	thinking	what	do	I	want	to	do	-	there’s	an	election	going	on,	it	would	be	really	
interesting	to	find	out	how	it	works.	And	also	talk	to	people	who	were	working	in	that	
area	and	see	what	they	do.	And	it	was	massively	helpful	for	that.”	(#04,	member	<1	
year)	
	
“I	was	quite	keen	in	a	way	because	I	had	been	quite	impressed	to	see	how	some	
volunteers	had	moved	on	to	run	boards	and	stuff	like	that.	And	that	appealed	to	me	
from	a	quite	self-interested	perspective;	I	thought	this	is	probably	quite	a	good	
opportunity	to	practice	my	leadership	skills.”	(#09,	member	<	1	year)		
	Interviewees	tended	to	initially	downplay	their	career	aims	noting	that	they	didn’t	have	ambitions	in	that	area.	Yet	whilst	not	initially	open	to	admitting	to	selective	outcome	incentives,	extended	discussion	revealed	their	significance.	In	describing	their	routes	to	membership,	for	most	interviewees,	a	selective	outcome	incentive	featured.	This	suggests	that	admitting	to	political	ambitions	is	undesirable	in	the	party	context.		
“I	knew	I’d	need	to	be	a	member	of	the	party	to	work	for	[Party	representative]	
anyway.	So	yeah,	I	guess	in	a	way	when	I	did	join	the	party	I	did	have	designs	on	it	
being	useful	to	my	career;	I	guess	it	was	just	a	natural	step	to	doing	whatever	I	was	
going	to	do	next.”	(#02,	member	<	1	year)		
	
“I	can’t	say	I	have	any	political	ambitions	of	my	own	but	working	in	Parliament	looks	
fun	and	interesting.”	(#07,	member	2	years)	
	It	is	interesting	to	note	that	party	members	are	not	initially	open	to	admitting	to	selective	outcome	incentives.	Often	interviewees	initially	gave	other	reasons	for	choosing	to	join	the	party.	Mostly	these	were	collective	incentives	based	on	ideological	views,	drawing	on	party	values	and	negative	associations	with	other	parties.	Only	after	some	hesitation	were	selective	incentives	revealed.	One	interviewee	directly	noted	the	problem	of	discussing	career	aims	in	a	party	political	environment:	
	
“I	definitely	don’t	want	to	stand	as	an	MP	but	I	have	been	told	that	even	if	you	do,	you	
shouldn’t	say	for	another	ten	years!”	(#01,	member	2	years).			
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That	interviewees	who	had	clear	selective	motivations	for	joining	offered	collective	incentives	when	initially	questioned	suggests	that	responses	to	such	questions	are	shaped	by	an	expectation	of	the	appropriate	response	within	party	culture.	Indeed,	this	confirms	the	view	that	the	reasons	party	members	give	for	joining	are	shaped	by	what	is	socially	acceptable	(Scarrow,	2015;	Seyd	and	Whiteley,	1992).	Whilst	members	might	join	for	personal	benefits,	other	reasons	for	attachment	to	the	party	may	be	arrived	at	later	in	response	to	party	norms.	This	would	explain	the	dominance	of	collective	or	values-based	incentives	in	surveys	which	restrict	responses	and	cannot	draw	out	other	potentially	former	or	underlying	motivations.			Only	by	exploring	how	members	arrived	at	the	party,	what	they	do	as	party	members	and	what	they	feel	about	being	a	party	member,	is	the	importance	of	selective	incentives	revealed.	Seyd	and	Whiteley	were	right	to	suggest	(1992,	p.76)	that	selective	outcome	incentives	may	have	been	underestimated	in	their	surveys.	Though	some	studies	have	suggested	that	there	is	a	propensity	to	admit	to	career	motivations	amongst	younger	members	(Bruter	and	Harrison,	2009;	Young	and	Cross,	2007),	it	would	seem	that	in	general,	member	surveys	may	be	under-representing	these	incentives.	Whilst	it	should	be	acknowledged	that	the	timing	and	recruitment	of	these	interviews	may	have	encouraged	a	focus	on	the	recent	election	and	opportunities	the	election	campaign	afforded,	selective	incentives	were	not	confined	to	recent	joiners.	In	fact,	members	recalled	joining	to	assist	with	elections	dating	back	to	1966	and	those	who	joined	outside	of	election	years	also	discussed	selective	outcome	and	process	incentives.			
5.4.3.	 Active	non-members	and	joining	
	The	relationship	between	activism	and	membership	is	also	exposed	by	taking	a	more	in-depth	look	at	member	attitudes.	Party	member	narratives	reveal	that	political	interest,	membership	and	activity	do	not	always	occur	in	the	expected	order.	For	the	majority	of	these	members,	political	interest	and	activism	have	preceded	party	membership.			Many	of	the	members	interviewed	had	first	volunteered	for	the	party	as	non-members.	This	supports	the	growing	literature	recognising	the	contribution	of	non-member	supporters	and	increasing	opportunities	for	non-member	activity	(Cross	and	Gauja,	2014;	Fisher	et	al.,	2014;	Scarrow,	2015;	Webb	et	al.,	2017).	These	supporters	and	new	members	are	clearly	an	asset	to	parties	who	need	an	active	base	to	provide	volunteer	support	and	to	fill	elected	positions,	but	attracting	and	retaining	active	support	outside	of	membership	
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calls	for	a	review	of	the	way	parties	are	structured	and	the	opportunities	they	offer.	It	suggests	that	the	growing	availability	of	online,	centralised,	and	easy	access	membership	(Scarrow,	2015)	is	essential	for	interested	new	recruits,	and	that	engaging	activists	as	supporters	is	also	valuable,	but	that	more	hands-on	political	experiences	and	ways	to	be	involved	with	party	activity	would	be	necessary	outside	of	election	periods	to	keep	them	involved.		Members’	initial	experiences	of	party	structures	suggests	their	valuable	political	experience	is	not	going	to	be	found	in	local	party	meetings:		
“Weird	branch	meeting,	weird	people	…	everyone	talking	in	acronyms.	It’s	based	on	a	
structure	when	people	didn’t	even	have	telephones	or	cars”	(#05,	member	5	years).			
	“We	went	to	a	couple	of	meetings	and	some	events.	It	was	a	fairly	desultory	bunch	of	
people,	it	was	quite	old	-	just	the	old	stagers	-	so	I	never	got	involved	again”	(#20,	
member	>20	years)	
	
“The	branch	Chair	said	“it’s	good	to	have	so	many	people”	and	I	said	“Yes,	but	they’re	
never	going	to	come	again	because	we’ve	got	all	this	to	get	through	before	we	get	to	
item	number	10”	and	he	said,	“yes	but	they’ll	learn	what	branch	meetings	are	like”	and	
I	thought	‘yes,	they	will,	and	they’ll	never	come	again!’	(#27,	member	2	years)	
	The	majority	of	these	selective	incentive-focused	members	came	to	the	party	independently,	joining	via	the	website.	This	supports	other	membership	studies	which	find	party	members	to	be	largely	self-starters	(Seyd	and	Whiteley,	1992;	Scarrow,	2015;	Bale	et	al.,	2018),	not	having	been	recruited	by	existing	members.	However,	many	were	influenced	by	their	friends	who	had	ideologically	similar	views	or	who	made	attending	the	first	party	events	less	intimidating.			Previous	studies	have	shown	the	importance	of	family	and	friends	in	introducing	new	young	members	to	political	parties	(McCulloch,	1990;	Cross	and	Young,	2008)	and	there	was	evidence	of	both	political	socialisation	through	family	and	the	importance	of	ideologically	supportive	friendships	in	members’	joining	narratives	within	these	interviews.	However,	the	act	of	joining	itself	was	largely	an	individual	act	with	only	one	member	reporting	being	recruited	by	another	party	member.	Many	in	fact	found	the	process	of	joining	particularly	difficult:	“Before	I	was	a	party	member	I	could	not	tell	you	
how	to	get	involved	in	the	party.	You	know,	not	through	lack	of	trying”	(#02,	member	<	1	
year).	This	is	a	finding	supported	in	previous	work	on	the	Labour	Party	over	two	decades	previously	(Seyd	and	Whiteley,	1992,	p.85).			
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A	significant	number	of	interviewees	had	also	previously	been	members	of,	or	supported	another	political	party:			
“I	think	I	flirted	with	the	Liberals	at	the	time,	I	think	I	went	to	a	couple	of	party	
meetings”		
	
“And	of	course,	once	upon	a	time	I	was	a	Lib	Dem”		
	
“I’ve	been	to	a	couple	of	Green	party	meetings	…	I	know	a	lot	of	Green	people	and	
occasionally	I	nominate	the	person”	
	
“I	just	kind	of	voted	Green	and	thought,	I	could	join	…	but	I’ll	always	vote	for	you	and	
put	a	poster	up”	
	This	pattern	of	activism	outside	of	membership	and	involvement	with	other	parties	suggests	that	many	members	have	an	interest	in	politics,	political	careers	and	political	activity	and,	secondary	to	that,	choose	which	party	fits	best.	For	many,	the	initial	reasons	they	give	for	joining	appear	to	be	reasons	for	joining	this	party	rather	than	for	joining	a	party.	This	suggests	that	political	interest	is	often	a	prior	motivation	to	identification	with	party	ideology	and	that	a	strong	partisan	ID	is	not	a	necessary	precursor	to	membership.		
“I	decided	I	actually	wanted	to	join	the	party	as	well	but	that	kind	of	came	secondary	to	
wanting	to	work	on	the	election	campaign.”	(#04,	member	<	1	year)		
	
“I	was	kind	of	looking	for	a	way	to	be	more	involved	in	politics	in	general	and	the	
Labour	Party	at	the	time	was	the	best	match	for	me.”	(#16,	member	2	years)	
	For	some	interviewees	it	was	a	case	of	supporting	the	party	that	most	aligned	with	their	values	at	the	time.	As	parties	changed,	so	too	which	party	they	lent	their	membership	to:	“I	
could	go	Green	or	Lib	Dem	or	Labour.	I	waver	around”.	It	would	be	a	mistake	to	assume	that	all	active	party	participants	always	strongly	identify	with	the	party.			This	would	also	explain	the	dominance	of	collective	motivations	in	surveys.	Collective	motivations,	relating	to	the	party’s	goals	and	ideology,	may	be	arrived	at	later	in	response	to	party	norms.		This	is	good	news	for	the	multi-speed	party.	A	more	flexible	approach	to	membership	can	attract	active	supporters	when	they	feel	most	aligned	to	the	party.	However,	it	also	requires	a	change	in	how	support	is	viewed.	Lifelong	loyalty	and	commitment	cannot	be	a	requirement	if	parties	want	to	attract	these	participants	who	are	politically	active	but	not	always	for	the	same	party.	It	would	also	mean	relaxing	rules	about	previous	activity	for	other	parties.	
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5.4.4.	 Implications	for	multi-speed	membership	
	The	descriptions	party	members	give	to	explain	their	routes	to	joining	the	party	challenge	the	usual	understanding	of	the	relationship	between	membership	and	activism,	and	the	nature	of	partisanship.	They	suggest	that	widening	affiliation	options	to	capture	potentially	active	but	less	attached	supporters	(even	if	short	term)	is	an	organisationally	valuable	move.	Strong	partisan	attachment	and	membership	are	not	necessary	components	of	activism	and	the	multi-speed	membership	model	captures	that	dynamic.	However,	a	change	in	party	culture	is	also	needed	to	embrace	these	dynamics.	The	traditional	model	of	lifelong	commitment	through	membership	(exemplified	in	rules	that	banned	people	who	had	supported	other	parties	in	the	past	from	joining	up	as	registered	supporters)	and	valorisation	of	strong	ideological	commitment	to	party	values	(and	corresponding	disdain	for	selective	outcome	motivations)	run	against	this	new	model	of	organising	and	indeed,	may	dissuade	the	more	loosely	attached	type	of	active	supporter.		The	multi-speed	party	may	also	successfully	expand	support	without	directly	affecting	the	incentives	that	attract	active	members.	Selective	outcome	and	selective	process	benefits	are	shown	to	be	important	to	party	members.	A	wider	and	more	loosely	affiliated	support	base	does	not	necessarily	have	an	impact	on	these	selective	incentives.	A	wider	supporter	base	is	unlikely	to	affect	selective	outcome	incentives	which	are	largely	exclusive	to	members	(commitment	in	the	form	of	membership	and	particularly	active	membership	is	still	the	gateway	to	jobs	and	voluntary	positions	in	the	party).	Nor	is	a	wider	supporter	base	likely	to	prevent	active	members	from	deriving	benefits	from	the	process	of	participation	such	as	meeting	with	other	likeminded	people	(unless	new	supporters	were	not	‘likeminded’).	The	multi-speed	membership	model,	with	opportunities	for	non-member	supporters,	ease	of	joining	and	looser	affiliation	options,	can	draw	on	the	activism	of	non-member	supporters	whilst	also	offering	a	gateway	to	membership.	Yet	sustaining	the	support	of	those	attracted	by	active	opportunities,	outside	of	election	periods,	is	a	challenge	for	parties.	This	suggests	such	support	is	likely	to	be	transitory.			Moving	to	a	model	of	wider	affiliation	does	have	the	potential	to	change	the	composition	of	the	party.	Making	it	easier	to	engage	with	the	party	in	an	informal	way	may	result	in	an	active	but	more	fluid	and	less	reliable	support	base:	one	more	likely	to	walk	away	when	the	political	mood	changes.	For	multi-speed	parties,	accepting	the	fluidity	of	the	support	base	is	the	price	to	pay	for	wider	engagement.		
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Results:	Section	Two	
	
5.5.	 What	next?	The	bonds	and	barriers	of	party	membership	
	The	previous	section	suggested	that	changing	the	affiliation	structure	may	have	benefits	for	attracting	non-member	active	support	and	creating	a	gateway	to	membership.	The	looser	structure	captures	a	more	fluid	partisan	support	whilst	not	directly	impacting	on	the	incentives	for	full	membership.	It	does	suggest,	however,	that	some	change	to	party	culture	may	be	required.			In	this	next	section	I	explore	how	party	membership	develops	for	members	over	time.	All	of	those	interviewed	had	been	active	at	some	stage	in	their	membership,	sometimes	continuously	or	on	and	off,	but	all	had	been	inspired	to	do	more	than	just	pay	a	membership	fee.	Indeed,	at	some	point,	all	of	those	interviewed	had	been	‘high-intensity’	participants	in	the	party.	These	are	the	very	participants	that	parties	might	be	expected	to	want	to	hold	onto.	Knowing	what	happens	after	joining	for	these	members	gives	an	insight	into	the	membership	experience:	how	it	develops,	how	it	changes	members.	In	doing	so,	this	analysis	facilitates	an	assessment	of	what	might	change	as	a	result	of	a	multi-speed	strategy.			Interviews	exploring	party	membership	and	political	activity	over	the	course	of	a	lifetime	enables	not	only	a	more	nuanced	assessment	of	incentives	but	a	lens	through	which	to	view	how	party	membership	develops.	In	this	study,	analysis	of	longer-term	members’	conceptions	of	the	value	of	party	membership	revealed	the	importance	of	socialisation	and	social	ties,	both	of	which	influence	members’	relationship	with	the	party	and	their	activities	within	it.	Yet	socialisation	and	social	networks	within	the	party,	whilst	activating	and	retaining	party	members,	may	also	create	barriers	discouraging	more	loosely	affiliated	supporters	from	becoming	or	remaining	active.	As	parties	turn	towards	multi-speed	models	of	membership	and	affiliation,	the	role	of	contact	and	socialisation	in	relation	to	what	party	members	do	takes	on	additional	significance.			Recall	evidence	of	memberships	dating	back	(in	some	cases),	a	number	of	years,	requires	some	sensitivity.	Initial	reasons	for	joining	are	likely,	not	only	to	be	inaccurately	recalled,	but	to	have	changed	over	time.	The	motivations	a	person	attributes	to	their	party	membership	now	will	undoubtedly	have	been	shaped	by	experience.	As	one	interviewee	
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reflected,	“The	early	‘90s	to	now	is	a	very	long	time	and	my	views	changed	significantly,	
motivations	changed	significantly,	and	all	sorts	of	things	changed	over	that	period”	(#17,	
member	23	years).	In	this	respect	it	is	difficult	to	distinguish	interviewees’	initial	motivations	for	joining	from	their	motivations	for	staying.	However,	examining	how	longer-term	members	(re)cast	their	membership	in	light	of	that	experience,	how	they	describe	their	movement	either	in-and-out	of	the	party,	or	how	it	might	have	changed	over	time,	revealed	significant	processes.			This	research	supports	the	idea	that	contact	and	socialisation	have	a	positive	relationship	to	activism.	Whilst	this	study	suggests	that	membership	is	not	a	necessary	condition	of	activism,	I	find	that	membership	does,	over	time,	create	bonds	that	encourage	participation,	and	‘high-intensity’	participation	in	particular.			
5.6.	 Results		
	
5.6.1	 Socialisation			Open	analysis	of	party	member	narratives21	revealed	the	importance	of	socialisation	in	lowering	the	barriers	to	activity	and	in	keeping	members	active.	This	analysis	has	highlighted	not	only	the	importance	of	socialisation	in	inducting	new	members	into	the	party,	but	the	specific	content	of	that	socialisation	process	and	its	relationship	with	activity,	particularly	activity	defined	as	‘high-intensity’.			Socialisation	is	a	well-established	concept	in	sociology,	psychology	and	organisational	studies.	In	its	broadest	sense	it	is	the	‘way	in	which	individuals	are	assisted	in	becoming	members	of	one	or	more	social	groups’	(Grusec	and	Hastings,	2008).	Transferring	this	to	a	political	party	context,	the	most	pertinent	comparison	is	with	work	of	organisational	theorists.	Van	Maanen	and	Schein	(1979)	define	organisational	socialisation	as	‘the	process	by	which	an	individual	acquires	the	social	knowledge	and	skills	necessary	to	assume	an	organizational	role’	(p.211,	1979).			Yet	whilst	a	typical	organisation	would	employ	informal	and	formal,	intentional	processes	of	socialisation	for	employees	(inductions	or	‘on	the	job’	training	for	instance),	the	party	political	setting	is	different.	Members	are	not	employees,	nor	are	they	necessarily	
                                                          
21	The	theme	of	socialisation	emerged	from	the	data	during	open	coding.		
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volunteers.	It	is	up	to	party	members	themselves	whether	they	take	an	active	role	and,	to	a	large	extent,	which	activities	they	choose	to	engage	in.	There	are	some	parallels	with	the	socialisation	that	occurs	within	trade	unions,	but	whereas	unions	often	employ	specific	programmes	of	socialisation	(formal	orientation,	personal	invites	to	meetings)	(Fullagar	et	al.,	1994),	parties	generally	take	a	less	formal	approach	(if	they	take	any	specific	approach	at	all).	As	noted	in	the	previous	section,	members	interviewed	in	this	research	had	not	experienced	any	specific	induction	process.	The	party	does	not	appear	to	employ	any	specific	socialisation	tactics	and	indeed	new	members	had	found	navigating	the	party	structures	and	procedures	initially	very	confusing.		Yet	despite	this,	I	found	that	socialisation	was	strong	in	the	party	context,	in	particular,	the	learning	of	language	and	of	skills	relating	to	party	activity.	Learning	these	specific	types	of	rules	and	norms	appeared	to	reduce	the	barriers	to	participation	and	in	doing	so	make	activity	for	the	party	more	likely.			
5.6.1.i.	Language,	skills	and	knowledge			The	importance	of	language	and	knowledge	in	the	party	context	emerged	from	this	data.	Language	appeared	to	operate	in	two	distinct	ways	within	the	party	context.	There	was	the	technical	language	associated	with	party	structures	and	organising,	and	also	a	sense	of	more	informal	party-specific	language:	the	ways	of	discussing	issues	and	values.	Language	was	seen	as	helping	create	an	impression	of	the	party	as	a	separate	and	enclosed	world	but	also	a	world	which	members	could	enter	once	they	had	learned	the	language.			Knowledge	also	emerged	as	a	theme,	operating	in	much	the	same	way	as	language	by	providing	a	key	to	entering	the	party	world.	Knowledge	was	also	linked	to	activity:	a	lack	of	knowledge	creating	a	barrier	to	being	more	actively	involved	but	greater	knowledge	facilitating	activity.		
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Figure	6:	Socialisation	(language,	skills	and	knowledge)	–	category	and	properties		
Socialisation	Category	(explanation	of	behaviour)	 Language,	skills	and	knowledge		Creating	an	enclosed	world		Category	(behaviours)	 Shared	language		 Party-specific	knowledge	and	skills	Properties	of	category		 • Party-specific	terminology		• Party-specific	ways	of	discussing	issues	
• Sense	of	exclusion	/	closed	world			
• Knowledge	linked	to	participation	
• Concern	for	lack	of	party	knowledge	(esp.	in	canvassing)	
• Recognition	of	need	for	party	specific	knowledge	and	different	levels	of	knowledge	amongst	volunteers		Examples	from	data	 “you	need	to	know	the	language”		“And	if	you	don’t	know	the	language	and	don’t	know	‘point	of	order’	and	all	that	stuff,	your	voice	isn’t	heard”		“Like	any	relatively	closed	system	there’s	a	lot	of	jargon	and	assumed	knowledge”		“I	think	there’s	a	language:	‘the	proletariat’,	‘petty	bourgeoisie’	-	why	don’t	they	say	‘me’	or	‘shopkeeper’”		“I	think	it’s	quite	an	enclosed	world”		“you	do	become	institutionalised”		
“I	went	[	]	and	again	I	found	it	all	very	confusing.	And	then	I	didn’t	do	anything	again.”		“[I	was]	educated	in	the	structures	of	the	party	[in	order	to	stand]”		“It	was	a	whole	different	language	and	nobody	bothered	explaining	it	[	]	and	so	I	kind	of	took	myself	off”		“I	was	a	bit	nervous	about	getting	started	…	I	was	thinking	I	would	have	to	be	strong	on	policy”			
	Many	members	reflected	on	how	alien	the	language	of	the	party	had	seemed	when	they	first	joined.	For	example,	invitations	to	CLP	meetings	were	shunned	by	new	young	members	who	had	no	idea	what	‘CLP’	meant.	For	some	this	had	prevented	them	getting	further	involved	initially:		
“It	was	a	whole	different	language	and	nobody	bothered	explaining	it.	So,	I	took	myself	
off	and	thought	‘I’ll	do	my	own	thing’.”	(#10,	member	>20	years)	
	Not	knowing	the	technical	language	appeared	to	prevent	members	practically	from	actively	participating.	The	party-specific	language	(often	linked	to	party	structures)	
 138 
created	a	barrier	to	participation,	with	new	members	confused	as	to	how	things	worked	and	what	they	were	supposed	to	do.	There	is	also	some	evidence	that	party-specific	language	is	not	limited	to	technical	aspects	of	membership	but	that	there	are	also	shared	ways	of	discussing	issues.	In	this	sense	language	is	conveying	shared	values,	or	shared	ways	of	seeing	the	world:		
“I	think	there’s	a	language:	‘the	proletariat’,	‘petty	bourgeoisie’	-	why	don’t	they	say	
‘me’	or	‘shopkeeper’”	(#24,	member	54	years)	
	This	party-specific	language,	both	technical	and	value	driven,	creates	a	community	but	may	also	unintentionally	create	an	enclosed	community.	It	can	be	exclusionary,	creating	the	sense	of	the	party	being	a	world	apart:		
“I	think	it’s	quite	an	enclosed	world	and	if	you’re	not	in	it	you	don’t	really	know	what	
people	do”	(#04,	member	<	1	year)		Learning	the	language	is	a	barrier	to	overcome	for	those	wanting	to	engage	but	could	also	prevent	more	loosely	affiliated	or	less	engaged	members	and	supporters	from	becoming	active.			As	well	as	language,	interviews	revealed	how	socialisation	had	assisted	with	the	development	of	the	skills	and	knowledge	required	for	active	participation.	This	had	particular	significance	for	one	of	the	most	important	‘high	intensity’	activities:	canvassing.	Many	members	spoke	of	an	initial	reluctance	to	get	involved	in	campaigning	activity	‘on	the	doorstep’.	It	was	primarily	through	not	knowing	what	the	process	entailed	that	many	were	reluctant	to	get	involved.		
“What	made	me	nervous	was	I	was	thinking	I	would	have	to	be	strong	on	policy,	so	to	
be	honest	it	wasn’t	what	I	expected	as	it	was	more	of	a	data-gathering	exercise	than	it	
was	about	trying	to	persuade	people.	[then]	I	felt	more	happy	about	being	regularly	
involved.”	(#09,	member	<	1	year)		
	
“To	start	off	with	I	never	went	canvassing.	I	just	don’t	have	the	confidence.	I	just	don’t	
want	to	go	and	knock	on	somebody’s	door	…	but	then	I	got	involved	with	[	]’s	campaign	
and	thought	‘yes	this	is	really	effective’	and	you	learn	so	much	on	the	doorstep”	(#27,	
member	2	years)	
	Many	interviewees	mentioned	an	initial	reluctance	to	canvass	voters.	This	suggests	that	new	members	and	supporters	prefer	lower-intensity	party	work,	such	as	delivering	leaflets,	that	does	not	entail	situations	where	their	policy	or	party	knowledge	may	be	tested.	Though	most	members	had	overcome	their	initial	reluctance	and	found	it	to	be	a	more	positive	activity	than	they	had	anticipated,	how	far	supporters	and	members	are	
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socialised	into	party	norms	and	values	is	a	consideration,	not	just	for	skills-based	knowledge,	but	for	party	coherence.	More	seasoned	campaigners	highlighted	the	problems	of	a	lack	of	local	policy	knowledge	and	lack	of	party	skills	in	newer	members:		
“The	new	member	said	“I	think	X”;	that’s	not	the	position	of	the	party	locally	and	I	felt	
she	was	not	representing	the	party	properly	on	the	doorstep,	and	I	felt	I	had	to	censor	
the	new	member.	I	could	see	it	was	off-putting	but	I	didn’t	want	the	person	[on	the	
doorstep]	to	think	it	was	the	party’s	position”	(#15,	member	7	years)		
	
“They’re	not	very	competent.	No	chairing	skills	-	not	knowing	when	to	stop	a	
discussion.”	(#30,	member	>40	years)	
	The	extent	of	party	socialisation	is	a	consideration	for	parties	that	want	to	involve	supporters	more	in	party	activity	and	particularly	the	more	valuable	‘high-intensity’	type	of	activities.			Shared	language	and	skills	clearly	have	a	role	in	party	activity.	Parties	need	volunteers	and	therefore	have	an	interest	in	making	participation	as	open	as	possible.	Yet	the	knowledge	gained	through	contact	over	time	is	a	useful	tool	in	making	that	participation	effective.	Socialisation	enabled	party	members	and	supporter-turned-members	to	learn	the	necessary	skills	to	take	part	in	‘high-intensity’	activity.			Comparing	this	to	the	literature	on	organisational	socialisation,	there	are	clear	parallels.	The	literature	on	organisational	socialisation	demonstrates	the	impact	of	early	socialisation	of	employees	on	their	attitudes	and	behaviour,	their	activity	and	loyalty.	Organisational	socialisation	is	positively	linked	to	employee	motivation	and	commitment	(Kelley,	1992),	job	satisfaction,	commitment	and	organisational	identification	(Ashforth	and	Saks,	1996).	Likewise	literature	on	socialisation	in	trade	unions	finds	that	early	union	socialisation	experiences	affect	union	attitudes	(Fullagar	et	al.,	1994),	that	those	who	are	most	socially	integrated	in	the	union	are	most	likely	to	participate	in	strike	and	contract	ratification	votes	(Mcshane,	1986)	and	that	the	most	highly	active	union	members	are	those	who	have	a	higher	number	of	active	union	friends	(Flood	et	al.,	2000).	For	both	paid	and	unpaid	participants	in	organisations,	socialisation	has	a	clear	link	to	activity	and	attitudes.			There	is	little	literature,	however,	on	socialisation	in	a	party	political	context,	despite	the	obvious	parallels	with	other	organisations	and	trade	unions.	Two	exceptions	to	this	are	Granik	(2003)	who	finds	that	socialisation	is	a	valid	construct	in	a	single	party	political	setting	and	that	socialisation	has	a	positive	relationship	to	activity	and	attitudinal	
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commitment,	and	Dodson	(1990)	who,	in	a	panel	study	of	national	convention	delegates	find	that	socialisation	is	a	product	of	increased	affiliative	ties	and	helps	sustain	the	activity	of	certain	types	of	activist.	Looking	at	conventional	and	unconventional	delegates	(defined	by	their	position	on	traditional	party	norms),	Dodson	finds	that	over	time,	less	conventional	activists	had	adopted	more	traditional	party	norms.	The	importance	of	this	process	of	socialisation	to	party	viability	is	set	out	by	Dodson:		 “The	socialised	unconventionals	may	have	become	psychologically	a	party	of	the	
party,	they	valued	the	party	and	therefore	(consciously	or	unconsciously),	grew	
more	willing	to	accept	norms	that	constrained	individual	autonomy	for	the	good	
of	the	group	…	to	the	extent	that	parties	can	provide	an	environment	where	
insurgent,	unconventionals	feel	a	part	of	the	organization	and	value	the	
organization,	the	party	experience	can	be	a	socialization	experience	that	helps	to	
increase	the	probability	of	transmission	of	norms	that	further	organizational	
viability”	(Dodson,	1990).		Active	participants	in	the	interviews	analysed	here	had,	over	time,	adapted	to	traditional	party	norms.	They	had	got	over	the	barriers	and	invested	in	learning	the	rules	to	become	members	of	the	club:	an	investment	that	can	be	seen	as	contributing	to	their	active	involvement.	Like	any	club,	the	shared	language,	rules,	knowledge	and	skills	creates	a	bond	and	sense	of	belonging.	Yet	the	creation	of	an	enclosed	world	with	a	shared	language	and	specific	set	of	skills,	whilst	important	for	cementing	and	activating	existing	memberships,	can	also	act	as	a	boundary,	preventing	others	from	joining	in.	This	is	clearly	a	consideration	for	parties	moving	to	multi-speed	membership	and	suggests	that	parties	may	need	to	give	more	thought	to	formal	socialisation	processes.		
5.6.1.ii.	 Convergence	of	ideas		
	An	additional	theme	emerging	from	the	data	was	the	convergence	of	ideas	and	shared	beliefs.	These	interviews	suggest	that,	at	the	local	level,	socialisation	can	emphasise	ideological	congruence.			
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Figure	7:	Socialisation	(convergence	of	ideas)	–	category	and	properties			
Socialisation	Category	(explanation	of	behaviour)	 Convergence	of	ideas		Category	(behaviours)	 Ideological	congruence		Properties	of	category		 • Similarity	of	views	amongst	party	groupings/CLPs	• Shared	views	are	valued	by	party	members		
• Solidarity	through	shared	views		Examples	from	data	 “there	would	be	very	little	movement	from	the	set	opinions,	they	would	reinforce	each	other’s	beliefs	a	lot”		“they	were	very,	very	hostile	to	anybody	who’s	on	the	left	of	the	party”		“I	didn’t	quite	dare	speak	openly	in	case	I	said	the	wrong	thing”		“shared	values	and	people	who	you	could	have	conversations	with	which	were	shared”		“I	think	they’re	used	to	going	to	meetings	[	]	and	thinking	worthy	thoughts	[	].	And	I	think	in	a	way,	you’ve	got	to	pitch	to	people	who	don’t	necessarily	have	such	a	coherent	and	cohesive	set	of	messages	or	beliefs.”	
	The	ideological	positioning	of	the	local	party	was	noted	by	many	interviewees	either	positively	or	negatively.	It	is	possible	that	the	shared	language	also	seeps	into	shared	views.	These	interviews	suggested	the	presence	of	a	link	between	socialisation	and	ideological	cohesiveness:		
“A	lot	of	my	friends	were	in	the	Labour	Party.	There	was	a	massive	social	connection	as	
well	-	shared	values	and	people	who	you	could	have	conversations	with	which	were	
shared.”	(#17,	member	23	years)		
	
“I	was	influenced	by	the	people	who	were	around	at	that	time”	(#29,	member	24	years)	
	This	supports	Whiteley	and	Seyd’s	(2002)	argument	that	the	development	of	group	solidarity	and	the	convergence	of	political	ideas	are	important	outcomes	of	socialisation.	Likewise,	Huckfeldt	and	Sprague	suggest	that	socialisation	‘strengthens	political	boundaries	between	groups’	(1995,	p.78)	by	bringing	members’	views	in	line	with	the	dominant	view.	Campbell	et	al.	(1960)	observed	this	effect	in	social	groups:	“when	primary	groups	engage	in	political	discussions	and	are	homogeneous	in	basic	member	viewpoints,	the	attitudes	of	the	individual	must	be	continually	reinforced	as	he	sees	similar	opinions	echoed	in	the	group”	(1960,	p.293).	Whilst	this	observation	was	not	
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directed	at	political	parties,	it	clearly	has	an	application	in	a	party	political	context.	In	this	way,	socialisation	creates	ideological	cohesiveness	which	in	turn	could	create	a	greater	incentive	for	activism.	A	sense	of	a	strong	shared	set	of	values	would	certainly	enhance	the	solidary	incentives	for	activity.			Yet	whilst	this	outcome	could	be	beneficial	for	activity,	for	new	members	or	supporters,	the	strength	of	shared	views	could	be	exclusionary.	A	similarity	in	ideological	positioning	could	create	a	barrier	for	those	who	might	broadly	align	with	party	values	and	wish	to	dip	into	party	activity,	but	who	may	not	want	to	join	the	family	and	be	assimilated	into	it.	Whilst	important	for	activating	existing	members,	these	socialisation	processes	can	become	a	barrier	to	recruitment	should	newer	members	and	active	supporters	not	feel	equipped	with	the	right	knowledge	or	have	views	which	are	not	wholly	in	tune	with	the	local	party.	As	one	former	supporter	reflected:			
“But	then	you	go	to	the	Labour	party	and	there	would	be	very	little	movement	from	the	
set	opinions,	they	would	reinforce	each	other’s	beliefs	a	lot…I	did	think	that	they	made	
it	difficult	for	each	other	to	move	away	from	set	views.	It	didn’t	leave	much	room	for	
other	opinions.	And	I	didn’t	always	share	the	views.”	(#08,	member	<1	year)			
“The	levels	of	jeopardy	in	talking	about	politics	and	policy	in	the	Labour	party	can	be	
quite	off-putting	sometimes.	And	I	noticed	that	as	a	new	member.	I	didn’t	quite	dare	
speak	openly	in	case	I	said	the	wrong	thing.	I	now	notice	me	doing	that	to	others.	And	I	
think	it’s	kind	of	unavoidable…You	have	to	be	quite	brave	to	say	things	which	are	going	
against	the	grain	and	you	have	to	be	brave	to	admit	a	lack	of	knowledge	about	things.	
Like	any	relatively	closed	system	there’s	a	lot	of	jargon	and	assumed	knowledge.	People	
start	talking	in	a	language	because	it’s	a	short	hand	and	people	new	to	it	are	excluded.”	
(#15,	member	7	years)	
	
	
5.6.2.	 Social	ties		
	Alongside	these	socialisation	effects,	a	major	theme	emerging	from	the	data	was	the	link	between	the	party	and	members’	social	groups	or	networks.	Social	ties	were	a	recurring	theme	in	members’	narratives	about	their	relationship	with	the	party.	Two	key	features	of	this	theme	were	the	strong	links	between	members’	social	lives	and	their	party	lives	(the	two	had	become	intertwined	to	the	point	that	the	party	was	part	of	the	fabric	of	their	lives),	and	the	relationship	between	these	social	ties	and	party	activity.			
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Figure	8:	Social	ties	–	category	and	properties		
Social	ties	Category	(explanation	of	behaviour)	 Party	members	linked	to	the	party	through	social	networks	Category	(behaviours)	 Party	as	fabric	of	life	 Party	activity	influenced	by	social	ties		Properties	of	category		 • Friendship	groups	are	predominantly	party	members	
• Members	are	connected	to	party	through	different	routes	(e.g	jobs,	other	networks)	
• Party	as	a	community	
• Work	and	politics	intertwined		
• Friendships	make	party	activity	easier	
• Change	in	party	connections	affects	activity	
• Collective	activity	valued		
• Work	and	party	intertwined		
Examples	from	data		 	“Most	of	our	friends	were	in	the	Labour	party”		“They	work	together,	they	associate	together,	they	go	out	together,	they	socialise	together.”		“It	was	great	to	feel	back	in	that	Labour	family	of	people”		“Being	a	member	of	the	Labour	party	not	only	made	new	friendships	moving	to	a	new	area	but	also	got	me	employment”		“I	think	people	just	like	belonging”		“it’s	a	good	way	of	getting	to	know	people	and	being	involved	in	the	community.”		“It	was	a	very	cliquey	feel.	And	there	was	almost	like	this	little	suspicion	of	me	as	a	new	member.”		“It	was	my	main	social	life”		
“That’s	why	people	go,	because	their	friends	go”		“We	moved	cities	and	I	didn’t	reconnect	with	the	party	…so	we	didn’t	really	get	involved”		“There’s	also	a	lot	of	people	that	I	was	in	the	party	with	who	left	who	are	[now]	coming	back	so	that’s	a	comfort	thing	as	well”		“[I]	was	quite	active	then	but	it	was	the	social	life	for	me	as	well”		“I	then	went	to	work	for	[MP]	so	had	a	[LP]	network	…	so	that	was	when	my	career	started	linking	me	in”		“Through	work	experience	I	got	more	involved”		
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5.6.2.i.	Social	networks:	Party	as	fabric	of	life	For	nearly	all,	but	particularly	for	longer-standing	members,	the	social	contacts	that	developed	through	party	membership	and	activity	were	seen	as	cementing	their	relationship	with	the	party.	The	party	had	become	part	of	the	very	fabric	of	their	lives:			
“And	I	do	find,	because	I’ve	been	a	party	member	for	26	years,	that	most	of	my	friends	
are	party	members.	Not	exclusively.	But	my	best	friends	are	from	the	Labour	party	and	
I’ve	got	to	know	them	through	the	Labour	party.	It’s	not	true	for	everyone.	But	if	you	
spent	any	time	here	on	a	regular	basis	you’d	see	the	same	people	who	socialise	with	the	
same	people	as	well	-	and	it	just	becomes	part	of	your	life.”	(#06,	member	26	years)		
	
“When	I	moved	here	I	did	get	more	involved	and	a	lot	of	our	social	life,	or	a	lot	of	people	
we	know,	come	through	the	Labour	Party…	I	think	we	probably	just	thought,	we’ve	
come	here,	we	don’t	know	people,	it’s	a	good	way	of	getting	to	know	people	and	being	
involved	in	the	community.”	(#20,	member	>20	years)	
	
“We	moved	here	from	X	and	I	saw	the	party	offices,	and	I	thought	that	would	be	a	good	
way	to	meet	people”	(#30,	member	>40	years)	
	Party	members’	friendship	groups	were	heavily	comprised	of	fellow	party	members.	The	links	with	the	party	through	these	friendship	groups	had	extended	beyond	party	activity	into	social	activities.	There	was	also	a	strong	overlap	between	party	links	and	members’	work.	In	some	cases	this	was	working	directly	in	politics	but	for	others	it	was	realising	their	political	values	through	other	types	of	work:	work	where	they	were	likely	to	be	in	contact	with	other	party	members	and	in	some	cases,	work	which	had	been	found	through	connections	in	the	party.			This	supports	McCulloch’s	(1990)	analysis	of	party	member	motivations	which	notes,	‘The	activity	was	not	only	meaningful	to	the	participant	as	a	means	to	an	end,	that	is,	as	a	means	to	achieving	the	goal(s)	implicit	in	the	declared	motivation,	but	had	also	become	meaningful	in	itself’	(p.513).	McCulloch	highlights	how	party	activity	can	grow	from	being	part	of	an	individual’s	life	to	becoming	‘his	or	her	way	of	life’	(1990,	p.514)	particularly	for	smaller	groups	of	volunteers	where	the	demands	on	each	individual	are	greater	(something	that	is	clearly	still	a	problem	for	activists:	“And	then	I	started	going	to	branch	
meetings	and	was	flattered	when	they	made	me	branch	secretary	in	the	way	that	all	[new	
members]	are	made	branch	secretary	when	they	don’t	know	what	they’re	doing!”(#06,	
member	26	years).		
5.6.2.ii.	 Social	networks:	Party	activity	influenced	by	social	ties	Social	links	had,	for	these	members,	a	connection	to	party	activity.	As	one	member	reflected,	when	these	connections	broke	down,	their	activity	decreased:		
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“Party	colleagues	I	knew	well	drifted	out.	New	people	had	come	in,	and	I	had	perhaps	
less	social	contact	with	the	new	people…	So,	my	Labour	Party	work	changed	from	being	
attendance	at	meetings,	collecting	subs,	helping	in	a	practical	way,	to	only	helping	out	
at	election	time	…	and	carrying	on	the	subscription.”	(#12,	member	43	years)			Yet,	such	was	the	strength	of	these	ties	that,	for	some	members,	the	social	network	had	continued	even	after	party	activity	ceased.	Though	interviewees	tended	to	report	different	levels	of	activity	at	different	stages	of	their	lives,	the	party-based	social	connections	appeared	more	stable,	remaining	with	members	who	had	ceased	to	be	active.	Some	members	recalled	how	the	Labour	Party	had	helped	them	make	friends	when	they	moved	to	new	towns.	Some	had	even	sought	out	the	local	party	in	order	to	meet	people	and	build	friendships.	This	social	network	kept	members	engaged	with	the	party	even	in	periods	of	their	lives	when	their	activity	had	decreased,	leaving	the	door	open	to	future	activity.				Social	networks	also	provided	an	element	of	safety	or	comfort	in	engaging	in	party	activity.	For	some	newer	members,	friendships	provided	a	reason	to	get	involved	or	a	helping	hand	to	make	the	first	meeting	or	conference	less	intimidating.			
“I	mostly	[got	involved]	because	a	couple	of	my	friends	were	going	to	conference	and	I	
thought	that	sounded	interesting”	(#07,	member	2	years)	
	Most	members	in	this	research	had	found	the	party	on	their	own	(though	some	had	been	supported	in	their	early	activity	by	friends)	so	the	strength	of	these	social	ties	suggests	that	new	networks	are	forming	within	the	party	rather	than	existing	networks	being	replicated.			The	local	nature	of	party	membership	is	also	important	to	note.	Whilst	the	party	is	national,	for	most	members	the	connection	is	local.	In	an	anthropological	account	of	British	party	conferences	Florence	Faucher-King	(2005)	notes	how	party	members	at	national	gatherings	socialise	with	those	they	know	from	their	own	constituency	(2005,	p.38).	Most	face-to-face	party	activity	is	locally	based	and	helps	to	reinforce	the	social	elements	of	membership.		In	the	party	context,	these	tight,	local	bonds	appear	to	stretch	beyond	party	activity	into	the	social	networks	of	members’	lives.	In	this	way	the	social	context	of	party	membership	appears	to	take	on	the	appearance	of	a	‘primary	group’.	The	‘primary	group’,	first	defined	by	sociologists	as	a	group	small	in	size	and	close	in	physical	proximity	which	has	a	psychological	closeness	(Cooley,	1909),	was	developed	to	be	applicable	to	contemporary	
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groups	including	trade	unions	and	defined	by	smallness,	long	duration	and	physical	and	social	nearness	of	its	members	(Davis,	1965).	The	notion	of	a	primary	group	also	captures	the	ideological	closeness	and	socialisation	processes	noted	earlier,	In	a	primary	group,	‘the	members	completely	identify	with	the	norms	and	attitudes	of	the	group	and	view	social	relationship	as	just	as	important	at	the	objectives	of	the	group’	(Perline	and	Lorenz,	1970).			If	party	membership	is	approaching	a	‘primary	group’-type	of	social	formation,	even	partly,	then	it	has	significant	implications	for	multi-speed	membership	organising.	These	bonds	are	important	for	member	activity	and	also	for	retaining	members	in	the	face	of	change.	However,	there	is	also	a	negative	side	to	these	social	networks.	The	extent	of	these	strong	ties	can	also	act	as	a	boundary,	making	it	harder	for	new	members	to	feel	welcomed.	This	is	a	problem	for	parties	seeking	to	attract	active	but	more	loosely	attached	supporters.	Whilst	social	networks	sustain	activity	amongst	members,	they	may	also	be	dissuading	others	from	getting	more	involved.			
5.6.3.	 Socialisation	and	social	ties:	conclusions	
	This	research	shows	that	socialisation	and	social	ties	are	crucial	components	of	party	membership.	Whilst	there	is	a	vast	literature	on	socialisation	within	organisations,	and	to	a	lesser	extent	trade	unions,	socialisation	within	parties	is	little	researched	(bar	two	notable	exceptions	(Dodson,	1990;	Granik,	2003)).	Yet	the	precise	content	of	socialisation	in	parties	has	not	been	studied.	The	interviews	analysed	here	suggest	that	language,	skills	and	ideology	are	key	components	of	party	socialisation	and	would	benefit	from	further	analysis.			The	learning	of	skills,	convergence	of	ideas,	the	forming	of	group	solidarity	and	the	creation	of	a	social	networks	are	important,	both	for	active	participation	and	for	realising	some	of	the	benefits	of	membership.	In	their	analysis	of	‘high-intensity’	participation,	Whiteley	and	Seyd	(2002)	demonstrate	a	link	between	socialisation	(understood	as	face	to	face	contact)	and	activity.	They	conclude	that,	‘the	most	powerful	factor	influencing	high	intensity	participation	…	is	the	contact	variable’	(2002,	p.	143).	They	note	that	contact	is	necessary	but	not	sufficient,	as	many	party	members	can	be	in	regular	contact	and	not	participate	regularly,	but	that	without	contact	the	socialisation	process	is	inhibited	and	the	likelihood	of	activism	reduced.	Without	contact,	uncertainty	about	what	might	be	involved	in	activity	for	the	party	increases	the	‘costs’	of	deciding	to	get	involved;	party	members	simply	don’t	know	what	party	activism	entails.	In	addition,	potential	benefits	may	not	be	
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realised:	selective	outcome	incentives	such	as	gaining	access	to	office	or	other	opportunities	cannot	be	realised	from	a	non-active	position	in	the	party;	nor	is	it	possible	to	realise	selective	process	incentives,	the	goal	of	spending	more	time	with	‘likeminded	people’,	without	actually	spending	time	with	them;	and	expressive	motivations,	the	emotional	attachments,	can	exist	only	in	the	abstract	and	cannot	be	reinforced	without	contact	(Whiteley	and	Seyd,	2002).	Activity	is	therefore	a	condition	of	achieving	many	of	the	benefits	that	might	have	motivated	joining,	and	socialisation	through	contact	influences	activity.			This	research	supports	those	findings	and	adds	depth	to	the	specific	nature	of	socialisation	in	a	party	political	context.	Socialisation	in	its	various	forms	not	only	keeps	members	active	but	provides	a	way	back	into	the	party	for	those	who	have	left.	The	shared	networks,	language	and	skills	remain	even	when	party	membership	lapses.	Socialisation	and	social	ties	helped	members	build	a	relationship	with	the	party,	making	exit	harder:	
“You	develop,	I	think	very	quickly,	an	emotional	attachment.	One	of	the	things	is	you	begin	to	
develop	friends	in	the	party	and	those	friendships	become	hard	to	break”	(#16,	member	2	
years).	This	link	between	socialisation	and	exit	is	explored	further	in	the	next	chapter.			For	long-standing	members	in	these	interviews,	the	party	had	become	part	of	their	way	of	life.	The	central	and	important	role	of	the	party	in	active	members’	lives	was	secured	by	socialisation	and	cemented	by	social	ties.	These	bonds	supported	the	activity	of	those	involved	but	could	also	prevent	activity	from	newer	or	more	loosely	attached	members	and	supporters.		Understanding	the	specific	nature	of	party	socialisation	and	social	networks	helps	in	assessing	the	impact	of	changes	to	the	membership	model.	Knowing	how,	where,	and	what	sort	of	bonds	form	between	parties	and	their	members	gives	us	a	platform	from	which	to	assess	how,	where	and	indeed,	whether,	those	bonds	are	broken	by	opening	the	party	beyond	party	members.			
5.6.4.	 Implications	for	multi-speed	membership		Informal	processes	of	socialisation	within	the	party	provide	new	party	members	with	the	tools	needed	to	take	part	in	activity	for	the	party,	they	also	create	bonds	that	encourage	activity	and	potentially	lead	to	greater	ideological	cohesion.	However,	these	bonds	can	also	create	a	barrier,	excluding	those	who	do	not	fit	in,	don’t	speak	the	language,	and	don’t	
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already	hold	‘membership	of	the	club’.	The	ideological	views,	languages	and	processes	(formal	and	informal)	of	the	local	party	were	noted	by	many	interviewees,	sometimes	positively	and	sometimes	negatively.	This	negative	side	to	socialisation	has	implications	for	parties	trying	to	branch	out	to	a	wider	group	of	affiliates.	For	parties	following	a	multi-speed	model	and	seeking	to	engage	supporters	in	activity,	there	is	a	potential	tension	here.		Socialisation	is	not	however	a	one-way	process	and	new	members	also	have	scope	to	change	the	party	norms.	How	much	a	large	influx	of	new	members	can	disrupt	the	norms,	values	and	ideology	of	the	existing	local	parties	is	a	crucial	question	for	the	multi-speed	party	but	this	would	of	course	require	new	members	to	be	sufficiently	engaged	to	stay	long	enough	to	effect	change,	and	strong	existing	social	bonds	make	this	harder.			
5.6.5.	 Conclusions		Analysis	of	the	relationship	between	active	party	members	and	their	party	reveals	a	complex	pattern	of	motivations.	It	highlights	the	importance	of	selective	incentives	in	persuading	members	to	join,	highlights	the	fluidity	in	the	relationship	between	membership,	activism	and	partisan	identification,	and	it	adds	depth	to	our	understanding	of	the	value	of	social	connections	and	contact	in	sustaining	active	participation.			This	research	supports	the	idea	that	members	and	potential	members	are	responding	to	a	range	of	opportunities	and	incentives	for	joining	and	remaining	active	participants	in	party	political	activity.	Within	this,	two	dynamics	are	revealed	to	have	particular	significance:	opportunities	for	personal	benefit	and	long-term	socialisation	effects.			These	incentives	and	benefits	are	important	for	attracting	members	keen	on	active	participation	and	for	keeping	those	members	active	in	the	long	term.	It	is	clear	in	this	case	that	the	multi-speed	party	that	opens	up	to	supporters	does	not	directly	negate	the	value	of	membership,	primarily	because	members	are	responding	to	incentives	that	are	unaffected	by	a	change	in	affiliation	options.	Providing	opportunities	for	non-member	activism	not	only	harnesses	the	volunteer	power	of	supporters	but	can	also	act	as	a	gateway	to	membership.	Socialisation	within	the	party	also	has	beneficial	impact	on	activism,	keeping	those	already	in	the	party	active	and	engaged	(or	providing	an	easy	route	back	in	for	those	who	leave).	The	problem	is	that	these	incentives	tend	to	be	exclusive	to	members	and	that	is	potentially	a	problem	for	parties	trying	to	widen	their	
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base.	The	incentives	that	keep	members	in	the	party	and	active	within	it	may	also	create	a	barrier	to	those	seeking	a	looser	attachment.			The	results	also	suggest	that	party	members	may	not	be	as	partisan	as	expected.	The	incidence	of	non-member	active	support	and	party	switching	suggests	that	party	support	is	already	more	fluid	than	previously	recognised.	This	fluidity	provides	a	potentially	rich	source	of	volunteer	support	for	parties	who	open	up	participation	in	party	activity	but	also	a	less	stable	one,	and	one	that	requires	a	significant	shift	in	party	culture.			Taken	together	these	finding	suggest	that	taking	a	multi-speed	approach	to	membership	and	affiliation	is	strategically	sound,	but	may	only	be	taken	so	far.	The	fluidity	of	modern	partisans	suggests	that	an	open	approach	to	support	is	necessary,	but	sustained	activism	(particularly	in	‘high-intensity’	activity)	relies	on	processes	of	socialisation	which	may	be	exclusionary	to	newer	and	more	loosely	affiliated	participants	or	potentially	undermined	by	the	multi-speed	model.	The	supporter	may	find	that	the	strength	of	processes	of	socialisation	amongst	the	membership	create	a	number	of	barriers	to	their	active	participation.	Likewise,	the	processes	that	bond	members	in	the	long-term	and	encourage	activity	could	be	disrupted	by	a	widening	and	loosening	of	affiliation.			The	party	members	who	sustain	party	activity,	that	stand	for	election,	attend	meetings	and	provide	volunteer	support	for	election	campaigns,	are	an	important	resource:	one	that	parties	have	a	clear	incentive	to	retain.	Whilst	moving	to	a	multi-speed	membership	model	can	attract	a	larger	constituency	of	support,	this	may	have	a	long-term	impact	on	organisational	capacity.	Understanding	the	relationship	between	active	members	and	their	party	and	how	this	might	be	affected	by	a	move	to	a	wider	affiliation	model	is	vitally	important	for	parties	wishing	to	recruit	and	crucially,	sustain,	an	active	support	base.			In	the	next	section	I	look	at	the	next	phase	of	membership:	loyalty	and	exit.	And	I	consider	how	these	too	may	be	affected	by	a	move	to	multi-speed	membership.			 	
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Chapter	6:	Exit,	voice	and	committed	incongruence	
	The	previous	chapter	suggested	that	the	multi-speed	organised	party	can	successfully	appeal	to	both	members	and	supporters,	capturing	the	fluidity	of	party	support	to	bolster	activism	when	needed.	But	organising	in	this	way	is	a	balancing	act:	retaining	the	loyalty	of	the	membership	base	whilst	making	an	attractive	offer	to	supporters.	As	long	as	the	multi-speed	party	wishes	to	retain	a	stable	and	loyal	membership	base	(if	it	does),	knowing	why	and	when	members	exit	the	party,	and	the	impact	of	multi-speed	organising	on	member	exit,	is	important.		Party	membership	numbers	suggest	that	far	from	being	a	lifelong	commitment	or	a	one-off	activity,	party	membership	is	more	like	a	revolving	door	(Pemberton	and	Wickham-Jones,	2013).	Parties	see	increases	around	key	moments	and	opportunities	(General	Elections,	leadership	challenges)	and	outside	of	these	opportunities,	experience	declines.	Multi-speed	membership	parties	may	be	comfortable	with	this	fluidity	because	they	take	a	functional	approach	to	support:	it	is	what	activists	do	rather	than	what	type	of	affiliation	they	hold	that	is	important	(Scarrow,	2015,	p.	206).	And	as	long	as	supporters	can	be	mobilised	when	needed,	whether	they	hold	a	membership	card	or	not	is	immaterial.	Yet	whilst	a	fluid	support	base	might	be	desirable,	a	highly	fluid	membership	base	is	a	different	proposition.			Parties	rely	on	their	volunteer	base	for	more	than	delivering	leaflets.	Party	members	are	also	the	party’s	source	of	candidates	and	holders	of	voluntary	positions	in	the	organisation	(such	as	local	party	chairs	and	secretaries).	They	are	also	generally	those	who	invest	the	time	in	learning	the	skills	for	party	political	work	and	engage	in	more	high-intensity	activity.	As	long	as	parties	rely	on	their	membership	to	take	up	these	roles	and	lead	on	volunteer	activities,	organisational	stability	would	appear	to	rely	on	maintaining	some	degree	of	loyal	membership	base.	Collective	and	selective	benefits,	crucial	for	attracting	active	members,	can	also	be	disrupted	by	a	large	amount	of	fluidity	in	the	membership	base	as	argued	in	the	previous	chapter.	Whilst	the	multi-speed	party	may	want	to	capitalise	on	the	fluidity	of	party	support,	it	would	not	be	organisationally	sound	to	do	so	at	the	expense	of	member	loyalty.			
6.1.	 Exit,	voice	and	loyalty	(and	ideology)	in	multi-speed	Labour	
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In	taking	an	open	inductive	approach	to	understanding	the	relationship	members	have	with	their	party,	one	of	the	central	themes	to	emerge	was	the	idea	of	ideological	change.	The	idea	of	change	in	the	party	featured	in	all	interviews	either	in	reference	to	the	current	changes	in	the	party	or	reflecting	on	changes	in	the	past.	Ideological	change	also	featured	prominently	in	members	discussions	of	exit	and	loyalty.			The	notion	of	ideological	change	is	particularly	closely	linked	to	the	consequences	of	multi-speed	organising	in	the	Labour	case.	Multi-speed	changes	in	rules	have	led	to	the	election	of	a	leader	from	the	left	of	the	party	whose	ideology	is	seen	as	a	radical	departure	from	previous	leaderships.	This	raised	an	interesting	additional	research	question	in	understanding	the	implications	multi-speed	organising:	How	does	ideological	change	affect	exit,	voice	and	loyalty?		Hirschman’s	(1970)	theory	suggests	that	customers	experiencing	a	decline	in	quality	or	services	from	a	private	firm	may	take	their	custom	elsewhere	(exit)	or	voice	their	displeasure	whilst	remaining	loyal	to	that	firm.	Loyalty	in	this	calculation	acts	as	an	inhibitor	to	exit.	In	the	marketplace,	organisations	need	to	balance	exit	against	voice,	not	reducing	quality	or	service	beyond	the	point	that	exit	replaces	voice.	In	a	party	political	context,	the	organisation	(party)	will	be	restricted	in	its	policy	positioning	by	the	need	to	avoid	the	discontent	and	exit	of	party	members.			Labour’s	positioning	in	the	period	of	this	research	would	suggest	that	the	direction	of	travel	is	towards	the	member/customer,	but	the	membership	of	the	Labour	party	is	not	a	homogenous	group.	This	period	in	the	party’s	history	has	exposed	the	extent	of	factionalism	in	the	party	and	has	seen	some	very	high-profile	members	of	the	party	exercising	their	voice	in	dissent.	For	some	members	this	change	in	the	party	would	represent	a	‘decline	in	service’	of	some	magnitude	and	an	exit	of	party	members	might	be	expected.	Yet	the	numbers	of	members	leaving	has	not	been	significant.22	Why	would	members	remain	loyal	when	their	party	appears	to	no	longer	represent	their	values:	why	
                                                          
22	Membership	reached	a	peak	of	554,000	in	July	2016	dropping	to	around	517,000	in	March	2017.	Party	analysis	of	declines	in	membership	in	early	2017	suggest	60%	had	fallen	into	arrears	immediately	following	the	leadership	election	and	40%	had	joined	for	the	General	election	in	2015	and	failed	to	renew	their	membership	after	the	first	year	(25%	failed	to	renew	after	the	2010	General	Election	year).	Only	992	people	actively	resigned	in	the	same	period	and	reports	suggest	that	the	party’s	approach	to	Brexit	was	the	main	reason	for	this.	Though	we	do	not	have	a	detailed	account	of	membership	flows	in	and	out,	this	suggests	that	the	decline	in	membership	following	the	leadership	election	is	not	significantly	greater	than	previous	membership	drops	in	non-election	years	and	that	the	results	of	the	leadership	election	did	not	see	a	mass	departure	of	long-standing	party	members.		
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do	members	stay	when	the	exit/voice/loyalty	equation	points	to	exit?	This	period	of	change	in	the	party	presents	an	ideal	moment	to	explore	party	member	exit,	voice	and	loyalty	and	its	relationship	to	multi-speed	organising.		
6.2.	 Exit		
	
6.2.1	 Exit	as	a	process		The	extensive	literature	on	reasons	why	members	join	parties	is	not	matched	by	literature	on	exit,	with	just	a	few	exceptions	(Whiteley	and	Seyd,	2002;	Kosiara-Pedersen,	2016;	Bale	et	al.,	2017;	Wagner,	2017).	Kosiara-Pedersen’s	(2016)	study	finds	a	range	of	reasons	for	potential	exit	amongst	Danish	party	members,	with	political	disagreement	(measured	by	party	members’	perception	of	distance	between	their	views	and	the	party’s	on	economic	and	values	dimensions)	and	party	responsiveness	(measured	as	satisfaction/dissatisfaction	with	intra-party	democracy)	being	the	most	important.	‘Tiring’,	‘boring’	and	‘not	enough	activities’	as	well	as	‘a	lack	of	emotional	attachment’	are	also	reasons	for	exit.	Whiteley	and	Seyd’s	(2002)	analysis	of	exit	finds	some	parallels	with	the	general	incentives	model	used	to	explain	high-cost	participation.	Selective	incentives	are	important	as	are	expressive	incentives,	and	party	performance	has	an	influence	(though	leadership	performance	does	not).	They	find	that	rather	than	resulting	in	burnout,	high	levels	of	activism	inhibit	exit	(Whiteley	and	Seyd,	2002).	Bale	et.	al.	(2017)	also	find	that	leavers	are	more	likely	to	be	less	involved	in	high-intensity	party	activities.				To	explore	reasons	for	exit	behaviour	further,	these	interviews	asked	members	about	times	they	had	either	left,	or	considered	leaving,	the	party	and	about	whether	their	attitudes	had	changed	in	light	of	recent	changes	in	the	party.	An	inductive	analysis	of	the	data	reveals	the	dynamics	of	members’	attachment	to	the	party	and	the	circumstances	around	members’	exit.	Considering	movement	in	and	out	of	party	support	over	time,	as	these	interviews	have	done,	makes	it	possible	to	analyse	exit	as	a	process.	This	approach	has	uncovered	not	just	the	reasons	given	for	exit	but	the	background	conditions	behind	exit	decisions.			
6.2.2.	 Exit	and	re-joining		
	Though	interviewees	in	this	study	were	selected	on	the	basis	of	being	current	and	active	members,	a	number	of	interviewees	had	at	some	stage	left	the	party	[interviews:	10,	11,	
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14,	17,	20,	21,	22,	24,	25,	30].	Though	this	research	did	not	seek	out	members	who	were	currently	ex-members,	at	the	time	of	interviewing,	one	interviewee	had	just	left	the	party	and	another	was	contemplating	exit.			Notably,	even	some	members	who	currently	held,	or	had	held,	elected	office	or	elected	positions	within	the	party	had	left	and	re-joined	at	one	or	more	stages	in	their	lives.	This	observation	is	a	useful	reminder	that	party	membership	can	change	over	the	course	of	a	lifetime.	Those	that	find	themselves	taking	up	positions	in	the	party	have	not	necessarily	always	been	loyal	stalwarts.	Just	as	those	that	engage	in	high-intensity	activity	are	not	necessarily	members	nor	supporters	of	only	one	party	in	their	lifetime.	This	fluidity	suggests	that	movement	in-and-out	of	the	party	is	not	only	based	on	having	a	looser	type	of	affiliation	or	being	a	looser	type	of	supporter.	People’s	levels	of	commitment	and	activity	changes.	Members,	and	even	members	engaged	in	high-intensity	activity	at	some	stage,	can	find	themselves	exiting.			This	movement	within	members’	own	lifetimes	supports	the	idea	of	party	membership	as	a	revolving	door.	There	are	moments	that	prompt	members	to	leave	just	as	there	are	moments	that	prompt	members	to	join,	but	this	is	better	viewed	as	a	continuum.	Party	membership,	levels	of	activity,	and	indeed	how	party	members	feel	about	their	party,	can	and	does	change	for	individuals.	Classifying	party	members	into	types	can	lead	to	a	false	sense	of	static.	As	one	active	member	put	it:	“It’s	how	people	are	–	they	are	on	things	and	off	
things	depending	what	the	other	circumstances	in	their	life	are.	And	there	are	factors	in	the	
organisation	that	turn	them	on	or	off”	(#03,	member	<1	year).			Taking	a	qualitative	approach	to	understanding	party	membership	has	helped	to	reveal	the	on-and-off	nature	of	individuals’	relationships	with	the	party.	This	chapter	will	also	consider	what	‘factors	in	the	organisation’	may	be	pressing	the	off-switch	for	members.				
6.2.3.	 Reasons	for	exit		
	Interviews	looking	at	party	membership	over	the	course	of	a	lifetime	allows	for	an	analysis	of	exit	as	a	process	rather	than	a	static	event.	It	is	possible	to	discern	not	just	the	reason(s)	members	attach	to	their	exit	decision,	but	the	background	conditions	that	may	have	influenced	that	decision.	Members	who	had	left	the	party	had	done	so	for	very	specific	political	reasons;	in	every	case,	members	highlighted	one	specific	policy	(or	leadership	action)	that	they	recognised	as	the	prompt	for	their	decision	to	leave	the	party.	
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However,	this	moment	was,	for	all	members	who	had	exited,	also	preceded	or	accompanied	by	a	decline	in	activism,	lack	of	social	contact	with	the	party	and	fellow	members,	and	in	some	cases,	dissatisfaction	with	the	workings	of	intra-party	democracy.			For	members	who	had	left	the	party,	the	point	in	which	they	had	done	so	was	one	in	which	their	activity	for	the	party	was	either	minimal	or	non-existent,	and	they	were	not	in	regular	social	contact	with	other	members.	A	lack	of	social	and	participatory	links	with	the	party,	coupled	with	negative	views	of	party	organisation	create	a	ripe	environment	for	exit.	This	is	the	reverse	of	the	social	ties/activism	dynamic	highlighted	in	the	previous	chapter.		For	all	members	who	had	made	an	exit	decision	however,	one	key	policy	or	leader	action	had	provided	that	catalyst.	These	policies	represented	a	value	change	too	far,	and	they	were	personal	and	specific	to	those	members.	For	these	members	it	was	not	a	sense	of	broad	party-wide	value	shift	but	a	specific	policy	which	encapsulated	a	shift	in	values.			
“Brown	was	Chancellor	and	he	was	really	pushing	PFI	bigtime”	(#14,	member	36	
years)	
	
“Blair’s	speeches	were	something	else,	so	I	lapsed”	(#25,	member	57	years)	
	It	wasn’t	necessarily	the	‘big’	decisions	(War,	Clause	4)	that	provided	the	final	straw	for	members,	but	something	that	was	personal.	Members	even	recognised	that	they	had	not	been	moved	by	the	things	that	were	expected	to	have	moved	them.			
“Never	the	big	things,	never	the	invasions.	It’s	often	been	something	small	that’s	tipped	
me	over	the	edge.”	(#24,	member	54	years)	
	Whilst	members	who	had	left	were	very	clear	about	what	they	considered	to	be	the	tipping	point,	there	were	other	aspects	in	their	relationship	with	the	party	at	that	time	which	provided	the	conditions	for	exit			
6.2.3.i.	Reasons	for	exit:	Activity,	socialisation	and	exit		
	Members	who	had	left	the	party	tended	to	have	lost	links	with	the	party	before	exiting.	They	were	neither	active	nor	in	regular	contact	socially	with	other	party	members:		
“I	wasn’t	doing	anything	so	there	wasn’t	anything	to	leave,	then	suddenly	you	thought	‘I	
can’t	keep	giving	my	money	to	these	people’”	(#11,	member	>20	year)	
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“I	don’t	see	how	I	can	still	be	part	of	this	and	sort	of	knock	on	doors	for	people	and	
deliver	stuff,	‘cos	it	was	in	the	middle	of	children,	so	I	wasn’t	that	active”	(#14,	member	
36	years)		
“I	think	I	just	wanted	an	excuse	to	leave.	Because	I	wasn’t	active	-	I	was	going	to	be	a	
supporter	but	I	couldn’t	see	any	point	in	being	a	member.	They	wouldn’t	have	noticed	
my	absence”	(#20,	member	>20	years)	
	It	is	likely	that	the	relationship	between	active	participation	and	satisfaction	with	membership	goes	both	ways.	Members	who	had	left	the	party	were	not	active	at	the	time	of	exit	but	it	is	also	true	that	members’	activity	levels	had	at	times	declined	because	of	dissatisfaction	with	the	party,	(though	not	always	ending	in	exit).		
“I’m	not	active	politically	now	in	the	way	that	I	used	to	be.	And	that’s	partly	
disillusionment	through	the	Blair	years”	(#13,	member	49	years)		The	relationship	between	socialisation	and	active	participation	was	explored	in	the	previous	chapter.	Socialisation,	in	different	forms,	was	shown	to	be	key	to	encouraging	active	participation.	And	of	course,	active	participation	helps	reinforce	the	socialisation	processes	by	bringing	members	into	contact	and	reinforcing	shared	language,	views	and	values.	These	twin	factors	may	also	help	explain	why	some	members	choose	exit	and	when.	Socialisation	provides	an	important	catalyst	for	activity	within	the	party	but	it	may	also	be	the	glue	that	prevents	exit.	Ware	(1992)	argues	that	solidary	incentives	are	more	likely	to	produce	loyalty.	Certainly,	for	the	members	who	had	left	the	party,	that	social	connection	was	on	a	low	ebb	at	the	time	of	their	departure:		
“Because	of	the	Suits,	it	just	felt	a	whole	different	world,	so	as	much	as	those	initial	
meetings	had	been	dull	as	ditch-water	at	least	they	were	led	by	real	people	that	did	real	
jobs	and	suddenly	there	were	all	these	posh	suits	and	slickness	that	I	didn’t	feel	
connected	to.”	(#10,	member	>20	years)		Loyalty,	socialisation	and	activity	together	create	a	barrier	to	exit.	Socialisation	and	activity	strengthen	each	other	and	make	exit	harder.	Likewise,	remaining	loyal	over	a	period	of	time	helps	social	bonds	develop	and	gives	members	time	to	develop	the	skills	and	experience	for	activism.	These	links	are	important	considerations	for	the	multi-speed	membership	party.			Parties	wishing	to	maintain	stable	and	active	grassroots	organisations	(which	a	multi-speed	party	might	not	necessarily	want	to)	would	need	to	consider	what	effect	opening	up	the	organisation	to	more	loosely	attached	supporters	could	do	to	the	availability	of	solidary	benefits	and	correspondingly,	levels	of	activism.			
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A	decline	in	social	connections	and	activity	create	conditions	that	make	exit	easier.	When	members	perceive	that	a	specific	policy	decision	runs	against	their	values	providing	a	catalyst	for	exit,	these	background	conditions	make	it	less	likely	that	they	will	stay.	Perceived	ideological	distance,	inactivity	and	a	lack	of	social	connection	together	provide	the	perfect	conditions	for	exit	but	there	is	an	additional	ingredient	(a	feature	of	the	multi-speed	party)	that	appears	to	facilitate	exit.	Centralisation	and	the	ease	of	joining	afforded	by	online	and	digital	options	(the	central	features	of	a	multi-speed	party),	whilst	making	it	easier	to	join,	also	make	it	easier	to	leave.		
6.2.3.ii.	 Reasons	for	exit:	Centralisation	and	exit	
	For	members	who	had	left	the	party	at	some	stage,	whilst	they	were	motivated	by	political	reasons,	their	exit	was	not	heralded	by	a	resignation	letter	or	declaration	but	by	the	rather	more	prosaic	action	of	failing	to	renew	a	direct	debit.			
“And	then	when	it	comes	to	renewal	time	I	haven’t	done	it.	It’s	partly	due	to	laziness.	I	
would	have	done	it	in	the	old	days	when	[name]	came	to	the	door	and	collected	money”	
(#24,	member	54	years)	
	Moving	membership	administration	to	the	party’s	head	office	was	part	of	the	party’s	modernisation	in	the	late	‘80s	and	early	‘90s.	It	meant	that	new	members	could	join	up	directly	with	the	central	party,	gave	HQ	access	to	membership	lists	and	strengthened	the	links	between	members	and	the	central	party	enabling	direct	communications	(Russell,	2005).	But	removing	face-to-face	contact	can	have	a	negative	effect	on	members’	relationship	with	the	party.	The	contact	with	other	party	members	through	the	collecting	of	subs	under	the	previous	arrangements	added	to	social	processes.	As	one	member	who	formerly	carried	out	this	role	noted:		
“I	used	to	be	a	local	group	organiser,	[it	was]	a	neighbourhood	in	the	sense	that	we	all	
had	a	patch,	we	used	to	take	newsletters	round,	collect	subs,	talk	to	people	and	you	
knew	your	patch	and	you	knew	your	members	in	that	patch”	(#12,	member	43	years)		Accessibility	(making	it	easy	to	join)	and	centralisation	(affiliating	directly	with	the	central	party)	are	two	of	the	three	key	features	of	the	multi-speed	party	(Scarrow,	2015,	p.	136).	The	fluidity	in	members’	relationship	with	their	party,	seen	in	the	easy	movement	in-and-out	of	membership,	suggests	that	the	multi-speed	party	has	much	to	gain	from	opening	up	to	all	types	of	affiliate	and	making	it	easier	to	join	the	party	(most	of	the	recent	members	interviewed	in	this	research	had	found	their	own	way	to	the	party,	via	the	internet).	By	centralising	and	modernising,	the	multi-speed	party	is	able	to	tap	into	a	larger	resource	of	
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potential	members	and	supporters	making	it	easier	to	join	but	by	default,	also	makes	it	easier	to	leave	the	party:	easy	entrance	also	means	easy	exit.			Whilst	it	is	inconceivable	today	to	consider	managing	the	joining	process	by	anything	other	than	an	online	function,	something	has	been	lost	in	the	change.	Whether	social	media	and	other	online	channels	have	replaced	this	social	connection	is	not	within	the	scope	of	this	research	but	it	is	clear	from	these	interviews	that	socialisation	and	the	development	of	social	ties	are	crucial	part	of	party	membership	and	can	be	realised	in	many	ways,	including	through	the	mundane	task	of	collecting	membership	fees.			
6.3	 Voice		
	The	second	of	Hirschman’s	trilogy,	voice,	is	presented	as	the	alternative	to	exit:	the	discontented	customer	raises	their	concerns	rather	than	take	their	custom	elsewhere.	For	party	members	there	are	many	ways	of	expressing	their	discontent,	within	party	channels	and	externally,	and	indeed	a	third	option	of	neither	voicing	their	discontent	nor	exiting.			Van	Haute	(2011)	suggests	that	there	may	be	a	difference	in	how	activists	and	more	passive	members	‘voice’	their	discontent.	Involved	party	members	may	use	internal	party	channels	to	criticise	the	party	but	would	be	more	reluctant	to	do	so	to	the	‘outside	world’.	But	for	members	who	are	more	passive,	the	option	to	voice	discontent	in	party	meeting	is	unavailable	and	therefore	they	might	be	more	likely	to	make	public	their	discontent	(van	Haute,	2011).			In	a	party	political	context,	however,	voice	is	an	ambiguous	concept;	disagreement	and	debate	are,	after	all,	a	part	of	the	very	nature	of	politics.	But	discontent	is	interesting.	To	understand	exit	and	the	processes	that	lead	to	exit	(or	loyalty),	it	is	important	to	understand	member	discontent.		
6.3.1.	 Discontent	and	(non-)voice	
	Party	members’	descriptions	of	their	progress	towards	exit	reveal	not	only	the	catalysts	and	background	conditions	of	this	process,	but	are	also	revealing	of	just	how	much	discontent	and	value	change	members	are	willing	to	stomach	before	contemplating	leaving.	This	section	considers	the	role	of	discontent	in	party	membership.		
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In	a	survey	of	Belgian	party	members,	Van	Haute	(2011)	finds	that	34%	use	at	least	one	negative	adjective	to	describe	their	party	(when	asked	to	provide	three	adjectives).	Common	categories	of	negative	opinions	define	the	party	as	weak,	not	democratic,	not	reliable	and	having	a	gap	between	the	party	elite	and	party	on	the	ground	(2011,	p.	173).			All	member	interviewees	in	this	research	appeared	at	odds	with	their	party	in	some	way.	It	is	hardly	surprising	that	in	interviews	lasting	an	hour	or	more,	members	found	time	to	highlight	at	least	one	thing	that	annoyed	them	about	their	party.	Negative	views	therefore	cannot,	in	this	research	context,	be	taken	to	represent	what	van	Haute	terms	’discontents’.	Examining	party	member	concerns	does	however	reveal	where	the	tensions	lie	and	how	much	party	members	will	put	up	with	before	contemplating	exit.	In-depth	interviewing	can	reveal	not	just	when	party	members	choose	exit,	but	how	far	they	can	be	pushed	before	considering	exit:	how	discontented	these	discontented	members	can	get.	The	variety	and	strength	of	party	members’	negative	views	shows	just	how	much	members	are	willing	to	accept:		
“I’ve	learnt	to	expect	very	little	from	them	over	the	years	because	organisationally	
they’ve	been	a	bit	of	a	disaster.”		
	Members’	negative	opinions	fell	into	four	categories:	Communications;	organisational	structures;	personalities	and	local/national	division;	and	value	change.			Many	members	found	something	organisationally	infuriating.	Common	negative	attitudes	were	based	around	practical	organisational	issues	such	as	communications.	Members	found	the	emails	they	received	annoying,	particularly	so	for	longstanding	members	who	might	recall	a	more	personal	approach.		
	
“Also	for	normal	party	members	who	are	involved	in	a	lot	of	activism,	get	a	bit	upset	by	
the	donation	email	because	they	say	‘I	already	do	all	this	for	the	party,	I	donate	at	
events	..’(#01,	member	2	years)	
	
I	keep	getting	different	emails	about	different	things	to	different	people	and	ones	that	
ask	‘would	I	like	to	join	now’	and	I’m	like	..!	(#13,	member	49	years)	
	Party	meetings	and	organisational	structures	provided	another	rich	seam	of	frustration:	
	
“It’s	been	a	tremendous	release	not	to	have	to	go	to	party	meetings	and	listen	to	all	
those	prats.”	(#25,	member	57	years)	
	
“The	other	meeting	I	went	to	was	[	]	and	it	was	full	of	a	bunch	of	cantankerous	old	farts	
who	wouldn’t	shut	up”	(#09,	member	<1	year)	
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For	some	party	members,	meetings	failed	to	provide	the	same	political	excitement	and	engagement	they	felt	during	campaigning	activity.	Often	this	was	linked	to	the	sense	that	the	real	power	existed	elsewhere	and	they	were	keen	to	experience	greater	internal	democracy.		
“It	didn’t	feel	like	active	politics,	it	felt	like	a	few	blokes	shuffling	power	around;	well,	
most	of	it	was,	wasn’t	it?”	(#11,	member	>20	years)	
	As	with	any	organisation,	frustrations	often	focused	on	individual	conflicts.	These	were	sometimes	between	the	local	and	national	party	or	between	the	local	party	and	candidate.		
	
“A	lot	of	the	time	ego	gets	in	the	way	of	actually	running	a	successful	event”	(#02,	
member	<1	year)	
	
“If	you	want	to	get	to	crux	of	why	people	leave	or	stay,	it’s	about	personalities”	(#05,	
member	5	years)	
	The	fourth	and	final	category	of	negative	opinion	is	unsurprisingly	value	change.	Many	members	felt	considerable	dissatisfaction	with	the	ideological	positioning	of	their	party	currently,	or	at	some	stage	in	the	past.			
“What	does	the	Labour	party	stand	for	now?	I	don’t	know	if	I	know.”	(#02,	member	<1	
year)	
	
“I	thought	the	party	had	lost	its	way	in	terms	of	the	values	I	held.	So	I	wasn’t	driven	and	
motivated	to	..	I	wouldn’t	say	I	felt	moved	to	be	part	of	it	because	there	was	nothing	to	
be	part	of	really.”	(#13,	member	49	years)	
	Whilst	members	were	colourfully	vociferous	in	their	analysis	of	problems	in	the	party	in	these	interviews,	it	was	clear	that	they	did	not	consider	making	public	their	discontent.	Those	who	had	left	had	not	done	so	by	resignation	but	had	drifted	away.	Some	of	the	members	in	these	interviews	who	had	felt	uncomfortable	about	the	changes	in	the	party	felt	that	they	had	been	able	to	“shut	up	and	get	on	with	it!”.	This	reflects	Van	Haute’s	(2011)	suggestion	that	activists,	those	socialised	in	the	party	‘family’,	whilst	being	a	source	of	criticism	within	the	party,	are	less	likely	to	voice	their	discontent	outside	it.	This	is	another	consideration	for	the	multi-speed	party.	More	loosely	attached	affiliates	and	supporters	who	join	at	specific	moments	and	do	not	stay	long	enough	to	develop	social	bonds	may	be	more	likely	to	criticise	the	party	publicly.	It	is	possible	therefore	that	discontent	may	be	more	likely	to	be	voiced	outside	the	party	when	members	are	attracted	by	short-term	opportunities.			
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6.3.2.	 Discontent	and	ideological	incongruence	
	Value	change	within	the	party	and	the	resulting	ideological	dissonance	was	clearly	a	major	factor	in	party	members’	decisions	to	leave	and	is	a	significant	source	of	discontent	for	existing	party	members.	Recent	literature	has	revealed	the	significant	extent	of	ideological	incongruence	in	parties	(van	Haute	and	Carty,	2012;	Kölln	and	Polk,	2017):	a	perceived	gap	between	party	members’	views	and	those	of	the	party	they	belong	to.	Van	Haute	and	Carty	(2012)	call	these	members	‘ideological	misfits’.	They	find	that	one	in	six	members	of	Belgian	and	Canadian	political	parties	see	themselves	as	ideological	misfits	(defined	as	members	who	place	themselves	in	a	different	place	on	a	left-right	scale	to	their	party).	Kölln	and	Polk’s	(2017)	survey	of	Swedish	party	members	finds	two-thirds	to	be	not	perfectly	congruent	with	their	party	(measured	on	a	10-point	left-right	scale).			The	presence	of	high	levels	of	ideological	incongruence	amongst	party	members,	particularly	in	party	systems	that	have	a	broader	range	of	political	parties	than	the	UK,	suggests	that	ideological	incongruence	is	a	major	aspect	of	party	membership.	Yet	it	is	an	under-theorised	area	of	party	membership	studies.	Whilst	we	know	how	many	party	members	see	themselves	as	ideologically	different	and	some	sense	of	who	they	might	be	in	terms	of	activity,	we	don’t	know	why	these	members	stay	with	their	parties.	Kölln	and	Polk,	(2017)	find	that	ideological	incongruence	is	associated	with	higher	probability	of	exit.	Given	this	relationship,	those	who	decide	to	stay	are	even	more	interesting.			Many	members	in	this	research	perceived	the	values	of	the	party	to	be	different	from	their	own	(significantly	different	in	some	cases),	but	many	also	demonstrated	an	acceptance	of	those	differences.	They	recognised	that	their	party	was	broad	in	its	appeal	and	that	they	could	not	expect	perfect	congruence	of	values.			
“It	would	be	bizarre	if	we	all	agreed	with	everything	all	the	time”	(#07,	member	2	
years)	
	
“I	can	live	with	the	division	I	think	because	that’s	healthy”	(#20,	member	>20	years)	
	
“I	have	a	long	history	in	the	party.	The	right	and	left	factions	have	always	been	in	the	
party.	I’m	used	to	that”	(#30,	member	>40	years)	
	Nor	do	members	necessarily	want	or	hope	for	perfect	congruence:		
“I	don’t	think	I	would	vote	for	a	party	because	they’re	saying	everything	I	think.	
Corbyn’s	brand	of	socialism	isn’t	mine”	(#19,	member	3	years)	
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“I’m	also	very	conscious	of	not	floating	in	and	out	of	the	party	as	and	when	it	agrees	
with	me.	It’s	not	like	I	want	the	party	always	to	be	in	agreement	with	me”	(#15,	
member	7	years)		It	is	clear	from	interviews	with	party	members	that	members	often	see	a	vast	difference	between	their	values	and	those	that	their	party	seems	to	be	representing.	Yet	many	accept	this	as	a	part	of	party	membership,	a	part	of	politics.	It	is	perhaps	inevitable	in	a	party,	like	Labour,	that	has	traditionally	tried	to	appeal	to	a	broad	range	of	values,	that	those	values	may	fail	to	align	with	their	supporters	at	one	time	or	another.	The	catch-all	party	necessarily	sacrifices	a	degree	of	member	congruence	for	wider	support.	As	Hirschman	(1970)	theorised,	in	moving	to	the	median	voter,	parties	risk	member	discontent.	Van	Haute	and	Carty	(2012)	find	that	mass	parties	of	the	left	in	their	study	(of	nine	Belgian	and	Canadian	parties)	have	‘disproportionately’	large	numbers	of	these	party	member	misfits.	They	suggest	that	the	more	radical	party	members	in	these	parties	of	the	left	may	see	no	viable	alternative	despite	their	party	being	more	centrist	than	they	would	like.	This	reasoning	could	also	be	applied	in	the	British	context	as	Labour	has	historically	dominated	the	left	of	politics	and	other	parties	have	struggled	for	success	under	the	electoral	system.	Exit	in	Hirschman’s	model,	after	all,	requires	an	alternative	opportunity	to	be	available.	The	breadth	and	extent	of	ideological	discontent	in	these	interviews	would	support	this	view.			Members	not	only	recognised	a	difference	in	their	values	and	the	values	the	party	seemed	to	represent	nationally,	but	also	with	the	perceived	values	of	their	local	party.			
	“I	did	mention	Jeremy	one	day	[at	a	meeting]	and	got	a	sharp	intake	of	breath	….	And	I	
thought	‘Oh,	this	is	interesting	-	we	do	not	like	our	leader’”	(#23,	member	<1	year)			Some	members	see	an	ideological	difference	between	the	party	at	the	local	level	and	the	national	party,	and	associate	with	one	and	not	the	other.	It	is	a	differentiation	that	has	not	been	made	in	studies	of	ideological	incongruence.			
“I	associate	very	strongly	with	some	figures	in	the	Labour	party	but	I	don’t	kind	of	like	
the	party	..	just	me	personally,	I	don’t	always	agree	with	what	HQ	says”	(#07,	member	2	
years)	
	
“I	think	because	party	politics	at	a	national	level	is,	and	can	be,	very	different	from	
party	politics	at	a	local	level,	what	we’ve	done	now	is	get	very	engaged	locally”	(#11,	
member	>20	years)	
	The	‘decoupling’	of	the	local	and	national	party	is	a	consideration	for	the	multi-speed	membership	party.	Scarrow	(2015)	argues	that	multi-speed	organising	strategies	can	help	local	operations	by	identifying	local	volunteers	for	these	local	campaigns:	the	central	
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control	of	supporter	information	can	be	utilised	to	connect	volunteers	back	with	the	local	party.	And	this	was	indeed	a	strategy	used	to	significant	effect	in	the	2015	election	campaign.23	Yet,	there	is	also	the	potential	to	heighten	division:	‘to	the	extent	that	new	affiliation	modes	remain	focused	on	national	party	brands	and	the	personalities	of	national	leaders,	they	could	contribute	to	a	vertical	decoupling	of	partisan	mobilising’	(Scarrow,	2015,	p.214).	If	supporters	and	new	affiliation	types	link	directly	to	party	HQ	and	do	not	come	into	contact	with	the	local	party,	these	divisions	could	be	intensified.	Members	highlighted	this	sense	of	separation	between	the	different	‘faces’	of	the	party.	In	situations	where	leadership	support	is	greatest	amongst	those	not	connected	to	local	parties,	the	multi-speed	party	could	exacerbate	the	local/national	divide.			Party	members	can	be	annoyed	with	the	way	the	party	communicates	with	them,	frustrated	with	the	individuals	involved	at	the	top	of	the	organisation,	disappointed	in	the	structures	of	the	organisation	and	find,	on	occasion,	that	their	values	don’t	match	those	the	party	appears	to	be	representing,	yet	not	only	remain	members	of	that	organisation	but	engage	in	work	on	its	behalf.	Transferring	this	situation	outside	of	party	politics	it	is	hard	to	imagine	a	customer	of	a	high	street	firm	remaining	loyal	to	that	company	in	the	face	of	such	terrible	customer	experience.	The	customer	who	receives	annoying	emails,	dislikes	the	company	bosses	and	the	way	the	company	is	run,	as	well	as	at	times	finding	themselves	at	odds	with	the	morals	of	that	firm,	is	highly	unlikely	to	offer	to	work	for	them	voluntarily.	Yet	party	members	do	just	that.		It	is	a	useful	reminder	that	the	relationship	party	members	have	with	their	party	differs	greatly	from	the	relationship	consumers	have	with	private	firms.	The	customer	experience	of	party	membership	leaves	a	great	deal	to	be	desired,	yet	these	organisational	quality	issues	do	not	have	a	bearing	on	exit	in	these	situations.	They	are	peripheral	for	party	members,	something	that	is	accepted	as	part	of	party	membership.				Even	more	surprising	than	the	breadth	of	negative	opinions	was	the	strength	of	emotion	in	some	of	the	responses,	from	members	who	despite	these	views,	were	still	carrying	their	membership	card:		
“I’m	ashamed	to	be	associated	with	it”	
	
“So	that	made	us	very	angry,	but	I	was	still	involved	in	the	party	at	that	stage”	
                                                          
23	Author’s	observation	during	participant	observation	phase	of	research	on	the	2015	election	campaign	
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“I	feel	probably	the	most	politically	homeless	I’ve	ever	felt,	in	that	the	Labour	Party	
does	not	feel	like	the	Labour	Party	I	thought	I’d	joined.”		Despite	viewing	their	party	in	negative	terms	and	feeling	themselves	apart	from	the	party	ideologically,	these	discontented	members	are	still	members	of	their	party.	In	spite	of	grievances,	negative	opinion	and	ideological	distance,	party	members	were	not	calculating	their	exit	strategy.	The	next	section	considers	loyalty	and	seeks	to	explain	the	reason	member	‘misfits’	endure.			
6.4.	 Loyalty		
	Loyalty	is	seen	as	the	‘unsold’	(van	Haute,	2011)	or	‘residual’	(Ware,	1992)	category	in	Hirschman’s	trilogy.	In	the	exit/voice	calculation,	loyalty	effects	an	‘exit	tax’	potentially	making	voice	a	more	attractive	option.	Hirschman’s	(1970)	use	of	‘loyalty’	appears	to	be	akin	to	brand	loyalty	but	his	discussion	of	group	identification,	family	and	tribe,	appears	to	suggest	something	more	(Dowding	et	al.,	2000).	In	Whiteley	and	Seyd’s	(2002)	exit	model,	loyalty	is	measured	as	expressive	attachment	potentially	conflating	two	different	concepts	or	attitudes.	Without	definition,	‘loyalty’	risks	becoming	a	vessel	for	any	behaviour	that	doesn’t	fit	in	the	rational	framework.	To	unpick	the	different	concepts	that	underpin	member	loyalty,	I	use	it	here	to	simply	mean	continuous	membership:	the	opposite	of	exit.	In	doing	so	(effectively	taking	loyalty	as	the	dependent	variable),	the	conditions	and	attitudes	underpinning	member	loyalty	can	be	explored.24		Value	change	is	the	crucial	catalyst	prompting	member	exit,	but	members	who	have	remained	loyal	for	years	have	also	seen	the	party’s	ideological	position	move	away	from	their	own	at	some	stage.	These	party	‘misfits’	have	remained	loyal	to	a	party	that	appears	not	to	represent	their	values.	Their	loyalty	has	remained	constant	through	leadership	change	and	perceived	value	shift	(even	those	who	left	had	experienced	a	great	deal	of	ideological	incongruence	before	doing	so).	This	raises	the	question	of	what	exactly	these	members	are	being	loyal	to.			Members	interviewed	in	this	research	see	a	difference	in	the	party’s	values	and	their	own;	they	also	see	a	difference	in	the	party	at	the	national	and	local	level.	This	suggests	that	
                                                          
24	This	differs	from	Kölln	and	Polk's	(2017)	analysis	which	operationalises	loyalty	as	‘their	propensity	to	vote	for	another	party’.		
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party	member	misfits	may	be	making	a	distinction	in	what	aspect	of	the	party	they	are	staying	loyal	to.			In	analysing	member	loyalty,	a	significant	conceptual	difference	emerged	in	terms	of	where	members	placed	their	loyalty	and	the	type	of	attachment	they	have	to	the	party.	Below	I	outline	the	different	categories	of	‘loyalty’	emerging	from	the	data.			
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Figure	9:	Loyalty	as	expressive/instrumental	attachment	–	categories	and	
properties		
Loyalty	(non-exit)	Category	(explanation	of	behaviour)	 Loyalty	as	expressive	attachment	 Loyalty	as	instrumental	attachment		Category	(behaviours)	 Membership	as	identity		 Membership	as	responsibility	and	ownership	 Membership	as	functional		Properties	of	category		 • Emotional	attachment	to	party	
• Party	forms	part	of	self-identity	
• Linked	to	socialisation	and	social	networks		
• Loyalty	to	ideal	of	party	(values	based)	
• Responsibility	to	
ideal	of	party	
• ‘Holding	on’/’hanging	in’	
• Linked	to	investment	and	to	work	(see	social	ties)		
• Loyalty	to	goals/outcomes	
• Loyalty	to	values	(own)	over	party	attachment	
• Absence	of	aspects	of	expressive	attachment,	e.g,	self-identity.	
• Linked	to	fluidity	in-out,	multiple	partisan	memberships	
Exit	behaviours	 Linked	to	loyalty	(non-exit)	when	values	perceived	to	have	changed	 Linked	to	exit	when	party	values	perceived	to	have	changed	Examples	 “It	was	almost	like	being	welcomed	back	home”		“I	think	I’m	more	emotionally	connected	this	time”		“You	develop,	I	think	very	quickly,	an	emotional	attachment”		“I	don’t	see	an	alternative	for	me”		“It’s	become	who	I	am.	I	am	a	Labour	Party	member	and	I	am	a	card-carrying	Labour	Party	member”		
“You	had	a	pride	in	that,	which	was	not	necessarily	associated	with	the	party	at	that	time”		“The	massive	cost	of	leaving	the	party	is	that	it	loses	you	all	of	the	capital	and	commitment	that	you’ve	built	up”		“In	a	way	it	was	me	saying,	I’m	not	going	to	let	you	have	this	party”		“I	do	think	that	it	is	the	history	and	an	idea	of	that	[history]	and	of	how	it	[the	party]	should	be.”			
“There’s	lots	of	things	you	can	do	which	you	couldn’t	as	a	non-member”		“The	only	reason	I	stayed	in	the	Labour	party	was	because	I	thought	x	was	a	project	that	could	help	change	Labour”		“[I	thought]	I	would	stick	with	the	best	Opposition	that	there	is.	And	that’s	the	Labour	Party.”		“At	the	moment	I	think	I	can	continue	that	relationship	up	until	the	point	when	those	values	are	put	to	the	electorate.”		“It’s	the	impact	that	this	would	have.	It	makes	anything	possible”	
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The	significant	theoretic	distinction	emerging	from	this	research	is	the	difference	between	type	of	party	attachment	measured	by	which	aspect	of	the	party	members	feel	loyal	to	and	the	nature	of	their	connection.	These	distinctions	also	appear	to	be	able	to	shed	light	on	exit	behaviours.	I	label	these	expressive	and	instrumental	attachments.	These	terms	have	been	used	in	a	range	of	other	contexts	but	here	they	are	applied	uniquely	to	the	member-party	connection.			The	concept	of	expressive	or	emotional	attachment	in	this	analysis	takes	two	forms:	membership	as	a	sense	of	self/self-identity,	and	membership	as	ownership	of,	or	responsibility	to,	the	party.	These	emotional	attachments	appear	to	inhibit	exit	behaviour	and	explain	how	members	remain	in	the	party	despite	perceived	shifts	in	values/party	goals.			The	nature	of	members’	expressive	attachment	is	further	refined	by	considering	that	the	object	of	members’	loyalty	may	differ.	Amongst	those	with	expressive	attachment	to	the	party,	it	appears	that	their	loyalty	is	based	on	a	version	of	the	party	that	may	not	correspond	to	the	party	as	it	is	exists	in	reality.	They	are	emotionally	attached	to	the	ideal	of	the	party:	the	party	as	they	imagine	it	should	be.	This	can	be	either	the	notion	of	the	party	they	have	assimilated	as	part	of	their	identity	or	the	party	that	they	feel	they	have	invested	in	at	one	time	or	other.	That	initial	investment	creates	a	sense	of	ownership	of	the	party	which	members	hold	on	to	in	hope	that	the	party	may	return	to	their	ideal	of	it	in	future.	In	a	sense	it	is	a	loyalty	to	the	party	as	organisation,	but	it	is	a	version	of	the	party	that	may	not	correspond	to	reality.	This	group	are	likely	to	be	loyal	to	values	but	they	needn’t	be	the	party’s	perceived	values	at	that	time,	rather	they	may	be	seen	as	the	party’s	‘true’	values.		These	aspects	of	expressive	attachment	clearly	also	have	a	link	to	aspects	of	socialisation	and	social	ties	discussed	in	chapter	5.	Party	socialisation	and	social	ties	developed	through	friendship	networks	and	work	help	create	and	reinforce	the	sense	of	responsibility	and	ownership	to	the	party.	Likewise,	those	networks	reinforced	the	idea	of	the	party	as	part	of	members’	self-identities.			In	contrast	to	this	expressive	attachment,	some	members	placed	a	greater	emphasis	on	the	party’s	goals	and	values	and	how	these	related	to	their	own	goals	and	values.	These	members	expressed	doubt	about	their	ability	to	remain	in	the	party	through	change.	They	linked	their	membership	to	expected	outcomes	and	a	shift	in	values	was	seen	as	good	
 167 
reason	for	exit.	A	change	in	direction	in	the	party	was	a	reason	to	leave	or	seek	membership	of	a	different	party.	This	links	to	the	aspects	of	fluidity	in	party	membership	and	fluidity	within	some	party	members’	partisan	behaviour	(previous	memberships	with	other	parties	(see	section	5.4.3)).	These	members	had	a	loyalty	to	values	and	outcomes,	instead	of	the	party	as	an	organisation.	Those	with	this	more	instrumental	attachment	may	not	have	the	sufficient	investment	and	social	ties	to	see	the	party	as	part	of	their	identity	or	something	they	have	a	stake	in	through	ownership	and	responsibility.			The	links	between	expressive	and	instrumental	attachments	and	socialisation	and	membership	fluidity	also	suggests	that	neither	of	these	attachments	are	set	in	stone.	As	with	party	members’	movement	in-and-out	of	active	participation,	the	nature	of	their	attachment	could	change:	socialisation	may	help	move	party	members	from	instrumental	to	expressive	attachment.			Exploring	member	exit	and	members’	attachment	to	the	party	has	revealed	different	objects	of	loyalty	and	types	of	attachment.	The	discovery	that	some	members	had	remained	loyal	despite	significant	changes	in	leadership,	and	arguably	values,	as	well	as	remaining	in	the	party	when	they	had	perceived	the	party	as	not	pursuing	the	goals	they	valued,	when	they	had	developed	significant	ideological	incongruence	and	also	perceived	that	incongruence,	is	a	puzzle.	But	the	distinction	between	expressive	and	instrumental	attachment,	and	the	idea	of	remaining	loyal	to	the	ideal	of	the	party	rather	than	the	party	itself,	developed	in	this	research,	helps	explain	this	inconsistency.	Below	I	explain	these	concepts	in	detail.			
6.4.1.	 Loyalty	as	expressive	attachment	
		This	research	finds	loyalists	amongst	those	who	are	dissatisfied	with	the	current	leadership	and	those	who	were	dissatisfied	with	leaders	of	the	past.	Leadership	for	most	was	not	the	focus	of	their	party	attachment.	Though	a	few	members	cited	the	party	leader	as	a	factor	in	their	reasons	for	joining,	or	as	a	symbol	of	the	value	change	that	caused	their	exit,	leadership	change	was	not	a	catalyst	for	exit.	The	party’s	leadership	was	sometimes	seen	as	an	embodiment	of	party	values	but	members	also	disassociated	the	leader	from	the	party.			Party	members	have	also	remained	loyal	even	when	they	see	the	party	as	diverging	from	their	values	(a	change	in	the	party’s	‘purpose’).	In	these	circumstances	it	is	hard	to	see	
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how	loyalty	could	attach	to	either	the	values	they	see	the	party	representing	(which	they	perceive	to	have	changed)	or	their	own	values	(which	they	would	consider	to	be	different	from	the	party’s).	For	loyalists,	there	must	be	something	else	that	helps	to	explain	their	perseverance.			Analysis	of	loyalists’	narratives	suggests	that	it	is	emotional	or	expressive	attachments	that	are	key	to	understanding	that	loyalty.	Many	members	described	their	connection	to	the	party	as	an	emotional	attachment.		
“I	really	felt	comfortable	–	it	was	almost	like	being	welcomed	back	home”	(#12,	
member	43	years)	
	
“You	get	swept	away	in	the	emotion	of	it”	(#06,	member	26	years)	
	
“So,	in	a	sense	it	was	very,	very	personal”	(#13,	member	49	years)	
	The	strength	of	these	expressive	attachments	had	a	clear	bearing	on	their	decisions	to	remain	loyal	in	the	face	of	value	change:		
“Maybe	something’s	gonna	happen	and	I	will	just	have	to	leave	and	it	will	be	a	relief	in	
a	way	because	I	won’t	have	to	worry	about	this	stuff,	but	I	think	I’m	more	emotionally	
connected	this	time.”	(#20,	member	>	20	years)	
	
You	develop,	I	think	very	quickly,	an	emotional	attachment.	One	of	the	things	is	you	
begin	to	develop	friends	in	the	party	and	those	friendships	become	hard	to	break.	But	I	
think	it	is	something	I	would	give	up	with	a	very	heavy	heart	(#16,	member	2	years)	
	We	know	that	expressive	attachment	is	a	motivating	factor	in	joining	a	party	(Whiteley	et	al.,	1994)	and	partly	explains	exit	in	the	literature	(Whiteley	and	Seyd,	2002;	Kosiara-Pedersen,	2016).	However,	expressive	attachment	can	be	understood	in	different	ways	and	can	attach	to	different	objects.	These	interviews	suggest	that	members	make	a	distinction	between	the	central	party	and	party	on	the	ground	(section	6.3.2)	so	when	questioned	about	attachment,	what	part	of	‘the	party’	do	members	think	about?			Delving	further	into	the	nature	of	members’	expressive	attachment	to	their	party	reveals	two	important	themes.	Members’	party	attachments	were	expressed	as	loyalty	from	a	sense	of	responsibility	and	ownership	and	also,	as	a	commitment	based	on	self-identification.			
6.4.1.i.	Expressive	attachments:	Membership	as	identity		
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For	some	loyal	party	members,	the	party	has	become	part	of	them	as	much	as	they	are	a	part	of	the	party.	Members	have	assimilated	the	party	as	part	of	their	self-identity	and	this	attachment	has	endured	even	when	the	party	changed.	Some	members	simply	couldn’t	consider	exit	as	it	would	mean	rejecting	part	of	their	identity.		
“I	think	my	loyalty	was	cemented	in	1972	…	It	wasn’t	loyalty	to	something	in	particular	
because	certainly	the	Labour	Party	changed	over	the	years	and	I	may	have	agreed	with	
something	more	in	1983	than	in	1993	but	it	was	almost	by	that	time,	something	of	who	
I	am,	my	identity	-	this	is	me,	this	is	who	I	am.	It’s	part	of	me	and	of	how	I’ve	lived	my	
life.”	(#12,	member	43	years)	
	
“It’s	become	who	I	am.	I	am	a	Labour	Party	member	and	I	am	a	card-carrying	Labour	
Party	member.”	(#22,	member	>20	years)	
	
“I	need	to	stay	in	[the	party].	I	feel	like	it	is	part	of	my	life.	It	would	be	almost	like	a	
bereavement	to	leave;	it’s	such	a	part	of	my	identity.”	(#29,	member	24	years)	
	Members’	identification	with	the	party	was	not	simply	a	matter	of	party	identification	as	understood	as	‘the	party	you	feel	closest	to’,	but	in	a	sense	of	converging	with	the	party:	the	party	becoming	part	of	a	member’s	self-identity.	Again,	this	links	back	to	socialisation	and	social	ties	within	the	party.	Members’	sense	of	themselves	as	identified	with	the	Labour	Party	would	be	reinforced	by	those	social	connections.			For	members	who	felt	the	party	was	a	part	of	their	identity,	the	party	would	need	to	change	significantly	in	order	to	break	that	connection.	Members	felt	the	party	would	need	to	change	beyond	recognition,	shifting	further	to	the	right	or	left	than	it	had	ever	previously	done.		
“if	the	Labour	Party	went	even	further,	past	Corbyn	or	back	past	Blair,	I	might	think	
again”	(#12,	member	43	years)		
“The	Labour	Party	would	have	to	be	awful	for	me	to	leave”	(#30,	member	>40	years)	
	
6.4.1.ii.	 Expressive	attachments:	Membership	as	responsibility	and	
ownership	
	Members	who	remained	loyal	in	the	face	of	ideological	dissonance	also	described	their	attachment	in	terms	of	‘hanging	in’.	It	would	seem	that	some	‘misfits’	are	staying	loyal	to	the	party	in	the	hope	of	future	change	or	a	belief	that	they	have	a	responsibility	to	direct	the	party	back	to	where	it	should	be.	They	are	remaining	loyal	to	the	party	they	think	Labour	should	be:		
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“I	just	stick	with	it.	It’s	better.	Something’s	got	to	be	better	than	the	alternative”	(#24,	
member	54	years)	
	
“I	beat	myself	up	and	said,	no,	we’ve	had	more	difficult	times	than	this.	Christ,	we	had	
Gaitskell!	And	you	hung	on	in	there,	so	you	better	go	back	in	and	hang	back	in	there.	So,	
I	did.”	(#25,	member	57	years)	
	Members	felt	they	could	sit	back	and	wait	until	the	party	changed,	and	they	felt	they	had	a	responsibility	to	do	so.	These	members	were	loyal	to	an	ideal	of	the	party	and	expressed	a	sense	of	responsibility	for	keeping	that	idea	alive.	This	also	explains	why	leadership	change	doesn’t	always	prompt	exit:	members	were	able	to	disassociate	the	party	from	its	leader,	waiting	for	a	leader	that	better	represented	the	party	as	they	believed	it	should	be.			This	sense	of	responsibility	was	also	expressed	as	ownership:	“I	made	a	conscious	decision.	
It	was	my	party	not	his.	In	a	way	it	was	me	saying,	I’m	not	going	to	let	you	have	this	party”	
(#13,	member	49	years)		This	helps	explain	how	members	can	remain	loyal	to	both	their	personal	values	and	to	a	party	that	doesn’t	appear	to	represent	those	values:	it	is	a	loyalty	to	an	ideal	of	the	party.	Within	a	broad-based	party	like	Labour,	this	is	not	an	unobtainable	ideal.	The	election	of	a	left-wing	leader	at	the	time	of	interviewing	had	given	some	members	a	sense	of	justification	that	their	‘hanging	in’	had	paid	off:		
“It	was	huge.	I	felt	quite	vindicated	…Because	the	left	had	stuck	about	and	kept	
plugging	away	at	things”	(#19,	member	3	years)	
	Investment	in	membership	was	also	mentioned	in	the	context	of	processes	of	socialisation	(identified	in	the	previous	chapter).	Members	felt	they	had	invested	in	learning	the	rules	of	the	club	and	building	friendships	within	it:		
“The	massive	cost	of	leaving	the	party	is	that	it	loses	you	all	of	the	capital	and	
commitment	that	you’ve	built	up”	(#15,	member	7	years)		It	is	also	worth	noting	that	for	many	exit	was	simply	not	considered	an	option.	Some	members	felt	a	sense	of	ownership	of	party	values	but	for	members	who	were	in	elected	positions,	they	had	a	responsibility	and	ownership	of	the	party	as	organisation.			
6.4.2.	 Expressive	vs	instrumental	attachment	
	Loyalty	and	attachment	are	intimately	linked,	but	loyalty	is	more	than	identifying	with	the	party.	Members	remained	loyal	through	periods	when	they	would	be	unlikely	to	describe	
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themselves	as	‘identifying’	with	the	party;	indeed,	through	periods	in	which	they	were	deeply	antagonistic	towards	the	party.	By	examining	party	attachment	in	more	depth	(party	members’	connection	to,	and	breaks	with	their	party	over	the	course	of	their	lives)	these	interviews	have	revealed	the	exact	nature	of	that	attachment	and	how	members	can	remain	loyal	as	‘misfits’.			Most	party	members	find	aspects	of	the	organisation	irritating.	Some	feel	very	negatively	about	their	party.	At	points,	most	members	have	seen	their	party	represent	values	they	do	not	associate	with.	These	findings	coupled	with	the	pull	of	the	centre-ground	in	‘big	tent’	politics	of	the	catch-all	party,	suggests	that	at	some	point,	most	members	would	experience	being	a	party	‘misfit’.	In	some	cases,	the	combination	of	ideological	distance	and	a	lack	of	social	and	participatory	connection	has	seen	members	drift	away	from	the	party.	For	others,	however,	the	same	circumstances	have	not	led	to	exit.			Mapping	members’	movements	in-and-out	of	the	party,	and	the	way	they	conceptualise	and	frame	their	relationship	with	the	party,	has	revealed	that	the	critical	factor	in	keeping	members	in	is	expressive	attachment.	For	those	who	have	stayed	loyal	to	the	party	when	all	other	factors	point	towards	exit,	it	was	the	emotional	pull	of	the	party	(not	necessarily	what	it	is,	but	the	idea	of	it)	that	has	prevented	them	leaving.			Those	members	who	did	leave,	had	done	so	at	a	time	when	they	did	not	feel	the	same	emotional	attachment.	They	saw	a	distinction	between	the	party’s	values	and	their	own,	and	did	not	see	the	party	as	the	vehicle	for	progressing	those	values.	Members	highlighted	this	more	instrumental	approach:		
“We	always	said	that	the	Labour	party’s	a	necessary	but	insufficient	vehicle	–	you	
needed	to	go	beyond	it.	But	it	was	necessary,	that	was	the	key	point,	that	it	was	
necessary.	I	guess	when	I	left	[	],	I	didn’t	think	it	was	necessary	anymore.”	(#17,	
member	23	years)		Making	this	distinction	between	expressive	and	instrumental	attachment	helps	explain	why	some	members	remain	loyal	to	an	organisation	that	does	not	appear	to	represent	their	values	and	others	exit	under	the	same	circumstances.	Members	who	have	an	instrumental	view	of	party	membership	would	be	inclined	to	find	a	new	vehicle	to	further	their	values	if	the	party	was	felt	not	to	be	progressing	their	causes.	Those	with	an	expressive	attachment	would	be	disinclined	to	associate	themselves	with	another	party,	even	if	that	party	more	closely	matched	their	values.	Importantly,	these	attachments	are	
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not	set	in	stone.	Members	who	had	previously	taken	a	more	instrumental	approach	to	their	membership	had	gone	on	to	develop	an	emotional	attachment.		Delving	into	the	expressive/instrumental	distinction	also	helps	explain	why	some	members	join	and	don’t	participate,	whilst	others	participate	without	feeling	the	need	to	formally	join.	The	former	may	have	a	predominantly	expressive	attachment	linked	to	their	identity	which	sees	simply	‘being’	a	member	as	an	adequate	expression	of	their	identity.	Those	with	more	instrumental	attachment	may	see	the	‘card	carrying’	aspect	of	membership	unnecessary	(“I	don’t	join	things	in	general”	(#08,	member	<	1	year)).		This	insight	into	members’	relationships	with	their	party	adds	depth	to	our	understanding	of	exit	and	loyalty.	Making	the	distinction	between	expressive	and	instrumental	attachments,	and	exploring	their	precise	nature,	helps	explain	the	presence	and	perseverance	of	ideological	misfits	in	parties.	For	multi-speed	membership	parties,	this	distinction	is	important.			
6.4.3.	 Implications	for	multi-speed	membership	
	Multi-speed	parties	benefit	from	making	joining	the	party	easier	and	more	remote	(via	online	channels	and	directly	to	the	central	party),	ensuring	supporters	can	attach	themselves	to	the	party	with	minimal	effort.	This	approach	would	also	make	it	easier	for	those	with	an	instrumental	attachment	to	join	as-and-when	they	feel	the	party	is	the	right	vehicle	to	further	their	values	(and	also	to	leave	when	they	feel	the	party	is	not	the	right	vehicle	for	their	goals).	In	doing	so,	the	multi-speed	party	can	pick	up	new	members	and	tap	into	new	support	bases.	However,	to	maintain	a	stable	membership	base,	it	is	necessary	to	provide	the	right	environment	for	expressive	attachments	to	develop.		As	earlier	chapters	have	shown,	there	is	a	difficult	relationship	between	processes	of	party	socialisation	and	the	multi-speed	approach.	Socialisation	may	create	a	difficult	environment	for	multi-speed	organising	to	thrive:	new	supporters	may	be	dissuaded	from	active	participation	by	the	strength	of	existing	social	networks	amongst	members,	or	find	it	difficult	to	integrate	into	the	enclosed	party	world	created	by	its	specific	language	and	rules.	Conversely,	the	important	processes	of	socialisation	that	keep	members	involved	and	active	could	be	eroded	by	the	fluidity	and	change	in	membership	that	a	multi-speed	approach	embraces.	Likewise,	strong	expressive	attachment	may	be	affected	by	significant	change	in	the	party.	The	emotional	link	may	be	severed	by	significant	change	in	party	
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membership	and	conversely,	the	strength	of	members’	emotional	attachments	may	make	it	difficult	for	the	party	to	fully	embrace	a	more	fluid	multi-speed	model.	However,	this	research	also	suggests	that	these	expressive	attachments	provide	a	ballast	to	change:	they	keep	members	in,	even	when	there	is	significant	ideological	and	party	change.	Expressive	attachments	may	therefore	provide	the	glue	to	keep	the	party	going	when	all	else	is	in	flux.			
6.4.4.	 Conclusions	-	Party	membership	as	committed	incongruence	
	The	previous	chapter	looked	at	the	links	between	socialisation	and	activism,	and	suggested	that	processes	of	socialisation	had	a	positive	impact	on	levels	of	active	participation.	This	chapter	has	shown	the	role	of	these	social	links	and	activism	in	preventing	exit.	Exit	is	driven	by	a	change	in	values	(members	highlighted	specific	policies	that	provided	the	catalyst	for	their	exit),	but	a	decline	in	activity	and	lack	of	social	connection	create	the	conditions	that	make	exit	possible.	There	are	positive	links	between	loyalty,	socialisation	and	social	ties,	and	activity,	but	these	are	facets	of	party	membership	which	may	be	eroded	by	centralisation:	a	key	characteristic	of	the	multi-speed	party.			Whilst	the	multi-speed	party	may	be	able	to	attract	active	support	around	internal	democratic	opportunities,	and	the	big	electoral	contests,	it	may	also	want	to	maintain	a	more	stable	and	skilled	membership	base	for	party	activities	outside	of	these	high-profile	moments.	To	maintain	this	balance,	the	multi-speed	party	would	need	to	ensure	that	organisational	changes	do	not	impact	on	socialisation	processes.			However,	when	it	comes	to	attracting	high-intensity	participants	(those	who	are	willing	to	stand	for	election	and	take	on	time-intensive	roles	within	the	party),	fluidity	in	party	membership	is	not	necessarily	a	problem.	Many	of	those	who	had	left	the	party	had,	at	other	stages	in	their	lives,	also	taken	on	key	roles.	Movement	in-and-out	of	the	party	is	not	the	preserve	of	more	loosely	attached	members.	Providing	members	with	the	right	opportunities	when	they	have	the	time	to	commit	is	more	important	than	a	lifetime	of	commitment;	just	as	attracting	supporters	when	they	want	to	get	involved	is	more	important	than	issuing	them	with	a	membership	card.			Value	change	is	central	to	member	exit	but	many	members	who	feel	ideologically	apart	from	their	party	remain	loyal.	It	is	likely,	given	the	changing	policy	environment,	movement	in-and-out	of	government,	and	the	range	of	ideological	standpoints	that	catch-all	parties	try	to	encapsulate,	that	many	members	will	find	themselves	at	odds	with	the	
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direction	of	their	party	at	some	point.	It	is	likely	that	at	some	stage	everyone,	if	they	stay,	will	become	a	party	‘misfit’.	Understanding	why	these	member	‘misfits’	remain	is	of	value	if	parties	want	to	maintain	some	stability	in	their	membership	base.			This	analysis	reveals	that	party	members	are	often	discontent	and	predominantly	discontented	about	value	change.	Ideological	incongruence	is	a	significant	feature	in	party	members’	experience	but	is	largely	accepted	as	part	of	the	nature	of	party	membership.	Though	the	multi-speed	party	may	be	comfortable	with	a	more	fluid	support	base	and	may	see	little	distinction	between	membership	and	non-member	support,	there	are	compelling	reasons	to	maintain	some	stability	in	the	membership	base.	Understanding	exactly	why	members	can	remain	loyal	in	the	face	of	significant	change	in	the	party	reveals	the	factors	that	may	help	multi-speed	parties	do	just	that.			Analysing	member	exit	(and	loyalty)	has	highlighted	the	role	of	expressive	or	emotional	attachment	in	keeping	members	in	the	party.	Some	members	remain	loyal	under	conditions	that	would	be	expected	to	prompt	exit	(value	change,	a	decline	in	social	contact	and	decline	in	participation).	The	fundamental	difference	for	these	loyal	members	is	expressive	attachment.	Self-identification	with	the	party	and/or	commitment	to	an	ideal	of	the	party,	encourages	members	to	‘hold	on’.	Members	are	not	necessarily	remaining	loyal	to	the	party	but	to	a	sense	of	self,	or	to	the	party	as	they	want	it	to	be.	Refining	how	we	understand	expressive	attachment	helps	to	explain	how	members	can	remain	loyal	to	a	party	that	they	feel	no	longer	represents	their	values,	and	this	could	help	operationalise	expressive	attachment	in	quantitative	analysis	of	exit.	Members	are	also	making	a	distinction	between	different	levels	of	the	party	organisation	in	their	attachments	(local,	national,	leader,	other	representatives).	This	is	a	distinction	that	has	not	been	explored	before	in	the	context	of	ideological	incongruence	and	exit.				 	
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Chapter	7:	Members	vs	supporters	–	expanding	affiliation	and	
political	rights	
	This	in-depth	supply-side	analysis	of	party	membership	(why	party	members	join,	how	their	relationship	with	the	party	develops,	and	why	they	remain	loyal	or	not)	has	revealed	new	aspects	of	party	membership	and	allowed	conclusions	to	be	drawn	about	the	impact	of	moving	to	multi-speed	membership.	Chapter	5	highlighted	that	two	of	the	most	significant	perceived	benefits	(selective	incentives	and	solidary	bonds)	are	not	directly	affected	by	expanded	affiliation.	Chapter	6	revealed	that	members	with	a	particular	type	of	attachment	can	withstand	significant	change	within	the	party	before	considering	exit.	These	findings	suggest	that	changes	to	the	party	brought	about	by	looser	affiliation	options	and	easy	access	components	of	multi-speed	membership,	may	not	disrupt	the	traditional	membership	model.	This	chapter	now	looks	more	directly	at	the	impact	of	the	final	component	of	multi-speed	membership:	the	extension	of	political	rights	to	non-members.			This	research	has	found	that	social	bonds	and	selective	outcome	and	process	incentives	are	important	for	prompting	joining	(or	re-joining)	the	party,	and	for	becoming	active	and	staying	active	in	the	party.	The	problem	is	that	they	tend	to	be	exclusive	and	that	is	potentially	a	problem	for	parties	trying	to	widen	their	base.	However,	parties	are	expanding	affiliation	more	often	through	the	expansion	of	political	rights,	not	solidary	or	material	ones.	Scarrow	(2015)	argues	that	parties’	declining	ability	to	offer	material	and	solidary	incentives	means	political	incentives	such	as	voting	rights	and	policy	input	are	an	increasingly	important	offer:	though	few	parties	highlight	specific	reasons	to	join	on	their	website,	those	that	do	highlight	opportunities	to	participate	and	influence	policy	(2015,	p.161).			The	multi-speed	party	pursues	a	dual	strategy	of	retaining	traditional	membership	whilst	expanding	other	affiliation	options	which	suggests	there	is	potential	for	conflict.	Parties	wishing	to	recruit	and	retain	members	might	be	advised	to	limit	intra-party	ballots	to	the	long-term	membership,	whilst	those	seeking	to	mobilise	a	wider	constituency	of	support	would	want	to	expand	them	(2015,	p.212).	These	political	rights	can	be	used	to	attract	new	affiliates	or	reward	and	encourage	member	loyalty,	but	not	both	at	the	same	time.	To	date,	however,	we	do	not	know	whether	the	multi-speed	model	of	expanded	affiliation	and	
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rights	does	in	fact	create	the	expected	tension,	and	whether	it	can	have	an	effect	on	existing	member	motivations	and	attachments.			
7.1	 Multi-speed	membership	and	‘narratives	of	legitimacy’		
	Scarrow	(2015)	argues	that	when	member	rights	and	privileges	are	extended	to	a	wider	group	of	supporters,	questions	about	the	distribution	of	influence	arise:	the	change	brings	into	question	the	party’s	‘narrative	of	legitimacy’.	Parties	that	have	grown	out	of	a	cleavage	representation	model,	defending	group	interests	and	using	membership	to	reinforce	links	to	the	groups	they	represent,	have	particular	difficulties	with	the	shift	to	a	‘multi-speed’	model	of	representation.	In	such	parties,	the	widening	of	affiliation	presents	a	significant	shift	in	the	party’s	notion	of	political	legitimacy,	that	is,	who	the	party	represents	and	who	should	define	its	values	(Scarrow,	2015).			The	Labour	Party’s	response	to	the	first	outing	of	the	new	supporter	rules	suggests	that	this	change	did	challenge	the	party’s	narrative	of	legitimacy.	By	the	end	of	the	summer	of	the	first	leadership	contest	under	multi-speed	rules,	members	of	the	Parliamentary	Labour	Party	had	called	for	the	election	to	be	halted	amid	fears	of	entryism.	This	fear	of	non-legitimate	supporters	signing	up	(known	registrations	included	high-profile	Conservative	supporters	who	created	a	spoof	‘ToriesforCorbyn’	campaign,	and	members	and	former	candidates	of	other	parties	such	as	the	Trade	Union	and	Socialist	Coalition	and	Left	Unity	(Wintour	and	Perraudin,	2015))	saw	the	party	begin	a	process	of	‘rigorous	due	diligence’.	This	process	involved	full-time	members	of	staff	as	well	as	MPs	and	their	constituency	staff	‘vetting’	supporter	sign-ups	using	social	media	and	local	constituency	knowledge	to	detect	and	report	anyone	who	was	deemed	not	a	genuine	supporter.	The	party	issued	a	list	of	seven	criteria	they	used	for	rejecting	registered	supporters	including:	if	the	applicant	had	nominated	candidates	in	recent	national	or	local	elections,	if	the	applicant’s	reason	given	for	applying	to	vote	was	deemed	unacceptable,	or	when	statements	made	by	the	applicant	on	social	media	appeared	to	run	against	party	aims	and	values.	In	practice	this	proved	a	difficult	process	with	one	member	allegedly	reported	for	failing	to	attend	a	constituency	BBQ	(Bush,	2015),	a	suggestion	not	upheld.			The	problems	defining	who	should	and	should	not	receive	a	ballot	highlights	the	multi-speed	nature	of	partisan	attachment	and	the	problems	of	moving	to	a	multi-speed	affiliation	model	within	a	party	traditionally	representing	group	interests	and	designed	around	a	collective	interest	representation.	Whilst	the	process	of	vetting	supporters	in	the	
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Labour	leadership	contest	may	have	been	primarily	motivated	by	a	desire	to	avoid	the	result	being	subject	to	legal	challenge,	it	highlights	the	difficulty	parties	like	Labour	can	face	when	trying	to	layer	new,	wider	affiliation	models	on	top	of	traditional	collective,	member-based	structures.		The	Labour	Party’s	process	of	vetting	supporters	enrolling	in	the	leadership	contest	can	be	seen	as	a	process	of	drawing	a	boundary	around	who	is	legitimate	and	who	isn’t:	an	attempt	to	rigidly	define	what	it	means	to	support	a	party.	Yet	for	most	parties	the	notion	of	membership	is	blurring,	and	the	nature	of	support	is	increasingly	fluid.	The	struggle	in	the	Labour	Party	can	be	seen	as	a	struggle	to	accommodate	the	notion	of	a	fully	open	contest,	responding	to	the	more	fluid	supporter	environment	(and	encouraging	it),	within	the	structure	of	a	party	which	formerly	expressed	interests	through	a	rigid	system	of	collective	representation.	For	parties	like	Labour	this	change	is	an	uncomfortable	one	because	it	challenges	who	the	party	is	responsible	to.	Opening	up	and	‘reaching	out’	contains	an	implicit	shift	in	responsiveness	from	the	interests	of	the	committed	to	the	wider	electorate,	and	from	group	interests	to	individuals.			These	tensions	in	the	party	appear	to	confirm	the	multi-speed	hypothesis	that	expanding	rights	challenges	the	narratives	of	legitimacy	within	a	party.	However,	it	is	not	clear	whether	the	discomfort	at	the	elite	level	is	replicated	in	the	membership.	Does	the	expected	tension	between	supporters	and	members	replicate	this	elite	level	conflict?		
7.2.	 Members	vs	supporters	
	This	analysis	looks	at	attitudes	towards,	and	evaluations	of,	the	new	supporter	scheme25	in	the	context	of	what	motivates	members	and	how	they	view	their	own	membership	of	the	party.	Contrary	to	expected	outcomes	I	find	there	to	be	significant	support	for	registered	supporter	status	and	external	involvement	in	leadership	elections.	Whilst	organisationally	a	move	towards	multi-speed	membership	suggests	a	conflict	in	the	status	of	different	affiliates,	from	a	member	perspective,	the	conflict	appears	minimised.			
                                                          
25 Interviews	with	party	members	were	conducted	after	the	new	supporter	structure	had	been	introduced	in	the	Labour	Party	and	both	during,	and	after,	the	first	leadership	contest	using	the	new	rules.	The	interviewees	were	asked	their	opinion	of	the	new	supporter	scheme	and	where	necessary,	details	of	the	scheme	were	given.	The	explanation	of	how	the	scheme	worked	was	given	in	neutral	terms	but	reference	was	made	to	the	cost	of	joining	as	a	supporter	as	it	was	at	the	time	of	interviewing	(£3).		
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Drawing	on	member	interviews,	I	offer	three	possible	explanations	for	members’	positive	attitudes	towards	open	intra-party	democracy	in	the	party.	Firstly,	the	role	of	financial	costs	in	member-party	transactions	is	explored	and	members’	reactions	to	the	scheme	analysed	in	terms	of	their	relationship	with	the	party.	This	analysis	finds	that	members	stand	in	a	reciprocal	relationship	with	their	party,	willing	to	trade	off	loss	of	personal	benefits	for	the	benefit	of	the	party	as	a	whole.	Secondly,	I	analyse	the	impact	of	widened	affiliation	in	terms	of	member	motivations	and	perceptions	of	wider	party	benefits.	This	analysis	reveals	that	political	rights	do	not	feature	significantly	in	the	incentive	processes	that	are	driving	active	party	members	towards	membership.	Thirdly,	the	place	of	political	rights	in	the	context	of	the	party	itself	is	explored.	I	argue	that	the	collective	traditions	of	the	party,	whilst	undermined	by	the	transition	to	individualised	participation,	are	also	making	that	transition	easier.			
7.3.	 Results	
	
7.3.1.	 Beyond	cost-benefit	
	Expanding	plebiscitary	intra-party	democracy	beyond	the	membership	of	the	party	would	appear	to	lessen	the	value	of	membership	and	we	would	therefore	expect	to	see	a	negative	reaction	to	the	introduction	of	the	supporter	scheme	from	members.	Yet	for	the	members	interviewed	in	this	research,	some	positive	assessment	was	offered	by	most.	Most	of	the	members	who	assessed	the	scheme	positively	did	so	from	the	party’s	perspective.	They	made	a	judgement	according	to	what	would	benefit	the	party	as	organisation,	rather	than	what	would	benefit	them.	That	is	not	to	say	that	members	could	not	see	the	potential	problems	in	the	scheme	(“I	thought	it	was	undemocratic”)	or	that	they	were	happy	with	the	outcomes.	They	tended	to	articulate	but	then	discount	their	personal	views.	Whilst	expressing	some	concern,	they	(re)evaluated	the	change	from	the	party’s	perspective,	considering	the	potential	benefits	for	the	continuity	and	strength	of	the	party.			
	“I	suppose	there’s	a	tiny	bit	of	me	that	says,	if	they	have	the	same	rights	as	me,	why	am	
I	paying	ten	times	the	amount	they	are.	But	the	majority	of	me	thinks	–	but	this	is	
what’s	healthy	for	the	party	and	we	run	the	risk	of	ossifying	and	being	set	in	our	ways	
and	not	allowing	other	people	in	that	can	bring	new	ideas	and	fresh	blood	and	bums	on	
seats	and	feet	on	pavements	and	knuckles	on	doors…	And	so	for	a	grumpy	old	cow	like	
me	to	say	‘ohh	they	have	the	same	rights	as	me	and	I	pay	x	amount	per	year’	it’s	just	a	
bit	silly	really,	because	we’re	not	a	club,	we	should	be	a	living,	breathing,	rejuvenating	
party”	(#06,	member	26	years)	
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“I	think	personally	I	feel	a	little	awkward	with	it	because	I	think	for	me	there	isn’t	the	
level	of	commitment	and	buy-in	that	I	would	look	for	in	the	movement	but	I	equally	
accept	there’s	a	strategy	to	build	a	mass	party	and	to	reflect	changing	times	then	I	
think	you’ve	got	to	embrace	it.	So,	I	personally	feel	discomfited	by	it	but	actually	I	think	
it’s	probably,	as	a	strategy,	probably	the	right	thing	to	be	doing	at	this	time.”	(#13,	
member	49	years)	
	Though	many	admitted	that	there	was	an	element	of	selfishness	and	protectiveness	over	their	party	and	their	place	within	it,	they	tended	to	put	aside	their	personal	feelings	and	self-interested	position	to	take	the	wider	view.	Members	articulated	conflicting	personal	and	party-focused	opinions:	part	selfish,	part	altruistic,	demonstrating	a	dual	attitude	towards	this	change	in	their	party.	Members	had	a	selfish	preference	for	preserving	the	party	they	knew	and	an	altruistic	preference	for	the	broader	success	of	their	party.	In	thinking	about	party	organisation,	it	would	appear	that	the	altruistic	preference	governs.			Giving	members	space	to	reflect	on	their	views	during	these	interviews	allowed	for	a	more	detailed	assessment	of	their	attitudes.	Whilst	some	members	initially	expressed	some	discomfort	with	the	supporter	scheme,	they	tended	to	re-evaluate,	thinking	beyond	narrow	personal	cost-benefit	assessments.	These	responses	suggest	that	members’	commitment	to	the	party	is	such	that	they	put	the	benefits	for	the	party	as	organisation	above	their	own	interests.	Whilst	this	could	also	be	conceived	as	a	very	indirect	way	of	achieving	personal	benefits	(people	like	to	feel	part	of	successful	organisations	and	movements)	it	suggests	a	more	reciprocal	relationship.	This	dual	altruistic/selfish	stance	also	mirrors	the	selective	and	collective	incentives	structures	outlined	earlier.	Members	can	be	drawn	to	the	party	on	both	individual	and	solidaristic	motives	and	would	therefore	also	be	expected	to	have	both	personal	and	group-based	responses	to	party	change.			This	altruistic-selfish	stance	towards	the	supporter	scheme	was	the	same	for	both	new	and	longer-standing	members,	as	well	as	those	that	had	originally	become	active	as	supporters	themselves.	Such	was	the	surprising	uniformity	of	this	response	that	it	was	necessary	to	search	for	deviant	cases.	Two	groups	of	member	would	be	imagined	to	be	more	likely	to	react	negatively	to	the	change:	long-standing	members	and	those	not	in	favour	of	the	leadership	candidate	who	won	under	the	OMOV-plus-supporters	scheme.	Long-standing	members,	those	who	have	built	up	social	connections	and	given	many	hours	of	voluntary	service	to	the	party,	might	be	more	protective	of	the	party	against	‘outsiders’	whose	commitment	fell	short	of	their	own.	Likewise,	they	may	also	feel	that	their	long	years	of	service	should	earn	them	greater	returns.	Particularly	given	the	long	history	of	battles	within	the	party	for	greater	membership	rights	(see	Russell,	2005),	
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members	might	rightly	object	to	their	expansion	outside	their	number	when	finally	achieved.	Members	with	longer	memberships	were	sought	in	the	second	round	of	interviews	to	interrogate	this	finding.			The	search	for	deviant	cases	in	the	second	round	of	interviews	served	to	confirm	the	trend.	Those	that	had	a	long-standing	commitment	to	the	party	were	supportive	from	a	party	perspective,	though	with	some	acknowledgement	of	personal	feelings.	Additionally,	those	who	were	not	pleased	with	the	outcome	of	the	leadership	election,	looked	past	the	result	offering	a	positive	analysis	of	the	scheme,	again	from	the	party	perspective.	The	two	wholly	negative	responses	to	the	scheme	raised	an	objection	to	OMOV	in	general	(in	favour	of	assembly-based	party	democracy)	and	concerns	from	a	union	perspective.			When	considering	the	impact	of	party	organisational	change	on	existing	memberships,	the	influence	of	this	altruistic	preference	is	significant.	It	is	clear	from	these	interviews	that	party	members	are	inclined	to	make	assessments	of	party	change	from	a	collective	position:	for	the	good	of	the	party.	This	is	perhaps	unsurprising	in	a	party	that	venerates	these	values.	However,	in	the	context	of	party	change,	it	would	appear	that	a	basic	cost-benefit	reading	of	member	preferences	is	too	narrow.		 	Another	recurring	theme	was	the	idea	of	supporter	status	as	a	route	to	further	commitment.	Many	interviewees	expressed	a	desire	for	the	supporter	scheme	to	act	as	a	gateway	to	full	membership	or	more	activism	(even	without	full	membership):			
“If	people	want	to	become	a	supporter	as	a	stepping	stone	to	membership	then	that’s	
good”	(#19,	member	3	years)	
	
“I	can	see	the	point,	that	it	is	a	sort	of	commitment	without	it	being	a	total	
commitment.	So	maybe	it	is	a	way	in.	On	the	other	hand	maybe	it	is	delaying	any	real	
commitment	which	is	what	we	want”	(#21,	member	54	years)	
	These	views	reflect	members’	own	experience	of	membership,	as	linked	to	commitment	and	activism.	They	were	more	comfortable	with	supporter	status	as	a	route	to	a	level	of	commitment	and	activism	commensurate	with	their	own.	In	this	there	is	a	potential	conflict	between	members’	aims	and	party	aims.	The	multi-speed	model	would	see	looser	supporter	status	as	something	distinct.	Multi-speed	parties	take	a	functional	approach	to	support:	it	is	what	affiliates	do	rather	than	their	affiliation	status	that	counts	(Scarrow,	2015,	p.206)	and	movement	in-and-out	of	party	support	is	accepted	as	a	normal	feature	of	participation	and	engagement.	For	more	committed	activists,	personal	aims	for	a	similarly	
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committed	support	base	may	run	against	party	aims	for	a	wider	and	more	loosely	attached	base.	This	change	of	culture	is	a	potential	source	of	tension.			However,	some	members	took	a	distinctly	instrumental	view	of	the	scheme.	The	electoral	and	linkage	benefits	of	involving	supporters	in	leadership	choice	were	raised	by	a	number	of	interviewees.	These	members	suggested	that	the	membership	(defined	by	more	than	one	interviewee	as	“weird”)	was	not	always	best	at	making	such	decisions,	particularly	in	a	strategic	electoral	sense.26			
“Surely	they’re	the	very	people	you	want.	If	you’re	asking	as	big	a	group	as	possible,	
who	would	you	like	to	lead	us,	or	[	]	if	we	chose	that	person	as	our	leader	would	you	
elect	them”	(#09,	member	<1	year)	
	Those	that	took	an	outcomes	view	were	happier	to	see	supporter	status	as	something	separate	from	membership:	it	has	a	separate	purpose	and	therefore	a	different	level	of	commitment	was	to	be	expected	(“I	feel	that	being	a	party	member	is	only	significant	to	
other	people	in	the	party”	(#02,	member	1	year))		Some	members	saw	the	increase	in	numbers	as	a	positive	outcome	for	the	party,	“I	was	
quite	pleased	when	we	had	this	huge	influx	[of	new	supporters].	We	had	huge	excitement	and	
many	are	still	here.”	(#30,	member	>40	years)		Both	the	members	who	viewed	the	supporter	scheme	as	electoral	strategy	and	those	that	saw	it	as	a	gateway	to	further	commitment	and	activism,	overlooked	the	financial	angle.	Actual	financial	costs	were	of	little	to	no	significance	to	members	in	these	interviews.	Despite	explicit	reference	to	financial	cost	of	joining	as	a	supporter	when	questioned,	all	except	two	participants	failed	to	mention	financial	inequity	in	their	responses.	Members	appeared	largely	unconcerned	that	someone	could	get	the	same	intra-party	rights	as	them	for	as	little	as	a	fifteenth	of	the	price.27			This	supports	Whiteley	and	Seyd’s	contention	that	actual	party	financial	costs	are	trivial	or	‘below	the	threshold	of	saliency’	(1992,	p.78).	This	is	probably	especially	true	in	a	party	like	Labour	which,	following	a	multi-speed	approach,	has	at	various	times	reduced	the	cost	of	membership,	introducing	£1	joining	offers	and	reduced	fees	for	certain	groups.	
                                                          
26	Many	of	these	interviews	took	place	before	the	result	of	the	first	leadership	contest	in	2015.	
27	At	the	time	of	interviewing,	full	adult	party	membership	was	£46.50	and	reduced	membership	(students/young	people/unwaged)	£12	per	year.	
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However,	it	also	suggests	that	party	members	have	a	relationship	with	their	party	that	cannot	be	understood	on	a	basic	cost-benefit	understanding.	Interviewees’	tendency	to	overlook	the	financial	inequality	contained	within	the	£3	supporter	scheme	corresponds	with	another	recurring	theme	that	members	see	party	membership	dues	as	donations.	Party	membership	was	simply	not	seen	as	something	purchased.	This	emphasises	the	idea	of	membership	being	an	attachment	rather	than	an	exchange.			Party	members’	willingness	to	take	personal	views	out	of	the	equation	and	to	discount	the	actual	cost	inequity	of	the	supporter	scheme,	suggest	that	simple	cost-benefit	assessments	are	of	limited	value	in	a	party	membership	context.	Whilst	parties	are	seeking	to	attract	new	participants	by	reducing	the	costs	of	joining	or	offering	temporary	or	‘light’	membership	options	(Kosiara-Pedersen	et	al.,	2014),	this	research	suggests	that	actual	costs	are	not	a	barrier	to	recruitment.	Indeed,	in	Labour’s	experience,	raising	the	fee	to	vote	in	the	second	leadership	election	from	£3	to	£25	appeared	to	do	little	to	diminish	the	number	of	supporters	signing	up.	Responding	to	declining	memberships	by	addressing	the	costs	alone,	would	do	little	to	reverse	the	trend.		These	findings	suggest	that,	whilst	the	party	that	pursues	a	multi-speed	approach	to	membership	may	shift	the	balance	of	power	towards	those	who	have	less	of	a	connection	to	the	party,	those	that	do	have	an	established	relationship	may	be	willing	to	accept	this	loss	of	power	in	return	for	the	success	of	their	party.	Were	the	move	towards	multi-speed	membership	perceived	to	be	affecting	the	party	negatively	however,	the	response	might	be	different:	“It	should	be	an	opportunity,	if	it	wasn’t	all	combined	with	utterly	disastrous	
electoral	prospects”.	
	
7.3.2.	 Activists	and	active	incentives			By	expanding	plebiscitary	intra-party	democracy,	parties	place	a	focus	on	political	rights	as	incentives	to	attract	new	participants.	The	expansion	of	these	rights	to	non-members	would	appear	to	be	taking	away	from	existing	party	members	by	sharing	their	rights	with	those	who	have	less	of	a	connection	with	the	party.	However,	it	may	be	the	case	that	intra-party	democratic	rights	simply	don’t	hold	much	worth	in	members’	assessments	of	the	value	of	their	membership.	This	research	suggests	that,	considered	in	the	context	of	what	motivates	active	party	members	to	join	in	the	first	place,	intra-party	democratic	rights	have	little	value	on	their	own.		
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In	the	detailed	exploration	of	active	participants	routes	to	party	membership	in	Chapter	5	(the	values,	ideas,	context	and	events	that	led	them	to	join	the	party)	intra-party	rights	featured	in	only	two	members’	joining	narratives.	Political	rights	also	failed	to	feature	in	the	current	concerns	of	these	party	members.	Intra-party	democratic	opportunities	may	have	been	a	catalyst	for	signing	up	for	some,	but	they	were	replaced	by	other	incentives	for	continued	membership.	In	interviews	I	found	little	evidence	that	these	rights	were	valued	above	other	benefits	by	active	members:	new,	long-standing,	or	supporter-turned-members.			Even	though	the	leadership	election	(and	for	some,	the	London	Mayoral	primary)	had	placed	a	focus	on	selection	within	the	party	at	the	time	of	interviewing,	many	interviewees	were	unaware	of	what	rights	they	and	others	had,	or	how	they	worked.		
“My	overall	thought	is,	‘Do	I	feel	empowered	to	participate	in	Labour	Party	elections’?	
Well	clearly	I	am	important	in	a	sense	because	I’m	getting	all	these	emails	from	people	
and	phone	calls.	On	the	other	hand,	I	don’t	understand	what	the	value	of	my	
participation	is”	(#03,	member	<1	year)	
	
“I	definitely	wouldn’t	have	paid	£3	to	have	those	rights”	(#08,	member	<1	year)		Though	political	rights	are	clearly	attractive	(over	200,000	new	(or	returning)	members	and	supporters	joined	to	vote	in	the	2015	leadership	selection,	121,000	supporters	signed	up	for	the	2016	vote	and	the	previous	leader	selection	in	2010	also	saw	an	increase	in	membership)	these	rights	would	appear	to	have	little	value	to	members	who	have	been,	or	are	involved	in,	high-intensity	activities:	those	that	sustain	the	party	during	elections,	outside	of	election	periods,	and	within	representative	institutions.			That	active	opportunities	are	valued	by	active	members	is	perhaps	unsurprising,	but	it	is	an	important	consideration	for	parties	that	need	to	sustain	an	active	volunteer	base.	Political	rights	were	barely	mentioned	in	active	members’	narratives.	Even	when	questioned	directly,	it	would	appear	that	they	were	of	little	value	compared	to	other	forms	of	engagement:	they	played	little	to	no	role	in	drawing	these	members	to	the	party.	This	is	not	to	say	that	members	would	be	unconcerned	if	they	were	taken	away,	but	that	compared	to	other	benefits,	political	rights	had	not	been	instrumental	in	persuading	active	members	to	join	in	the	first	place.	This	would	seem	to	support	Seyd	and	Whiteley’s	findings	in	their	analysis	of	high	intensity	participation	(2002),	that	an	increase	in	opportunities	for	plebiscitary	participation	is	‘self-defeating’	if	the	aim	is	to	sustain	an	active	grassroots	membership	(2002,	p.147).	They	found	that	following	previous	reforms	to	the	Electoral	College,	expanding	the	opportunity	for	intra-party	democratic	
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engagement,	the	Labour	Party	experienced	an	increase	in	membership	but	a	decline	in	average	rates	of	active	participation.			It	is	a	paradox	of	participation	within	political	parties	that	whilst	greater	political	rights	are	desired,	and	increasingly	granted,	members	do	not	always	take	them	up	(Gauja	and	van	Haute,	2014).	A	more	nuanced	understand	of	the	routes	people	take	to	party	membership	and	the	different	ways	they	connect	to	and	engage	in	party	activity	revealed	in	Chapter	5	suggests	an	answer	to	this	paradox.	The	incentives	that	draw	active	party	members	to	the	party	and	the	place	of	plebiscitary	opportunities	within	this	pathway	suggests	that	for	committed	activists,	political	rights	are	important	perhaps	only	symbolically.			The	incentives	that	have	led	people	to	active	membership	would	appear	to	be	unaffected	by	a	change	in	intra-party	democratic	rights.	Selective	outcome	incentives	and	selective	process	incentives	require	active	participation	to	be	realised.	To	gain	access	to	selective	outcome	benefits	such	as	career	opportunities	or	new	skills,	members	need	to	get	involved	in	party	activity.	Those	serious	about	careers	in	politics	would	need	to	demonstrate	commitment	and	this	would	require	not	only	full	membership	but	a	substantial	amount	of	active	participation.	Likewise,	realising	selective	process	benefits	would	require	some	engagement	with	activity:	one	cannot	benefit	from	‘meeting	likeminded	people’	if	one	does	not	meet	with	them.	These	benefits	cannot	be	supplanted	or	substituted	by	atomised	plebiscitary	participation.			Moreover,	selective	process	benefits	are	not	directly	affected	by	reaching	beyond	the	membership.	In	Olson’s	scheme	of	collective	goods,	these	are	benefits	that	have	‘jointness	of	supply’:	one	person’s	consumption	does	not	diminish	another’s	(Olson,	1995).	Similarly,	expanding	voting	rights	is	unlikely	to	affect	the	bonds	formed	amongst	those	engaged	in	campaigning	together.	In	other	words,	the	sharing	of	political	rights	with	supporters	would	appear	to	leave	the	value	of	members’	selective	process	and	outcome	benefits	unchanged.	For	collective	incentives	too,	the	extension	of	voting	rights	on	its	own	does	little	to	affect	these	ideological	motivations.	Were	these	rights	to	extend	to	policy	development	(being	considered	at	the	time	of	writing	as	part	of	a	wider	programme	of	change	in	the	party,	but	not	yet	enacted),	collective	incentives	could	be	affected.			It	would	appear	that	the	expansion	of	political	rights	takes	little	away	from	active	party	members	because	such	rights	are	not	necessarily	highly	prized	in	the	first	place	and	can’t	
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diminish	the	things	that	are.	As	one	party	member	put	it,	“to	feel	like	new	people	take	
something	away	from	you	is	sort	of	against	the	spirit	of	a	political	party”.	It	would	appear	that	the	multi-speed	party	can	take	a	dual	approach	to	membership	and	support	because	these	two	groups	of	affiliates	potentially	have	different	incentive	structures.	Active	members,	attracted	by	selective	benefits,	value	active	opportunities.	Those	initially	attracted	by	plebiscitary	participation	may	not.	However,	these	members	and	supporters	may	come	to	value	other	party	‘goods’,	such	as	those	derived	from	active	participation,	if	parties	can	provide	an	environment	in	which	to	make	that	happen.			Yet	whilst	an	increased	supporter	base	may	leave	selective	incentives	untouched,	a	substantially	increased	membership	base	might	not.	Unlike	supporter	involvement,	an	increase	in	membership	could	increase	competition	for	party	positions	and	potentially	expand	local	groups	beyond	those	members	considered	‘likeminded’,	directly	affecting	members’	selective	benefits.	Though	members	attracted	by	plebiscitary	opportunities	may	be	less	interested	in	taking	on	formal	roles	in	the	party	that	go	beyond	voting,	there	is	a	potential	conflict	if	they	do	become	active.	For	some	of	the	members	interviewed,	the	seeds	of	this	potential	intra-membership	conflict	had	already	taken	root	(though	perhaps	only	in	the	short	term):		
	“I	think	if	I’m	completely	honest,	I’m	a	little	bit	anxious	about	being	a	party	member	
now	because	of	what’s	happened	in	recent	times	and	the	increase	in	membership.”	
(#12,	member	43	years)	
	
“I	can	live	with	the	division	I	think	because	that’s	healthy	but	[	]	a	lot	of	it	is	quite	a	slap	
in	the	face,	[	]	I	do	feel	that	there	is	a	dismissiveness	of	the	people	who	have	put	in	a	lot	
of	the	legwork.”	(#20,	member	>20	years)	
	
7.3.3	 Multi-speed	membership	and	collective	traditions	
	Another	possible	explanation	for	members’	support	of	expanded	intra-party	democratic	rights	can	be	found	in	the	history	of	democracy	in	the	party.	As	noted	in	Chapter	4,	the	British	Labour	Party,	unlike	other	European	social-democratic	parties,	has	not	always	had	an	individual	membership	base.	Members	were	not	allowed	to	join	as	individuals	until	1918.	Before	that	point,	most	Labour	Party	members	participated	through	their	unions	or	as	members	of	the	affiliated	Independent	Labour	Party	(Tanner	et	al.,	2000).	As	such,	the	party	structures	have	always	reflected	a	collective	affiliation	approach.	Moreover,	trade	union	affiliation	has	always	dwarfed	individual	membership	numbers	in	the	party.28	
                                                          28	Though	records	of	membership	are	notoriously	inaccurate	(Mair	and	Van	Biezen,	2001;	Scarrow,	2002),	individual	membership	of	the	party	reached	a	peak	of	just	over	a	million	members	in	1952,	
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Individual	Labour	Party	members	have,	as	their	intra-party	democratic	rights	expanded,	always	shared	these	rights	with	other	affiliates.	Accordingly,	Labour	Party	members	have	not	enjoyed	exclusive	rights	to	intra-party	democratic	functions	in	the	same	way	as	members	of	other	mass	membership	parties.			The	leadership	election	immediately	prior	to	the	introduction	of	the	new	supporter	scheme	is	a	good	example	of	the	role	played	by	member	and	affiliate	votes	in	leadership	contests.	Though	union	influence	was	widely	seen	to	have	been	reduced	by	earlier	reforms	(Quinn,	2004b;	Russell,	2005),	the	2010	leadership	election	saw	the	union-favoured	candidate	triumph	over	the	candidate	narrowly	preferred	by	the	Parliamentary	Labour	Party	and	member	sections	of	the	electoral	college	(Jobson	and	Wickham-Jones,	2011).	The	union	vote	has	played	an	important	role	in	Labour	leadership	selections	even	after	modernisers	sought	to	reduce	it.	In	this	context,	the	expansion	of	intra-party	democratic	rights	takes	on	a	different	dimension.			The	multi-speed	membership	strategy	of	appealing	to	both	affiliates	and	members	is,	in	the	British	Labour	Party,	familiar	territory.	Whilst	the	expansion	of	intra-party	democratic	rights	to	a	wider	group	of	affiliates	would	be	expected	to	create	a	tension	within	a	mass	
individual	membership	party,	a	party	which	has	always	been	open	to	affiliation	might	be	expected	to	respond	differently.	Reforms	to	intra-party	democracy	within	the	Labour	Party	could	be	seen	as	more	of	a	threat	to	affiliated	membership	than	individual	membership.	Members,	having	never	enjoyed	exclusive	rights,	had	little	to	lose.	In	interviews,	members	highlighted	the	role	of	the	trade	unions	under	the	previous	voting	system	and	concern	was	expressed	about	the	role	of	the	union	vote	in	the	2015	contest.		
“I	suppose	if	they	sign	up	as	a	supporter	there	is	a	degree	of	conscious	choice	and	
they’ve	take	an	interest	in	the	party	and	so	why	shouldn’t	they	elect	the	leader	or	help	
elect	the	leader	as	it	would	really	be	no	more	disproportionate	than	union	members	
having	two	votes”	(#02,	member	<1	year)		
	For	Labour	Party	members	particularly,	the	expansion	of	rights	to	supporters	is	not	taking	away	from	them	but	is	instead	an	expansion	of	rules	that	have	traditionally	meant	their	democratic	rights	are	shared.	
                                                          dropping	under	half	a	million	for	the	next	fifty	years,	whilst	affiliated	trade	union	memberships	remain	in	the	millions. 
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	The	shift	to	supporter	affiliation	is	however	different	in	form	to	affiliated	membership.	It	represents	a	further	shift	to	individualised	and	atomised	participation	over	collective	assembly-based	decision-making.	The	move	to	an	‘opt-in’	for	union	affiliates	at	the	same	time	as	the	supporter	scheme	was	introduced	represents	a	shift	in	the	same	direction.	These	changes	are	significant,	they	represent	a	change	in	the	nature	of	the	party	(Faucher,	2015),	in	its	very	identity	(Watts,	2017).	It	is	a	shift	from	being	a	party	of	interest	representation	to	a	party	of	individual	concerns.	The	use	of	open	plebiscitary	intra-party	democracy	has	shifted	who	the	party	is	responsive	to,	changing	the	party	demos.	And	yet,	whilst	the	multi-speed	membership	strategy	has	taken	Labour	further	away	from	its	collective	traditions,	it	is	the	history	of	the	party,	its	collective	traditions,	that	would	appear	to	be	smoothing	the	path	of	this	latest	transformation.			The	concept	of	membership	and	the	rights	attached	to	membership	take	on	a	very	different	shape	in	this	mass	party	that	has	never	truly	been	a	mass	membership	one.	The	sharing	of	democratic	rights	with	supporters	who	do	not	share	the	same	formal	commitment	is	a	marginalisation	of	member	rights	that	were	never	exclusively	held.			
7.4.	 Conclusions		
	This	chapter	has	assessed	the	impact	of	expanding	political	rights	on	existing,	active	members	of	the	party,	highlighting	the	supply-side	consequences	of	multi-speed	membership.			Party	members’	support	for	a	scheme	that	would	appear	to	directly	affect	the	value	of	their	membership	has	been	explained	by	looking	beyond	a	simple	cost-benefit	reading	of	members’	relationship	with	their	party.	Members	readily	put	personal	concerns	aside	in	favour	of	the	wider	benefits	to	the	party.	Committed	members	are	willing	to	discount	their	personal	views	if	there	is	a	larger	electoral	or	organisational	benefit.	For	these	members,	party	membership	is	not	something	‘bought’	but	rather	a	reciprocal	relationship	(explained	here	through	the	concept	of	a	dual	altruistic-selfish	stance).			Members’	lack	of	concern	for	expanding	political	rights	beyond	their	number	can	also	be	explained	by	reconsidering	the	motivation	structures	outlined	in	Chapter	5.	Selective	benefits	such	as	career	opportunities	or	those	derived	from	participation	itself,	cannot	be	supplanted	by	the	expansion	of	plebiscitary	intra-party	democracy	alone.	An	expanded	
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membership	base	on	the	other	hand,	does	have	the	potential	to	disrupt	this	balance.	The	Labour	Party’s	multi-speed	experiment	led	to	a	tripling	of	membership	and	was	here,	rather	than	with	the	notion	of	supporter	status,	that	tensions	were	felt.			From	this	research	it	is	clear	that	tensions	in	the	model	are	reduced	if	the	changes	are	perceived	to	be	of	benefit	to	the	party	as	a	whole.	Tensions	are	also	reduced	for	those	with	a	more	instrumental	view,	if	the	change	is	perceived	to	be	electorally	beneficial.	And	tensions	are	reduced	for	those	whose	primary	motivation	is	active	participation	beyond	intra-party	democracy.	Some	of	these	factors	can	however	be	disrupted,	if	the	changes	are	not	seen	as	electorally	beneficial	or	should	a	growth	in	membership	(instead	of	supporters)	beginning	to	affect	the	benefits	of	high-intensity	participants	and	the	socialisation	processes	that	support	their	engagement.	There	is	also	the	potential	for	tension	arising	from	differences	in	ideological	view.	Though	ideological	tension	has	certainly	been	a	factor	in	Labour’s	multi-speed	experience,	this	has	not	necessarily	been	a	tension	between	members	and	supporters	(the	leader	preferred	by	£3	supporters	was	also	supported	by	49.6%	of	members).	Had	the	balance	been	different,	the	expected	tension	between	categories	of	support,	and	the	authoritative	weight	given	to	them,	may	have	occurred.	However,	it	is	also	worth	remembering	that	such	ideological	tensions	have	existed	within	Labour’s	electoral	college	prior	to	the	introduction	of	a	more	multi-speed	model.	The	previous	leadership	election	saw	union	affiliates’	first	choice	win	over	the	candidate	preferred	by	the	majority	of	the	membership.	The	existence	of	these	tensions	prior	to	the	changes	helps	explain	why	tensions	arising	from	new	rules	are	reduced.			Whilst	expanding	political	rights	has	successfully	expanded	the	number	of	party	supporters,	it	has	not	had	the	corresponding	negative	effect	on	member	status.	Indeed,	the	growth	in	membership	numbers	since	the	rule	change	suggests	that	the	concept	of	membership	has	not	itself	been	adversely	affected	by	the	change	to	intra-party	rights;	membership	of	the	party	is	still	seen	as	valuable	even	when	a	less	formal	(and	cheaper)	supporter	option	is	available.	This	supports	the	idea	that	there	is	more	to	membership	than	rules,	fees	and	rights	(as	Chapter	6	has	elaborated).	Members	are	not	greatly	concerned	that	their	political	rights	are	being	shared	with	others	and	it	is	perhaps	the	history	of	affiliation	within	the	Labour	party	that	explains	this	dynamic.	Labour’s	collective	traditions	may	be	contributing	to	making	their	very	erosion	more	palatable	to	members.				
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Chapter	8:	Conclusions	
	In	a	speech	to	the	Special	Conference	that	would	ratify	multi-speed	changes	in	the	party,	the	then	party	leader	said,	‘I	was	talking	with	somebody	in	Westminster	in	July,	just	after	I	
announced	these	reforms,	and	they	said	to	me	in	a	classic	Labour	Party	way:	“What	if	all	
these	new	people	did	come	into	the	party,	where	would	we	be	then?”	I’ll	tell	you	where	we	
would	be:	We	would	be	a	much	better	party	for	it’.	Two	years	later	the	party	had	a	new	leader,	a	three-fold	increase	in	membership	(more	than	all	other	UK	parties	combined)	and	a	significant	increase	in	member-based	revenue.	In	membership	terms	a	‘better	party’	had	emerged	as	predicted.	But	this	change	in	the	party	has	not	been	straightforward.			Starting	at	the	critical	moment	that	the	British	Labour	Party	adopted	a	model	of	multi-speed	membership	that	went	beyond	the	boundaries	that	most	other	parties	have	been	willing	to	go	to,	this	research	has	sought	to	answer	the	question	facing	the	Labour	Party	in	its	new	organisational	shape:	what	happened	and	what	does	it	mean	for	the	party?	This	research	has	sought	to	explain	how	the	change	came	about	and	its	impact,	and	in	doing	so,	what	it	means	for	party	organisation	in	future.			Taking	the	framework	of	multi-speed	membership,	this	thesis	has	explored	these	changes	in	the	party.	Multi-speed	membership	is	the	lens	through	which	the	party’s	organisational	changes	have	been	analysed	and,	in	doing	so,	this	research	has	added	to	the	understanding	of	multi-speed	organising	more	generally.	It	has	expanded	our	understanding	of	how	party	membership	works	and	the	nature	of	the	member-party	relationship	in	today’s	partisan	context.	This	nuanced	understanding	of	the	relationship	between	parties	and	their	members	has	facilitated	a	more	detailed	assessment	of	the	impact	of	changing	the	membership	model.			
8.1	 Multi-speed	Labour			The	Labour	Party	has	provided	a	critical	case	with	which	to	test	and	expand	the	multi-speed	theory.	The	experience	of	the	Labour	Party	in	the	period	of	this	research	shows	that	the	move	towards	multi-speed	membership,	and	beyond	traditional	membership,	is	not	without	consequences.	As	Scarrow	(2015)	hypothesised	in	the	idea	of	multi-speed	membership,	changes	to	membership	and	affiliation	structures	have	the	potential	not	only	
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to	create	tensions	but	to	fundamentally	shift	the	party.	Layering	new,	more	open,	affiliation	options	on	top	of	traditional	collective,	member-based	structures	brings	into	question	the	source	of	authority	within	a	party	and	challenges	the	concept	of	membership	and	where	it	fits	within	a	party’s	notions	of	representation	and	legitimacy.			Multi-speed	changes	suggest	that	loyalty	and	commitment	are	no	longer	the	principal	standards	of	membership.	These	ideals	are	giving	way	to	a	greater	fluidity	and	flux	and	potentially	sacrificing	party	cohesiveness	and	continuity	in	the	process.	There	are	implications	too	for	party	participation,	potentially	shifting	to	individualised	participation	over	collective.	Multi-speed	organising	is	ultimately	a	balancing	act	in	which	parties	attract	new	support	within	a	more	fluid	membership	and	supporter	environment	by	opening	up	intra-party	rights	to	non-members,	whilst	at	the	same	time	convincing	traditional	members	to	stay	within	the	party	and	continue	to	contribute	to	campaigning	and	financing	the	party.	It	is	a	balancing	act	which	would	initially	seem	challenging	to	sustain.			This	research	has	revealed	the	specific	nature	of	the	challenging	multi-speed	path	Labour	is	walking	down,	seeking	to	explain	why	a	party	would	adopt	a	multi-speed	membership	approach	and	what	the	consequences	are.	It	has	demonstrated	that	many	aspects	of	multi-speed	membership	in	theory	are	supported	by	multi-speed	membership	in	action	within	the	British	Labour	Party.	We	see	a	layering	of	new	affiliation	on	top	of	traditional	membership	structures	and	the	challenge	to	the	party’s	‘narratives	of	legitimacy’	as	a	result.	This	has	indeed	resulted	in	questions	over	where	authority	resides	and	new	tensions	in	the	supply-side	model.	Unusually	this	shift	in	authority	has	led	to	a	new	party	organisation	forming,	with	significant	shifts	in	power	and	tensions	as	a	result.			Yet	this	case	study	has	also	discovered	how	the	multi-speed	balancing	act	may	be	successfully	negotiated.	By	revealing	the	exact	nature	of	party	members’	relationship	and	commitment	to	the	party,	this	research	reveals	the	path	to	multi-speed	success.			
Summary	of	findings		
	
8.2.	 Why	adopt	multi-speed	membership?	
	On	the	demand	side	of	the	multi-speed	question,	the	reasons	the	Labour	Party	has	adopted	new	models	of	affiliation	match	the	combination	of	political	economic	and	ideological	
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considerations	suggested	by	Scarrow	(2015).	The	party	is	moving	with	the	general	tide	of	intra-party	democratisation,	seeking	to	attract	support	with	expanded	political	rights.	The	desire	to	expand	affiliation	was	linked	to	the	general	decline	in	membership	numbers	and	the	financial	implications	of	membership	decline,	suggesting	the	party	still	sees	member	support	as	an	important	resource.	There	is	also	strong	evidence	of	contagion	in	the	party	system.	These	membership	environment	explanations	(drawn	together	under	the	category	of	an	‘ecology	of	membership’)	are	important	in	driving	the	party	towards	expanded	affiliation	options.			Whilst	changing	structures	to	accommodate	multi-speed	membership	organising,	the	party	can	also	be	seen	to	be	influenced	by	its	party	type:	its	origins	as	a	cleavage	representation	party.	The	narratives	of	legitimacy	within	the	party	have	exerted	a	conservative	influence	as	well	as	an	enabling	one.	A	narrative	of	legitimacy	around	mass	membership	was	both	the	starting	point	for	reform	and	the	way	in	which	these	reforms	have	been	‘sold’	to	those	whose	support	was	needed	to	ratify	the	change.	The	promise	of	improved	participatory	and	representational	linkage	(important	legitimising	factors	within	cleavage	representation	parties)	were	key	to	promoting	multi-speed	reforms	to	membership	and	affiliation.	And	yet	it	is	also	the	historical	structures	of	the	party	that	have	reduced	the	tensions	that	would	be	expected	to	arise	from	expanded	affiliation.	Labour’s	historical	trade	union	affiliation	structures,	whilst	constraining	the	leadership	of	the	party	have	also	reduced	the	impact	of	the	change	with	the	notion	of	non-member	rights	having	been	established	from	the	very	birth	of	the	party.			Environmental	and	structural	explanations	of	change	are	not	sufficient,	however,	to	explain	the	totality	of	multi-speed	membership	change	within	the	British	Labour	Party.		A	‘purposive	action’	understanding	which	includes	leadership	decisions	and	external	moments	of	impact	is	also	needed	to	fully	explain	why	the	party	adopted	a	multi-speed	model	of	organising.	Whilst	environmental	and	party-type	explanations	explain	the	gradual	movement	towards	multi-speed	membership,	the	exact	moment	that	the	Labour	Party	adopted	a	more	extreme	version	of	open	plebiscitary	intra-party	democracy	(the	moment	the	party	went	further	beyond	members	than	most	cleavage	representation-type	parties	have	previously	been	willing	to	go)	was	the	result	of	a	specific	external	shock	that,	when	filtered	through	the	usual	political	economy	logic,	forced	the	leader	to	act.	However,	it	is	unlikely	that	party	elites	would	have	made	such	a	decision	if	the	path	had	not	already	been	laid	out	by	the	environmental	shifts	that	preceded	it.	Significantly,	it	was	the	
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environment	created	by	the	initial	supporter	reforms	that	truly	opened	the	door	to	the	latter,	more	far-reaching,	reforms.			This	examination	of	organisational	change	within	the	Labour	Party,	employing	an	ecosystem	model	of	change,	has	shown	that	a	multi-level	and	interactional	model,	including	and	linking	environmental	factors,	structural	and	party-type	considerations,	and	purposive-action	factors,	and	accounting	for	pressures	of	both	change	and	continuity,	is	necessary	to	fully	explain	the	drivers	of	multi-speed	membership	change.	Recognising	not	only	the	role	of	party	actors	in	responding	to	change	but	also	in	shaping	it,	and	the	complexity	of	the	decisions	they	make,	adds	to	our	understanding	of	party	change.			By	using	the	introduction	of	multi-speed	organising	within	the	Labour	Party,	a	new	model	of	multi-speed	party	change	has	been	developed	which	provides	a	framework	for	analysing	multi-speed	change	in	other	parties.			
8.3.	 What	are	the	consequences	of	multi-speed	membership?	
	
8.3.1.	 Members	and	their	party	
	Taking	a	comprehensive	and	detailed	look	at	why	the	most	active	party	members	join	reveals	a	process	of	participation	that,	whilst	including	a	range	of	incentives	and	motivations,	puts	greater	emphasis	on	the	selective	process	and	selective	outcome	benefits	of	membership	than	quantitative	research	has	found.	These	incentives	provide	the	catalyst	that	moves	political	interest	(developed	in	early	family	socialisation	(social	norms)	and	through	the	formation	of	values	(collective	incentives))	into	active	membership.	Parties	moving	to	multi-speed	organisation,	and	wishing	to	maintain	an	active	campaigning	membership	base,	will	need	to	consider	how	the	expansion	of	political	rights	and	potential	growth	in	support	can	avoid	disrupting	selective	process	and	outcome	incentives.	Given	that	these	benefits	are	largely	achieved	through	active	participation,	they	are	likely	to	remain	untouched	by	changes	in	intra-party	democratisation	alone.			Looking	at	member	motivations,	attitudes	and	activities	in	depth	has	revealed	a	number	of	membership	dynamics	in	the	party	that	potentially	facilitate	a	smooth	transition	to	multi-speed	organising.	There	are	aspects	of	party	membership,	hitherto	unrecognised,	that	reduce	the	expected	tensions	between	traditional	membership	and	looser	affiliation.	It	is	clear	from	this	research	that	active	party	members	are	politically	motivated	but	not	as	
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singular	in	their	party	attachment	as	might	be	assumed.	Recognising	the	distinction	between	choosing	‘this’	party	and	choosing	‘a’	party	as	the	site	of	political	activity,	this	research	highlights	how	members	have	often	developed	political	interest	and	engaged	in	political	activity	before	coming	to	the	party	(sometimes	having	been	active	in	campaign	groups,	sometimes	in	other	parties).	These	members	are	prompted	to	join	this	party	when	an	opportunity	arises	or	when	their	interests	are	momentarily	aligned	with	the	party.	In	other	words,	partisan	identification	does	not	necessarily	precede	party	membership.	The	multi-speed	organised	party	can	reap	the	benefits	of	the	political	interest	and	active	support	of	members	who	may	have	been	attached	to	other	parties	in	the	past,	by	making	it	easier	to	join	and	get	involved	at	the	point	in	which	their	interests	coincide	with	the	party.	But	to	reap	these	rewards,	parties	must	also	lower	the	bar	to	those	who	have	not	been	exclusive	in	their	partisan	activity	in	the	past.	It	is	this	switch	to	a	more	fluid	and	individualised	type	of	political	engagement	that	cleavage	parties	are	likely	to	struggle	with	most.	Having	been	formed	on	the	basis	of	a	collective	identity	and	shared	goals,	departing	from	the	notion	of	exclusive	support	is	particularly	difficult	for	this	type	of	party,	and	the	Labour	Party	is	a	good	example	of	these	challenges	(Garland,	2016).		Accessibility,	one	of	the	pillars	of	the	multi-speed	party,	facilitates	ease	of	entrance	to	the	party	(and	its	corollary:	easy	exit).	Membership	figures	over	time	suggest	that	there	are	significant	fluctuations	around	elections	and	leadership	change.	A	looser,	wider	model	of	affiliation	with	lower	bars	to	entry	could	therefore	enable	the	party	to	gain	from	these	fluctuations,	boosting	campaigning	resource	and	financial	support	when	most	needed.	However,	there	are	also	potentially	negative	implications.	This	research	suggests	that	the	strongest	forces	shaping	party	members’	activity	and	engagement,	once	within	the	party,	stem	from	processes	of	socialisation	and	the	development	of	social	ties.	The	analysis	presented	here	reveals	the	value	of	solidary	benefits	in	partisan	activity;	these	are	benefits	that	do	not	come	through	particularly	strongly	in	survey	data.			Members’	socialisation	into	party	culture,	language	and	values	appears	to	have	a	positive	impact	on	their	party	activity.	Likewise,	the	development	of	personal,	social	ties	with	other	party	members	(ties	which	often	extend	beyond	the	party	to	influence	their	social	lives	in	work	and	at	home)	would	appear	to	influence	party	activity,	as	well	as	members	propensity	to	stay	in	the	party	or	return	to	it.	These	solidary	processes	have	implications	for	party	organisation.	They	provide	the	glue	that	keeps	members	involved,	and	the	elastic	that	enables	and	encourages	them	to	return	to	membership	after	a	lapse,	or	return	to	active	membership	after	a	period	of	inactivity.	Familiarity	through	shared	language,	
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known	rules,	shared	values	and	most	importantly,	social	connections,	kept	party	members	active	and	attached	to	the	party,	even	throughout	periods	of	absence.			Whilst	we	don’t	know	exactly	how	many	new	party	members	are	in	fact	returning	party	members,	these	processes	of	socialisation	certainly	suggest	a	boomerang	effect	in	addition	to	the	revolving-door	effect.	Whilst	the	multi-speed	party	can	successfully	navigate	and	benefit	from	the	in-and-out	of	a	revolving-door	party	membership	base,	it	may	struggle	with	the	boomerang	effect.	These	processes	of	socialisation	provide	party	cohesion	and	organisational	strength;	they	ensure	members	have	an	incentive	to	continue	with	their	activism	outside	of	key	campaigning	moments	such	as	elections.	Those	members	socialised	within	the	party	carry	with	them	the	skills,	knowledge	and	commitment	that	enables	the	party	to	operate	‘on	the	ground’.	Large	changes	in	membership	have	the	potential	to	disrupt	socialisation	processes	as	tentatively	indicated	in	this	research.	Old	social	connections	may	be	replaced	by	new	social	connections	and	new	networks,	or	they	may	be	replaced	by	a	more	fluid	and	transitional	type	of	membership	base	that	does	not	exhibit	the	same	levels	of	socialisation.	If	the	latter	is	true,	this	has	important	implications	for	party	organisation.				The	multi-speed	party	may	need	to	pay	more	attention	to	formalising	induction	and	socialisation	for	new	members	and	supporters.	Though	the	dispersed	and	localised	nature	of	most	party	activity	makes	this	difficult,	some	formalised	programme	of	induction	(currently	absent	or	at	least	of	varying	quality	in	the	Labour	Party	case)	might	ease	the	potentially	disruptive	effects	of	multi-speed	organising.			
8.3.2.	 Party	change	and	membership	as	committed	incongruence	
	Party	change	is	not	a	new	phenomenon:	parties	change	leaders,	change	policy,	change	structures,	create	new	wings	and	factions,	and	occasionally	change	into	new	parties.	The	British	Labour	Party	has	been	through	many	phases	of	modernisation	and	the	party	has	changed	significantly	within	the	lifetime	of	many	members.	Yet	some	members	have	weathered	all	of	this	change,	even	when	it	has	challenged	the	very	values	that	drove	them	to	membership	of	the	party	in	the	first	place.	The	pervasive	presence	of	party	member	‘misfits’	(those	whose	ideology	is	odds	with	that	of	the	party	they	support)	is	an	area	of	membership	study	that	has	received	little	attention	to	date.			
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This	research	has	explored	the	attitudes	and	attachments	of	member	‘misfits’	and	discovered	an	explanation	for	the	phenomenon.	By	refining	and	developing	the	distinction	between	expressive	and	ideological	attachment,	and	linking	it	to	exiting	behaviours,	I	have	shown	why	some	members	may	remain	within	the	party	despite	ideological	dissonance.	Expressive	attachment	provides	a	significant	amount	of	elasticity	in	the	party-member	relationship	which	ensures	the	connection	holds,	even	during	periods	of	significant	change.	This	analysis	suggests	that	party	members	may	be	making	a	distinction	between	the	party	as	it	is,	and	the	party	they	think	it	should	be.	They	may	also	have	internalised	their	membership	to	the	point	that	it	is	part	of	their	self-identity.	These	new	ways	of	understanding	how	members	feel	about,	and	relate	to,	their	party	helps	explain	why	party	members	stay	when	the	party	feels	ideologically	distant.	In	contrast,	members	may	have	a	more	instrumental	attachment.	This	instrumental	approach	is	more	rigid;	the	party-member	connection	is	cemented	to	the	achievement	of	value-based	goals	and	a	change	in	party	direction	breaks	this	connection.			This	distinction	is	important	for	understanding	the	party-member	relationship	and	has	implications	for	the	multi-speed	party.	Expressive	attachment	and	socialisation	are	linked	and	they	have	implications	for	member	activity	for	the	party.	For	continuity	in	membership,	parties	would	want	to	preserve	the	socialisation	processes	that	help	grow	and	reinforce	expressive	attachment.			This	research	has	found	new	dimensions	of	the	party-member	relationship	which	help	explain	the	curious	phenomenon	of	party	member	‘misfits’	and	provides	a	framework	for	further	research.			
8.3.3.	 Intra-party	tension?	
	Looking	at	the	supply	side	of	the	multi-speed	membership	picture,	this	research	has	explored	the	suggested	tensions	arising	from	this	‘layering’	of	affiliation	types.	From	the	membership	perspective	the	expansion	of	affiliation	and	rights	does	raise	issues,	but	these	are	not	the	main	source	of	tension.	Members	have	an	understanding	and	attachment	to	membership	that	goes	beyond	a	cost-benefit	exchange.	They	are	able	to	rationalise	their	discomfort	with	the	changes	to	affiliation	by	viewing	it	from	the	party	perspective.	I	have	characterised	this	as	an	‘altruistic-selfish’	dichotomy:	a	personal	desire	for	exclusive	rights,	balanced	by	a	commitment	to	what	is	best	for	the	party	as	a	whole.	This	dual	preference	is	employed	by	members	in	discussing	the	personal	impact	of	change	and	has	a	
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dampening	effect	on	the	expected	tension	arising	from	sharing	their	intra-party	democratic	rights	with	supporters.	By	understanding	the	party-member	relationship	as	a	commitment	that	extends	beyond	a	cost-benefit	exchange,	the	expected	impact	of	multi-speed	membership	is	revised.	As	long	as	members	see	the	introduction	of	new	affiliation	options	and	extension	of	rights	as	a	benefit	to	the	party	(and	the	party’s	electoral	chances),	they	are	likely	to	be	more	willing	to	accept	the	change.	This	suggests	that	communicating	the	value	of	multi-speed	membership	to	members	from	both	the	political	economic	and	ideological	perspective	is	essential	in	managing	the	shift.			Another	explanation	for	this	unexpected	acceptance	of	multi-speed	membership	change	is	revealed	in	the	analysis	of	what	party	members	value	most	about	their	membership.	Active	members	appear	to	be	mostly	ambivalent	about	political	rights.	The	expansion	of	such	rights	to	supporters	may	not	create	a	tension	for	active	members	as	these	rights	are	not	the	most	valued	aspect	of	their	membership.	However,	a	challenge	remains	for	multi-speed	parties	in	converting	those	initially	attracted	by	political	rights	(a	group	that	grows	so	long	as	parties	continue	to	offer	these	incentives)	into	other	spheres	of	activity.			The	structures	and	history	of	affiliation	within	the	Labour	party,	the	unique	way	it	has	developed	out	of	a	collective	model,	itself	may	also	ease	the	expected	multi-speed	tensions.	The	Labour	Party	in	Britain	may	be	more	able	to	move	further	towards	multi-speed	organising	than	others	simply	because	it	has	always	contained	an	element	of	wider	affiliation,	and	these	affiliates	have	always	had	access	to	intra-party	rights.	Labour	Party	members	in	Britain	have	always	been	part	of	a	form	of	multi-speed	membership	(many	having	held	more	than	one	type	of	affiliation	themselves).			
Contribution	
	
8.4.	 Multi-speed	membership	success?		Taking	a	qualitative	approach	to	the	analysis	of	party	membership	and	the	effects	of	multi-speed	organising	has	expanded	and	added	depth	to	our	understanding	of	the	processes	and	relationships	underpinning	party	membership	organisation.	This	case	study	has	contributed	not	only	to	the	party	membership	literature,	but	in	revealing	how	members	come	to	join	and	become	active,	it	adds	to	the	literature	on	political	participation	more	generally.	Understanding	the	implications	of	multi-speed	membership	adds	to	the	growing	
 197 
literature	on	intra-party	democracy	and	intra-party	conflict,	and	contributes	to	the	literature	on	party	organisation	more	widely.			This	research	has	placed	people	in	a	central	role,	recognising	and	exploring	the	role	of	ideology	and	individuals	in	party	decision	making,	recognising	the	patterns,	processes	and	complex	decision-making	procedures	that	people	make,	their	values	and	emotional	attachment	to	organisations,	the	attitudes	that	bind,	and	those	that	break	ties.	Understanding	party	membership	as	more	than	a	fee	and	a	set	of	rules	and	rights,	as	more	than	a	simple	exchange	of	cost	for	benefit	(on	both	the	demand	and	supply	side),	has	facilitated	a	deeper	understanding	of	the	impact	of	party	change.	It	has	established	not	only	whether	there	are	tensions	arising	from	multi-speed	membership,	but	where	exactly	those	tensions	lie	and	how	they	might	be	overcome.			Drawing	from	a	unique	set	of	interviews,	conducted	as	multi-speed	changes	in	the	Labour	Party	were	being	enacted,	this	research	has	provided	an	insight	into	the	effects	of	party	change	on	those	most	affected	by	it.	This	qualitative	approach	has	added	depth	to	existing	quantitative	research	in	this	area,	and	provided	a	more	detailed	picture	of	what	drives	party	membership.	It	has	also	provided	new	ways	of	categorising	and	understanding	party	membership	that	could	be	tested	quantitatively	in	future.	The	fluidity	in	party	members’	initial	political	attachments,	found	in	this	research,	also	strongly	suggests	that	(as	many	Labour	members	are	formerly	members	or	supporters	of	other	parties)	the	structures	of	membership,	motivations	and	attachments	would	have	application	in	other	parties.			The	findings	presented	here	are	complimentary	to	a	quantitative	approach,	revealing	aspects	of	the	dynamics	of	party	membership	that	could	add	to	quantitative	models.	Future	membership	surveys	exploring	exit	could	usefully	include	questions	that	add	expressive	and	instrumental	attachment	variables.	The	specific	nature	of	these	types	of	attachments	found	in	this	research	(such	as	the	concepts	of	membership	as	self-identity,	responsibility	and	ownership)	could	be	utilised	to	help	shape	survey	questions.	The	motivation	structures	revealed	here	also	provide	a	framework	for	understanding	the	process	of	joining	which	could	help	quantitative	analysis	of	joining.	For	instance,	questions	that	pick	up	on	the	background	conditions	for	partisan	activity	could	be	separated	from	questions	concerning	the	events	that	provide	the	catalysts	or	triggers	for	joining.	This	could	help	address	party	culture	effects	in	survey	responses.			
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By	taking	an	explanatory	and	exploratory	approach,	this	research	has	confirmed	many	aspects	of	the	characterisation	of	multi-speed	parties,	but	has	also	gone	further,	developing	a	more	detailed	understanding	of	multi-speed	membership	in	action.	This	case	study	has	taken	a	holistic	look	at	both	the	supply	and	demand	perspectives	on	multi-speed	membership.	The	ecosystem	of	the	party	has	been	explored	to	assess	exactly	how	the	multi-speed	membership	model	developed	and	what	the	implications	are.	This	analysis	has	revealed	the	ways	parties	may	mitigate	the	expected	tensions	inherent	in	the	multi-speed	model.			The	Labour	Party	has	been	drawn	to	the	multi-speed	model	of	organising	by	many	of	the	same	factors	that	affect	parties	across	the	political	spectrum	and	across	different	party	systems.	Changes	in	the	membership	environment	which	have	encouraged	the	Labour	party	to	seek	support	outside	of	the	membership	are	common	to	many	party	systems	and	have	indeed	encouraged	other	parties	in	a	similar	direction	(Scarrow,	2015).	Indeed,	the	role	that	contagion	(both	within	and	outside	of	the	party	system)	has	played	in	creating	an	environment	for	change	for	Labour	suggests	that	other	parties	may	be	experiencing	similar	effects.	Understanding	the	consequences	of	pursuing	these	changes	in	the	Labour	Party	has	revealed	where	other	parties	and	other	studies	might	usefully	focus	their	analyses.			In	this	way,	though	perhaps	unintentionally,	Labour	has	led	a	change	in	party	organising	that	may	come	to	be	more	widely	used	by	those	facing	similar	membership	challenges.	The	current	political	climate	points	towards	a	continued	expansion	of	multi-speed	organising.	This	is	unlikely	to	be	restricted	to	parties	from	the	same	family	as	strong	contagion	effects	suggest	a	party	system	impact.	At	the	time	of	writing,	as	membership	of	the	Labour	Party	stands	at	well	over	half	a	million.	Other	parties,	particularly	Labour’s	main	opposition	the	Conservatives,	are	facing	declining	membership	numbers.	Having	experimented	with	other	forms	of	intra-party	democracy	(such	as	primaries),	other	parties	may	also	adopt	more	open	affiliation.	Recent	developments	have	seen	the	Liberal	Democrats	in	the	UK	initiate	a	member	consultation	on	party	democracy	which	recommends	a	registered	supporter	scheme	with	rights	to	leader	selection	(Liberal	Democrats,	2018).	The	multi-layered,	leader	and	elite-centred	model	of	change	developed	here	would	provide	a	useful	framework	for	analysing	the	drivers	of	those	changes.	Whether	such	change	can	be	accommodated	within	the	party’s	‘narratives	of	legitimacy’	is	unknown.	What	this	research	reveals	is	that	fitting	within	such	narratives	is	an	essential	component	of	multi-speed	change;	essential	for	both	legitimising	and	facilitating	reform.		
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	For	Labour,	at	this	point	in	time,	the	answer	to	whether	multi-speed	membership	has	been	a	success	is	a	resounding	‘yes’,	at	least	from	the	point	of	membership	strength.	The	multi-speed	tightrope	could	be	said	to	have	been	negotiated	successfully.	The	party	has	attracted	new	support	without	appearing	to	lose	substantial	numbers	of	existing	members.	The	increase	in	membership,	member-based	finance,	and	‘on-the-ground’	campaigning	resource	is	a	significant	win	for	the	party.	However,	greater	fluidity	and	greater	disruption	to	processes	of	socialisation	may	come	to	have	far	reaching	consequences	for	the	party	in	future.	Over	time	the	new	party	members	may	come	to	be	the	old	and	the	boomerang	of	party	membership	may	continue	as	it	has	for	those	members	interviewed	here.	But	this	research	suggests	that	an	alternative	scenario	is	also	possible,	one	in	which	membership	becomes	increasingly	fluid	at	the	expense	of	party	bonds.			The	move	to	multi-speed	membership	has	of	course	not	been	straightforward	for	the	Labour	Party.	Factionalism	within	the	party	continues	and	members	of	the	Parliamentary	Labour	Party	(PLP)	still	operate	with	the	threat	of	sharper	deselection	rules	hanging	over	them.	The	membership	has	gained	in	strength	perhaps	at	the	cost	of	its	elected	representatives.	And	yet	the	Leader	of	the	party	is	also	shored	up	by	the	strength	of	membership	support.	When	the	Labour	Party	introduced	a	plebiscitary	mechanism	for	leader	selection	in	the	early	1990s	it	was	at	the	expense	of	the	activists	who	were	seen	as	a	liability	electorally.	The	wider	membership	was	seen	as	a	ballast	for	the	leadership	against	those	who	sought	to	pull	the	party	in	a	different	direction.	In	a	strange	twist	this	pattern	has	repeated	with	the	move	to	even	greater	plebiscitary	intra-party	democracy	again	empowering	the	leader	and	wider	membership	–	this	time	at	the	expense	of	the	PLP.	It	was	perhaps,	however,	not	the	intended	result	when	these	changes	were	introduced.	As	hypothesised	in	the	theory	of	multi-speed	membership,	these	changes	have	challenged	lines	of	intra-party	accountability,	but	the	tension	here	is	not	between	members	and	supporters	but	rather	the	party’s	members	and	its	elected	representatives.			This	extraordinary	period	in	the	history	of	the	party,	in	which	membership	has	grown	three-fold	making	Labour	larger	than	all	other	UK	parties	combined;	a	period	which	has	seen	the	birth	of	a	new	political	organisation	whose	membership	is	larger	than	some	other	UK	parties	and	the	election	of	a	leader	whose	position	puts	him	significantly	further	to	the	left	of	the	party	than	his	predecessors;	this	is	the	result	of	multi-speed	membership.	Whilst	Corbyn’s	popularity	would	have	seen	him	win	enough	votes	amongst	the	membership	and	affiliated	trade	unionists	without	the	addition	of	£3	supporters,	it	is	
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unlikely,	without	the	change	in	rules,	which	saw	power	pass	from	the	PLP	to	the	membership	with	the	introduction	of	OMOV,	that	he	would	have	succeeded.	He	certainly	would	not	have	been	elected	under	the	Electoral	College	which	gave	a	third	of	the	vote	to	MPs.	The	surprising	energy	his	campaign	achieved	throughout	the	first	leadership	contest	also	owes	a	great	deal	to	the	inclusion	of	non-member	supporters.	Multi-speed	membership	then	is,	and	is	the	cause	of,	the	most	remarkable	change	within	the	Labour	Party	for	decades.	Whether	this	has	resulted	in	a	‘better	party’,	as	its	former	Leader	suggested	when	seeking	approval	for	these	changes,	however,	is	a	contested	matter.			100	years	on	from	the	decision	to	allow	individual	membership	of	the	Labour	Party,	the	Labour	party	has	once	again	initiated	a	radical	change	in	party	affiliation.	In	the	centenary	year	of	that	decision,	Labour	Party	membership	stands	at	a	forty	year	high,	more	than	all	other	British	parties	combined.	The	party	has	achieved	this,	in	part,	by	making	another	radical	change	to	party	affiliation.	By	opening	up	the	party,	embracing	a	wider	model	of	affiliation,	and	crucially,	expanding	intra-party	rights,	the	Labour	party	has	once	again	embraced	a	new	model	of	party	organisation.			As	the	Labour	Party	embarks	on	a	review	of	party	democracy	which	seeks	to	make	changes	in	many	areas	of	party	organisation	(including	policy-making,	leader	selection,	union	links,	regional	structures,	the	National	Executive,	candidate	selections	and	the	participation	of	members	and	supporters)	the	multi-speed	membership	transformation	is	by	no	means	finished.	The	party	may	move	further	towards	a	multi-speed	model	or,	having	dived	into	an	extreme	version	of	it,	the	party	may	seek	to	return	to	more	familiar	and	comfortable	cleavage	party	terrain.	Yet	whilst	the	notion	of	total	loyalty	and	commitment	from	a	stable	membership	base	may	be	attractive,	I	would	suggest	this	is	a	mistake.	The	multi-speed	partisan,	fluid	in	their	commitment,	choosing	‘a’	party	rather	than	‘this’	party,	as	and	when	they	feel,	is	likely	to	be	a	feature	of	party	activity	in	the	future,	and	they	will	need	a	multi-speed	party	in	which	to	(albeit	perhaps	temporarily)	make	their	home.	 		 	
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Appendix	
	
Table	1:	Case	study	units	
	
LEVEL	 Total	System	 Intermediate	Units	 Individuals	
Unit	 British	Labour	Party	 Leadership/Executive	 Constituency	Labour	Party/	Individual	campaigns		
Party	members	/	supporters	
Case	type	 Single	critical	case	 Subunit	 Embedded	Subunits			
Multiple	cases	
Data	Source	 	 Party	elites	and	decision-makers	 Constituency	Organisers,	volunteers.	Operations,	systems	(incl.	technology)		
Party	members	(high-intensity	activists)	
Method	 	 Interviews	(semi-structured)	Documentary	evidence		
Interviews	and	observation	 Interviews	(life-history/biographical,	semi-structured)	
Sampling	
strategy	
	 Purposive	-	positional	and	reputational	criteria		
Theoretical/	convenience		 Theoretical	(elements	of	snowball)	
Properties/	
type	of	data	
Organisational	change	as	evidence	through	strategies,	ideologies,	attitudes	and	behaviours	of	those	within	it.	
Ideologies,	beliefs,		Decisions	and	justifications	Strategies			
Relationships	Structures	Processes	 Attitudes	Values	Motivations	Relationships	Activities	
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Table	2:	Interviewees	No.		 Gender	 Age	 Length	of	membership	at	time	of	interview	
Continuous	membership	 Position	at	time	of	interview	 Constituency	 Activity	at	time	of	interview		1	 F	 18-25	 2	years	 yes	 None	 Midlands	 active	2	 M	 18-25	 <1	year	 yes	 None	 London	 active	3	 F	 36-45	 <1	year	 yes	 None	 London	 active	4	 F	 18-25	 <1	year	 yes	 None	 London	 active	5	 M	 18-25	 5	years	 yes	 Party	staff	(local)	 Midlands	 active	6	 F	 36-45	 26	years	 yes	 Party	staff	(local)	 London	 active	7	 F	 18-25		 2	years	 yes	 None	 London	 active	8	 F	 46-55	 <1	year	 yes	 None	 London	 passive	9	 M	 36-45	 <1	year	 yes	 None	 London	 passive	10	 F	 46-55	 >20	years	 no	 BLP	position	 NW	 active	11	 M	 46-55	 >20	years	 no	 None	 NW	 active	12	 F	 56-65	 43	years	 yes	 None	 SE	 passive	13	 M	 56-65	 49	years	 yes	 None	 SE	 passive	14	 M	 46-55	 36	years	 no	 Councillor	 SE	 active	15	 M	 26-35	 7	years	 yes	 Councillor	 London	 active	16	 M	 26-35	 2	years	 yes	 None	 London	 passive	17	 M	 46-55	 23	years	 no	 None	 Scotland	 Left	18	 F	 36-45	 4	years	 yes	 Councillor	 SE	 active	19	 M	 18-25	 3	years	 yes	 None	 Scotland	 active	20	 F	 56-65	 >20	years	 no	 None	 SE	 active	21	 M	 >75	 54	years	 no	 None	 SE	 active	22	 F	 66-75	 >20	years	 no	 None	 SE	 active	23	 F	 66-75	 <1	year	 yes	 None	 SE	 active	24	 F	 66-75	 54	years	 no	 None	 SE	 passive	25	 M	 66-77	 57	years	 no	 None	 SE	 passive	26	 F	 26-35	 19	years	 yes	 None	 SE	 passive	27	 M	 56-65	 2	years	 yes	 None	 SE	 active	28	 F	 66-75	 2	years	 yes	 None	 SE	 active	29	 F	 36-45	 24	years	 yes	 None	 London	 active	30	 F	 56-65	 >40	years	 no	 None	 SE	 active			
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